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What is psychosis? From a medical psychiatry perspective, psychosis is generally 
viewed as a psychopathological and incomprehensible mental disorder of biological 
aetiology. My dissertation argues that this represents a limited view, and that a 
psychospiritual investigation of psychosis may enable a better understanding of its 
nature and determinants. My aim is not to negate the discipline of psychiatry, but to 
demonstrate the viability and efficacy of incorporating psychospiritual considerations 
into psychosis research. Subsequently, I challenge several core psychiatric beliefs, and 
call for the discipline to extend its investigative parameters beyond the limited 
epistemological bounds of materialism.  
This undertaking has required the creation of a provisional bridge between materialist 
and metaphysical worldviews. Accordingly, I use an open-ended heuristic methodology 
that enables the systematic examination and critical appraisal of views on psychosis 
across the materialist-to-metaphysical spectrum. This is structured in four ‘Focal 
Settings’ that sequentially examine the construal of psychosis within different 
paradigms of psychospiritual understanding. 
Focal Setting One provides a historical overview of evolving understandings of 
psychosis within the tradition of psychiatry, in which psychospiritual matters are 
generally not considered. Focal Setting Two aims to demonstrate that, while psychiatry 
has traditionally eschewed psychospiritual considerations, such investigation is 
possible. Focal Setting Three critically investigates the problem of discerning psychotic 
from non-psychopathological psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences. Finally, Focal 
Setting Four argues that, in the absence of deep metaphysical knowledge, it is 
ultimately impossible to discern culturally normative psychotic-like experiences from 
psychotic instances.  
Overall, my dissertation aims to demonstrate the importance and validity of 
incorporating psychospiritual knowledge into conventional psychiatric thinking and 
practice, while challenging the view that psychosis is a biogenic and incomprehensible 
form of psychopathology characterised by specific diagnostic criteria. This challenge 
suggests the necessity for fundamental changes to psychiatric theory in order to foster 
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Psychosis, and psychotic-like experience, has occurred within all cultures throughout 
recorded human history in apparent mad and mystic forms. Over time, different and 
divergent views concerning the nature and cause of such experiences have been 
proffered within various cultural frameworks of understanding. Psychiatry has 
traditionally viewed psychosis as a psychopathological and innately incomprehensible1 
mental disorder of probable biological aetiology. In other cultural settings, however, 
psychotic-like experiences are understood to be of a psychospiritual2 nature and cause. 
In light of this, my dissertation undertakes an investigative process which strives to 
span the epistemological gap between physical and metaphysical worldviews in order 
to better understand both psychotic and psychospiritual human experiences. Hence, 
the aim here is not to ascertain what psychosis is per se, but to systematically extend 
the scope of exploration to glean a better, or broader, understanding of psychotic and 
psychotic-like experience, beyond the traditional psychiatric picture. While recognising 
that psychoses, or psychotic-like experiences, are often distressing, socially disabling 
and enigmatic; I argue that a psychospiritual approach can open pathways to more fully 
comprehend such experiences. 
 
A baseline proposition driving this venture is that the word ‘psychosis’ represents an 
anomalous and enigmatic phenomenon which is poorly understood by Western 
psychiatry.3 Indeed, Campbell's Psychiatric Dictionary suggests that use of the term 
‘psychosis’ “has been anything but precise and definite…As a result of conflicting 
usage, there is no single acceptable definition of what psychosis is” (Campbell, 2009, 
p.812). I argue that this paucity of understanding is essentially due to psychiatric 
research being governed by the principles of medical materialism, which works to 
                                                          
1
 The idea of incomprehensibility has entered the language of psychiatry via the work of psychiatrist Karl 
Jaspers and is examined in more detail in Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2.   
2
 A definition and explication of the term ‘psychospiritual’ is provided in Chapter Two, Section 2.1. 
3
 Throughout this dissertation various adjectives are used in reference to psychiatry (e.g. Western, 
medical, bio-medical, biogenic, mainstream, traditional, conventional, categorical, etc.). Such terms 
basically infer a psychiatric model that understands the aetiology of psychopathology to be anatomical. It 
also refers to a reductive model of psychiatry which seeks to concretise anomalous human experiences 
into discrete diagnostic categories. This includes psychoanalytic psychiatry, for while it does not subscribe 
to a biomedical understanding of psychopathology, it does employ a categorical diagnostic approach. Also, 
my frequent anthropomorphic use of the word ‘psychiatry’ (i.e. speaking of psychiatry as if a person) is a 
matter of expediency. It is a shorthand and convenient inference to the general thinking of psychiatrists 
within the discipline of psychiatry. 
2 
restrict its conceptual and investigative scope. This has resulted in a predominantly 
biogenic understanding of psychosis by psychiatry. Indeed, the 2005 American 
Psychiatric Association (APA) president Steven Sharfstein (2005) acknowledges that 
“we have allowed the biopsychosocial model to become the bio-bio-bio model”. As a 
consequence of this prominent focus on a biological model of understanding, the 
consideration of psychospiritual matters is all but absent from psychiatric epistemology 
and psychosis research. Yet, Andreasen (2005) has proposed that “it's useful for 
psychiatrists to remember that the word comes from the Greek psyche, which means 
breath, life, animating principle or spirit…Literally, a psychiatrist is a healer of the spirit, 
not of the mind or brain”. These variant viewpoints reflect the investigative scope of my 
dissertation, which ranges across both materialist and metaphysical landscapes of 
understanding psychotic-like phenomena.  
 
Throughout my dissertation, then, I aim to challenge this psychiatric view by adopting a 
heuristic approach which systematically demonstrates the apparent validity and value 
of incorporating psychospiritual considerations into the quest for better understanding 
psychosis. The open-ended nature of this investigative approach innately leads beyond 
the limited scope of simply studying psychopathology, into a deeper conceptual and 
phenomenological exploration of the subliminal depths of being human. Indeed, Bentall 
(2004, p.xiv) states that "I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that the study of 
psychosis amounts to the study of human nature". My research leads me to concur 
with this view. As is demonstrated throughout the latter chapters of this dissertation, it 
is often difficult, if not impossible, to discern psychopathological from psychospiritual 
human experience. Hence, my overall challenge is composed of three key interrelated 
foci:  
i) a challenge to psychiatry to extend beyond the materialist assumptions that 
govern its thinking and practice so as to include psychospiritual 
considerations within its epistemological remit;  
ii) a challenge to the subsequent psychiatric construal of psychosis as a 
biogenic and discrete form of psychopathology that can be clinically 
identified via certain characteristic diagnostic criteria; and  
iii) a challenge to the psychiatric idea that psychotic experiences are 
fundamentally incomprehensible.  
I propose that, if psychiatry was to consider and accept the feasibility of this composite 
challenge, it would be better able to understand and therapeutically respond to 
anomalous human experiences within the psychotic-psychospiritual nexus. The signs 
of psychosis which appear incomprehensible from a materialist perspective become 
increasingly comprehensible when considered from other paradigms of understanding. 
3 
Hence, it appears that the perceived incomprehensibility of psychosis is more a 
reflection of inherent limitations to psychiatry’s worldview, than of the nature of 
psychosis per se.   
 
Overall, then, this dissertation argues that a psychospiritual investigation and appraisal 
of the anomalous human state of consciousness called ‘psychosis’ can step beyond 
the limited materialist parameters of medical psychiatric thinking to afford an enhanced 
understanding of the nature, and numerous possible determinants, of this 
phenomenon. As suggested by Winship (2014, p.xix); 
 
a theory of spiritual crisis in psychosis, rather than an approach which 
begins by assuming biological imbalance, tracks one of many new 
directions and gives an intriguing vista for debates…The challenge of 
working with people with psychosis can shift with new insights. 
 
This approach challenges some of the fundamental tenets underpinning psychiatric 
thinking and practice. For instance, the notion of psychopathology, upon which the 
existence of psychiatry depends, is shown to be ambiguous when examined in light of 
psychospiritual considerations, to the degree that conventional psychiatric 
understandings of psychosis become questionable and contestable. In doing so, 
however, I do not aim to dismiss the validity of psychiatry as a profession, but to 
demonstrate the plausible need for a paradigm shift in psychiatric thinking and practice 
that will enable a better understanding of human ‘psychotic’ experience. Such a 
paradigm shift would arguably entail the supersedence of psychiatry’s prevailing 
psychopathological approach, by a heuristic approach. While the traditional 
psychopathological approach is largely prescriptive and restricted to identifying 
presumed forms of mental illness, a heuristic approach engages enigmatic states of 
consciousness in an open-ended process of investigation, that aims to glean new 
knowledge as to their physical, psychological, socio-cultural and psychospiritual 
natures. My investigative approach throughout this dissertation attempts to exemplify 
the latter approach. 
 
Finally, my investigation of spirit possession serves to demonstrate the considerable 
degree to which understanding can be advanced through the close examination of any 
given psychospiritual phenomenon. Choosing this over other psychospiritual 
phenomena is deliberate for spirit possession is recognised by psychiatry as a 
culturally normative occurrence. However, whereas psychiatry’s understanding of such 
phenomena and their possible play in psychosis goes little beyond a culturally sensitive 
4 
nod of diagnostic acknowledgement, my detailed exploration in Chapters Twelve and 
Thirteen illustrates the validity and potential value of deeper research into cross-cultural 
and psychospiritual matters. Showing just how much can be learned from a depth 
examination of psychosis in light of spirit possession acts as a challenge for psychiatry 
to do likewise with all so-called culture-bound beliefs. That which may appear to be of 
marginal diagnostic interest from a traditional psychiatric perspective can, if examined 
more closely, open to vast realms of potential new knowledge and understanding about 
the nature of reality, psychosis, and the illimitable mysteries of being human. 
 
1.1 Methodological approaches 
Throughout this dissertation I utilise three methodological approaches to facilitate the 
joint task of drawing on psychospiritual considerations to challenge medical psychiatry 
while concurrently working to glean a better understanding of psychosis. First and 
foremost, my overall methodological approach is heuristic which enables an open-
ended exploration of matters pertaining to psychosis across the physical-metaphysical 
spectrum. Secondly, this heuristic approach is orchestrated through the use of four 
progressive focal settings.4 Thirdly, in Chapter Nine, I conduct a comprehensive critical 
content analysis of literature regarding the notion and ways of differentiating psychotic 
from non-psychotic psychospiritual experiences. 
 
1.1.1 Heuristic approach 
This dissertation aims to examine and critically appraise a broad spectrum of views on 
psychosis, ranging from the materialist to the metaphysical. Doing so necessitates 
utilising an open investigative approach that is not bound by any particular model or 
methodology of understanding. A heuristic methodological approach meets this 
requirement. 
 
Accordingly, my endeavour is driven by the research question - Can, and how can, 
psychosis be better understood by employing a heuristic approach which includes 
psychospiritual considerations within its investigative ambit? Etymologically, the term 
‘heuristic’ derives from the Greek ‘heuriskein’, meaning “to discover or to find” 
(Moustakas, 1990, p.9). During the 1960s, heuristics was developed as a working 
methodology for furthering “processes of understanding” (Lauer, 2004, p.8) and has 
since been adopted as a theoretical and research model by a raft of disciplines 
(Gilovich & Griffin, 2002, p.2). Although formally recognised as a research 
methodology, from a certain perspective, heuristics is essentially, and paradoxically, 
non-methodological. As Douglass & Moustakas (1985, p.44) note, a heuristic approach 
                                                          
4
 Section 1.1.2 below elucidates the notion and my methodological application of ‘focal settings’. 
5 
to research ideally operates “free from external methodological structures that limit 
awareness or channel it”. Therefore, as an unbounded research medium it provides me 
with the flexibility to examine a variety of perspectives on psychotic and psychotic-like 
experiences.  
 
This approach especially enables the critical investigation of understandings of 
psychosis within and beyond the epistemological horizons of psychiatric diagnostics 
and scientific materialism. As Segen (1992, p.294) contends, a heuristic approach is; 
 
a form of problem-solving based, not on scientific proof but rather on 
plausible, possible, or creative conclusions to questions that cannot be 
answered in the context of, or the ‘logic’ of which lies outside of, a currently 
accepted scientific paradigm. 
 
Hence, it allows a critical examination of materials and worldviews pertaining to 
psychosis that medical science perceive to be unscientific, irrational or unreal. In this 
sense, I use a heuristic approach to bridge the perceived gap between materialist and 
metaphysical worldviews, for its open-ended nature enables phenomenological 
investigation in both domains. While psychiatry has been described as a 
phenomenological discipline in its attention to the details of psychopathological 
symptomatology (Bürgy, 2008; Nelson et al, 2008; Andreasen; 2007; Owen & Harland, 
2007),5 this is limited to considering only that which can be physically observed. A 
heuristic approach creates the scope to extend beyond this limitation to investigate and 
understand the possible play of psychospiritual phenomena in psychosis. 
 
A further advantage in using this approach is that its mutable nature enables me to 
formulate innovative ideas that attempt to reconcile some of the ambiguities and 
paradoxes that abound in the quest to better understand psychosis. Heuristic research 
is renowned for its usefulness in tackling the complex issues of being human (Greig et 
al, 2007, p.45). For instance, the psychiatric understanding of psychosis is replete with 
binary tensions such as normal versus mad, pathological versus healthy, physical 
versus psychological, scientific versus irrational (i.e. metaphysical), psychotic versus 
sane, and so on. Jablin & Putnam (2001, p.388) refer to these conundrums as 
“intersecting dualisms” which are heuristically valuable for “making sense of opposing 
views” and establishing new lines of research. Similarly, Saukko (2003, pp.180, 178) 
                                                          
5
 The psychiatric observation of physical symptomatology is exemplified in Karl Jaspers’ phenomenological 
approach (see Chapter Four, Section 4.3). 
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advocates heuristic investigation “that is capable of doing justice to difference and to 
point to unities across differences” and which enables the researcher; 
 
to break up what appears inevitable or common sense by illuminating that 
the same phenomenon may be attached to very different social agendas in 
different locations and contexts, to the extent it may begin to look as if one 
is no longer talking about the same phenomenon. 
 
This reflects my heuristic use of focal settings to systematically examine, and extend 
beyond, various viewpoints concerning the nature and genesis of psychosis. According 
to psychiatrist and Native American healer Lewis Mehl-Madrona (2005, p.189) “mind, 
body, spirit, and community are one, and…our modern boundaries between self and 
others, self and nature, self and spirit are artificial constructions of a restricted 
materialist vision”. My dissertation aims to demonstrate that this holistic view applies 
also to psychotic experiences and a heuristic approach provides an apt medium for 
doing so. 
 
Finally, my investigative process does not aim to arrive at any reified or ultimate 
understanding of psychosis. As Abbott (2004, p.160) asserts, “heuristics should not be 
reified. They are not about the true and the untrue but about finding new ideas. They 
should be taken as aids to reflection, not as fixed things” [italics in original].6 Similarly, 
Mehl-Madrona (2007, p.200) contends that our knowledge about things does not 
represent absolute truth, but serves the function of fashioning “experience into 
interpretive frameworks”. He subsequently asserts that; 
 
there are no privileged stories except those that work, when and where 
they do work. Within medicine, this means challenging the sanctity of the 
randomized, controlled clinical trial as the only valid way to obtain 
knowledge. It provides a fresh critique of what has been called ‘evidence–
based medicine’, from the understanding that acceptable evidence is itself 
determined by a story about the world that can be challenged (ibid).  
 
Hence, although I examine various models for conceptualising psychosis, my aim is not 
to generate an ultimate model for understanding psychosis, but to orchestrate an open-
ended inquiry that includes, yet supersedes, the epistemological limits of the 
biomedical model. Doing so intrinsically challenges the conventional medical and 
                                                          
6
 Henceforth, text quoted in italics appears as such in the original. In instances where I add italics to 
quotes for emphasis, I include the notation ‘[italics added]’. 
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materialist–based model of psychiatry, yet also opens other prospective lines of inquiry 
for future research into better understanding psychosis and developing apposite 
therapeutic practices. 
 
1.1.2 Explication on focal settings 
This dissertation is structured in four progressive and interrelated parts, each of which 
represents a particular ‘focal setting’; a notion adopted from the philosophy of the 
Tibetan Buddhist teacher Tarthang Tulku. According to Tulku (1977, p.12) the 
development of human understanding can be profoundly impeded by “different ‘focal’ 
or epistemic settings”. He maintains that; 
 
throughout history, we have been maintaining a fixed and limiting ‘focal 
setting’ without even being aware of doing so. Yet, although our familiar 
world seems to depend upon this ‘setting’, if we become able to change the 
‘setting’, fantastic new knowledge and appreciation of life can be gained 
(ibid, pp.4-5). 
 
Hence, a ‘focal setting’ constitutes a certain worldview about reality beyond which 
investigation does not usually ensue. An exemplary case-in-point is the materialist-
based focal setting that scopes psychiatric research, and which proscribes the 
exploration of possible psychospiritual determinants in psychosis. However, while a 
focal setting is, by nature, conceptually restrictive, it can also be extended to enable 
new paradigms of investigation. Tulku (1984, p.25) expresses this with simple 
eloquence: 
 
By accepting provisional answers as conclusive, we close off the possibility 
of deeper knowing. We trap ourselves in a vast unknown realm that we do 
not even know is unknown. Paradoxically, it will remain unknown as long as 
we already ‘know’ it. To begin to know something new, we must first realise 
that there is something we do not know.  
 
Throughout this dissertation, then, I aim to systematically reveal ‘something new’ about 
psychosis in order to better understand it. The use of focal settings works as a 
methodical heuristic tool that enables a deeper, broader and progressive investigation 
of this phenomenon. As my trajectory of inquiry unfolds, each successive focal setting 
introduces a broader epistemological paradigm, thus establishing new investigative 
pathways for better understanding psychosis and related notions concerning its 
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assumed psychopathological and incomprehensible nature. The respective focus of 
each focal setting is explicated below in Section 1.3. 
 
1.1.3 Content analysis 
In Focal Setting Three of this dissertation I undertake a comprehensive content 
analysis of literature that engages the problem of symptomatically discerning psychotic 
from psychospiritual experiences. Krippendorff (2004, p.18) broadly defines content 
analysis as a methodology which “provides new insights [and] increases a researcher's 
understanding of particular phenomena”, while Pfarrer (2012) notes that “by 
systematically evaluating texts…qualitative data can be converted into quantitative 
data”. These descriptions essentially reflect my objective for using this tool. Analysing 
the various ways in which numerous commentators understand the differences and 
similarities between psychotic and psychospiritual phenomena enables me to elicit 
quantitative data in the form of the foremost differentiation criteria identified by authors. 
Further details pertaining to this investigative undertaking are provided in Chapter Nine.   
 
1.2 Literature review 
The interdisciplinary nature of my heuristic investigation throughout this dissertation 
entails the examination of an extensive and diverse body of literature. As such, it is not 
possible to provide a formal literature review. However, the process of engaging these 
many texts arguably represents an unfolding literature review as key texts within 
various conceptual focal settings are progressively reviewed. Therefore, in this sense, 
an integral aspect of my heuristic approach involves conducting an ongoing literature 
review throughout my dissertation. 
 
1.3 Outline of focal settings 
Each Focal Setting throughout my dissertation sequentially investigates the construal 
of psychosis in context various paradigms of psychospiritual understanding. 
 
1.3.1 Focal Setting One 
Focal Setting One undertakes a historical overview of depictions of psychosis by 
mainstream psychiatry since the term’s inception. Within this purview, where scientific 
materialist theory sets psychiatric research parameters, psychosis is construed as 
psychopathological, and the consideration of psychospiritual determinants in 
understanding psychosis is absent. The challenge to psychiatry here is in highlighting 
and critically appraising its ambiguous depictions of, and its predominant bias towards 
a biogenic understanding of, psychosis. 
 
9 
1.3.2 Focal Setting Two 
Focal Setting Two examines significant instances within mainstream psychiatry 
whereby psychospiritual matters have been viewed as important to better 
understanding psychopathology. As a focal setting, this moves beyond psychiatry’s 
conventional materialist strictures to bring metaphysical concerns into its 
epistemological fold. Doing so challenges and repudiates the prevailing view that such 
matters have no place in psychiatric research and epistemology. It demonstrates that 
psychiatry can investigate psychospiritual considerations in psychosis research. 
Establishing this prepares for the in-depth critical investigation of the psychosis-
psychospiritual nexus throughout Focal Settings Three and Four. 
 
1.3.3 Focal Setting Three 
Here psychospiritual determinants are presented as central to the task of better 
understanding and diagnosing psychosis. In examining and conducting a content 
analysis of literature on the issue of discerning psychotic from psychotic-like 
psychospiritual experiences, Focal Setting Three represents a significant paradigm 
shift. Demonstrating the pertinence of psychospiritual considerations in diagnostic 
practice challenges psychiatry to reassess its understanding of psychosis and 
psychopathology, and to extend its epistemological borders to incorporate 
metaphysical matters.  
 
1.3.4 Focal Setting Four 
Focal Setting Four undertakes a deeper critical appraisal of cross-cultural and 
psychospiritual matters in context of psychiatric psychopathology. In arguing that 
discerning psychotic from psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences is seemingly 
impossible, Focal Setting Four constitutes a further paradigm shift. Here, the validity of 
key psychosis diagnostic criteria are further contested, as is the veracity of psychiatry’s 
modus operandi of psychopathology-seeking. Cross-cultural conundrums and 
considerations are also examined, including the phenomenon of spirit possession and 
its practical application in Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry. Psychiatry is subsequently 
challenged to supersede its prescriptive psychopathological approach with a heuristic 
approach in order to foster deeper insights into the psychotic-psychospiritual nexus of 
human experience.  
 
1.4 Original aspects of my research 
Throughout this dissertation I have added to the existing literature regarding psychotic 
and psychotic-like psychospiritual human experiences in various ways. Generally 
speaking, I have: 
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 proffered a challenge to mainstream psychiatry through a psychospiritual 
lens; 
 comprehensively elucidated the psychospiritual-psychosis nexus within a  
psychiatric context, and within interdisciplinary and cross-cultural  views 
beyond this; 
 created a heuristic investigative structure, comprised of four focal settings, 
which enables the systematic examination of how psychospiritual matters 
are, or may be, considered in better understanding psychosis;  
 proposed that a heuristic and non-psychopathological investigative 
approach may lead to better understanding of both psychosis and the 
psychospiritual domain of being human. 
More specifically, I have (in sequential order): 
 provided an in-depth critical appraisal of DSM-III7 to demonstrate the 
degree to which social, economic and political factors have shaped this key 
psychiatric manual and its depictions of psychosis (see Chapter Five, 
Section 5.3 and Appendix Two); 
 provided a comprehensive description and critical appraisal of psychiatrist 
Stanley Dean’s work on ‘ultraconsciousness’ and ‘Metapsychiatry’ (see 
Chapter Six, Section 6.2); 
 provided a comprehensive description and critical appraisal of the process 
by which Lukoff and company’s psychospiritual V-Code category (Religious 
or spiritual problem) was introduced into the DSM-IV manual (see Chapter 
Seven, Section 7.1);  
 conducted a comprehensive content analysis of literature pertaining to 
discerning psychospiritual from psychotic experiences. However, contrary 
to standard practice whereby researchers strive to formulate a list of 
differential diagnostic criteria, I have critically appraised and challenged the 
differentiation validity of each criterion (see Chapter Nine);  
 proposed and demonstrated that psychospiritual and psychotic experiences 
are ultimately indistinguishable (see the Focal Setting Four); 
 undertaken an in-depth investigation of the phenomenon of spirit 
possession and its possible influence in psychotic experiences (see 
Chapter Twelve, Section 12.4; Chapter Thirteen; and Appendices Seven 
and Eight). 
                                                          
7
 The acronym ‘DSM’ refers to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. DSM-III is the 
third manual in this series. 
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Combined, these research undertakings constitute a significant contribution to the 
psychosis-psychospiritual research field, set the stage for further such research, and 
proffer a challenge to psychiatry to partake in this endeavour.    
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Chapter Two 
Scoping the Psychospiritual Challenge to Psychiatry 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter sets the stage for my systematic investigation of psychosis via four focal 
settings. Here, I define and explain my reasons for adopting the key notion of 
‘psychospiritual’ and then scope my challenge by elucidating how psychiatry’s 
materialist and psychopathological approaches inherently limit a better understanding 
of psychosis. 
 
2.1 Defining the psychospiritual domain 
The term ‘psychospiritual’ has broad meaning throughout this dissertation, and is used 
synonymously with other terms such as ‘spiritual’, ‘metaphysical’, ‘transpersonal’, and 
‘mystical’. This is because such terms are difficult to define separately as their domains 
of meaning overlap. For instance, in context of the discipline of transpersonal 
psychology,8 the term ‘transpersonal’ connotes a diverse array of states of 
consciousness and is described by Sutich (1968, pp.77-78) as being;  
 
concerned specifically with the scientific study and responsible 
implementation of becoming, individual and species-wide meta-needs, 
ultimate values, unitive consciousness, peak experiences, B-values, 
ecstasy, mystical experience, awe, being, self-actualization, essence, bliss, 
wonder, ultimate meaning, transcendence of the self, spirit, oneness, 
cosmic awareness, individual and species-wide synergy, maximal 
interpersonal encounter, sacralization of everyday life, transcendental 
phenomena; cosmic self-humor and playfulness; maximal sensory 
awareness, responsiveness and expression; and related concepts, 
experiences and activities. 
 
Yet, while mystical experience is included within this transpersonal matrix, all 
transpersonal experiences are not, by strict definition, mystical. As Ortolf (1994, p.8) 
notes, “most definitions of the classical mystical experience have failed to define its 
unitive core. Therein, they fail to differentiate…it from other unusual, transpersonal or 
religious experience”. While the term ‘mysticism’ also has broad meaning and 
application, in the strict sense it refers only to transcendent states of spiritual 
Enlightenment, or as Merrell-Wolff (1994, p.328) explains, “the essence of the mystical 
                                                          
8
 The advent of transpersonal psychology and the related incorporation of psychospiritual considerations 
into DSM-IV are discussed throughout Chapters Seven and Eight. 
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state is a Consciousness that does not fall within the subject-object framework”.9 Due 
to the multiple and interfacing meanings of these similar yet different terms it is 
impracticable to use each in a specific context.  
 
Hence, for the purpose of simplification, I generally use the terms ‘psychospiritual’, 
‘metaphysical’, ‘transpersonal’, and ‘mystical’ interchangeably to connote, and 
encompass, a vast spectrum of phenomena, experiences, and states of consciousness 
or being, that exist beyond the normal limits of human cognitive and sensory capacity. 
This spectrum ranges from the more common human experiences of dreaming, 
intuition and myth-making, through the various modes of extrasensory perception, to 
the myriad aspects and experiences of a more classically spiritual nature. Accordingly, 
this includes phenomena, experiences, and states of consciousness that are generally 
beyond the ken of Western knowledge systems, yet are known and named by other 
cultures. Generically, these constitute what I refer to as ‘the psychospiritual domain’.10  
 
Importantly, I also use the term ‘psychospiritual’ because it intrinsically characterises 
the idea that a synthesis exists between the psychological and spiritual self. Although 
‘psychospiritual’ is a word of multiple meanings and far-reaching scope, it generally 
connotes the psychological and spiritual nexus of human life, where it is impossible to 
identify the end of ‘psychological’ and the beginning of ‘spiritual’. It is understood here 
that both are intrinsically merged domains of human consciousness. This reflects 
Gleig’s (2010, p.738) explanation that “the term psychospiritual has entered 
psychological and religious discourse as a loose designation for the integration of the 
psychological and the spiritual”. Similarly, the Oxford English Dictionary (2013) broadly 
defines psychospiritual as that which is “of, involving, or relating to the interrelation of 
the mind and spirituality”. Furthermore, Dalal (2001, p.xii) purports, “psychology is part 
of and intermingled with cosmology”, while Wilber (1975, p.113) maintains that the 
various modalities of consciousness “infinitely shade into one another”. It is pertinent to 
note that none of these commentators attempt to delineate where psychological ends 
and spiritual begins, presumably, because it is impossible to nominate a discrete 
border between the two, since they interpenetrate. As is evidenced throughout Focal 
Settings Two-to-Four, it very much appears that this dialogical fusion presides in both 
states of mental health and psychopathology. 
                                                          
9 See Appendix Three for a more detailed explication of the term ‘mysticism’. The phenomenon of 
mysticism, in context of prospective psychiatric research, is also examined in Chapter Six, Section 6.2.2, in 
light of Dean’s notion of Metapsychiatry. 
10
 Appendix One proffers an historical overview of uses of the term ‘psychospiritual’ from its inception to 
present date. This illustrates the historical significance and substance of the term and gives weight to the 
definition provided in this section and to my use of it throughout my dissertation. 
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2.2 Psychospiritual as psychopathological  
As explained in Chapter One, this dissertation is structured as four consecutive focal 
settings, each of which constitutes a progressively larger investigative and conceptual 
framework for better understanding psychosis in relation to psychiatry, 
psychopathology, and psychospiritual matters. Focal Setting One undertakes a 
historical exploration of how psychosis has been characterised by mainstream 
psychiatry. Here, the biomedical model has prevailed, psychospiritual considerations 
have largely been ignored, and psychospiritual experiences have been construed as 
evidencing psychopathology. 
 
The psychiatric literature clearly demonstrates the discipline’s discomfort or antipathy 
towards matters pertaining to psychospiritual phenomena and knowledge. This is 
particularly evident in instances whereby psychiatrists have depicted psychospiritual 
experiences as intrinsically psychopathological and/or psychotic. A marked example 
occurred at the turn of the twentieth century when “the historical Jesus was subjected 
to post mortem psychiatric examination” (Peavy, 1974, p.154, fn.14). This ‘post 
mortem’ was conducted “from the medical point of view” (Bundy, 1922, p.48) in books 
published by three psychiatrists: one German [George de Loosten (1905), Jesus 
Christus von Standpunkte des Psychiaters (Jesus Christ from the Standpoint of the 
Psychiatrist)], one French [Charles Binet-Sanglé (1910-1915), La Folie de Jésus (The 
Dementia of Jesus)], and one American (William Hirsch (1912), Religion and 
Civilization: The Conclusions of a Psychiatrist).  
 
First, De Loosten’s view concerning the insanity of Jesus was unequivocal. For 
instance, he interpreted Jesus’ seemingly atypical behaviour as indicative of a “fixed 
delusional system” (de Loosten in Havis, 2001), spoke of the “pathological elements in 
his nature”, and concluded that “Jesus was regarded by many of his contemporaries as 
actually insane and that from this fact certain conclusions can be drawn regarding the 
personal impressions made by him” (de Loosten in Bundy, 1922, pp.75, 78). Binet-
Sanglé also used psychiatric terminology to describe Jesus’ behaviour. For example, 
he identified him as a sick individual who suffered hallucinations and “religious 
paranoia” (Binet-Sanglé in Havis, 2001). He also described him as a fanatic who made 
declarations which were “identically that of the megalomaniacs in our present day 
asylums”, and  as a “psychic degenerate” who exhibited a “purely pathological process” 
that ultimately delivered him “into the ranks of the incurables” (Binet-Sanglé in Bundy, 
2001, pp.106, 92, 94, 97). After five years of research and deliberation he concluded in 
the fourth and final edition of his study that, “I believe that I can say for the alienists, 
medical men, for all learned and sincere persons, the insanity of the founder of the 
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Christian religion is a demonstrated truth” (ibid, p.107). Finally, Hirsch (1912, p.99) 
invested his views about Jesus with putative empirical validity by asserting “all his 
manifestations can be explained entirely satisfactorily by purely scientific facts”. 
According to his evaluation “Christ belongs to those cases of paranoia in which the 
patients are quiet and self-engrossed during their youth”, but as he entered manhood, 
Jesus experienced an exacerbation of psychotic symptoms, such as hallucinations and 
delusional thinking (ibid, p.103). In sum, he deduced that “such a course of the 
disease, a transition from the latent to the active state of paranoia, is altogether 
characteristic of this psychosis” (p.106). All three men, therefore, adopted and 
transposed the tenets of scientific materialism to make a strict psychiatric assessment 
about Jesus’ sanity, whereby the consideration of valid cultural and psychospiritual 
matters were eclipsed. Here, psychospiritual is seemingly analogous to 
psychopathological.  
 
Unsurprisingly, some commentators have challenged the veracity of the controversial 
assessments made by De Loosen, Binet-Sanglé and Hirsch. For instance, the German 
physician Albert Schweitzer (1948 [1913]) conducted an appraisal of these three works 
in his medical dissertation titled The Psychiatric Study of Jesus. He concluded that, 
although Jesus’ experiences and behaviours personified an extreme expression of the 
religious and cultural beliefs of Judaism at the time, “the exaggeration of an idea does 
not in itself justify our considering it the manifestation of a psychosis” (ibid, pp.63-64). 
In closing, and in light of psychiatric theory at the time, he determined that the findings 
of De Loosen, Binet-Sanglé and Hirsch were, by-and-large, a mix of “false 
preconceptions”, “entirely hypothetical symptoms” and constructed depictions of illness 
which “cannot be made to conform exactly with the clinical forms of sickness diagnosed 
by the authors” (p.72). In his view, then, they were more the product of subjective bias 
and confabulation than of objective medical science.  
 
In a later assessment Bundy (1922, p.268) likewise concluded that De Loosen, Binet-
Sanglé and Hirsch had failed to consider cultural dynamics and that their works 
constituted “an amateur application of the principles of the science of psychiatry”. 
According to James (1905, p.13), such psychiatric views typified the reasoning of 
“medical materialism”, which he described as a “simple-minded system of thought” 
whereby proponents believed that, by simply asserting physical primacy, 
psychospiritual reality was disproven. He identified Binet-Sanglé as an exemplar of 
medical materialism (ibid, fn.1). Also, Jung (1966, p.45) decried these psychiatrists as 
exemplifying “how irresponsibly a psychologizing doctor can falsify his subject through 
narrow, pseudo-scientific prejudice”. These commentators clearly challenge the limited 
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conceptual parameters of materialism for defining psychopathology and repudiate the 
consequent diagnosis of psychospiritual experiences as being intrinsically psychotic. 
 
Far from being extreme examples, it appears that the views of De Loosen, Binet-
Sanglé and Hirsch represent a general bias within mainstream psychiatry against 
recognising the legitimacy psychospiritual reality. Since the inception of psychiatry as a 
discipline, personal reports of psychospiritual experiences have commonly been 
viewed by clinicians as possible, or definite, signifiers of psychosis and 
psychopathology. For instance, Harrowes (1929, p.17) held that any “mystic” interests 
of a patient are “an example of imperfect reality contacts”, Alexander (1931, p.130) 
claimed that Buddhist spiritual practices were a “training in catatonia” and “a sort of 
artificial schizophrenia”, and Devereux (1956, p.29) maintained that, despite the 
cultural acceptance of shamanic beliefs and practices, they were essentially 
psychopathological (“ego dystonic”). More recently, in their clinical analysis of some 
key religious figures, Murray et al (2012, p.410) concluded that “Abraham, Moses, 
Jesus, and St. Paul…had experiences that resemble those now defined as psychotic 
symptoms, suggesting that their experiences may have been manifestations of primary 
or mood disorder-associated psychotic disorders”. Such clinicians have plainly and 
wholly equated psychospiritual experience with psychopathology.  
 
Others have decried this practice, while acknowledging its ubiquitous existence. At the 
turn of the twentieth century, for example, James (1905, p.426) critically asserted, in 
regards to  mainstream psychiatric texts of the time, that -  “Open any one of these, 
and you will find abundant cases in which 'mystical ideas' are cited as characteristic 
symptoms of enfeebled or deluded states of mind”. Similarly, Ehrenwald (1949, p.236) 
expressed his concern that “the current system of psychiatric thought has failed to 
make any provision for the very possibility of…psychical phenomena”, while Grof 
(1975, pp.209-210) observed that; 
 
transpersonal phenomena…are labelled psychotic, whether it occurs in a 
schizophrenic patient, in a normal subject after the ingestion of a 
psychedelic drug, in an individual who has spent several hours in a 
sensory-deprivation tank, in a Zen student during a sesshin, or in mystics 
and religious teachers of the stature of Sri Ramana Maharishi, Sri 
Aurobindo, or Jesus. 
 
Here, counter to the psychospiritual-equals-psychopathological view, Grof suggests the 
existence of transpersonal phenomena of a non-psychopathological nature which may 
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routinely be misdiagnosed as psychotic. In a similar vein, Wilber (2001, p.23) has wryly 
asserted that “because scientism could not get a ruler on God, it proclaimed Spirit 
nonsensical and meaningless. Christ was therefore deluded, Buddha was 
schizophrenic, Krishna was hallucinating, Lao Tzu was psychotic”. Therefore, while 
psychiatry has commonly associated psychospiritual experiences with 
psychopathology throughout its history, there seems to be no substantial empirical 
basis for doing so. It is a practice which appears, at best, to be purely speculative. 
 
The main task throughout this section has been to demonstrate the existence of a 
traditional and ubiquitous psychiatric view that mystical or paranormal experiences are, 
in fact, forms of psychopathology. Although psychiatric diagnostics over the past two 
decades has seen a growing trend toward the inclusion of cultural matters, and a 
tentative acceptance of religious and psychospiritual concerns, there still remains a 
general disinclination by clinicians to consider the veracity of reported psychospiritual 
experiences in making diagnoses. Rather, personal reports of psychospiritual 
experiences by patients are routinely viewed as signifiers of psychosis and 
psychopathology. This view seems unlikely to change in the near future, for the 
predominant focus in contemporary medical psychiatry is to discover the biological 
cause of psychosis; a venture strongly influenced by pharmaceutical companies who 
have considerable vested interests in the biological treatments of psychosis (Frances, 
2013a, pp.89-97). Yet, while the core psychiatric notion of psychopathology is accepted 
as fact, its precise nature remains undefined.11 Frances (ibid, p.117) consequently 
acknowledges that “in evaluating any given person, we lack a general definition of 
mental disorder to help us decide whether he is normal or a patient”. This ambiguity of 
definition arguably creates the conceptual space for questioning whether various 
psychotic-like experiences are psychopathological or psychospiritual in nature. 
 
2.3 Challenging the medical psychiatry and materialism nexus 
The quest of science is fundamentally one of investigating and better understanding 
the nature of reality. Ideally, this is an open-ended process of interplay between 
observation, theory, and knowledge formulation, in relation to the multifarious objective 
and subjective phenomena that constitute reality. However, many commentators 
maintain that the materialist view of science is outdated and represents a poor grasp of 
the nature of reality, in that it operates by a set of reductive theoretical assumptions 
which limit the scope of investigation to physical reality only, thus ignoring other 
domains of investigation that may advance understanding about the nature of life and 
                                                          
11
 As discussed in Chapter Five and Appendix Two, psychiatrists have unsuccessfully wrestled with the 
core task of defining mental illness since the formulation of DSM-III. 
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human experience. This is particularly so in the field of quantum physics where 
theorists have long questioned the universal application of materialism’s key tenets 
(Beauregard, 2012, p.228). For instance, Jeans (1984, p.44) proffers the broad view 
that “every conclusion that has been tentatively put forward [by materialist science], is 
quite frankly speculative and uncertain”. In context of understanding human nature, 
Peierls (2000, p.75) argues that “the premise that you can describe in terms of physics 
the whole function of a human being…including its knowledge, and its consciousness, 
is untenable”. Also, Laszlo (2003, p.1) attests to an emergent scientific paradigm shift, 
whereby conventional mechanistic science will be superseded by integral quantum 
science. Whereas the former views reality as atomistic, the latter proposes “an 
integrated unified vision of living and non-living systems” that will “give us the coherent 
universe, where all things are intrinsically connected” (ibid, pp.20, 101). From the field 
of neuroscience, Beauregard (2012, p.6) takes a more radical stance in expressing his 
“vehemently” held view that “the materialist framework is not science” because it 
operates according to a set of “beliefs without proof”. He envisions an “expanded 
model of reality” whereby “scientists, free of the materialist box, are…invited to embark 
on research into the whole gamut of psi phenomena, expanded and altered 
consciousness, and spiritual experiences” (ibid, pp.212-214). These are but a few of 
many examples whereby scientists have challenged the veracity of strict scientific 
materialism. 
 
Similar views have been proffered from within the mental health field. For instance, 
Boyle (2002, p.316) refers to the materialist scientific approach as “squeezing data into 
existing belief systems rather than changing theory in line with data”. In context of 
understanding psychosis, she further maintains that it shows “a striking lack of a 
reflective approach to the production of knowledge about psychotic behaviour and 
experience” (ibid). Likewise, in his early psychiatric career, Jung (1960) maintained that 
a better understanding of the psyche, mental disorders, and particularly psychoses, 
required extending the scope of conventional scientific investigation to include the 
immediacy and depths of subjective experience. In fact, the term ‘scientistic’ has been 
coined “in ironic contrast to ‘scientific’” (Gallagher et al, 2002, p.701), to denote the 
traditional reductive approach to scientific inquiry whereby the scope of investigation is 
limited to exclude, or dismiss, phenomena that apparently exist beyond the epistemic 
bounds of strict materialism. Maritain (1964, p.264) defines ‘scientistic’ simply as 
“secularized positivism”, while Phillips (2009, p.175) proffers the more pejorative 
explanation that “the term ‘scientistic’ evolved to cover cases where there was 
exaggerated respect for, and a narrow and illiberal account of, the ‘scientific method’”. 
Regarding the impact of ‘scientistic’ thinking in psychiatry, Szasz (1991, p.6) argues 
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that, “like all ideologies, the ideology of insanity – communicated through the scientistic 
jargon of psychiatric ‘diagnoses’, ‘prognoses’, and ‘treatments’…finds its characteristic 
expression in what it opposes: commitment to an officially forbidden image or definition 
of ‘reality’”. This goes to the heart of the issue of understanding psychosis, for 
materialist assumptions not only determine what reality is, but also what reality is not, 
and therefore, which phenomena are, and are not, worthy of serious clinical 
investigation. Extending this into psychiatric practice results in the occlusion of 
subjective and psychospiritual experience from the process of trying to understand 
psychosis. 
 
It is apparent, then, that much of the understanding, or misunderstanding, of psychosis 
stems directly from the transferral of limited materialist assumptions into medical 
science, and subsequently, into medical psychiatry. These assumptions are used to 
dictate what is real, and thus normal, and what is unreal, and thus deviant, and to then 
assert a clinical boundary that separates normality from mental illness. This is evident 
below in Table 1, which lists the foremost “axiomatic assumptions” of materialism 
(Kimura, 2008, p.11) alongside the neo-Kraepelinian12 credo which, according to 
Klerman (1978, p.104), consists of nine tenets that guided “psychiatry towards greater 
integration with medicine” during the formation of DSM-III. As shown below, the latter 
are clearly reflective of the former. 
 
Table 1 – A comparison of key materialist assumptions with key tenets of medical 
psychiatry 
Key materialist assumptions 
(Kimura, 2008, p.11) 
Key tenets of medical psychiatry 
(Klerman, 1978, pp.104-105) 
 Physical reality as such is reality; there 
is no reality other than physical reality. 
 No phenomenon is a phenomenon in 
reality, unless it is observed, or in 
theory observable, through the senses 
and its mechanical extensions (such 
as telescopes). 
 Reality exists independent of 
consciousness. 
1. Psychiatry is a branch of medicine. 
2. Psychiatry should utilize modern 
scientific methodologies and base its 
practice on scientific knowledge. 
3. Psychiatry treats people who are sick 
and who require treatment for mental 
illnesses. 
4. There is a boundary between the 
normal and the sick. 
5. There are discrete mental illnesses. 
                                                          
12
 The term ‘neo-Kraepelinian’ refers to a group of American biomedical psychiatrists who, during the 
1960s and 1970s, played a key role in changing the DSM from a psychoanalytic back to a medical model. 
This neo-Kraepelinian phenomenon is further discussed in Chapter Five and Appendix Two. 
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 Reality exists in objective (i.e. 
objectively measurable) space-time. 
 Reality consists of fundamental (or 
subatomic) particles in motion in 
space. 
 Reality in its base-state is a non-living 
and non-conscious (or unconscious) 
process. 
 Life emerged from and through non-
living processes not by necessity but 
by chance. 
 Consciousness is an epiphenomenon 
of the unconscious brain activities and 
processes. 
 The scientific method is the only valid 
method for achieving objective 
knowledge. 
 All valid scientific knowledge is 
reducible to mathematical equations or 
other logical formulations such that the 
sequential train of inferences 
therefrom shall at some stage suggest 
an empirically possible experiment or 
observation that can verify or falsify 
the inference. 
 Objective scientific knowledge thus 
achieved is the only valid knowledge 
of reality. 
Mental illnesses are not myths. There 
is not one but many mental illnesses. 
It is the task of scientific psychiatry, as 
of other medical specialities to 
investigate the causes, diagnosis, and 
treatment of these mental illnesses. 
6. The focus of psychiatric physicians 
should be particularly on the biological 
aspects of illness. 
7. There should be an explicit and 
intentional concern with diagnosis and 
classification. 
8. Diagnostic criteria should be codified, 
and a legitimate and valued area of 
research should be to validate such 
criteria by various techniques. Further, 
departments of psychiatry in medical 
schools should teach these criteria 
and not depreciate them, as has been 
the case for many years. 
9. In research efforts directed at 
improving reliability and validity of 
diagnosis and classification, statistical 
techniques should be utilized. 
 
In cross-referencing these two lists it is apparent that materialist theory has 
fundamentally shaped the worldview and practice of medical psychiatry. For instance, 
in the neo-Kraepelinian credo, psychiatry is unequivocally identified as a branch of 
medicine that exemplifies scientific methodologies and knowledge. Hence, the 
materialist presumption that physical reality is the only ‘real’ reality is reflected in the 
assertion that psychiatry’s predominant focus should be on ‘the biological aspects of 
illness’. The related materialist idea that consciousness is epiphenomenal to the brain 
is a root idea governing the theory, research and practice of medical psychiatry. This 
generally results in psychiatry disregarding subjective reality. As Beauregard (2012, 
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pp.211-212) claims, materialist theory compels scientific investigators “to neglect the 
subjective dimension of human experience and downplay the importance of mind and 
consciousness. In so doing, they create a severely distorted and impoverished 
understanding of human beings and reality”. Indeed, Tart (1975, p.81) maintains that 
orthodox Western psychology assumes that “deliberately cultivating altered states 
of consciousness is also a sign of psychopathology…Such cultivation is easily seen as 
flirting with psychosis, and indicates the person is not well adjusted to reality and must 
be seeking some kind of escape”. Hence, understanding has become impoverished to 
the point that any altered state of consciousness is viewed as psychopathologically 
suspect. Furthermore, the materialist theory of an atomistic reality composed of 
discrete physical entities is reflected in psychiatry’s notion that a boundary exists 
between normal and pathological, and also fuels its penchant for the categorisation of 
distinct diagnostic criteria.  
 
The above critical appraisal of the conceptual and investigative limitations of a 
psychiatric model based on the tenets of medical materialism sets the stage for my 
ensuing psychospiritual challenge to medical psychiatry. In essence, this challenge 
aims to incrementally demonstrate how the inclusion of psychospiritual considerations 
in psychiatric thinking and practice can open new pathways for understanding the 
enigma of psychosis. It concomitantly aims to critically question axiomatic psychiatric 
assumptions regarding the incomprehensible and psychopathological nature of 
psychosis, and to show that such assumptions are relative to the materialist worldview 
from which they stem, and are, therefore, interpretive and not absolute. This challenge 
unfolds by systematically demonstrating, via an engagement with psychospiritual 
considerations, that it is not only possible to comprehend reality beyond the 
epistemological parameters of materialism, but it is preferable, if not necessary, for 
psychiatry to do so in order to better understand psychosis. 
 
2.4 Challenging the assumed incomprehensibility of psychosis  
A fundamental notion in the psychiatric construal of psychosis is that it is, by nature, an 
enigmatic phenomenon that is ultimately impervious to comprehension. This idea 
stems from the work of German psychiatrist, Karl Jaspers (1997 v2, p.577), who 
maintained that psychotic experience is essentially “ununderstandable”.13 Indeed, 
many commentators have identified incomprehensibility as a defining feature of 
psychotic disorders. For instance, Henriksen (2013, p.106) contends that 
“incomprehensibility is considered the hallmark of schizophrenia”, while Heinimaa 
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 An examination of Jaspers’ views concerning the incomprehensibility of psychosis is undertaken in 
Chapter Four, Section 4.3.2. 
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(2008, p.26) holds that, from a Jaspersian perspective, “incomprehensibility was 
conceived of as constitutive” of psychotic disorders, and that, subsequently, “the field of 
psychoses came to be structured primarily in terms of the degree to which they 
appeared as ‘un-understandable’”. Hence, in the context of psychiatric practice, the 
notion of incomprehensibility essentially discerns non-psychotic from psychotic 
disorders.  
 
In drawing on psychospiritual considerations to glean a better understanding of 
psychosis, my dissertation intrinsically challenges the psychiatric assumption that 
psychotic experiences are unfathomable. This idea represents a key obstacle in the 
quest to better understand psychosis, for if something is deemed intrinsically 
incomprehensible, then attempts to better understand it are consequentially proscribed. 
That is, if something cannot be understood, then why attempt to understand it? 
However, delineating that which is comprehensible from that which is not is relative to 
the observer’s axiomatic assumptions. In operating by the materialist assumption that 
reality is primarily physical, and that psychic life, including psychosis, is an 
epiphenomenal reality, it is therefore logical for psychiatry to assume that the form and 
content of psychotic experiences are ultimately impervious to comprehension. From 
this perspective, the definitive truth as to the cause of psychosis can only be explained 
in biological terms, with psychosocial and psychospiritual considerations being of 
secondary or no importance. My dissertation’s heuristic investigative process of 
examining psychosis within various psychospiritual contexts works to challenge the 
notion that psychosis is incomprehensible, as well as the materialist-cum-biogenic 
reasoning from which it stems. As the investigative process unfolds from one focal 
setting to the next it is demonstrated that examining psychosis and psychotic 
symptomatology through the lens of psychospiritual considerations opens to vistas of 
understanding that are invisible and seemingly impossible from a materialist 
perspective.   
 
2.5 Challenging the assumed psychopathology of psychosis  
For psychiatry, psychosis is synonymous with psychopathology. Therefore, psychiatric 
research into psychosis is driven by the unquestionable assumption that psychotic 
experiences are intrinsically psychopathological. I critically examine and challenge this 
basic psychiatric assumption for it plays a primary role in delimiting the investigative 
scope for better understanding psychosis. 
 
The parameters of psychiatric practice are essentially defined by the presence of 
psychopathology, for it is a discipline concerned with diagnosing and remediating 
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apparent pathological mental states and behaviours. This was clearly asserted ninety 
years ago by the German psychiatrist, Friedrich Moerchen, who held that 
“psychopathology asks but one question, normal or abnormal? Healthy or morbid?” 
(Moerchen in Bundy, 1922, p.xiii).14 Similarly, Boisen (1936, p.308) defined 
psychopathology as “the basic science upon which the practice of psychiatry is 
founded”, while more recently, Hamilton (1985, p.2) noted that “psychiatry is concerned 
with pathological human psychology”, and Andreasen (1997a, p.592) has explained 
that “psychiatry is the medical specialty that studies and treats a variety of disorders 
that affect the mind - mental illnesses”. Verhagen et al (2010, p.209) make the generic 
assertion that “all psychiatrists would probably agree” that psychopathology is the “core 
business of psychiatry”. The perceived need for psychiatric intervention is, therefore, 
directly proportionate to the perceived degree of psychopathology.  
 
Also, the jurisdiction of psychiatry terminates at the ostensible dividing line between 
psychopathology and normalcy. This is clearly suggested in the above neo-
Kraepelinian tenets that ‘there is a boundary between the normal and the sick’ and that 
‘psychiatry treats people who are sick’ with mental illnesses. Burang (1974, p.107) 
sagely notes, however, that despite the pragmatic necessity of proposing provisional 
lines of differentiation between normal and abnormal, doing so can result in “a certain 
amount of arrogance” when done prescriptively. Furthermore, repeated attempts by 
psychiatrists to definitively identify and describe this boundary have been unsuccessful. 
Addressing this issue in his recent book titled Saving Normal, Allen Frances (2013a, 
pp.9, 82) holds that “many have tried and all have failed” to delineate mental health 
from mental illness, and that “the boundary between mental disorder and normality is 
so fuzzy that whenever we quickly expand the use of psychiatric labels to identify some 
few people who do need help, we misidentify many others who don’t”. Hence, 
establishing diagnostic lines of differentiation can be very fuzzy and problematic and 
this ambiguity is amplified when factoring in psychospiritual considerations. The 
problem of misidentification and the associated question as to what does, and does 
not, define psychopathology, is highly pertinent to diagnosing psychosis, especially in 
terms of differentiating it from non-pathological psychospiritual experiences.  
 
While this psychopathological approach is evidently limiting, and the need for a more 
open-ended approach is called for, it is important to note that revealing the highly 
tenuous nature of the notion of psychopathology in psychiatric practice is not to 
suggest that psychic debilitation does not exist. It is apparent from the havoc and 
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 Moerchen, F. (1908) Die Psychologie der Heiligkeit: Eine religionswissenschaftliche Studie. Halle: C. 
Marhold. 
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suffering often experienced by people in psychosis that something is distressingly 
awry. Therefore, the point of the ensuing investigation is to show that pathways to 
better understanding psychosis can be opened when psychospiritual factors are seen 
as potentially informative, rather than being ignored or pathologised as a matter of 
course. It is my contention that a heuristic approach enables such deepened and 
diversified understanding. Whereas the psychopathological approach used by 
psychiatry looks at psychosis through the predetermined belief that it is a ‘mental 
disorder’, the heuristic approach is comparatively neutral and, therefore, aims to let the 
phenomenon of psychosis reveal its meanings, rather than projecting preconceived 
meanings onto it. This enables open scope to see hidden potentialities and nuances of 
meaning that are invisible and, indeed, unthinkable, within the limited investigative 
scope of psychiatric medical materialism. Through this prism of heuristic investigation it 
is shown that the notion of ‘psychosis as intrinsically psychopathological’ is not 
concrete, but rather, is highly mutable and open to interpretation. Indeed, it questions 
whether the notion of psychopathology hinders more than helps in understanding the 
nature of psychosis? The challenge and investigation throughout the ensuing focal 
settings of this dissertation systematically demonstrate the potential and untapped 
value of drawing on psychospiritual considerations to better understand psychosis 
beyond the limited purview of psychiatric medical materialism and its axiomatic 
assumptions about psychopathology. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
Having defined the term ‘psychospiritual’ and explicated the aim and scope of my 
challenge to medical psychiatry, the stage has been set for critically examining the 
psychosis-psychospiritual nexus within context of four Focal Settings. From this point 
forward, I systematically argue that the inclusion of psychospiritual considerations in 
psychiatric epistemology and research will enable a better understanding of psychosis 
than the traditional reductive materialist-based psychopathological approaches. Focal 
Setting One provides an historical and critical overview of psychiatric 
conceptualisations of psychosis which are nearly devoid of psychospiritual 
considerations. My attention to psychospiritual matters is then progressively developed 










FOCAL SETTING ONE 
 
UNDERSTANDING PSYCHOSIS:  





Focal Setting One provides a historical overview of evolving understandings of 
psychosis within the tradition of psychiatry, in which psychospiritual matters are 





Understanding Psychosis: Etymological and Clinical Origins 
 
3.0 Introduction 
This chapter formally begins my investigative process by examining three initial 
meanings attributed to the term ‘psychosis’: one, its psychospiritual etymological roots; 
two, its mid-nineteenth century clinical origins as a psychosomatic form of 
psychopathology; and three,  the first vestiges of a biogenic depiction of psychosis 
during the latter nineteenth century. My aim here is to demonstrate the term’s original 
conceptual plasticity and to identify the emergence of psychiatry’s prescriptive and 
biogenic understanding of psychosis. 
 
3.1 The etymology of psychosis 
The word ‘psychosis’ derives from the root word ‘psyche’ and is, therefore, 
etymologically invested with an essential psychospiritual meaning. As Ayto (1994, 
p.418) explains, the Greek psūkhḗ, which “started out meaning ‘breath’ and developed 
semantically to ‘soul, spirit’”, was later transcribed into the Latin psȳchē, and then 
adopted into English as psyche. Further to this, Barnhart (1988, p.859) maintains that 
the term ‘psychosis’ is a combination of the Greek psūkhḗ (soul, mind) and the New 
Latin –osis (abnormal condition). Thus, from an etymological perspective, ‘psychosis’ 
essentially appears to denote an abnormal condition of the soul or mind. Andreasen 
(2005) accordingly notes that “literally, a psychiatrist is a healer of the spirit, not of the 
mind or brain”. However, it appears mainstream psychiatry has eschewed its 
etymological psychospiritual roots to adopt a biomedical understanding of psychosis.  
 
As a pertinent aside,15 the Greek psūkhḗ is also directly connected to the word 
psȳkhroś which represents the quality of coolness. As Onions (1966, p.720) explains, a 
relationship exists between the Greek psūkhḗ (breath, soul, life), psūkhein (breathe, 
blow, cool), and psȳkhroś (cool). It is, therefore, possible that the medical term 
‘psychosis’ initially emerged in the 1830s as a derivative of psȳkhroś. 
 
3.2 The clinical emergence of the word ‘psychosis’ 
The term ‘psychosis’ first emerged from the crucible of mid-nineteenth century German 
Romantic medicine and psychiatry. Coining a new psychiatric word is a hermeneutic 
gesture that intimates the cause and meaning of a particular psychic anomaly, and 
works to produce a symbolic vehicle for breaking new ground in epistemological 
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 The pertinence of this is clarified below in Section 3.2.1 in my examination of Eisenmann’s clinical use of 
the term ‘psychrose’. 
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development. As Petitmengin & Bitbol (2009, p.389) contend, the formation of new 
vocabulary “enables us to progressively refine our consciousness of this experience”. 
What, then, did the original coining of the word ‘psychosis’ aim to communicate about 
the cause and meaning of mental disturbances? 
 
3.2.1 Gottfried Eisenmann (1835) 
As a medical term, the word ‘psychosis’ first appeared during the 1840s within the field 
of German medicine. However, just prior to this, a close approximation of it was used 
by the German physician Gottfried Eisenmann who, in his book Die vegetativen 
Krankheiten und die entgiftende Heilmethode (1835), coined the terms ‘psychrosen’ 
and ‘psychrose’ to depict a specific form of neurosis.16 Emulating the system of 
scientific classification in botany, he proposed that, within the overall kingdom of 
diseases, ‘psychrosen’ was one of four orders of illness under the class ‘neurosis’; 
namely, the order of “the mental diseases” (López Piñero, 1983, p.15). Beer (1995a, 
p.177) maintains that Eisenmann “used the word ‘psychroses’ in the same sense that 
psychoses was later to be used”.17 However, the word ‘psychosis’ has been used in 
many senses since it was first coined and Beer does not specify which of these he 
means. This aside, it appears that Eisenmann adopted the term ‘psychrosen’ from the 
etymological root word psȳkhroś.   
 
3.2.2 Carl Canstatt (1841) 
The apparent first use of the word ‘psychosis’ was in 1841 by the German physician 
Carl Canstatt (Bürgy, 2008, p.1200).18 Six years after Eisenmann’s coining of 
‘psychrosen’, Canstatt used the words “psychosis” and “psychotic neurosis” 
interchangeably to designate “psychic manifestations of a disease of the brain”, in 
contradistinction to other neurological disorders that were seen as “diseases of the 
nervous system” (Schultze-Lutter et al, 2008, p.304). As Bürgy (2008, p.1201) explains, 
for Canstatt “psychosis emphasized the psychic manifestation of an organically based 
neurosis”. In other words, psychosis referred to a particular form of neurosis (i.e. a 
brain-centred neurosis) that expressed itself psychically rather than physiologically. In 
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 An online keyword search of this text shows that Eisenmann used the term ‘psychrosen’ (in the plural 
form) five times and ‘psychrose’ (in the singular form) once. 
17
 Beer cites the following article as his source regarding Eisenmann and psychrosis - Mechler A. (1965) 
’Über den Begriff der Psychose’. Jahrbuch der Psychologie und Psychotherapie. Xii: pp.67-74. It is unclear 
why Beer uses the term ‘psychroses’ instead of Eisenmann’s ‘psychrosen’. 
18
 Bürgy cites the text in which the term was used as - Canstatt, C. (1841a) Handbuch der Medizinischen 
Klinik. Stuttgart, Germany: Enke. I have been unable to source a copy of this book to ascertain the extent 
to which Canstatt used the terms ‘psychosis’ or ‘psychoses’ (‘psychose’ and ‘psychosen’ in German), and 
Bürgy provides no examples.  
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Canstatt’s view, another cause and essential signature of psychosis was psychic 
vulnerability. For example, he saw “the etiology of psychoses as lying in a somatic 
weakness of the brain on the one hand and in a psychic vulnerability on the other” 
(ibid). He further explained that:  
 
One can observe in many subjects, who may not be directly labelled 
mentally ill, such a high degree of psychic agitation/activation (‘Erregung’), 
that only a small event (‘Anlass’) may be sufficient to produce manifest true 
alienation. We call this psychic vulnerability. And most of the occasional 
causes provoking manifest mental illness already find this predisposition 
(Canstatt in Zubin, 1988, p.468).19 
 
This description clearly highlights a psychic predisposition, or vulnerability, as being 
both prognostic and causative in psychoses; a view which still holds today (Lincoln et 
al, 2015; Cotier et al, 2014). However, the nature and composition of the ‘psychic’ self 
remains unexplained by Canstatt. Indeed, he attests to its aetiological obscurity in 
acknowledging that “often causal indication lies beyond the scope of the doctor, and 
nothing else remains than direct combat of the psychosis” (Canstatt in Schultze-Lutter 
et al, 2008, p.304).20 According to Bürgy, (2008, p.1202), this inability to understand 
and empirically grasp the intangible nature of the human psyche led materialist 
psychiatrists to assert a physical aetiology of psychosis. From these roots stemmed the 
medical approach to understanding and treating psychosis that later prevailed 
throughout psychiatry’s history. 
 
3.2.3 Ernst von Feuchtersleben (1845) 
The Austrian physician Ernst von Feuchtersleben is thought by many to have coined 
the word ‘psychosis’ in 1845,21 though, as is evident above, it seems Canstatt, or even 
Eisenmann, did so before him. This aside, Feuchtersleben was the first person to use 
the term extensively in his book titled Lehrbuch der ärztlichen Seelenkunde (1845), 
which was translated into English in 1847 as The Principles of Medical Psychology. 
Here, he used ‘psychosis’ synonymously with ‘psychopathy’, but offered no explanation 
or rationale for coining this new terminology (Beer, 1995a, p.177). It is possible, 
however, that he borrowed it from Canstatt who is cited several times in his book.  
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 Canstatt, C. (1841b) Die Specielle Pathologie und Therapie. Ekne, Erlangen, p.329. 
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 Canstatt, C. (1843) Handbuch der medicinischen Klinik: Die Specielle Pathologie und Therapie. Ekne, 
Erlangen. 
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 For instance, see - Middleton et al, 2008, p.14; Berrios, 2008, p.362; Laplanche & Pontalis, 1980, p.372; 
Bowman & Rose, 1951, p.162. 
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Whereas the respective descriptions of psychosis by Canstatt and Eisenmann seem 
aetiologically obscure, Feuchtersleben was unambiguous in his view that the aetiology 
of psychosis was both psychic and physical. At the time, a longstanding dispute as to 
the cause of mental illness was still in progress between Somatists and Mentalists 
(Beer, 1995a, p.178). In Feuchtersleben’s (1847, p.68) view, the former “assumes the 
operations of the mind to be an emanation from those of the body, and considers 
mental disorders to be merely bodily ailments”, while the latter “assumes an 
independent operation of the mind, and considers its disorders as purely psychical 
derangements”. Hence, Somatists believed that mental illness was the result of a 
physical aberration, while Mentalists believed that mental illness was the result of a 
psychical aberration. Although Feuchtersleben subscribed to the Mentalist belief 
regarding the mind’s independent nature, he also endorsed a “mixed” view that “sees in 
its derangements a half psychical, half corporeal disease” (ibid). This thinking was 
based on his observation that medical science had erroneously rejected the 
independent psychic reality of human nature in favour of an overly somatic fixation: 
 
If we consider the science of medicine in general, and especially its present 
state, there is perhaps nothing so essential to its advancement as 
psychology, carefully adapted to medical purposes…In the study of 
medicine, the psychical element is almost obscured by the abundance and 
prominence of the somatic portion, and its claims to attention are more 
imperatively felt, when we come to the study of psychiatrics proper - the 
doctrine of the diseases of the mind (p.7). 
  
It is apparent here that Feuchtersleben viewed psychiatric research and practice as an 
ideally psychosomatic venture.  
 
Within this framework of psychosomatic belief, Feuchtersleben engaged in a 
comprehensive analysis of what he called ‘psychosis’ (Psychose) or ‘psychoses’ 
(Psychosen). For example, he discussed psychosis/psychoses in terms of – pathology, 
pathogeny, phrenology, phenomenology, co-morbidity, natural history, cause, course, 
duration, prognosis, forms, signs, symptoms, treatments, cures, and so on. As such, 
even though he may not have coined the term, it is evident that he was the first person 
to flesh it out thoroughly. Broadly speaking, he employed the word ‘psychosis’ (or 
psychopathy) to generically indicate “mental disorders” or “diseases of the personality”: 
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Psychopathies…or diseases of the personality (insanity in the more 
comprehensive sense), is the name we give to those compound conditions, 
in which the psychophysical reciprocal relation is diseased in several 
directions, so that the empirical personality of the individual appears 
therefore to be disturbed – disordered (Feuchtersleben, 1847, p.244). 
 
It is evident from this description that, in Feuchtersleben’s view, psychoses are the 
result of a “reciprocal etiology between body and mind” (ibid, p.261) culminating in a 
series of imbalances within the ‘psychophysical reciprocal relation’. His malleable 
approach of giving equal weight to both sides of the Somatic and Mentalist dispute, and 
investing the new notion of psychosis with a synthetic aetiological character, arguably 
enabled the prospective marriage of both psychological and physiological research. 
Subsequently, the scope for psychiatric investigation was extended from a singular to a 
threefold potential. That is, it was extended from a purely physiological focus, to the 
combination of:  
i) a physiological focus;  
ii) a psychological focus; and  
iii) a dialectical focus that brings both worldviews together.  
However, this opportunity for gleaning a broader psychosomatic understanding of 
psychosis was short lived because it was soon superseded by the development of a 
materialist and biological model of psychiatry.  
 
3.3 Feuchtersleben to Kraepelin: 1840s to 1890s 
After Feuchtersleben’s prolific use of the term ‘psychosis’ in his 1845 treatise, it was 
employed by few writers until adopted fourteen years later by the psychiatrist Carl 
Flemming, at a time when materialist thinking began to supersede the last vestiges of 
German Romantic psychiatry (Beer, 1995a, p.182). Originally, in his book titled The 
Pathology and Treatment of Psychoses (1859), Flemming used the term ‘psychoses’ 
analogously with “mental disorders” (Beer, 1996a, p.275). According to Bürgy (2008, 
p.1206), however, his use of the term specifically inferred “both mental disorders with 
identifiable organic findings and disorders of the soul which were assumed to have an 
organic cause”. Hence, although maintaining its prior generic connotation, Flemming’s 
use of the term ‘psychoses’ constituted a transitional step into “the strong tide of 
organicity” (Beer, 1995b, p.317) and away from Feuchtersleben’s portrayal of a 
psychosomatically-based disease of the personality. His use of ‘psychoses’ as a term 
depicting somatically-based disorders was largely maintained by mainstream German 




The 1890s was an era when psychosis became less a nebulous generic idiom and 
more a reference to discrete forms of psychiatric disorder within nosological 
classification systems. According to Beer (1996a, p.275), it was during this decade that 
the term was “‘hijacked’ by materialistically minded psychiatrists”. For example, in 1891 
the German psychiatrist Julius Koch fashioned a “psychiatric-nosological system” that 
made a clear classificatory distinction between “psychopathic inferiorities” and 
psychoses, whereby the former consisted of “all abnormalities…which influence a 
human’s personal life, but which do not constitute…mental illnesses” (Koch in 
Gutmann, 2008, p.210),22 while the latter referred to three forms of insanity, namely 
“idiopathic, constitutional, and organic psychoses” (ibid, p.209). Similarly, the 
neurologist and psychiatrist Carl Wernicke proposed a multi-tiered classificatory system 
for psychoses in his lecture titled On the Classification of Psychoses (1899), whereby 
the three broad groups of Somatopsychoses, Autopsychoses and Allopsychoses could 
be further divided into twelve sub-categories of psychosis (Beer, 1995a, pp.187-188). 
The nosological systems created by psychiatrists such as Koch and Wernicke 
established a new way of conceptualising psychosis, shifting from a generic to a 
reductionist use of the term.  
 
Hence, throughout this fifty year period, an epistemological transition transpired. First, 
Feuchtersleben’s generic notion of psychosomatic psychoses was stripped of its 
psychological aetiology by Flemming to become a generic notion of somatic 
psychoses, and then transformed again by psychiatrists like Koch and Wernicke into 
discrete forms of somatically-based psychotic disorders. Arguably, this marked a 
gradual transition into a medical-based classificatory model which was further 
consolidated by the binary psychoses model proposed by the prominent psychiatrist 
Emile Kraepelin (see Chapter Four); a model which has prevailed in mainstream 
psychiatry ever since. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
The term ‘psychosis’ has a psychospiritual etymology; however, this meaning was not 
reflected in any of its initial iterations nineteenth century psychiatry, (nor has it been 
since). While Feuchtersleben’s 1845 construal of psychosis as a psychosomatic mental 
disorder enabled the conceptual flexibility to consider its psychological determinants, 
over the ensuing fifty years it was progressively perceived in biogenic terms. As 
evidenced in Chapter Four, this trajectory of biogenic understanding was further 
consolidated by key psychiatric commentators from 1890-1950.     
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Chapter Four 
Understanding Psychosis: Key Psychiatric Influences: 
Kraepelin to Schneider 
 
4.0 Introduction 
This chapter describes and critically appraises the work of four key psychiatrists who 
have fundamentally influenced modern psychiatry’s construal of psychosis. These are: 
Kraepelin’s binary model of psychosis; Bleuler’s coining of the term ‘schizophrenia’; 
Jasper’s phenomenological notion of the incomprehensibility of psychosis; and 
Schneider’s identification of first rank psychotic symptoms. Here, I illustrate the 
“persistent unclarity” (Janzarik, 2003, p.3) of psychiatric depictions of psychosis and 
challenge the recurrent unsubstantiated assertion as to its biological aetiology. 
 
4.1 The Kraepelinian binary model of psychoses 
The German psychiatrist, Emil Kraepelin, established a clinical picture of psychosis 
which has essentially endured within the lexicon of medical psychiatry until present 
day. He has been identified by many commentators as the instigator of modern 
psychiatry due to his introduction of a descriptive classificatory diagnostic model to the 
field. According to Wu & Duan (2015, p.106), the tradition of descriptive psychiatry was 
formally inaugurated with the publication of Kraepelin’s (1921) paper titled 
‘Psychological work experiments’ which subsequently led to him being “regarded as the 
contemporary father of psychiatry”. In the sixth edition of his consistently revised 
psychiatry textbook for students and physicians, Kraepelin (1899) proposed a model 
that reduced psychoses into two definitive types; i) deteriorating disorders clustered 
together as ‘dementia praecox’; and ii) cyclic, non-deteriorating disorders clustered 
together as ‘manic-depressive disorder’ (Gach, 2008, p.393; Jackson, 2008, p.456). 
Hence, the transition from a psychosomatic to a biomedical picture of psychosis 
culminated in his formulation of a binary model of discrete psychoses. This instituted a 
significant crossroads in conceptualising psychosis because he depicted dementia 
praecox and manic-depressive disorder as distinct disease entities. The present-day 
psychotic disorders of schizophrenia and bipolar disorder are its direct descendants.  
 
As with physical disorders, Kraepelin construed psychosis as a structured entity 
identifiable by key characteristic features and symptoms. In regards to dementia 
praecox he maintained that; 
  
the meaning of the term has been extended so as to include a larger group 
of cases appearing in earlier life, characterized by a progressively chronic 
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course with certain fundamental symptoms, of which progressive mental 
deterioration is the most prominent (Kraepelin, 1902, p.152). 
 
Hence, the three key features of dementia praecox were early onset, ongoing 
degeneration, and poor prognosis, while the ‘fundamental symptoms’ included 
“discrepancies between thought and emotion, negativism, stereotypical behaviours, 
hallucinations, delusions and disordered thoughts” (Middleton et al, 2008, p.15). 
Assuming a biological aetiology, he saw “an organic defect as the basis of the illness, 
leading to the destruction of cortical neurons, possibly by a process of ‘auto-
intoxication’” (Hoff, 2003, p.74). Kraepelin distinguished the thought disorders of 
dementia praecox from the morbid affective states of manic-depressive disorder. He 
perceived the aetiologically of manic-depressive illness as comparatively more obscure 
than dementia praecox and noted of the former that;  
 
thus far observation has failed to reveal any characteristic anatomical 
pathological changes. This fact, together with the recurrence of individual 
attacks, mostly independent of external causes, has led to the conclusion 
that the disease depends upon a neuropathic basis, which in the vast 
majority of cases is hereditary (Kraepelin, 1902, p.242). 
 
He also observed that patients with manic-depressive illness had “a later onset and 
better outcome” (Bentall, 1993, p.224). According to Owen et al (2010, p.70), 
Kraepelin’s proposed psychoses taxonomy “introduced order in the previously chaotic 
field of nosology and laid down the foundation for the current classifications of 
psychotic disorders”. However, an investigation of literature relating to Kraepelin’s work 
suggests that his binary model of psychoses only established a stream of quasi-order 
within a continuing chaotic field of differing views.  
 
Although Kraepelin’s classification system marked a major turning point in psychiatric 
thinking, his hypotheses seemingly worked to complicate, rather than simplify, the task 
of understanding psychosis. For instance, contrary to his assertion that dementia 
praecox and manic-depressive disorder were distinct disease entities, a growing body 
of psychiatrists have observed that they are not discrete, but conjoint, for psychotic 
patients often exhibit many of the signs and symptoms common to both (Bentall, 1993, 
p.224). Additionally, Kraepelin’s psychiatric textbook was a work in progress, therefore, 
his descriptions of psychosis consistently changed as he updated his views; a practice 
Read (2004, p.23) rather cynically refers to as “creating the illusion of discovery where 
there is nothing more than yet another meaningless re-categorization”. Yet another 
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complicating factor was the often-vague nature of Kraepelin’s assertions and the 
confused interpretations stemming from these. For instance, in the 1899 edition of his 
psychiatric textbook Kraepelin (1902, p.153) states:  
 
The nature of the disease process in dementia praecox is not known, but it 
seems probable, judging from the clinical course, and especially in those 
cases where there has been rapid deterioration, that there is a definite 
disease process in the brain.   
 
This statement is clearly ambiguous and, indeed, self-contradictory. On the one hand, it 
acknowledges that the cause of dementia praecox is unknown, yet immediately 
proceeds to suggest the probability, and then the certainty, that dementia praecox 
stems from an anatomical flaw in the brain. This unresolved aetiological dilemma has 
continued to feature in psychiatric representations of psychosis since Kraepelin. 
 
Furthermore, there are conflicting views in the literature regarding Kraepelin’s later 
understanding of the aetiology of psychosis. For example, Gilman (2008, pp.466-467) 
notes that although Kraepelin originally conceived of dementia praecox as a somatic 
disease, he later viewed it “as having a psychogenic rather than a somatic etiology”. 
This is seemly corroborated by Jablensky (1987, p.167), who cites Kraepelin as stating, 
in a 1920 article, 23 that “the affective and schizophrenic forms of mental disorder do not 
represent the expression of particular pathological processes, but rather indicate the 
areas of our personality in which these processes unfold”. In saying so, he appears to 
draw a conclusion similar to Feuchtersleben’s original psychosomatic perception of 
psychosis. However, Jaspers (1997 v2, p.853), a contemporary of Kraepelin,24 
unequivocally maintained that; 
 
Kraepelin’s basic conceptual world remained a somatic one which in the 
company of the majority of doctors he held as the only important one for 
medicine, not only as a matter of preference but in an absolute sense. The 
psychological discussions in his Textbook are brilliant in parts and he 
succeeded with them as it were unwittingly. He himself regarded them as 
temporary stopgaps until experiment, microscope and test-tube permitted 
objective observation. 
                                                          
23
 Kraepelin, E. (1920) ‘Die Erscheinungsformen des Irreseins’. Zeitschrift der gesamten Psychiatrie und 
Neurologie. 62: pp.1-29. 
24
 The text referred to here is from a 1997 edition of a book first published by Jaspers in 1913. Hence, the 
reference to its contemporaneity with Kraepilin is meant in the 1913 context. 
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Regardless of whether or not Kraepelin’s original strictly anatomical understanding of 
psychosis later changed to an ambivalent or psychosomatic view, it is apparent that 
mainstream psychiatry has inherited his initial and reductive physical disease theory, 
while overlooking, or ignoring, any later psychosomatic views he may have proffered as 
to the cause of psychosis.  
 
4.2 Bleuler and the advent of schizophrenia 
A further important development in the psychiatric epistemology of psychosis is the 
coining of the term ‘schizophrenia’ by the Swiss psychiatrist and psychologist Eugen 
Bleuler. Bleuler challenged Kraepelin’s notion of dementia praecox and proposed the 
alternative term ‘schizophrenia’ in his book titled Dementia Praecox oder die Gruppe 
der Schizophrenien (1911). He proffered several reasons to support his view that this 
name change was necessary. Clinically, he believed Kraepelin’s picture of dementia 
praecox was inaccurate in terms of prognosis and course. Whereas Kraepelin’s 
prognosis for patients diagnosed with dementia praecox was pessimistic, Bleuler 
(1950, p.8)25 observed that the course of dementia praecox was not always 
degenerative, for many patients recovered: 
 
There is hardly a single psychiatrist who has not heard the argument that 
the whole concept of dementia praecox must be false because there are 
many catatonics and other types who, symptomatologically, should be 
included in Kraepelin’s dementia praecox, and who do not go into complete 
deterioration. 
 
Furthermore, he identified four pragmatic problems regarding both the term and 
concept of ‘dementia praecox’: i) “it seems too awkward”; ii) “it only designates the 
disease, not the diseased”; iii) “it is impossible to derive from it an adjective denoting 
the characteristics of this illness” (ibid, p.7); and iv) a new name was “less apt to be 
misunderstood” (p.8). The latter point was proffered in light of his assessment that 
British psychiatrists had generally misconstrued the essential meaning of  Kraepelin’s 
dementia praecox; that  they “either have ignored or not understood the basic concept 
of this disease-entity” (ibid). Acknowledging that psychiatry, by nature, was a work in 
progress, and that “it is really quite impossible to find a perfect name for concept which 
is still developing and changing” (ibid), Bleuler proposed that his provisional term 
‘schizophrenia’ should supersede Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. 
 
                                                          
25
 Bleuler’s 1911 book was translated into English in 1950. 
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Bleuler’s schizophrenia embodied several clinical refinements pertaining to the nature 
of psychosis which, in his view, were not evident in Kraepelin’s dementia praecox. 
First, in coining the term ‘schizophrenia’, he broadened Kraepelin’s binary model of 
psychoses to denote a singular umbrella term with its constituent varieties of psychotic 
disorders, or schizophrenias (p.8). For Bleuler, the defining characteristic common to 
schizophrenia (singular) and the schizophrenias (plural) was the “more or less clear-cut 
splitting of the psychic functions” (p.9). Also, in contrast to Kraepelin’s perceived course 
of steady degeneration in dementia praecox, Bleuler’s schizophrenia depicted “a group 
of psychoses whose course is at times chronic, at times marked by intermittent attacks, 
and which can stop or retrograde at any stage, but does not permit a full restitutio ad 
integrum” (ibid). He asserted that schizophrenia was diagnosable as a disease entity 
via the presence of certain primary and secondary symptoms, and that it was 
necessary to distinguish between the former (“the symptoms stemming directly from 
the disease process itself”), and the latter (“symptoms which only begin to operate 
when the sick psyche reacts to some internal or external processes”) (p.348). However, 
despite the differences between Kraepelin’s dementia praecox and Bleuler’s 
schizophrenia, they shared in common an ambiguous and biogenic depiction. For 
instance, like Kraepelin, Bleuler (p.349) averred that “we do not as yet know with 
certainty the primary symptoms of the schizophrenic cerebral disease” (p.349). 
Arguably, then, rather than illuminate the clinical picture of psychosis, the advent of 
schizophrenia simply established a different form of ambiguity, shifting from a disease 
entity defined by its course and prognosis, to a disease entity defined by an uncertain 
symptomatology set. 
 
As with his predecessors and contemporaries, Bleuler also underscored the 
fundamental enigma of the process and aetiology of psychosis. For instance, he stated 
that “we assume the presence of a process” (p.461) from which the primary symptoms 
stem, and more candidly that “we do not know what the schizophrenic process actually 
is” (p.466). Similarly, due to the limits of psychiatric knowledge at the time, he was 
unable “to establish valid etiological groups of schizophrenia” (p.242). Additionally, 
although he personally presumed an underlying somatic aetiology for the schizophrenic 
psychoses, he cautioned that “it is not absolutely necessary to assume the presence of 
a physical disease process. It is conceivable that the entire symptomatology may be 
psychically determined” (p.461). Although medical psychiatry gradually accepted 
Bleuler’s schizophrenia into its nosology, his caveat regarding the possible psychic 
aetiology of psychosis has been ignored. In addition, despite Bleuler’s more positive 
prognosis for schizophrenia, psychiatry has generally invested the term with 
“Kraepelin’s original pessimism” (Warner, 2004, p.29). Hence, it appears that 
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psychiatry has exercised a selective bias in choosing from evolving theories about the 
nature of psychosis. Arguably, this sort of epistemological cherry-picking has been 
guided by an underlying bias towards a biogenic understanding of psychosis. 
 
Since its formulation by Bleuler, the term ‘schizophrenia’ has become analogous with 
psychosis and features prominently in the annals of psychiatry. However, despite 
Bleuler’s clear distinction between schizophrenia and dementia praecox, psychiatrists 
often used the terms interchangeably until the former superseded the latter around the 
mid-twentieth century. As Edelston (1949, p.960) wryly observed at the time, “even to-
day the change from dementia praecox to schizophrenia is not much more than an 
alteration in nomenclature, with no corresponding change in understanding”. 
Notwithstanding his intention to clarify the psychiatric conceptualisation of psychosis, 
Bleuler (1950, p.277) also recognised that “our literature is replete with complaints 
about the chaotic state of the systematics of psychoses and every psychiatrist knows 
that it is impossible to come to any common understanding on the basis of the old 
diagnostic labels”. His coining of the new diagnostic label ‘schizophrenia’, then, was 
ostensibly a step toward reconciling this clinical confusion. If so, it was a gesture in 
vain, for research conducted by Jansson & Parnas (2007, p.1178) indicates that 
schizophrenia “remains an elusive entity, and the history of psychiatric research is 
replete with the attempts at formalizing its definition…In fact, since the introduction of 
the concept, psychiatry has produced not less than 40 definitions”. Regardless, the 
term has become ubiquitous within psychiatric nosology where it connotes a psychotic 
type of psychopathology of assumed biological aetiology. 
 
4.3 Jaspers’ phenomenological approach 
The work of German psychiatrist Karl Jaspers played a fundamental role in shaping the 
nosological and diagnostic systems of global mainstream psychiatry, and significantly, 
though inadvertently, influenced the conceptualisation of psychosis as a disorder of 
somatic origin. Mishara & Fusar-Poli (2013, p.278) maintain that Jaspers was “the first 
major psychiatrist to bring scientific foundation to psychopathology” and this foundation 
was principally established via his landmark book titled General Psychopathology 
(1963).26 The impact of his work on the developing epistemology and practice of 
psychiatry has been substantial; a fact iterated by many commentators over the 
decades. For instance, Anderson (1959, p.v) referred to it as “epoch-making”, while 
                                                          
26
 This book was first published in 1913 under the title Allgemeine Psychopathologie (Jaspers, 1913). 
Jaspers made extensive revisions and additions over the next several decades; with seven updated 
editions published in total. The seventh edition (1959) was translated into English and published as 
General Psychopathology. 
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Fusar-Poli (2013, p.268) describes it as “one of those major works that have become a 
classic in psychiatric literature”. In terms of shaping psychiatric thinking and practice, 
Stanghellini (2004, p.31) claims that “the Jasperian approach to the phenomenology of 
madness was practically the law for a whole century in psychopathology”, while Mullen 
(2007, p.113) contends that Jaspers’ work was “to exert a profound influence on the 
development of psychiatry in general and psychiatric nosology in particular. The current 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) and International 
Classification of Diseases both reflect, at least in part, that legacy”. Hence, facets of his 
work were incrementally adopted and adapted to set both the clinical parameters for 
comprehending anomalous mental experiences, and for categorising them into 
diagnosable psychotic disorders.  
 
4.3.1 Key notions and principles of Jaspers’ phenomenological approach 
It is first apposite to outline the key ideas of Jaspers’ work to provide a background 
context for later examining his influential views on psychosis. Jaspers’ overarching 
vision in writing Allgemeine Psychopathologie was to harness phenomenology as a 
scientific medium for better understanding psychopathology and to incorporate this into 
the body of psychiatry. This was his innovative response to an intractable nineteenth 
and early twentieth century debate called Methodenstreit (Methodological 
Controversy), in which opposing camps argued for and against adopting the 
methodology of the natural sciences into the human sciences (Beveridge, 2011, pp.82-
83; Thornton & Schaffner, 2011, p.128). For Jaspers (1968 [1912], pp.1315-1316), the 
key to settling this disagreement was implementing a phenomenological approach:   
 
The first step towards a scientific comprehension must be the sorting out, 
defining, differentiating and describing of specific psychic phenomena, 
which are thereby actualized and are regularly described in specific 
terms...at this stage we must put aside altogether such considerations as 
the relationships between experiences, or their summation as a whole, and 
more especially must we avoid trying to supply any basic constructs or 
frames of reference. We should picture only what is really present in the 
patient's consciousness; anything that has not really presented itself to his 
consciousness is outside our consideration.27 
 
                                                          
27
 This text is quoted from a 1968 English translation of an article Jaspers published in 1912. The 
translated article appears in the British Journal of Psychiatry “on the initiative of Dr. J. N. Curran” (Jaspers, 
1968 [1912], p.1313). 
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In effect, then, Jaspers’ project aimed to resolve this dispute by establishing a 
methodology for “reconciling meanings and causes” (Stanghellini et al, 2013, p.288), 
whereby the concerns of both human and natural sciences, and subjective and 
objective lines of psychopathological inquiry, were considered. 
 
Broadly speaking, Jaspers held that meaning and cause constituted the two primary 
and interrelated lenses for understanding mental disorders. His elucidation on this is 
comprehensive and complex, therefore, only those aspects related to the Jaspersian 
conceptualisations of psychosis adopted by mainstream psychiatry are outlined here. 
For Jaspers, meaning referred to “‘understanding’ or ‘perception of meaning’ – 
Verstehen”, and cause to “‘explanation’ or ‘perception of causal connection’ – Erklären” 
(Jaspers, 1997 v1, p.27). Moreover, he explained that the notion of understanding 
pertains to “the understanding of psychic events ‘from within’” in contrast to the notion 
of explanation which denotes “the appreciation of causal connections, which…can only 
be seen ‘from without’” (ibid, p.28). Further to this, he differentiated between subjective 
and objective modalities – “Objective means everything that can be perceived by the 
senses…Subjective then means everything that can be comprehended by empathy 
into psychic events” (p.26). Hence, his phenomenological approach aimed to foster an 
understanding of a psychopathological event by employing empathy to fashion a 
picture of a person’s subjective experience. The repetition of this procedure with many 
patients over time worked to “provide a theory-neutral set of descriptions from which 
the science of psychiatry could begin” (Owen & Harland, 2007, p.105). Jaspers (1968 
[1912], pp.1313, 1314) referred to this process as the “systematic study of subjective 
experience” which enables a practitioner to draft a compilation of subjective symptoms 
that “cannot be perceived by the sense-organs, but have to be grasped by transferring 
oneself, so to say, into the other individual's psyche; that is, by empathy”. He 
understood that the proficient exercise of empathy essentially entailed an 
abandonment of absolute theories: 
 
We must set aside all outmoded theories, psychological constructs or 
materialist mythologies of cerebral processes; we must turn our attention 
only to that which we can understand as having real existence, and which 
we can differentiate and describe…And so this phenomenological attitude 
is to be acquired only by ever-repeated effort and by the ever renewed 
overcoming of prejudice (ibid, p.1316). 
 
In fact, he underscored the necessity of an atheoretical stance by insisting that 
“phenomenology can gain nothing from theory: it can only lose” (p.1322). The 
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combined application of these notions and principles characterises the 
phenomenological approach. While this approach differentiates psychological 
understandings from causal explanations, it also posits the former as complementary to 
the latter. Together, these constitute a more holistic approach to psychiatric practice 
whereby both modalities of knowledge formation are deemed component parts of the 
science of psychopathology.  
 
4.3.2 The incomprehensibility of psychosis 
Jaspers’ notion of the incomprehensibility of psychosis has been adopted by psychiatry 
as fundamentally delineating psychotic from non-psychotic experiences and has had 
significant sway on the development of psychiatric thinking. Indeed, Estroff (1989, 
p.190) refers to incomprehensibility as “the hallmark of psychosis”. Jaspers asserted 
that the application of his systematic phenomenological approach led to the 
identification of a particular defining feature of psychotic disorders, which he referred to 
as “incomprehensibility” or “ununderstandability” (Stanghellini, 2013, p.168). Hence, in 
his view, the empathic approach generally leads to what he called “genetic 
understanding” whereby “psychic events ‘emerge’ out of each other in a way which we 
understand…our understanding is genetic” (ibid, p.302). In other words, the genesis of 
a presenting clinical problem (i.e. psychic event ‘d’) can be logically traced as the end 
product of a series of preceding causal psychic events (‘a’ > ‘b’ > ‘c’ > ‘d’). In such 
instances, the emergence of a particular psychic event is genetically understandable.  
 
In contrast to most psychological problems, however, which can be empathically 
understood in terms of their discernible genetic unfolding, Jaspers held that a psychotic 
disorder is marked by its “complete inaccessibility to any empathic understanding” 
(1968 [1912], p.1318), for it seemingly “rises spontaneously…and is unrelated to the 
patient’s life-history and experiences” (1997 v1, pp.384-385). Elsewhere he explained 
that such psychic occurrences “appear suddenly as something entirely new…One 
psychic event follows another quite incomprehensibly; it seems to follow arbitrarily 
rather than emerge” (ibid, p.27). For him, psychotic delusions exemplified the 
incomprehensible, as they “cannot be understood in terms of prior psychological origin 
or motivation. They seem to come from nowhere and cannot be derived from anything 
else” (Mishara & Fusar-Poli, 2013, p.279). Jaspers subsequently concluded that “the 
most profound distinction in psychic life seems to be that between what is meaningful 
and allows empathy and what in its particular way is ununderstandable, ‘mad’ in the 
literal sense, schizophrenic psychic life” (Jaspers, 1997 v2, p.577). Psychiatry has 
subsequently recognised incomprehensibility as a defining feature of psychosis. 
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4.3.3 Psychiatry’s biogenic and reductive adaption of Jaspers’ thinking 
Psychiatry not only adopted but also adapted Jaspers’ notion of incomprehensibility to 
buttress its views concerning the ostensible somatic aetiology of psychosis. On this 
point Stanghellini (2004, p.27) maintains that “much of the contemporary medical 
model followed the spirit (if not the letter) of Jaspers’ axiom of incomprehensibility or 
ununderstandability of schizophrenic experiences. It…treated schizophrenia as merely 
an epiphenomenon of some biological dysfunction”. Bentall (2004, p.29) holds a similar 
view, purporting that “the irony” of Jaspers’ enterprise was that “he tried to identify a 
role for psychological explanations in psychiatry. In the process, he gave madness to 
the biologists and inadvertently discouraged the psychological investigation of the 
psychoses”. This is an odd development for he repeatedly expressed the need to be 
cautious of biological reductionism. Indeed, his General Psychopathology is replete 
with statements to this effect. For instance, he referred to the purported relationship 
between the brain and psychic events as “brain mythologies” that are “somatic 
constructions [with] no real basis” (Jaspers, 1997 v1, p.18). Further to this, he warned 
that “we should be particularly wary of regarding known cerebral processes as such 
direct bases for particular psychic events” (Jaspers, 1997 v2, p.460), and elsewhere 
asserted that;  
 
the assumption that what is physical and what is psychic coincide 
somewhere in the brain is pure fantasy, and must always remain an 
untestable hypothesis…It is a vague, general truth that the psyche is tied to 
the body, but how and where this connection takes place fragments into a 
multitude of possibilities awaiting exploration (Jaspers, 1997 v1, p.225). 
 
His views, therefore, seem to offer little leeway for supporting a biogenic psychiatric 
view. While he did state that “one must…assume that many of these psychoses have a 
somatic base which one day will be known” (Jaspers, 1997 v2, p.607), his method 
rejected the adoption and utilisation of any unsubstantiated theory, be it psychological 
or biological, as a presumed factual foundation for clinical research and practice. 
 
Through empathic, methodical and repeated observation, a phenomenological 
approach aimed to identify and systemise the veiled nuances of psychopathological 
experiences and in doing so, emulate the rigour of research development in the 
medical sciences. To further this undertaking, Jaspers (1997 v1, pp.58-60) promoted 
the idea of focussing on the form rather than the content of patients’ experiences and 
collating these into a provisional classification system for diagnostic and empirical 
research purposes (ibid, 43-44; Jaspers, 1997 v2, pp.604, 616). As Walker (1991, 
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p.94) explains, “Jaspers accepts that all experience or knowledge entails both an 
incoming sensation and an organising concept. The former is matter or content, the 
latter is form”. In terms of psychotic symptomology, for example, a hallucination 
constitutes a form of psychotic experience that is the object of phenomenological 
investigation, whereas its subjective content is of no interest in strict observational 
terms (Jaspers, 1997 v1, p.58). However, while this focus on form over content has 
been embedded into psychiatric research and classification systems worldwide, it has 
inclined towards a reductivism which Jaspers eschewed.  
 
Jaspers did not intend his phenomenological views to be used prescriptively or 
reductively by psychiatry, but more as a heuristic tool for advancing understanding. 
Hence, his depiction of psychosis as being incomprehensible was not absolute, but 
provisional. Heinimaa (2008, p.47) alludes to this in positing that “‘incomprehensibility’ 
is not a form of understanding at all, but marks the limits of understanding in human 
life”. In other words, Jaspers was not inferring that psychotic experiences are 
absolutely and irrevocably incomprehensible, but that their comprehension is beyond 
the grasp of conventional modalities for understanding reality. In fact, he warned 
against limiting the scope of traditional psychiatric understanding via reductionism: 
 
The chaos of phenomena should not be blotted out with some diagnostic 
label but bring illumination through the way it is systematically ordered and 
related. Psychiatric diagnosis is too often a sterile running round in circles 
so that only a few phenomena are brought into the orbit of conscious 
knowledge (Jaspers, 1997 v1, p.20). 
 
In other words, although psychosis seems to be incomprehensible, it is not to be 
dismissed as basically meaningless. It therefore seems Jaspers intended his approach 
to be used heuristically, and not reductively, for it allowed scope to incrementally 
understand that which is seemingly incomprehensible as phenomenological research 
was developed and refined.  
 
Some contemporary clinicians and researchers within the field of psychiatry have 
criticised the reductive interpretation and application of Jaspers’ work. For example, 
Jablensky (2013, p.241) holds that a misinterpretation of Jaspers’ notion of 
incomprehensibility has had a limiting effect in psychiatric practice due to “the view that 
psychotic experience is not amenable to psychological understanding”, while Owen & 
Harland (2007, p.105) caution that the “ununderstandability criterion risks casting 
schizophrenic experience into an inhuman light where physiological management and 
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research are all that seem possible”. Indeed, as is argued throughout Focal Settings 
Two-to-Four of my dissertation, psychotic experiences and phenomena are 
considerably more comprehensible when viewed in light of psychospiritual and cross-
cultural considerations. 
  
Overall, it seems Jaspers’ work both opened and closed potential pathways for better 
understanding psychosis. Regarding the former, his introduction of phenomenology 
into psychiatry called for an open-minded observation of psychotic experiences, which, 
free from the blinkers of preconceived theoretical constructs, ostensibly enabled the 
practitioner to delve more deeply into the forms of psychosis and, hopefully, their latent 
meanings. It also required that a psychiatrist engage his or her patients in a caring 
manner, exchanging clinical distance for active listening, in order to “become a fellow-
actor [who] participates in the patient’s destiny and goes through his crisis with him” 
(Jaspers, 1997 v2, p.676). Some commentators have subsequently referred to Jaspers 
as a humanist for advocating this approach (Jablensky, 2013; Ghaemi, 2008; Giorgi, 
1997). In terms of limiting a better understanding of psychosis, Jaspers’ notion of the 
incomprehensibility of psychotic disorders has arguably and ironically been 
misconstrued by psychiatry. Consequently, his thinking has been used to serve 
reductive diagnostic practices and to bolster the biogenic belief that the ultimate 
answers to the enigma of psychosis lay hidden in the physical body, thus limiting the 
primary focus of psychiatric research to an anatomical scope. 
 
4.4 Schneider and ‘morbid’ psychotic disorders of ‘unknown etiology’ 
A final28 key contributor to the evolution of modern psychiatric thinking was the German 
psychiatrist Kurt Schneider. As a student of Kraepelin, Schneider “consolidated and 
developed” his binary classification of psychoses (Beer, 1996b, p.21), and played a 
significant role in refocussing the attention of psychiatric diagnostics to the Kraepelinian 
model during the 1930s (Beer, 1995b, p.319). Hence, he acted as a clinical lynchpin 
between Kraepelinian thinking and the development of modern psychiatry. He also 
generated a set of first and second rank symptoms for diagnosing schizophrenia which 
strongly influenced the development of contemporary psychiatric diagnostics. 
Andreasen & Flaum (1991, p.28) assert that DSM-III “placed great emphasis on 
Schneiderian first-rank symptoms” while Tsuang et al (2000, p.1042) maintain that 
these symptoms “formed the basis of DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia”. As such, he 
was another primary player in medical psychiatry’s clinical trajectory towards 
                                                          
28
 Here, I mean ‘final’ in terms of the specific historical focus of this exposition, and not in an absolute 
sense, as many clinicians and commentators have contributed to the development of psychiatric thinking. 
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construing psychosis as a particular type of biogenic and psychopathological disorder 
that can be diagnosed via the identification of specific symptoms. 
 
4.4.1 Schneider’s model for diagnosing schizophrenia 
Schneider drew and built upon the work of Kraepelin, Bleuler and Jaspers to inform his 
own understanding of psychosis. In devising his diagnostic model, he adopted the 
works of Kraepelin and Bleuler as a baseline for this project and redressed perceived 
limitations within both to invest them with a refined clinical capacity (Nordgaard et al, 
2008, p.137). For instance, he divested Kraepelin’s dementia praecox of its “positivist 
theories and inappropriate clinical characterizations” (Hoenig, 1983, p.554), to propose 
a diagnostic formula that highlighted symptom specificity for identifying the two forms of 
psychosis (Tsuang et al, 2000, p.1042). Additionally, counter to the Kraepelinian 
prognosis of degeneration in dementia praecox, Schneider believed that recovery was 
possible, though rare (Hoenig, 1983, p.554). He also composed a modified and more 
succinct version of the Bleulerian primary symptoms, which he saw as overly vague in 
meaning (ibid) and as “often continuous with normality” (Andreasen, 1997b, p.108). It 
was his conviction that “somatically speaking there are no transitions with normality” in 
psychoses (Schneider in Beer, 1995b, p.319),29 hence, he endorsed the fundamental 
view in medical psychiatry that insanity and sanity are discrete states of being. Jaspers’ 
phenomenological approach also influenced Schneider’s thinking (Huber, 2002, p.52; 
Schneider, 1959, p.v), particularly his rationale regarding the imperviousness of 
psychotic disorders to empathic understanding (i.e. their apparent incomprehensibility) 
(Mundt, 1993, p.1245). Indeed, he played a significant role in helping Jaspers shape 
his fourth edition of General Psychopathology (Huber, 2002, p.50), and was 
subsequently acknowledged in the book’s preface.30 
 
In 1946, when Schneider published the first edition of his book that was later titled 
Klinische Psychopathologie (Clinical Psychopathology),31 many psychiatrists used the 
term ‘psychosis’ loosely in reference to various mental disorders, despite Kraepelin’s 
proposal of a binary model of psychoses. Hence, a driving aspiration of his venture was 
                                                          
29
 This is Beer’s translation of a journal article published by Schneider (1933). 
30
 In the preface to the fourth edition of General Psychopathology, Jaspers (1997 v1, p.xix) states – “I want 
to thank Professor Kurt Schneider of Munich. Not only has he stimulated me with penetrating criticism and 
valuable suggestions but he has greatly encouraged my work through his positive and exacting attitudes”.  
31
 Cutting et al (2016, p.339) explain that Schneider published a book in 1946 “entitled Beiträge zur 
Psychiatrie (Schneider, 1946) which then ran through nine editions. From the third edition, the title became 
Klinische Psychopathologie, and the fifth edition was translated into English as Clinical Psychopathology 
(Schneider, 1946/1959)”. 
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to crystallise the application of psychiatric diagnostics by asserting a more precise 
clinical picture of psychosis (Beer, 1995a, p.195). As Heinimaa (2008, p.29) states; 
 
Schneider dismissed the use of the concept of psychosis in the broad 
sense: for him it was a narrowly defined scientific concept, referring 
specifically to an organic illness, and did not lie on the continuum between 
illness and healthy personality function…He distinguished sharply between 
psychoses and ‘understandable abnormal reactions’. 
 
As such, he was a staunch advocate of “an empiric dualism of psyche and soma” 
(Schneider, 1959, p.1), and his objective was to unambiguously delineate psychosis 
from the throng of other mental disorders by depicting it in psychopathological 
juxtaposition to health and normality, and by stamping it with the status of biological 
disease. This is evident in his assertion of the “fact” that “a psychic disturbance, no 
matter how severe, should never be termed a psychosis if no morbid condition has 
given rise to it” (ibid, p.3). Schneider (p.7) defined a morbid condition as follows – 
“When we speak of morbid psychic disturbances, we mean that they are conditioned by 
organic processes and their functional and local effects. Thus, our concept of 
psychiatric illness is based entirely on morbid bodily change”. In other words, if a 
psychic disturbance is not caused by an underlying somatic malfunction, then it is not a 
psychosis. 
 
In order to instrumentalise this view, Schneider categorised two modes of mental 
illness in Clinical Psychopathology. These were the non-somatic “Abnormal variations 
of psychic life”, and the somatic “Effects of illness” (Beer, 1996c, p.245). The latter 
included the two Kraepelinian forms of psychosis: namely, a “Condition of unknown 
etiology causing schizophrenia” and a “Condition of unknown etiology causing 
cyclothymia” (manic-depressive disorder) (ibid). He subsequently established an 
unequivocal differentiation between psychological and somatic mental disorders, with 
schizophrenia and cyclothymia designated as belonging to the latter. In his own words, 
“psychosis is a matter of disease. In the end one could conclude that schizophrenia is 
an organic-constitutional, perhaps a primary cerebral disorder” (Schneider in Beer, 
1995b, p.319). It is pertinent to note here the incongruity between his classifying 
psychosis as being ‘of unknown etiology’ and his assertion that the cause of psychosis 
is almost certainly anatomical. This reflects the perennial practice throughout the 
history of medical psychiatry of professing a somatic core to psychosis, while 
simultaneously acknowledging its aetiology is yet to be scientifically substantiated.  
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Further to this, Schneider compiled a set of first and second rank symptoms to 
differentiate schizophrenia from cyclothymia and psychological disorders. He upheld 
the value of his suggested first rank symptoms “in helping us to determine the 
diagnosis schizophrenia…from cyclothymia”, and further stated that they “have a 
decisive weight above all others in establishing a differential typology between 
schizophrenia and cyclothymia” (Schneider, 1959, pp.133, 135). These symptoms were 
comprised of “abnormal experiences” in the form of “disturbances in perceptions, 
sensations, feelings, impulses and volition” (Pull, 2002, pp.2-3), or what Carpenter et al 
(2009, p.2032) refer to as “reality distortion phenomena”. According to Bruijnzeel & 
Tandon (2011, p.292), Schneider endorsed Jaspers’ view that psychosis was 
essentially defined by its incomprehensibility, and on this understanding he based the 
formulation of his ranked diagnostic symptoms. Schneider (1959, pp.133-134) listed 
these symptoms as follows: 
 
audible thoughts, voices heard arguing, voices heard commenting on one’s 
actions; the experience of influences playing on the body (somatic passivity 
experiences); thought-withdrawal and other interferences with thought; 
diffusion of thought; delusional perception and all feelings, impulses 
(drives), and volitional acts that are experienced by the patient as the work 
or influence of others. 
 
He maintained that “the decisive clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia” can be made if 
any these signs or symptoms appear in the absence of a known somatic disease (ibid, 
p.134). Hence, they were identified as being emblematic of schizophrenia. His 
proposed second rank schizophrenic symptoms consisted of supplementary 
experiences of diagnostic significance such as “other hallucinations, delusional notions, 
perplexity, depressed and elated mood, experiences of flattened feeling, and so on” 
(ibid). Schneider’s ranked symptom model had significant influence in the formation of 
the modern medical diagnostic system.   
 
4.4.2 Appraising Schneider’s model for diagnosing psychoses 
When considering that Schneider’s work on psychosis was fundamentally informed by 
the works of Kraepelin, Bleuler and Jaspers, it is apposite to appraise its veracity. 
Although the respective works of Kraepelin, Bleuler and Jaspers each represent a 
distinctive attempt to better clinically grasp the enigmatic nature of psychosis, in 
Schneider’s work they are drawn together to mark the end of a particular era of 
psychiatric investigation into the phenomenon of psychosis. Therefore, if Schneider’s 
construal of psychosis represents the incorporation, refinement and culmination of 
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nearly seventy years of psychiatric research into psychosis, does it hold veracity within 
the fabric of its own assertions and assumptions?  
 
Although Schneider’s work may appear to be authoritative and clinically sound at face 
value, it is actually fraught with ambiguity. In particular, this is the case with his ranked 
symptoms for diagnosing schizophrenia and also his contention regarding the likely 
biological aetiology of psychosis. To begin, the clinical validity of his first rank 
symptoms is debatable. For instance, psychiatrists such as Mellor (1970, p.15) claim 
that first rank symptoms possess pragmatic legitimacy because Schneider formulated 
them by drawing on his extensive clinical experience. However, Crichton (1996, p.538) 
maintains that Schneider’s clinical expertise in itself does not constitute medical 
validity, and consequently, psychiatrists “can really only guess how he determined 
which symptoms should be promoted to the first rank”. He also claims “no scientific 
evidence was found in Schneider's writings to establish the special importance of FRS 
[First Rank Symptoms] for the diagnosis of schizophrenia. He presented no data to 
suggest that FRS are anything more than a chance cluster” (ibid, p.539). If so, then 
Schneider’s ranked symptoms are seemingly more supposition than scientific fact.  
 
The ambiguity of his ranked symptoms is further evident in quantitative research 
conducted to test their veracity. When his first rank symptoms were initially utilised on a 
broad scale, they indeed seemed highly effective in identifying schizophrenia. For 
instance, their first widespread use was in 1966, when adopted for their perceived 
diagnostic efficacy by the World Health Organization (WHO), and incorporated into the 
International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS), “a large-scale cross-cultural 
collaborative project carried out simultaneously in nine countries” (Sartorius et al, 1974, 
pp.21, 29). The results of this study indicated that Schneider’s first rank symptoms 
were highly indicative of schizophrenia, for “if they were present, the chance that the 
clinical diagnosis would be schizophrenia was at least 95 percent” (ibid, p.30). Hence, 
at first, Schneider’s first rank symptoms appeared to offer psychiatry a breakthrough 
instrument for understanding and diagnosing schizophrenia. Recent research, 
however, seems to counter this view. For example, Škodlar et al (2008) conducted a 
study to ascertain the incidence of changing symptomatology in psychiatric diagnostics 
in Slovenia from 1881-2000, paying particular attention to change rates after the 
introduction of Schneiderian first rank symptoms. They found that “Schneiderian first-
rank symptoms were reported dramatically more frequently after Schneider’s ideas 
became known”, and tentatively concluded, “we presume that it was the attention of 
clinicians and not actual change in the first-rank symptoms that contributed to the 
increase ascertained in their percentages” (ibid, pp.104, 108). In other words, it is likely 
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that exposure to Schneider’s system of symptoms subjectively influenced clinicians to 
find what they expected to find.32  
 
Schneider’s contradictory reference to ‘morbid’ psychotic disorders of ‘unknown 
etiology’ also casts doubt on the validity of his postulations. The fact that he saw 
psychosis as biogenic is evident in his claim that “we are firmly postulating that 
cyclothymia and schizophrenia are psychopathologic symptoms of some unknown 
illness” and that “there is no question at this point whether some morbid condition does 
in fact underlie these psychopathologic forms” (Schneider, 1959, p.5). Additionally, he 
stressed that “our definition of illness in psychiatry is strictly a medical one…our 
concept of psychiatric illness is based entirely on morbid bodily change” (ibid, p.7). Yet, 
despite this show of biomedical certitude he also concedes that the somatic theory “is 
undoubtedly a confession of faith and it can be contested” (p.10). Elsewhere, he mixes 
concession with assertion in stating that “it is true we have no precise knowledge of the 
basic morbid processes leading to cyclothymia and schizophrenia but that they are in 
fact at the root of these disorders is an extremely well-supported postulate, a well-
founded hypothesis” (p.8). In a similar vein, he concludes: 
 
What then is to be the nature of these psychoses that lack any known 
somatic base? We are totally averse to identifying them as developments 
arising from psychic reaction to experience…We are quite adamant about 
this, though we cannot give conclusive grounds…We stand by our 
hypothesis, therefore, as a heuristic principle (pp.9-10). 
 
This dubious practice of asserting an unsubstantiated biological aetiology of psychosis 
has been a common feature and point of contention within the discipline of medical 
psychiatry since its inauguration. It also represents the prime obstacle to opening 
exploration into possible psychological and psychospiritual causes of psychosis. 
Intriguingly, Schneider acknowledged the vexing fact that “if we were to keep strictly to 
what is actually known…our concept of psychosis, with its accent on basic illness, 
could no longer hold” (p.9). It appears, then, that Schneider’s biomedical-based 
assertions regarding the nature and diagnosis of psychosis have dubious veracity, as 
does the general medical model of psychiatry with its propensity towards reductive 
diagnostics based on unproven biogenic theories. 
 
                                                          
32
  The questionable validity of psychiatry’s use of core symptoms in defining and diagnosing psychotic 
disorders, and the corollary assumption that sanity and insanity are discrete states of being, is critiqued in 
further detail throughout Focal Settings Three and Four of this dissertation. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
Despite six decades (1890-1950) of rigorous psychiatric theorising and research into 
the ostensible biogenic nature of psychosis, it remained enigmatic and 
‘incomprehensible’. Arguably, this was due to psychiatry’s general adherence to an 
unsubstantiated, materialist-based, biogenic view of psychosis, coupled with a 
reductive categorisation approach, which eclipsed the consideration of possible 
psychosocial and psychospiritual determinants in psychosis and stripped its 
symptomatic manifestations of any intrinsic meaning. As will be shown in Chapter Five, 
the advent of a psychoanalytic model of psychiatry in America (1952-1980) temporarily 
stemmed this biogenic trajectory. However, it was firmly reinstated in 1980 and has 





Understanding Psychosis: Historical Developments 
via the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals 
 
5.0 Introduction 
This chapter provides an historical overview of conceptualisations of psychosis 
throughout respective editions of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM). My concomitant critical review identifies key factors that have 
influenced the shift from a psychoanalytic model of psychiatry in DSM-I and DSM-II, to 
a medical model in DSM-III, and a prevailing biomedical model in DSM-IV and DSM-5. 
 
5.1 Background to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders was devised by the 
American Psychiatric Association (APA), as a diagnostic guidebook for clinicians and 
researchers. In terms of this dissertation’s core objective of investigating the notion of 
better understanding psychosis, the DSM manual is of especial interest due to the 
dynamic nature of conceptual developments throughout its history.33 The first edition 
(DSM-I) was published in 1952 and the current edition (DSM-5) was published in 2013. 
According to Kraemer (2008, p.8), “the process of DSM development is analogous to a 
spiral…Each successive iteration is expected to move closer to the true disorder”. 
Overall, then, the DSM series has been provisional in nature, with each edition aiming 
to gradually advance the clinical and aetiological understanding of mental disorders by 
psychiatry.  
 
Since its inception, there have been three key developmental phases within the DSM 
series. The first phase, in DSM-I and DSM-II, reflected a psychodynamic model of 
understanding, while the second phase, in DSM-III, saw a revival of the medical model 
of understanding. Finally, throughout the third phase, in DSM-IV and DSM-5, this 
medical view has been reinforced. For each of these phases and associated manuals, 
this chapter provides: i) an elucidation of key process developments and the resultant 
construal of psychosis; and ii) a critical appraisal of related conceptual issues. The aim 
of doing so is to present an unfolding picture of the variant ways in which psychosis 
                                                          
33
 My rationale for examining only the DSM, and not also the World Health Organisation’s International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), is as follows. Although the ICD contains a section on mental disorders, it 
has not seen the same degree of dynamic change throughout its development as has the DSM. While the 
ICD iterations have generally reflected a medical understanding of psychopathology, the DSM iterations 
reflect both psychodynamic and medical approaches. Hence, an historical and critical investigation of DSM 
developments proffers insights into various factors and forces not evident with ICD that can shape, and 
have shaped, how mainstream psychiatry has understood psychopathology and psychosis. 
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has been understood and to highlight the degree to which social, political and 
economic factors have worked to shape the present and prevailing biomedical view. 
This chapter completes the investigative process for Focal Setting One, beyond which 
the prevailing materialist view of psychosis is challenged and further explored in 
context of psychospiritual considerations throughout Focal Settings Two-to-Four. 
 
5.2 DSM-I and DSM-II: The psychoanalytic model 
Since the 1800s, when psychiatry first emerged as a discipline, it has predominantly 
been governed by a biomedical model of understanding. However, the DSM-I and 
DSM-II manuals reflect a twenty eight year epoch in America during which a 
psychoanalytic model of psychiatry prevailed. The publication of DSM-I by the APA in 
1952 represented a significant development in American and international psychiatry. It 
fulfilled the need to establish a generic classification and nosological system of mental 
disorders for consensus diagnostic purposes, and correspondingly, to create names for 
newly identified post-war disorders (APA, 1968, p.ix). DSM-I also marked the advent of 
an era of psychoanalytic understanding of mental illness in American psychiatry. Its 
success is evident in the fact that it was reprinted twenty times (ibid) before being 
replaced by the DSM-II update in 1968. While DSM-II remained a psychoanalytic-
based manual there were ostensible signs throughout its review process that indicated 
an emergent ideological shift back toward a biomedical model. These dynamics, and 
how they shaped the understanding of psychosis, are examined below.   
 
5.2.1 DSM-I process 
A salient feature of the DSM-I manual was that it superseded psychiatry’s long-
standing biogenic view with a psychogenic theory of mental illness. In contrast to this 
traditional view, DSM-1 highlighted a dialectical interplay between psyche and soma 
which was akin to Feuchtersleben’s original depiction of mental illness and psychosis. 
Although informed by Freudian psychoanalytic theory (Barton, 1987, p.134), the 
manual was fundamentally shaped by the psychobiological theory of the Swiss-born 
American psychiatrist Adolf Meyer, whose work shows the capacity for psychiatrists to 
understand psychopathology as a phenomenon caused by a mix of biological and 
psychic determinants.  
 
Meyer’s complex and comprehensive psychobiological theory and practice had a 
significant influence on American psychiatry during the early-to-mid twentieth century 
(Menninger et al, 1977, p.467; Lidz, 1966) and worked to fundamentally change the 
nature of American psychiatric practice via DSM-I. He rejected the Kraepelinian notion 
of discrete disease entities of purely organic aetiology (Lidz, 1966, p.328), and the 
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biomedical model of psychiatry in general. For instance, he spoke of the “fruitless 
debates” and conceptual cul-de-sacs stemming from “the desire to understand the 
peculiar reaction of mind as signs of irritation or other lesions of its organ, and the effort 
to use in a dogmatic way the medical formula of specific diseases” (Meyer, 1908, 
p.250). From this psychobiological perspective, mental illnesses were viewed as 
“reactions of the personality to psychological, social, and biological factors” (APA, 
1980, p.1). In order to reconcile the classic psyche-soma divide, Meyer proposed that 
“we must expect of the psychiatrist sound medical training along all the specifically 
medicinal lines, but with just as much of a sound grasp on the ‘person and setting’, 
situational and personal, psycho-biological, physiological and sociological and bio-
graphic” (Meyer, 1940, p.275). He maintained that “a ‘science of life’ without full respect 
for life where it lives and as it lives is not true science” (Meyer, 1941, p.156). This view 
was at odds with mainstream psychiatric theory as to the primacy of biological causes 
in mental disorders. 
 
Meyer understood mental illnesses to be stress-induced psychological reactions 
(Gaines, 1992, p.8) and, DSM-I highlighted the pivotal role of stress in activating 
mental illnesses and psychoses: 
 
While it is recognized that multicausal factors operate, the apparent or 
obvious external stress precipitating the condition is to be evaluated as to 
type, degree, and duration. The stress will generally refer to the immediate 
emotional, economic, environmental, or cultural situation which is directly 
related to the reaction manifest in the patient (APA, 1952, p.47). 
 
In adopting key tenets of psychobiological thinking, DSM-I was published as a 
compendium of “Diseases of the Psychobiologic Unit”34 in which “Psychotic Disorders” 
were listed under a section titled “Disorders of Psychogenic Origin or Without Clearly 
Defined Physical Cause or Structural Change in the Brain” (APA, 1952, pp.1, 6). These 
were further subdivided into four types of psychotic reaction; namely, “Affective 
reactions”, “Schizophrenic reactions”, “Paranoid reactions”, and “Psychotic reaction 
without clearly defined structural change, other than above” (ibid, pp.5-6). The term 
“psychotic reaction” was defined as “one in which the personality, in its struggle for 
                                                          
34
 According to Stevenson (1937, p.742); 
 
the psychobiologic unit is the feeling-acting-thinking person, the living man as 
contrasted…with the cadaver…In brief, the psychobiologic unit is the person as he is busied 
with his work, his pleasure, his rest, his growth and creativeness, his safety or whatever else 
may occupy him.  
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adjustment to internal and external stresses, utilizes severe affective disturbance, 
profound autism and withdrawal from reality, and/or formation of delusions or 
hallucinations” (p.12). The advent of this psychosocial model represented a marked 
breakaway from psychiatry’s history of promoting an anatomical conceptualisation of 
psychoses.  
 
5.2.2  DSM-I construal of psychosis 
In DSM-I, psychosis was understood to be a meaningful reaction to environmental 
stressors. However, the manual not only abandoned the premise of a biological 
aetiology for psychoses, but also rejected the identification of psychoses as discrete 
diseases. For instance, the majority of American psychiatrists throughout the 1950s 
believed mental illnesses existed “along a continuum of severity - from neurosis to 
borderline conditions to psychosis”, and that “the boundary between the mentally well 
and the mentally ill is fluid because normal persons can become ill if exposed to severe 
enough trauma” (Wilson, 1993, p.400). This view ushered a unitary conceptualisation 
of psychosis into mainstream psychiatry. In contrast to the discrete disorder model 
endorsed by Kraepelin and adopted by mainstream psychiatry prior to the advent of 
DSM-I, the unitary model conceived of a single form of psychosis which manifested 
variously (Berrios & Beer, 1994). Aetiologically, the unitary model saw the various 
manifestations of psychosis as major stress-related adaptive failures (Wilson, 1993, 
p.400). In DSM-I, then, the “tradition-determined” view of psychoses (Meyer, 1957, 
p.128) was replaced by a mental illness model whereby psychotic reactions were 
understood to be the product of multiple interacting and coalescing forces; 
psychosocial, psychodynamic, cultural and biological. Although as theoretical as the 
traditional biogenic model it replaced, it arguably opened several new research 
avenues for psychiatry to better understand psychosis.  
 
5.2.3 DSM-II process 
After sixteen years in print, DSM-1 was revised and replaced by DSM-II. Broadly 
speaking, the DSM-II revision process represented an attempt to reconcile the DSM 
and ICD frameworks; hence, it was a preliminary step towards establishing a 
multilateral and uniform classification system of mental illnesses. A collaborative 
process transpired between WHO and APA representatives culminating in the 
publication of the revised ICD-8 and DSM-II in 1968 (APA, 1968, pp.xii-xv). Although 
the revised DSM-II was based on the ICD-8 classification of mental disorders (APA, 
1980, p.1), the final product represented a compromise between adapted ICD-8 
categories and existing DSM-I categories (APA, 1968, p.xv). Its publication constituted 
a historical watershed in advancing parity between different international psychiatric 
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classification systems. The upgraded DSM-II manual has been described as “similar to 
DSM-I” (APA, 2000, p.3), however, it appears that the review process resulted in 
significant changes to the construal of mental disorders, including psychosis.  
 
5.2.4 DSM-II construal of psychosis 
The most significant change in DSM-II was the Review Committee’s decision to 
remove the term ‘reaction’ from many disorders, including most of the psychoses. The 
official explanation for this exclusion was that it “tried to avoid terms which carry with 
them implications regarding either the nature of a disorder or its causes”, however, the 
authors assured that this “has not changed the nature of the disorder” (APA, 1968, 
pp.viii–ix). Spitzer & Wilson (1969, p.358) mirrored the official view in assuring that 
“some individuals may interpret this change as a return to a Kraepelinian way of 
thinking, which views mental disorders as fixed disease entities…[but] this was not the 
intent of the APA Committee”. Many clinicians, however, were concerned that this 
omission reflected a significant conceptual or ideological change. Indeed, when 
considering that the aetiological term ‘reactive’ was integral to the unitary 
understanding of mental disorders, it is reasonable to conclude that removing the 
former equates to abandoning the latter. This change was particularly evident in the 
DSM-II psychotic disorders section. For instance, whereas the ‘struggle for adjustment 
to internal and external stresses’ was core to the DSM-I definition for reactive 
psychoses, in DSM-II, the terms ‘reactive’ and ‘stress’ were expunged from the 
psychosis definition (APA, 1968, p.23). This raises the pointed questions – If 
schizophrenic, affective and paranoid illnesses are not reactive psychoses, then what 
type of psychoses are they? And what substantiates the claim that their essential 
psychogenic nature remains unchanged? Arguably, removing the term ‘reactive’ 
represented a fundamental change to the understanding of the nature of psychosis. 
 
While the DSM-II Review Committee officially asserted that psychotic disorders were 
essentially the same, it appears significant changes had occurred, for removing the key 
psychobiological term ‘reaction’ correspondingly suggested a shift away from the DSM-
I understanding that psychosis and other mental disorders were caused by bio-psycho-
social stressors. Hence, it is apposite to suggest that this terminological change in 
DSM-II signified an attempt to precipitate an ideological shift away from ideas of the 
psychobiological aetiology of psychosis, and presumably back towards the biogenic 
model traditionally endorsed by medical psychiatry. The following critical appraisal of 




5.2.5 Conceptual issues 
While the formulation of mental disorder categories within the DSM manual was guided 
by psychiatric research, it was also significantly influenced by administrative and 
ideological factors. Hence, to a considerable degree, the construal of psychosis 
reflected a compromise between clinical observation, administrative expediency, and 
personal opinion. In terms of administration, the manual was created for both 
diagnostic and statistical purposes, with a strong emphasis on expediting the latter. For 
instance, in DSM-I, the descriptive material on mental disorders was about half that 
dedicated to elucidating statistical matters. On this matter, the authors explained that; 
 
the construction of a practical scheme of classification of disease and injury 
for general statistical use involves various compromises…to meet the varied 
requirements of vital statistics offices, hospitals of different types, medical 
services of the armed forces, social insurance organizations, sickness 
surveys, and numerous other agencies (APA, 1952, p.88). 
 
This attention to statistical needs was replicated in DSM-II, in which the reader was 
informed that the “preservation of statistical continuity has been considered at every 
stage in the development of this Manual” (APA, 1968, p.x). Although establishing 
enhanced statistical precision was a laudable goal, this entailed compromising 
epistemological integrity to administrative necessity, and had the effect of construing 
mental disorders as units of measure. Accordingly, Menninger (1969, p.415) critically 
described the DSM-II review process as serving “the interest of pigeonholing for 
statistical purposes”. While such ‘pigeonholing’ enabled easier and effective counting, it 
had the reductive effect of rendering DSM mental illness categories, including the 
psychoses, into ontologically-clipped units-of-measure. Hence, the understanding of 
mental disorders was not based purely on the clinical observation of their respective 
characteristics, but reflected, to a considerable degree, a diagnostic construct shaped 
by the empirical requirements of statisticians. Analogously speaking, this was 
tantamount to proclaiming that water is box-shaped because technicians measure the 
volume of swimming pools in cubic litres. 
 
The revised DSM-II manual was also the product of ideological influences in that 
apparent rudimentary steps were taken to reinvest it with a biomedical character. 
Despite official assurances that DSM-II changes did not signify a move back to a 
medical model, there were indicators that suggested otherwise. For instance, several 
years prior to the commencement of the revision process, Cole & Gerard (1959, p.10) 
observed that, in American psychiatry, “the pendulum is again swinging back a bit 
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toward the importance of material biological factors”. Furthermore, Henry Brill, the 
DSM-II Review Committee Chairman from 1960-1965, was described as having “had 
considerable impact on the form and content of the final classification” in DSM-II (APA, 
1968, p.xv). According to Whitaker (2002, p.156), Brill was a staunch biomedical 
advocate who played a critical role during the late 1950s in influencing “the final stamp 
of science” on the pharmacological treatment of psychiatric disorders. Indeed, two 
years after his nomination as Chairman, Brill (1962, pp.489-490) published an article in 
which he concluded that “it would seem that the clinical foundation for research in 
schizophrenia remains firm. Modified by experience and by technical advances, the 
broad outlines of a true entity appear to emerge more clearly than before”. This 
evidently eschews the DSM-I unitary understanding of psychosis in favour of a 
Kraepelinian ‘disease entity’ view. He also asserted that “failure to get laboratory 
confirmation is not conclusive disproof; it is only failure to find proof…Final laboratory 
correlates of the concept of clinical schizophrenia will soon be established” (ibid, 
p.490). It is, therefore, feasible to assume that the decision to remove the term 
‘reaction’ from DSM-II was influenced by Brill and his biomedical view of 
psychopathology. 
 
Another seemingly ‘hidden’ ideological occurrence was that the draft DSM-II manual 
was sent to only 120 American psychiatrists for evaluation (APA, 1968, p.ix) which led 
Jackson (1969, p.388) to comment – “One is left wondering how these psychiatrists 
were chosen and what biases may have influenced their choice”. Additionally, despite a 
formal declaration that the DSM-II review process “included representatives of many 
views” (APA, 1968, p.ix), proponents of the psychobiological term ‘reactive’ were not 
included in the Review Committee (Gruenberg, 1969, p.371). Contrary to formal 
assurances that DSM-II remained essentially the same as DSM-I, these factors 
constitute reasonable evidence that the beginning of an intentional ideological shift had 
occurred. 
 
This proposition is also supported by the views of various commentators on the DSM-II 
review process. For instance, Jackson (1969, p.388) wryly asserted that “as far as its 
Kraepelinian status is concerned, DSM-II in many respects is a progressive step in a 
backward direction”, while Menninger (1969, p.415) scathingly referred to the expulsion 
of psychobiologic terminology from DSM-II as a “retrogressive action” and “a great step 
backwards”. It may be presumed that the ‘backward’ move implied here is a return to 
viewing psychoses, and other forms of psychopathology, as discrete disorders of 
anatomical aetiology. Others viewed the DSM-II revision process, and particularly 
annulling the term ‘reaction’, as a preemptive step toward reviving a medical model of 
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psychiatry in DSM-III. For example, Skodal (2000, p.432) maintains that expunging the 
word ‘reaction’ from DSM-II “was seen by many as the first sign of a return of a 
Kraepelinian conceptualization” while Rogler (1997, p.10) described the same as 
having “anticipated the paradigm shift in the DSM-III”. When considering these factors 
there are enough circumstantial signs to suggest that, despite formal assurances and 
appearances, the chief DSM-II architects had instigated a nascent ideological shift of a 
biomedical nature in the manual. This was particularly evident in the removal of 
psychobiologic terminology. 
 
Finally, it seems the DSM-II review process was as much political as it was ideological. 
For one, the Review Committee’s declaration that no essential changes had occurred 
in DSM-II arguably represents the use of misleading political rhetoric to deny an 
ideological change that was ostensibly taking place. Additionally, rather than being 
chiefly informed by objective scientific and clinical evidence, the revision process was 
more one of wrangling over differing personal points of view. Indeed, Gruenberg (1969, 
pp.368-374), the 1965 Chairman of the APA Committee on Nomenclature and 
Statistics, described the heated discussions as sometimes reaching “fanatical 
proportions”, which, in his overall view, resulted in “obscuring the existing state of 
knowledge”. No doubt, this also worked to obscure the understanding and depiction of 
psychosis. Overall, while the degree to which ideological and political factors influenced 
the shaping of DSM-II is debatable, these factors had unequivocal sway throughout the 
DSM-III review process. 
 
5.3 DSM-III and DSM-III-R: The medical model revived35 
The 1980 publication of DSM-III represented a tectonic shift in modern psychiatric 
thinking and practice. In America, it saw an explicit change from a psychodynamic 
model of psychiatry back to a model based on the tenets of medical science. If the 
quest to reassert a medical model of psychiatry was veiled and ambiguous in DSM-II, 
then this was not the case with the publication of DSM-III, which was unambiguously 
identified as a manual based on the tenets of medical materialism. This change, which 
                                                          
35
 See Appendix Two for a comprehensive critical appraisal of various factors and forces that influenced 
the DSM-III review process. Although many authors have examined the history of DSM-III’s formulation, 
none have drawn together an exposition that maps the variety of socio-political forces, and other 
determining factors, that collectively influenced its production. Therefore, my extensive research into and 
critical appraisal of this historical transition provides a unique explication of the socio-political and 
economic influences that shaped the reinstitution of a medical model of psychiatry in DSM-III. In terms of 
better understanding the nature of psychosis, it also illuminates the generally invisible dynamics which 
have operated to maintain a restrictive clinical view of this enigmatic phenomenon. Because this body of 
research is too large to include in the main text body, I have presented it as an appendix. 
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was precipitated and orchestrated by a complex mix of converging forces, 
correspondingly saw a significant alteration in how psychosis was understood. 
 
5.3.1 DSM-III process 
The reinstitution of an American medical model of psychiatry with DSM-III was a 
momentous event which ended nearly thirty years of a psychodynamic understanding 
of psychosis and other forms of psychopathology. The magnitude of this change is 
reflected in descriptors used by various authors. For instance, DSM-III has been 
referred to as; “a major turning point” (Klerman, 1984, p.539); a revolutionary 
occurrence (Rogler, 1997, p.10; Decker, 2007, p.350); a “sea change” (Tsuang et al, 
2000, p.1042); a “dramatic shift in orientation” (Gruenberg et al, 2005, p.3); and a 
“major paradigm change” (Heinimaa, 2008, p.50). This change was gradually 
engineered by a minority faction of medically-oriented American psychiatrists who saw 
the psychodynamic nature of DSM-I and DSM-II as overly theoretical. They 
subsequently worked to supersede this in DSM-III with an ostensible “atheoretical” 
model which eschewed assumptions of aetiology in preference for identifying specific 
diagnostic criteria (Spitzer, 1985, p.522). In their view, this process re-established the 
professional legitimacy of psychiatry which, in its psychodynamic form, was censured 
by some as being redundant because it was essentially indiscernible from psychology 
(Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.257; Hackett, 1977, p.434). Klerman (1978, p.106) 
described this transformation as “a Kraepelinian revival”, which seemingly justifies 
Menninger’s aforementioned view that the DSM-II revision represented a return to 
Kraepelinian thinking.  
 
The review process began in 1974 (APA, 1980, p.2). Although there was little initial 
indication of impending ideological changes (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992), these became 
increasingly overt during the ensuing years, culminating in what Healy (2002a, p.304) 
referred to as “a successful palace coup” by medical psychiatrists with the 1980 
publication of DSM-III. While the task force hailed the new manual for its scientific 
value, and Klerman (1984, p.541) optimistically described it as “science in the service 
of healing”, others were less approving. For example, Faust & Miner (1986, p.962, 966) 
referred to it as an empirical “throwback” and “quick fix”, Schacht (1985, p.515) as a 
“political document”, and Vaillant (1984, p.545) as the product of “a bold series of 
choices based on guess, taste, prejudice and hope”. The formulation of DSM-III, then, 
was marked by much controversy and conflict of opinion.  
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The review process saw the instigation of three key developments which reflected its 
ideological shift back to a biomedical model of psychiatry.36 Firstly, a generic definition 
for ‘mental disorder’ was formulated in an attempt to consolidate the discipline’s scope 
of clinical focus (APA, 1980, p.363). According to Spitzer & Endicott (1978, p.15), this 
was a landmark endeavour which had not previously occurred in DSM, ICD, or other 
“standard textbooks of medicine and psychiatry”. A second novel development was the 
formulation of a framework of operational diagnostic categories and criteria, which have 
since been incorporated into global psychiatry (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.250).37 A final 
innovation was the development of a multiaxial evaluation system by which “every case 
be assessed on each of several ‘axes’, each of which refers to a different class of 
information” (APA, 1980, p.23). This consisted of five axes of evaluation, which formed 
a complete clinical picture when combined.38 Overall, these new DSM-III developments 
established a medical model of psychiatry with ostensible increased diagnostic 
reliability, which Allardyce et al, (2010, p.1) define as “diagnostic agreement…among 
practitioners”. They also resulted in consolidating a highly reductive depiction of 
psychosis. 
 
5.3.2  DSM-III construal of psychosis 
The DSM-III project instigated a significant shift in American psychiatric 
conceptualisations of psychosis. Three decades of a psychodynamic understanding of 
psychosis was superseded by a medical model which compressed psychotic 
symptomatology into an operationalised system whereby boxes were progressively 
ticked to arrive at a diagnostic label. This saw the understanding of psychosis narrowed 
to the simple identification of symptoms, with potential psychological determinants 
being eclipsed, or given peripheral clinical value (Blashfield, 1984, p.123). Frances & 
Cooper (1981, p.1199) noted that while this method provided an effective structure for 
collating symptom sets, it was phenomenologically superficial because it “generally 
selects material on the psychological surface”. This change resulted in the reification of 
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 For a more detailed account of these developments, see Appendix Two, Section A2.3. 
37
 In psychiatric terms, a mental disorder is invested with an operational definition as follows: 
  
Instead of stating that the typical features of a disease are features, A, B, C, D and E, etc., 
an unambiguous statement is presented in the operational definition defining precisely how 
much of A, B, C, D and E must be present (or about) to fulfil the definition, e.g. a disorder X 
may be diagnosed if the patient has one of the symptoms listed under A, two of the 
symptoms under B, one of the symptoms under C, etc. Thus proceeding operationally 




 See Appendix Two, Section A2.3.4. 
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psychotic disorders. For example, the construal of schizophrenia as a homogenous 
psychopathological entity was established through a system of operationalised 
selection criteria which represented “a modification of the criteria used in the Research 
Diagnostic Criteria”,39 combined with a selection of Schneider’s first rank symptoms 
(Spitzer, Andreasen & Endicott, 1978, pp.490, 492). In contrast, then, to the unitary 
depiction of schizophrenia in DSM-I and DSM-II, schizophrenia in DSM-III was invested 
with relatively distinct boundaries via operationalised diagnostic criteria.  
 
While the DSM-III authors recognised their diagnostic categories and criteria as 
provisional, these had the general effect of investing mental disorders with an artificial 
solidity. As Andreasen (1997b, p.108) explained, the DSM-III diagnostic criteria were 
“intended only as a ‘provisional consensus agreement’” for ongoing scientific research 
and diagnostic refinement, but became “reified and given power that they were 
originally never intended”. In her view, this was a development that worked to 
“discourage creative or innovative thinking about the psychological and neural 
mechanisms of schizophrenia” (ibid). Overall, then, despite DSM-III medical model 
developments, an understanding of the nature of psychosis remained obscure. 
Arguably, this was largely due to the empirical reification of the diagnostic picture of 
psychosis in DSM-III, which has consequently seen the potential psychological 
determinants of psychosis increasingly eclipsed from the psychiatric picture.  
 
5.3.3 DSM-III-R process 
In 1987, an upgraded manual was published in the form of DSM-III-R. Although some 
minor changes were made, the manual basically followed the same DSM-III formula of 
a categorised descriptive system with operationalised diagnostic criteria. The review 
process began in 1983 when updated research revealed diagnostic shortcomings in 
the recently released DSM-III. As explained by the task force, the manual “needed to 
be reviewed for consistency, clarity, and conceptual accuracy, and revised when 
necessary” (APA, 1987, p.xvii). Accordingly, Mayes & Horwitz (2005, p.264) observed 
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 The Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) is a diagnostic tool fashioned by Spitzer et al (1975). It is an 
adapted version of Feighner et al’s (1972) operational diagnostic criteria for fourteen psychiatric illnesses, 
which in turn, were modelled on a method developed by Robins & Guze (1970, p.983) for “achieving 
diagnostic validity…in five phases: clinical description, laboratory study, exclusion of other disorders, 
follow-up study, and family study”. According to Spitzer, Robins & Endicott (1978, p.1): 
 
The Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC) were formally developed to enable research 
investigators to apply a consistent set of criteria for the description or selection of samples of 
subjects with functional psychiatric illness…The purpose of this approach to psychiatric 
diagnosis is to obtain relatively homogenous groups of subjects who meet specified 
diagnostic criteria. 
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that DSM-III-R “reaffirmed and solidified the transformation of psychiatry and mental 
health that the DSM-III began in 1980”. Hence, the upgraded manual aimed to further 
validate and consolidate the legitimacy of psychiatry as a medical profession. The 
transition from DSM-III to DSM-III-R saw no major clinical changes in 
conceptualisations of psychosis. Indeed, the DSM-III-R definition for ‘psychotic’ 
remained essentially the same as in DSM-III. The only difference was that, while DSM-
III defined ‘psychotic’ as “gross impairment in reality testing” (APA, 1980, p.367), DSM-
III-R redefined it as “gross impairment in reality testing and the creation of a new 
reality” (APA, 1987, p.404). No explanation was provided as to why the extra criterion 
of ‘creating a new reality’ was added or how/if this reflected a new development in 
understanding psychosis.  
 
5.3.4  DSM-III-R construal of psychosis 
Although DSM-III-R saw no major medical changes in relation to psychosis, significant 
changes did occur within a cultural context. While cultural matters had been addressed 
in earlier DSM issues as marginal considerations (APA, 1980, p.188; 1968, pp.21-22; 
1952, p.47), in DSM-III-R they became more central to diagnostic practice, especially in 
consideration of psychotic disorders. Concerning seeming schizophrenic symptoms, for 
example, the manual stipulated that “when an experience or behavior is entirely 
normative for a particular culture…it should not be regarded as pathological” and that 
“the experience of hallucinating the voice of the deceased” is an example of a symptom 
that may be considered culturally normal (APA, 1987, p.xxvi). Additionally, whereas 
DSM-III defined bizarre delusions as a state whereby “content is patently absurd and 
has no possible basis in fact” (APA, 1980, p.188), DSM-III-R redefined them as 
“involving a phenomenon that the person’s culture would regard as totally implausible”; 
for example, “being controlled by a dead person” (APA, 1987, p.194). In justifying this 
cultural addition Kendler et al (1989, p.954) explained that, “a culture-free definition of 
bizarreness is difficult to defend, since what would not be bizarre in one culture (e.g., 
spirit possession) could be bizarre in another”. Although the introduction of a cultural 
context was laudable it was also diagnostically and conceptually problematic. For 
instance, from a purely medical perspective, the presence of bizarre delusions alone 
can warrant a diagnosis of schizophrenia because they are deemed intrinsically 
psychopathological (Pull, 2002, p.3). However, from the perspective of cultural relativity 
it appears that the social context of a bizarre belief, rather than the belief per se, is the 
essential marker of psychopathology. Hence, incorporating cultural relativity into 
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medical psychiatry paradoxically established a situation whereby a defining diagnostic 
psychotic marker may also be construed as not implicitly psychotic.40  
 
5.3.5 Conceptual issues 
The ideological swing from a psychodynamic to a medical model in DSM-III was 
shaped by a complex mix of scientific, social, economic, and political forces which 
converged to mould an understanding of psychosis that has been passed on to 
subsequent DSM editions. First, as a social force, medical-minded advocates 
refashioned psychotic disorders into reified diagnostic entities, thus establishing the 
appearance of improved medical certitude. This group, which became known as “the 
neo-Kraepelinians”, championed key tenets of Kraepelinian thinking as “part of a 
general movement of psychiatry towards greater integration with medicine”, particularly 
the categorisation of mental disorders (Klerman, 1978, pp.104-106).41 Second, forces 
of economic expediency coalesced with this development to influence the diagnostic 
parameters of DSM-III disorders. The foremost influence was from health insurance 
companies which pressured psychiatry to provide medically legitimate diagnoses so as 
to differentiate psychiatric illnesses from non-medical psychological problems (Decker, 
2007, p.345). Consequently, Schacht (1985, p.514) concluded that DSM-III had 
become “an official document that participates in the organization and distribution of 
social and economic power”.42 Third, psychiatry’s political imperative of establishing 
scientific legitimacy and jurisdiction resulted in psychotic disorders being forged in a 
medical mould. As Schacht (ibid, p.516) explained, the belief that science and politics 
should be separate is erroneous because “political forces are an integral part of the 
rational-scientific knowledge-producing process”. He, therefore, asserted that “DSM-III 
is a political document” (p.515); a view mirrored by DSM-III and DSM-III-R task force 
Chair, Robert Spitzer (1985, p.523), who observed midway through the divisive DSM-
III-R review process that the “ultimate outcome will be determined by a political process 
involving rhetoric and negotiation among groups with different goals and perspectives, 
as was the case with DSM-III”.43 Overall, then, it appears that ideological and socio-
economic-political forces considerably influenced the formation of psychotic disorders 
in DSM-III and DSM-III-R. 
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 This conundrum is further examined in Chapter Twelve within a psychospiritual context for it proffers 
potential new pathways for better understanding psychosis. 
41
 See Appendix Two, Section A2.4.1 for further detailed discussion of this issue. 
42
 See Appendix Two, Section A2.4.2 for further detailed discussion of this issue. 
43
 See Appendix Two, Section A2.4.3 for further detailed discussion of this issue. 
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The problems in DSM-III of defining ‘mental disorder’ and the parameters of 
psychiatry’s practice also featured in DSM-III-R. This is evident in Gaines (1992, p.15) 
critique of the ambiguity of definition in DSM-III–R:  
 
In looking at the disorders classified by DSM-III-R, one finds a variety of 
diseases but not an explicit common feature, aside from their 
inclusion...One might well ask, What do all the various disorders listed have 
in common? This very question appears in the Introductions of both DSM-III 
and III-R. Yet, no common element or elements could be offered uniting all 
the pathological conditions, behaviors, emotions, beliefs, states and 
processes. 
 
The inability to define ‘mental disorder’ is a vexing problem for psychiatry because its 
professional legitimacy and jurisdictional scope are dependent on doing so. Without 
this, the designated body of mental disorders have no unifying core that, collectively 
and individually, identifies them as belonging to the psychiatric domain. This important 
issue was not redressed in DSM-III-R. Indeed, it appears that despite assurances as to 
the veracity of DSM disorders, their essential nature remains elusive. It also seems that 
a combination of social, economic and political influences, more than scientific 
evidence, has been the foremost decider about which mental disorders are included in 
each revised manual. Furthermore, these socio-economic and political forces have 
seemingly played a significant role in establishing a reductive medical understanding 
and construal of psychosis in DSM-III and DSM-III-R. 
 
5.4 DSM-IV, DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5: The medical model reinforced 
While DSM-III and DSM-III-R saw the reinstitution and consolidation of a medical 
model of psychiatry in America, the manuals since then (i.e. DSM-IV (1994), DSM-IV-
TR (2002), and DSM-5 (2013))44 have reinforced this model. All three manuals have 
maintained the same basic structure established in DSM-III of descriptive categories 
and operationalised diagnostic criteria, though the multiaxial system became optional in 
DSM-IV and was abandoned in DSM-5. A significant development throughout this era, 
however, was the close relationship formed between psychiatry and pharmaceutical 
companies. This has arguably operated as a socioeconomic force to entrench and 
preserve a medical understanding of psychopathology and psychosis. Also, 
instructions for diagnostic cultural considerations have been substantially advanced. 
                                                          
44
 The shift from Roman to Arabic numerals, that is, from DSM-V to DSM-5, occurred in December 2009 
as an attempt by the task force to distance itself and the manual from the considerable controversy and 
criticisms surrounding the initial DSM-V review process (Decker, 2010, online). 
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While this is a progressive development it has also amplified the aforementioned 
diagnostic conundrum regarding the seeming discord between cultural relativity and 
clinical positivism.45  
 
5.4.1 DSM-IV process 
The diagnostic reign of DSM-III-R was short-lived. In May 1988, only four months after 
its publication, the APA appointed a task force to review the manual in preparation for 
DSM-IV (Kirk & Kutchins, 1992, p.207). Allen Frances was nominated as the new task 
force Chair, and Spitzer was relegated to an advisory role. A chief aim of the DSM-IV 
review process was to achieve improved empirical legitimacy. As explained by Francis, 
Widiger et al (1991, p.171),46 “the major difference between the preparation of DSM-IV 
and that of DSM-III and III-R is its emphasis on explicit review and documentation of 
the available data”. This task was undertaken via “1) comprehensive and systematic 
reviews of the published literature, 2) reanalyses of already-collected data sets, and 3) 
extensive issue-focussed field trials” (APA, 1994, p.xviii). Although the increased 
attention to empirical rigour in DSM-IV represented a proactive diagnostic 
development, by comparison, the necessity for this change arguably implied that the 
empirical processes employed in formulating DSM-III and DSM-III-R were perceived as 
somehow lacking. Indeed, it seems the instigation of the DSM-IV review process, so 
soon after the publication of DSM-III-R, was an attempt by the APA to distance the 
discipline from criticisms about the empirical veracity of the DSM-III manuals. For 
instance, Kirk & Kutchins (1992, p.209) maintained that DSM-III-R was empirically 
dubious because, in their view, its diagnostic categories were arbitrary constructs born 
chiefly of political decision-making processes. Skodal (2000, p.447) later observed that 
“DSM-III and DSM-III-R were both the results of expert group consensus…In contrast, 
each DSM-IV work group was responsible for conducting comprehensive literature 
reviews to explicitly document evidence supporting the fourth edition’s text and criteria”. 
It therefore appears that the DSM-IV empirical upgrade was deemed necessary in 
order to redress criticisms regarding the subjective and political influences inherent to 
formulating the DSM-III manuals.  
 
5.4.2 DSM-IV construal of psychosis 
Although the categories of psychotic disorders in DSM-IV generally remained the same 
as in DSM-III-R, the DSM-IV definition for ‘psychotic’ was markedly different. Whereas 
DSM-III-R provided a descriptive snapshot of various symptomatic manifestations of 
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 See my closing sentence in Section 5.3.4 above. 
46
 In this article Allen Frances’ surname is misspelt as ‘Francis’. I have adopted the incorrect spelling of 
‘Francis’ for citation purposes. 
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the generic psychotic state of “gross impairment in reality testing” (APA, 1987, pp.404-
405), DSM-IV portrayed the psychotic state as manifold, explaining that “different 
disorders in DSM-IV emphasize different aspects of the various definitions of psychotic” 
(APA, 1994, p.770). Put simply, DSM-III-R proffered one essential definition for 
‘psychotic’ as the common denominator for all psychotic disorders, while DSM-IV 
provided several nuanced definitions that respectively reflected different contexts of 
psychotic experience. Additionally, while DSM-III-R clearly depicted impaired reality 
testing as the constitutive marker of psychotic experience, DSM-IV was ambiguous 
about this. For instance, although it stated that “the term [psychotic] has been defined 
conceptually as…a gross impairment in reality testing”, this is proffered as one among 
several definitions, “none of which has achieved universal acceptance” (ibid). 
Consequently, the definition of ‘psychotic’ in DSM-IV seems more ambiguous than in 
DSM-III-R. In terms of psychotic symptomatology, some minor fine-tuning of psychotic 
diagnostic criteria occurred (Tsuang et al, 2000, p.1042) resulting in minimal changes. 
For instance, the duration of active symptoms for schizophrenia was increased from a 
week to a month, and a couple of negative symptoms were added (e.g. alogia and 
avolition) (APA, 1994, p.779). Also, the DSM-III Brief Reactive Psychosis was renamed 
Brief Psychotic Disorder and updated so a diagnosis could be made without the 
presence of a precipitating stressor (ibid). Arguably, this alteration represented a 
further incremental development in the neo-Kraepelinian effort to distance psychiatry 
from psychodynamic principles and terminology.  
 
In DSM-IV the DSM-III-R cross-cultural instruction was significantly upgraded. This 
included four innovations to help cultivate cultural sensitivity:  
i) an ‘Outline for Cultural Formulation’ which provided a “systematic review of 
the individual’s cultural background, the role of the cultural context in the 
expression and evaluation of symptoms and dysfunction, and the effect that 
cultural differences may have on the relationship between the individual 
and the clinician” (APA, 1994, pp.843-844);  
ii) a ‘Glossary of Culture-Bound Syndromes’ which listed “the best-studied 
culture-bound syndromes and idioms of distress that may be encountered 
in clinical practice...and...includes relevant DSM-IV categories when data 
suggest that they should be considered in a diagnostic formulation” (ibid, 
pp.844-849);  
iii) discussions and descriptions throughout the manual about “specific cultural 
factors relating to many of the axis I and axis II disorders” (Turner et al, 
1995, p.442); and  
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iv) a new V-Code (62.89) titled ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ (APA, 1994, 
p.685).47 
Prior to publication, the DSM-IV Cultural Committee proposed that cultural 
considerations about schizophrenia be given diagnostic primacy (Jenkins, 1998, 
p.361), however, the task force did not accept this proposition and relegated cultural 
concerns to the multiaxial system of optional diagnostic considerations (APA, 1994, 
p.843). This presumably set cultural considerations in diagnosing psychotic disorders 
as an optional adjunct. Additionally, the manual proffered the perplexing instruction that 
“determining whether a behavior is normative or pathological” is dependent on “cultural 
elements of the relationship between the individual and the clinician” (ibid, p.844). How 
this translates to discerning between psychotic and culturally normative situations is 
very vague. What exactly is inferred by the notion of ‘cultural elements of the 
relationship’? Does this speak of the level of proficiency in intercultural communication 
between patient and clinician? If so, is the incidence of the diagnosis of psychosis 
proportionate to achieved levels of intercultural proficiency (i.e. more proficient 
intercultural communication between clinician and patient results in less misdiagnoses 
of psychosis)? And why may a given behaviour be deemed essentially psychotic in a 
Western cultural context but not in a non-Western cultural context? Again, it appears 
the introduction of cultural relativity to a medical framework of psychiatry has raised 
many such questions and conundrums in relation to diagnosing psychotic disorders.  
 
Finally, it is pertinent to note that psychiatry forged deeper ties with drug companies 
after the publication of DSM-IV, resulting in the advancement of a biomedical 
understanding of psychosis and the promotion of physical (i.e. pharmaceutical) 
treatments. Indeed, all six members of the DSM-IV Schizophrenia and Other Psychotic 
Disorders Work Group had financial ties to drug companies (Cosgrove et al, 2006, 
p.154),48 which ostensibly influenced how psychosis was construed in the manual. Yet, 
despite this biogenic trend, DSM-IV acknowledged that “no laboratory findings have 
been identified that are diagnostic of Schizophrenia” (APA, 1994, p.280). Biogenic 
assertions by psychiatrists and drug companies have increasingly shaped the construal 
of psychosis beyond DSM-IV, despite the lack of substantiating biological evidence. 
This significant issue is further examined below in Section 5.4.4. 
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 The transpersonal origins of the ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ category, and dynamics pertaining to its 
eventual inclusion in DSM-IV, are examined in Chapter Seven, Section 7.1. 
48
 Cosgrove et al (2006, pp.154, 158) interviewed 170 DSM-IV panel members regarding their financial 
links with the pharmaceutical industry, of which, 95 (56%) indicated having such ties. 
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5.4.3 DSM-IV-TR process 
The DSM-IV-TR review process was, again, headed by Allen Frances, with the 
upgraded manual being published in 2000. This process began in 1997 (APA, 2000, 
p.xxix) with the updated text and structure remaining much the same as in DSM-IV. As 
stated by the authors, “no substantive changes in the criteria sets were considered, nor 
were any proposals entertained for new disorders, new subtypes, or changes in the 
status of the DSM-IV appendix categories” (ibid). However, some moderations were 
made. Whereas the DSM-IV task force chiefly aimed to invest the manual with a 
sounder empirical research foundation, the DSM-IV-TR task force worked to update 
and fine-tune the original content. Overall, this entailed a detailed revision of DSM-IV 
content and related literature in order to update the descriptive text. The authors 
described this as a process of “reviewing the text carefully to identify errors or 
omissions and then conducting a systematic, comprehensive literature review that 
focused on relevant material that has been published since 1992” (p.xxx). DSM-IV-TR 
also operated as a bridging document between DSM-IV and DSM-5 (p.xxix). The final 
published product was only fifty seven pages longer than its predecessor with much of 
the content remaining the same. 
 
5.4.4 DSM-IV-TR construal of psychosis 
The bulk of DSM-IV-TR text regarding psychotic disorders replicated that in DSM-IV. 
There were few changes to the psychotic disorders section of the updated manual and 
no changes to the cross-cultural section. However, two updates in the DSM-IV-TR 
‘Schizophrenia and Other Disorders’ section ostensibly reflect efforts to consolidate a 
medical and biogenic understanding of psychosis. First, the DSM-IV term psychotic 
“disturbance” (APA, 1994, p.274) was changed to read as psychotic “disorder” in DSM-
IV-TR (APA, 2000, p.298). No explanation is given for this change. At face value this 
may appear to be inconsequential, however, it possibly represents an intentional 
attempt to invest the term ‘psychotic’ with a more medically concrete meaning (i.e. 
whereas the term ‘disturbance’ is ambiguous and has a psychological connotation, the 
term ‘disorder’ is more medical in connotation). A second notable change was evident 
in the DSM-IV-TR Schizophrenia ‘Associated laboratory findings’ text. This section 
reported on neurophysiological research which found apparent anatomical aberrations 
in schizophrenic patients that did not occur in control groups. The DSM-IV-TR version 
was about triple the length of that in DSM-IV and also included a bio-aetiological 
emphasis that was absent in DSM-IV (APA, 2000, pp.305-306; 1994, p.280).For 
instance, the DSM-IV-TR version suggested that this neurophysiological finding “may 
have important pathophysiological implications, because it is suggestive of an early 
(i.e. prenatal) midline developmental brain abnormality” (APA, 2000, p.305). This 
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identification of causality as ‘prenatal’ represents a distinct leaning towards a biogenic 
and genetic construal of schizophrenia for it proscribes possible psychosocial or 
environmental determinants.  
 
5.4.5 DSM-5 process  
DSM-5 was published in 2013 and is the seventh and latest manual in the DSM series. 
Compared to other medical model DSM updates the DSM-5 review process was a 
somewhat protracted affair. The first phase began in 1999 with an appraisal of the 
DSM conceptualisation of mental disorders, and culminated with the 2002 publication 
of a conference proceedings monograph (Kupfer et al, 2002) titled A Research Agenda 
for DSM-V (APA, 2013, p.6). The next five year phase, from 2003 to 2008, consisted of 
“13 international DSM-5 research planning conferences, involving 400 participants from 
39 countries, to review the world literature in specific diagnostic areas to prepare for 
revisions in developing both DSM-5”; the selection of David Kupfer as task force Chair 
in 2006; and the inauguration of the task force in 2007 (ibid, pp.6-7). Finally, the 
ensuing years, until the manual’s publication in 2013, involved an intensive process of; 
 
conducting literature reviews and secondary analyses, publishing research 
reports in scientific journals, developing draft diagnostic criteria, posting 
preliminary drafts on the DSM-5 Web site for public comment, presenting 
preliminary findings at professional meetings, performing field trials, and 
revising criteria and text (p.7).  
 
Since then a new work group has formed to consider possible changes for the next 
planned update in the form of DSM-5.1 (APA, 2016; Appelbaum, c2015). Hence, the 
DSM series remains a provisional work in progress. 
 
Despite this rigorous process of extensive research and multiple reviews, the DSM-5 
project was plagued by controversy and marked by criticism from many quarters, far 
beyond that which occurred with its predecessors. Overall, key points of concern were 
that:  
 the review process lacked adequate transparency;  
 proposed new diagnostic parameters threatened to include normal human 
behaviours and experiences within the threshold of psychopathology; and 
 many task force members had a conflict of interest due to close ties and 
investments with pharmaceutical companies.49  
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 For more details on these and other related issues see – Funnell, 2014; Frances, 2013a; American 
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This controversy was exacerbated by the fact that two prior DSM task force Chairs, 
Robert Spitzer and Allen Frances, were among the most vocal of critics (Greenberg, 
2010). In light of the controversy surrounding DSM-5, Katschnig (2010, p.21) 
rhetorically questioned whether or not psychiatrists were becoming “an endangered 
species” due to the dubious “validity of psychiatry’s diagnostic definitions and 
classification systems”. Indeed, soon after the publication of DSM-5, Funnell (2014) 
reported that “psychiatry is currently experiencing a global schism” and that 
psychiatrists were “split on whether to ditch DSM” due to inherent problems with its 
observational and symptoms-based categorical approach. Additionally, due to the 
manual’s many issues, there were calls from numerous fronts to boycott it when 
published; an occurrence which Frances (2013b) described as “completely 
understandable [because] there is lots in DSM 5 to be angry at or frightened about”. 
Yet, despite such robust criticism from prominent psychiatrists, the manual has been 
published and now represents the latest iteration of expert opinion on psychosis and 
other forms of psychopathology. 
 
The DSM-5 review process also entailed updates to cultural considerations and the 
ongoing attempt to define mental illness. Several cultural-related changes and 
additions were made. The Outline for Cultural Formulation, which first appeared in 
DSM-IV, was updated; a ‘Glossary of Cultural Concepts of Distress’ was composed; 
and a new comprehensive ‘Cultural Formulation Interview’ was included (APA, 2013, 
pp.749-757, 833-837). However, the updated DSM-5 definition of ‘mental disorder’ 
remained essentially the same as definitions proffered in the DSM-III and DSM-IV 
manuals. This ongoing quest to formulate a basic definition for ‘mental disorder’ is 
understandable because it delineates the parameters of clinical focus for the discipline 
of psychiatry. Without such a definition psychiatry’s operational field is rendered vague, 
as are related factors such as diagnostic reliability, treatment approaches, clinical 
research data and medical rebate coverage for patients. However, a dilemma for 
psychiatry is that this ultimately appears to be an impossible task.  
 
Finally, a significant new development in DSM-5 was the suggestion that a dimensional 
model should supersede the traditional categorical model due to apparent deficits in 
the latter (ibid, p.5). For example, the task force maintained that: 
 “a too-rigid categorical system does not capture clinical experience or 
important scientific observations” (p.5); 
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 a transition to a dimensional model was a way to reduce “the inevitable 
reification that occurs with diagnostic conceptual approaches” (p.9); 
 “identifying homogeneous populations for treatment and research resulted 
in narrow diagnostic categories that did not capture clinical reality” (p.12); 
 and “the historical aspiration of achieving diagnostic homogeneity by 
progressive subtyping within disorder categories no longer is sensible; like 
most common human ills, mental disorders are heterogeneous at many 
levels” (ibid). 
However, the task force decided that, despite these factors, DSM-5 would maintain the 
traditional categorical model (p.13). It therefore appears that a future transition to a 
dimensional diagnostic model is imminent. 
 
5.4.6 DSM-5 construal of psychosis 
In general, the construal of psychosis in DSM-5 has remained much the same as in the 
DSM-IV series. For instance, the manual’s section titled ‘Highlights of Changes from 
DSM-IV to DSM-5’ has only a brief paragraph explicating some minor modifications to 
diagnostic criteria for several types of psychotic disorder (APA, 2013, p.810), including 
two alterations to the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia (see Table 2).   
 
Table 2 – Comparative DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5 Criterion A diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia  
Criterion A Diagnostic Criteria for Schizophrenia 
DSM-IV-TR  DSM-5 
A. Characteristic symptoms: Two (or 
more) of the following, each present for 
a significant portion of time during a 1-





3. disorganized speech (e.g., frequent 
derailment or incoherence). 
4. grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior. 
5. negative symptoms i.e., affective 
flattening, alogia, or avolition 
 
A. Two (or more) of the following, each 
present for a significant portion of time 
during a 1-month period (or less if 
successfully treated). At least one of 




3. Disorganized speech (e.g., frequent 
derailment or incoherence). 
4. Grossly disorganized or catatonic 
behavior. 
5. Negative symptoms (i.e., diminished 
emotional expression or avolition). 
(APA, 2013, p.99) 
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Note: Only one Criterion A symptom is 
required if delusions are bizarre or 
hallucinations consist of a voice 
keeping up a running commentary on 
the person’s behaviour or thoughts, or 
two or more voices conversing with 
each other.  
(APA, 2000, p.312) 
 
The most obvious change here is that the DSM-IV-TR note pertaining to Criterion A 
symptoms (i.e. bizarre delusions and particular manifestations of auditory 
hallucinations) has been removed from the DSM-5 diagnostic criteria specifications. 
Additionally, while DSM-IV-TR allowed a diagnosis of schizophrenia to be made in the 
absence of delusions, hallucinations, or disorganised speech (e.g. if negative 
symptoms combined with grossly disorganized or catatonic behaviour occurred), this is 
no longer possible in DSM-5 for primary diagnosis has been restricted to the first three 
Criterion A symptoms. The DSM-5 authors have proffered no explanation for these 
diagnostic changes.   
 
A final point of note is the apparent increased emphasis on advancing an empiric and 
biogenic understanding of psychosis in DSM-5. This is not so much evident in text 
pertaining to the main diagnostic categories, but in forward-looking statements 
regarding future psychiatric research and practice. For instance, the new provisional 
dimensional assessment measure provided in DSM-5 is hailed for its promise to aid in 
the identification of “neurobiological deficits” and “pathophysiological mechanisms” 
(APA, 2013, p.89). Furthermore, although psychological determinants are discussed, 
they are couched in bio-empirical language. For example, the assertion that “clinical 
neuropsychological assessment can help diagnosis and treatment” (ibid, p.90), 
seemingly anchors psychological determinants into a neurobiological frame. Indeed, 
this heightened trend towards developing a mechanistic and scientific view of 
psychosis, in both physiological and psychological terms, is evidenced in the DSM-5 
review process book titled Deconstructing Psychosis: Refining the Research Agenda 
for DSM-V (Tamminga et el, 2010). In this text, which guides present psychosis 
research by mainstream psychiatry, Regier (2010, pp.xvii-xix) asserts that “we will 
incorporate into our current understanding of psychosis new information gleaned from 
research now under way”, which includes a particular focus on “somatic, or 
somatoform, features of mental illness” and a general focus on “multiple areas, ranging 
from molecular genetics to brain imaging to social, behavioural, and anthropological 
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science”. This view clearly places primacy upon scientific biological research. Indeed, 
Gur et al (2010, p.111) maintain that using brain imaging methods in psychosis 
research will “enable integration of genetic and neuroimaging paradigms in our efforts 
to elucidate neurobiological mechanisms that underlie these disorders” [italics added]. 
To reiterate, this emphasis on biological research approach to better understanding 
psychosis is highly restrictive, for it fails to give due consideration to the possibility that 
psychosocial and psychospiritual factors may be fundamental in effecting psychotic or 
psychotic-like human experiences. 
 
5.4.7 Conceptual issues 
A prominent and controversial issue in the DSM-5 review process was the relationship 
between psychiatry and the pharmaceutical industry. This has been particularly so in 
regards to the apparent play of pharmaceutical companies in shaping psychiatric 
diagnostics. Indeed, some commentators have alleged that political and fiscal interests, 
rather than good science, are increasingly shaping psychiatric diagnostics. For 
instance, Pilecki et al (2011, pp.197, 199) propose that; 
 
at the very least such a high degree of financial connectedness constituted 
a powerful influence on the decision making process that produced the 
DSM-IV…At worst, these relationships may indicate that psychology and 
psychiatry are increasingly shaped and influenced by profit-seeking 
corporations who are exerting their economic powers in self-serving ways. 
 
Furthermore, Robbins et al (2011, p.33) have concluded from their investigation into 
this issue that “current psychiatric research and practice have become so biased by 
economic interests that the public health of patients served by psychiatry may hang in 
the balance”. This issue, which began with DSM-IV, has continued in DSM-5. For 
example, the task Force Chair, David Kupfer, was listed as having close ties with 
multiple drug companies (Citizens Commission on Human Rights, 2009) while about a 
third of the authors who contributed to the DSM-5 psychosis research text titled 
Deconstructing Psychosis: Refining the Research Agenda for DSM-V, had declared 
financial or professional ties with pharmaceutical industries (Tamminga et el, 2010, 
pp.xii-xiii). In fact, Frances (2009) viewed the DSM-5 project as a move by medical 
psychiatry to fulfil “their ambition to achieve a paradigm shift when there is no scientific 
basis for one”, and scathingly predicted the consequent;  
 
wholesale imperial medicalization of normality that will trivialize mental 
disorder and lead to a deluge of unneeded medication treatments—a 
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bonanza for the pharmaceutical industry but at a huge cost to the new 
false-positive patients caught in the excessively wide DSM-V net. 
 
In consideration of this issue, it appears that the perception and formation of psychiatric 
diagnostic categories is being influenced by the pharmaceutical industry which wishes 
to maintain a medical model of psychiatry so as to boost its profits via the sale of 
psychiatric medications.  
 
A related and significant issue is the ongoing quest by psychiatry to scientifically 
identify the putative biological cause of psychosis; an endeavour which has intensified 
with the DSM-5 review process. While the DSM-5 manual’s prominent inclusion of a 
biogenic focus for better understanding mental disorders offers a valid pathway for 
better understanding the enigma of psychosis, it is arguably problematic when posed 
as the ultimate investigative method, for this effectively eclipses other potential 
investigative pathways, such as psychosocial and psychospiritual approaches. Indeed, 
there is no substantive evidence to support the biogenic theory of psychopathology and 
psychosis. As Frances (2009) observed when contesting the validity of updated and 
newly formulated DSM-5 mental disorder categories, “not even 1 biological test is 
ready for inclusion in the criteria sets for DSM-V”. In this light, Andreasen (2005) 
contends that:  
 
We tend to over-biologise, we oversimplify the mechanisms of mental 
illness: in a reductionist framework, depression is a serotonin disease, 
schizophrenia a dopamine disease. But if we look only at brains, we fail to 
recognise the important role that personal life experiences may play in 
losing our minds. 
 
Here, she clearly warns against adopting an overly stringent biomedical approach and, 
correspondingly, advocates the value and clinical importance of considering 
psychosocial determinants in the quest to better understand psychosis. Arguably, then,  
present and prevailing biogenic view enables only limited scope for better 
understanding the enigmatic complexities of psychotic experience, while the forces and 
factors that hold this view in place largely proscribe an investigation by psychiatry into 
possible psychospiritual determents in psychosis.  
 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter’s critical examination of DSM depictions of psychosis culminates my Focal 
Setting One exposition. While psychiatry has viewed psychosis variously throughout its 
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history, including psychosomatic and psychoanalytic understandings, a prevailing 
biogenic trend is evident. However, socioeconomic and political factors, more than 
robust science, have apparently shaped these conceptual iterations. The consideration 
of possible psychospiritual determinants has generally been absent throughout this 
history of understanding psychosis, which seemingly suggests such investigation is 
antithetical to psychiatric research. The ensuing Focal Setting Two examination of 
marginal yet significant occurrences of psychospiritual research within mainstream 










FOCAL SETTING TWO 
 








Focal Setting Two aims to demonstrate that, while psychiatry has traditionally 
eschewed psychospiritual considerations, such investigation is possible. This sets the 
conceptual stage for my deeper investigation of the psychosis-psychospiritual nexus 







An Historical Overview of Psychospiritual Considerations by Psychiatry:  
Part One: Pre-1980 
 
6.0 Introduction 
This chapter aims to challenge the view that psychospiritual considerations are 
essentially extraneous to psychiatric practice and discourse by examining three 
significant pre-1980 occurrences within mainstream psychiatry that counter this view. 
These are: assertions by APA presidents as to the psychiatric relevance of 
psychospiritual matters; Dean’s notions of metapsychiatry and ultraconsciousness; and 
the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry’s (GAP) investigative report on 
mysticism. 
 
6.1 Psychospiritual assertions by APA presidents  
Since the late 1800s, at least three APA presidents have championed the importance 
of psychospiritual considerations in psychiatry.50 Although their views do not reflect 
those of the psychiatric majority, they do demonstrate that mainstream psychiatry is not 
devoid of psychospiritual standpoints.  
 
6.1.1 Richard M. Bucke 
Richard Bucke, the 1890 president of the then American Medico-Psychological 
Association (now the APA), exemplified the bringing together of metaphysical and 
psychiatric concerns. Integral to his work was the notion of ‘Cosmic Consciousness’, a 
phrase he coined after a brief experience of mystical illumination in 1872, at the age of 
thirty six (Bucke, 1901, pp.9-10). He presented a paper on Cosmic Consciousness at 
the Association’s annual meeting in Philadelphia on 18 May 1894 where he proposed 
that the human mind was verging on a further phase of evolutionary development: 
 
Cosmic Consciousness is not simply an expansion or extension of the self 
conscious mind with which we are all familiar, but the superaddition of a 
function as distinct from any possessed by the average man as self 
consciousness is distinct from any function possessed by one of the higher 
animals (1894, p.7). 
 
Hence, he understood Cosmic Consciousness as representing a transformative 
paradigm shift in the evolutionary development of humanity. He described this as “a 
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consciousness of the Cosmos...a consciousness of the life and order of the universe; 
not...a knowledge of this, but a consciousness of it” (ibid, p.10), and also referred to it 
variously as a state of “intellectual illumination” (ibid), “instantaneous illumination” 
(p.12), and an “unusual spirituality” (p.14). In his view, this state of consciousness 
represented the pinnacle of human evolution.   
 
Bucke’s treatise on Cosmic Consciousness ostensibly represents the first, if not only, 
instance within mainstream psychiatry whereby a psychospiritual aetiology of 
psychosis is proposed. While others have noted correlations between 
psychopathological and psychospiritual experiences, Bucke is unique in depicting the 
former as having its causal roots in the latter. He hypothesised that, in human 
evolution, newly emergent faculties initially appear and develop within relatively few 
people of a particular race, and that these faculties are often tenuous and unstable 
(Bucke, 1897, p.645). Cosmic Consciousness, in his view, characterised such an 
embryonic faculty. Furthermore, in keeping with the social Darwinist belief of the time, 
he maintained that, due to its advanced mental status, the Aryan race was at the 
vanguard of an evolutionary transition from self consciousness into Cosmic 
Consciousness, and that cases of insanity signified unstable instances of this faculty 
emerging (ibid). He summarised the key evolutionary dynamics pertaining to this as 
follows:  
i) The stability of a faculty in the individual depends upon its age in the 
race. The older the faculty the more stable it is, and the less old the 
less stable. 
ii) The race whose evolution is most rapid will be the most subject to 
breakdown. 
iii) Those functions in any given race whose evolutions are the most 
rapid will be the most subject to breakdown. 
iv) In the more progressive families of the Aryan race the mental 
faculties have for some millenniums last past developed with great 
rapidity. 
v) In this race the large number of mental breakdowns, commonly called 
insanity, are due to the rapid and recent evolution of those faculties in 
that race (Bucke, 1901, p.59). 
Accordingly, he concluded that the high incidence of insanity in America and Europe 
was the result of “the rapid evolution in late millenniums of the mind of the Aryan 
people”, while, conversely, for other races of supposedly less mental advancement, 
such as “the negro race…savages and semi-savages there exists comparatively little 
insanity” (Bucke, 1901, p.60). In fact, he identified this transformative process as the 
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near universal cause of insanity, stating that “the rapid mental evolution of the so-called 
Aryan peoples in the last four or five thousand years, is almost solely responsible for 
the large number of cases of insanity in the modern civilised world” (Bucke, 1897, 
p.645). Objectionable racial elitism aside, this view largely depicts madness as being 
an inevitable part of an unfolding metaphysical evolutionary process, and as disruptive 
and harrowing as it might seem, it actually heralds the emergence of an eventual 
apotheosis of human evolution via the achievement of Cosmic Consciousness. Hence, 
Bucke’s notion of Cosmic Consciousness depicts the aetiology of mental disorders as 
fundamentally psychospiritual. 
 
Bucke’s work also represents the apparent first attempt within mainstream psychiatry to 
differentiate psychopathological from metaphysical experiences. For instance, he 
explained that;  
 
in every, or nearly every, man who enters into cosmic consciousness 
apprehension is at first more or less excited, the person doubting whether 
the new sense may not be a symptom or form of insanity. The first thing 
each person asks himself upon experiencing the new sense is: Does what I 
see and feel represent reality or am I suffering from a delusion?...How, then, 
shall we know that this is a new sense, revealing fact, and not a form of 
insanity, plunging its subject into delusion? (Bucke, 1901, pp.69-70). 
 
His response to this conundrum was to identify four differentiation criteria for discerning 
psychopathological from psychospiritual experiences. In short, these were that:  
i) the predispositions of those experiencing psychopathology are “distinctly 
amoral or even immoral”, while those experiencing Cosmic Consciousness 
“are moral in a very high degree”;  
ii) “self-restraint” or “inhibition” is diminished in the former and enhanced in the 
latter;   
iii) “if...cosmic consciousness is a form of insanity, we are confronted by the 
terrible fact...that our civilization, including all our highest religions, rests on 
delusion”; and  
iv) there exists a high degree of epistemological and experiential concord 
between of those who have experienced Cosmic Consciousness throughout 
history (ibid, pp.71-72).  
Arguably, the latter two points are more an attempt at validating the experience of 
Cosmic Consciousness, for they seem to stray from the objective of differentiating 
insanity from valid mystical experience. This issue aside, Bucke’s proposal 
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demonstrates that psychospiritual dynamics can be, and have been, considered within 
the corpus of mainstream psychiatry’s quest to better understand psychotic or 
psychotic-like experiences.51 
 
6.1.2 Francis J. Braceland 
Francis Braceland’s 1957 presidential address to the APA convention in Chicago 
represents another instance of an APA president advocating the importance of 
including psychospiritual considerations in psychiatric epistemology and practice. 
Braceland (1957, pp.3-4) held that psychiatry was but one discipline in the composite 
“science of man” and that psychiatrists should ideally “achieve wisdom” of the 
“encompassing and well ordered knowledge” of being human. He endorsed an 
integrative, holistic, and scientific approach, asserting that clinical psychiatry and 
neurophysiology had demonstrated that “the various aspects of human existence and 
nature interpenetrate each other” (ibid, p.7). Further to this, he maintained that “the net 
result of the evidence we have underscores the need to approach psychological 
problems from the humanistic point of view which affirms man’s spiritual nature” (ibid). 
In terms of Zeitgeist, or “the general cultural atmosphere in which a person grows up 
and lives”, he observed that “psychiatry is finding it rewarding to give consideration to 
these cultural – in the widest sense, spiritual – conditions, as much as to the factors 
constituting the social situation of the individual” (p.8). In sum, while Braceland failed to 
define what ‘man’s spiritual nature’ is, or articulate how clinicians might consider this in 
therapeutic practice, he clearly stressed the importance for psychiatry to take 
psychospiritual considerations seriously. Indeed, he ostensibly depicts them as being 
integral aspects of the global ‘science of man’. Overall, then, he demonstrates the 
capacity for psychiatry to extend its epistemological parameters beyond the strictures 
of materialism to include metaphysical realities as part of scientific investigation. 
 
6.1.3 Jules H. Masserman 
Jules Masserman’s 1979 Chicago presidential address represents another instance of 
an APA president attesting to the value of incorporating psychospiritual matters into 
psychiatric thinking and practice. In his speech, Masserman (1979, p.1014) delivered 
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an appraisal of psychiatry’s ideal role in fostering mental health and identified three key 
areas of human need that “may serve as a template into which we may partially fit the 
past, present, and future of APA”. These were physical needs, social needs, and “a 
system of values and mystic beliefs to provide metapsychological serenity” (ibid). 
Strongly influenced by his internship under Adolf Meyer and his subsequent exposure 
to the Meyerian model of “integrative psychobiology”, Masserman averred that 
“traditional classifications of personality types and mental diseases thus appeared to 
me to be nosologically, prognostically, and therapeutically inadequate” (p.1013). He 
also claimed that “our current manuals almost never fulfill the essential purposes of a 
truly adequate dia-gnosis (Greek, thorough knowledge)” (p.1016) and proposed that a 
more effective model of psychiatry would employ a comprehensive and integrated 
knowledge of the manifold domains of human needs and nature in its diagnostic 
practices (p.1015). Although he did not use the word ‘spiritual’ throughout his address, 
his references to ‘mystic’ and ‘metapsychological’ needs in human mental health 
apparently connote this.  
 
Masserman’s address was titled ‘The future of psychiatry as a scientific and 
humanitarian discipline in a changing world’, which suggests he understood 
metapsychological considerations to be part and parcel of the astute scientific practice 
of medical psychiatry. This is exemplified in his concluding quote about interdisciplinary 
“scientific sessions” (p.1018): 
 
The scientist has scaled the mountains of ignorance; he is about to conquer 
the highest peak; as he pulls himself over the final rock, he is greeted by a 
band of theologians who have been sitting there for centuries (Jastrow52 in 
Masserman, ibid).  
 
Here he obviously infers that spiritual adepts are ahead of their scientific counterparts 
in the quest to understand the nature of reality and, presumably, insanity. His use of 
this quote arguably also suggests that both materialist and metaphysical investigative 
approaches are valid pathways to the ‘mountain peak’ of knowledge formation; an idea 
that was absent from the updated DSM-III medical model manual which was published 
the year after his address. 
 
6.2 Stanley Dean: Ultraconsciousness and metapsychiatry  
The emergence of the notion of ‘metapsychiatry’ in American psychiatry during the 
1970s exemplifies the capacity for the discipline to centrally include psychospiritual 
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matters within its investigative remit. The instigator and champion of metapsychiatry 
was Stanley Dean who was described as “one of the leading psychiatrists in North 
America” (Canadian Press, 1976, p.11). As a noted Clinical Professor of Psychiatry 
(Dean, 1975a, p.43) and a self-professed “conservative medical man” (Harakas, 1985, 
p.1), he was a seemingly unlikely candidate to urge psychiatry to explore 
psychospiritual matters. The proposed remit of metapsychiatry as a branch of 
psychiatric interest was to investigate ultraconscious phenomena (Dean, 1971, 
p.662).53 Whereas the metaphysical views of the aforementioned APA presidents 
seemingly found little support from fellow psychiatrists, Dean’s proposal to establish a 
branch of metapsychiatry within mainstream psychiatry attracted considerable support 
and interest. Indeed, his endeavour resulted in metaphysical and psi research54 being 




Before examining the advent and development of metapsychiatry, it is prudent to first 
investigate its origins in Dean’s initial notion of ‘ultraconsciousness’. His interest in this 
field of knowledge was triggered by four separate, yet related, events during the early 
1960s:  
i) his exposure to Zen Buddhist meditative and healing practices (Dean, 
1970a, p.33);  
ii) his discovery that “great numbers of sensible, rational people from all walks 
of life, lay and professional, believed in the ultraconscious” (American 
Press, 1984, p.16);  
iii) his perception that many of these people “heard voices, saw visions, 
communicated with spirits...Yet I found in them no other indication of 
psychosis” (Harakas, 1985, p.1); and  
iv) his experience in clinical practice of “observing paranormal phenomena of 
schizophrenics” (Rothman, 1982, p.20).  
Later, in 1972, his “observations of psychic healings in Bali” further fuelled his interests 
(Dean, 1975b, p.4). In his first published mention of ultraconsciousness in a Letter to 
the Editor of The American Journal of Psychiatry, Dean (1965, p.471) maintained that 
despite psychiatry’s “amazing advances in recent years…the secret of mental health 
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still remains a secret”. This set the stage for his subsequent introduction of the notion 
of ‘ultraconsciousness’ as a proposed key to the elusive secret of mental health. 
Indeed, he stated that the aim of his letter was “to argue for the systematic 
investigation of the ultraconscious and its integration into current psychiatric and 
psychotherapeutic usage...because of its extraordinary ability to bring about freedom 
from mental and physical suffering” (ibid). As such, in contrast to psychiatry’s practice 
of identifying and describing psychopathology, Dean’s primary focus was to promote 
the potential of ultraconsciousness for fostering mental health; a stance he maintained 
throughout his ensuing two decade endeavour to establish a rapprochement between 
ultraconsciousness and psychiatry. 
 
Dean coined the term ‘ultraconsciousness’ to reflect the spiritual knowledge and 
experience espoused within many religious, cultural and mystical traditions over 
millennia. For instance, he defined it as “a supra-sensory, supra-rational state of 
mentation whose existence has been known since antiquity...[and] has been called 
many names: nirvana, satori, samedhi, shema, kairos, cosmic-consciousness, unio-
mystica, Godliness, etc.” (ibid). However, he also saw the term as being congruent with 
modern psychiatric language and explained that “for the purposes of standardization I 
have proposed the term ‘ultraconsciousness’ to provide a semantic tie to current 
psychiatric terminology” (Dean, 1973, p.1036). He originally referred to this as “the 
summit of the ultraconscious mind” (Dean, 1965, p.471), then “the summit of the 
Ultraconscious” (1970a, p.36), and finally as “the ultraconscious summit” (Dean, 1973, 
p.1037); all of which designate a peak psychospiritual state of consciousness. Dean 
also used the term ‘ultraconsciousness’ in relation to other metaphysical occurrences. 
For instance, he referred to it in context of psi phenomena which he described as 
“flashes and formes frustes...probably latent in all of us” (Dean, 1965, p.471).55 He later 
stated that “though total ultraconsciousness is rare, a great variety of lesser 
manifestations is extremely common” (Dean, 1975a, p.46). Thus he posited two 
meanings for the term; one inferring an ultimate state of mystical illumination and the 
other inferring forms of paranormal human experience or capacity. Both of these 
metaphysical realities, however, are generally regarded as illusory by medical science 
and as potentially indicative of psychotic delusional ideation by mainstream psychiatry. 
Hence, Dean faced the formidable challenge of establishing the validity of his 
ultrconsciouness theory with his peers. 
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In order to support his notion of ultraconsciousness Dean drew attention to similar 
views expressed by the APA presidents, Braceland and Bucke. For example, he 
frequently cited Braceland’s appeal for psychiatry to heed ‘Man’s spiritual nature’ 
(Dean, 1970a, p.33; 1970b; p.58; 1974a, p.18; 1975b, p.6). This was possibly an 
attempt to lend legitimacy to his notion of ultraconsciousness by positing it as a 
response to Braceland’s call. His incorporation of Bucke’s work, however, was far more 
significant. For example, he asserted that Bucke’s proposed signs of Cosmic 
Consciousness reflected “the ultimate peak of untraconsciousness” and listed these as 
follows:  
1) Awareness of intense light. 
2) Emotions of supreme rapture and transcendental love. 
3) Intellectual illumination and uncovering of latent genius. 
4) Identification with creativity, infinity and immortality. 
5) Absence of all physical and mental suffering. 
6) De-emphasis of material wealth. 
7) Enhancement of physical vigour and activity. 
8) A sense of mission. 
9) A charismatic change in personality (Dean, 1970b, p.61).  
Intriguingly, Dean gave the impression that this was Bucke’s original list and did not 
explain it was his own adaptation.56 It is possible that this adaptation of Bucke’s work 
was an attempt by Dean to make these points reflect his personal vision and to invest 
them with significance and utility that would be meaningful and acceptable to 
conventional psychiatry of the time. For instance, Dean’s (1970b, p.60) explication on 
point 5 directly reflects his core belief in the potential utility of ultraconscious knowledge 
for psychiatry – “This property alone should be of particular interest to...the 
psychiatrist...and should give us an incentive to understand and use it in the treatment 
of the...mentally ill”. Also, the notion of a reduction in materialist interests (Dean’s point 
6) was more likely to pass the test of conventionality than Bucke’s notion of a ‘loss of a 
sense of sin’, which many psychiatrists would likely have rejected as outdated religious 
dogma. Although it is unclear why Dean did not admit or explain his adaptation of 
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 Bucke (1901, p.79) originally posited eleven signs or “marks of the Cosmic Sense”:  
 
a) The subjective light; b) The moral elevation; c) The intellectual illumination; d) The sense 
of immortality; e) The loss of fear of death; f) The loss of sense of sin; g) The suddenness, 
instantaneousness of the awakening; h) The previous character of the man – intellectual, 
moral, physical; i) The age of illumination; j) The added charm to the personality so that men 
and women are always (?) [sic] strongly attracted to the person; k) The transfiguration of the 
subject of the change as seen by others when the cosmic sense is actually present. 
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Bucke’s original points, he subsequently instituted them as being fundamental to his 
idea of metapsychiatry. 
 
A few years later, Dean added a tenth point to this list of indicators. He explained that 
“from the welter of literature and liturgy, ancient and modern, I have summarised ten 
distinguishing characteristics of the ultraconscious summit” (Dean, 1973, p.1037). His 
tenth point stated that: 
 
There is a sudden or gradual development of extraordinary perception, 
telepathy, precognition, or healing. Though generally regarded as occult, 
such phenomena may have a more rational explanation; they may be due 
to an awakening of the transhuman powers of perception latent in all of us 
(ibid). 
 
Here Dean eschewed the general view maintained by psychiatry that the belief in 
occult phenomena is irrational and potentially psychopathological. In his view, such 
phenomena were natural, conceivably beneficial, and within the scope of rational 
understanding. Hence, he saw psychospiritual matters as being a legitimate concern 
for psychiatric research, thinking and practice. From such thinking emerged his notion 
of ‘metapsychiatry’. Whereas ultraconsciousness was principally a theoretical notion, 




In 1971, after six years promoting ultraconsciousness and its potential therapeutic 
benefits for psychiatry, Dean coined the term ‘metapsychiatry’ as the name for a 
prospective branch of psychiatry that engaged in the scientific study of metaphysical 
experiences, phenomena and reality. This marked a shift from simply advocating an 
idea, to creating a vessel to officially actualise it. When first introducing the term, Dean 
(1971, p.662) stated that metapsychiatry aimed to “delimit the psychiatric ramifications 
of the subject”, and further explained that: 
 
The special province of metapsychiatry would be the cogitative and 
scientific investigation of such diverse ‘psi’ categories as mental telepathy, 
ESP, clairvoyance, prophecy, precognition, premonitions, intuition, déjà vu, 
sixth sense, premonitory dreams, miracles, spiritualism, trances, 
hallucinations, hypnosis, charisma, faith healing, personal magnetism, 
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psychedelic states, auras, psychokinesis (PK), catalepsy, graphoanalysis, 
tactile sight, radiesthesia, bioluminescence, cosmobiology, etc. (ibid). 
 
This heralded a marked transition, whereby his prior tentative and nebulous approach 
to discussing psi phenomena was superseded by an explicit spelling out of the formes 
frustes of ultraconsciousness that metapsychiatry might investigate. 
 
As Dean developed his idea of metapsychiatry he increasingly began to conceptualise 
it in context of mysticism. For instance, in 1973 he described metapsychiatry as the 
“important interface between psychiatry and mysticism” (Dean 1973, p.1036), and 
reiterated a year later that it constituted the “confluence of psychiatry and mysticism” 
(Dean, 1974b, p.3). At this juncture he adopted the American Heritage Dictionary 
(Morris, 1969) definition of mysticism as the “belief in the existence of realities beyond 
perceptual or intellectual apprehension, but central to being and accessible to 
consciousness” (Dean, 1974b, p.3). However, in his subsequent and influential edited 
book titled Psychiatry and Mysticism, he proffered a personal definition of mysticism, 
stating that “it simply means that very exceptional kinds of knowledge and awareness 
may reach consciousness through channels other than those known to us at present” 
(Dean, 1975c, p.1). He also predicted that “it is only a matter of time before those 
channels are identified – a matter of time before the mysticism of yesterday...becomes 
the science of today” (ibid, p.2). As such, he posited metapsychiatry as a prospective 
bridge to span the perceived gulf between mystical and scientific worldviews.57  
 
Dean’s conviction that the scientific enterprise of studying psychospiritual realities 
would open new frontiers to psychiatry was reinforced in his formulation of a list of 
twelve psychic aphorisms. These aphorisms distilled and encapsulated his 
understanding of ultraconsciousness, and provided a guiding conceptual framework for 
the practice of metapsychiatry.  
 
1. Faith is not fantasy; it is a form of precognition that has divined for 
countless years what science is just beginning to understand. 
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 As mentioned in Chapter Two, Section 2.1, the literature on mysticism is vast and proffers manifold 
meanings regarding the nature of mystic reality. While I generally use the terms ‘mystical’ and 
‘psychospiritual’ synonymously, here, in the instance of Dean’s work where mysticism per se is the subject 
of focus, it is apposite to expound upon its key meanings. Therefore, Appendix Three provides an 
overview of the term’s meaning according to two prominent scholars in the field, and also from the 
perspective of the mystic Franklin Merrell-Wolff. This elucidates the nature and qualities of mystic 
experience and introduces some related ramifications to better understanding psychosis. 
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2. Science and mysticism are fraternal twins, long separated, but now 
on the verge of reunion.  
3. Psychogeny recapitulates cosmogony - i.e. the developing mind 
includes an innate awareness of the origin and meaning of the 
universe. 
4. Evolution is not homogeneous, but proceeds in two divergent 
streams; mental and physical. Mental evolution is far ahead of the 
physical. 
5. The ultraconscious state bridges the evolutionary gap and produces 
cosmic awareness.  
6. Psi power is latent in all, and an experiential reality to many.  
7. Thought is a form of energy; it has universal ‘field’ properties which, 
like gravitational and magnetic fields, are amenable to scientific 
research.  
8. Thought fields, like the theoretical ‘tachyon’, can interact, traverse 
space, and penetrate matter more or less instantaneously.  
9. Thought fields survive death and are analogous to soul and spirit.  
10. Thought fields are eternal; hence, past existence (reincarnation) is as 
valid a concept as future immortality.  
11. Psychic research is on a par with other important courses of study; it 
should be included in academic curricula and lead to degrees and 
doctorates.  
12. A new age is dawning - the Psychic Age - on the heels of the Atomic 
Age and Space Age (Dean, 1974b, p.9). 
 
As a whole, his aphorisms reflected his perception of himself as an “eclectically-
oriented psychiatrist”, and scoped metapsychiatry as a central medium for the scientific 
exploration of a diversity of epistemological fields, including religion, mysticism, 
parapsychology, Bucke’s spiritual evolutionary theory, and quantum physics (Dean, 
1970a, p.33). Indeed, Dean (1975c, p.1) described metapsychiatry as “strongly 
interdisciplinary, having synergistic relationships with parapsychology, philosophy, 
religion, and empirical logic”, and elsewhere as “the base of a pyramid whose other 
sides are psychiatry, religion, parapsychology and mysticism” (Dean, 1976, p.115). 
Hence, his vision for metapsychiatry widened the remit of conventional psychiatry 
beyond the bounds of scientific materialism to an attitude that “strikes a harmonious 
chord with metaphysics...and seeks to explain the nature of being or reality and the 
origin and structure of the universe” (Dean, 1975c, p.1). Metapsychiatry, it seems, 
aimed to establish a branch of psychiatry that extended beyond simply contending with 
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mental illness, to fulfilling a catholic and almost ‘religious’ role in engaging with ultimate 
questions pertaining to mental health, life, and supreme reality. 
 
6.2.2.1 The promise of metapsychiatry 
It might be expected that, due to its metaphysical nature, Dean’s concept of 
metapsychiatry was spurned or ignored by the majority of psychiatrists. The fact, 
however, is that it met with considerable success. Indeed, the article in which he first 
introduced the term ‘metapsychiatry’ was also published in the Congressional Record 
(1971), lending it immediate credibility.58 Next, spurred by Dean’s work, the APA 
hosted a symposium at its 1972 annual meeting titled ‘Science and psi: Transcultural 
trends’ (Panati, 1975, p.27). Two subsequent symposia on “psychic phenomena” were 
also presented at the 1973 and 1974 APA general meetings, with the latter being 
attended by “an audience of 650 lay and professional people – the largest panel 
attendance in APA history” (Dean, 1975d, p.xx). Papers presented at these three 
symposia were compiled and published in Dean’s Psychiatry and Mysticism (1975). At 
this point, the term ‘metapsychiatry’ was also included in the 1975 edition of A 
Psychiatric Glossary: The Meaning of Terms Frequently Used in Psychiatry, in which it 
was defined as: 
 
The interface between psychiatry and such psychic phenomena as 
parapsychology, mysticism, transcendental meditation, biofeedback, and 
other suprasensory, suprarational, esoteric manifestations of 
consciousness that are in any way relevant to the theory and practice of 
psychiatry (APA et al,1975, p.101). 
 
 As such, it had been accepted as an official and ‘frequently used’ psychiatric term, and 
was subsequently included in the 1977 edition of the prestigious International 
Encyclopedia of Psychiatry, Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Neurology (Dean, 1977). 
Furthermore, in his 1979 APA presidential speech, Jules Masserman (1979, p.1015) 
averred that “there is a growing interest among us in what we call metapsychiatry, 
reflecting parallel preoccupations among the general public with esoteric faiths and 
transcendental seekings for the ultimate”. He cited Dean’s Psychiatry and Mysticism as 
an exemplar. It is evident from these occurrences that psychospiritual considerations 
have not only been conceptually entertained by mainstream psychiatrists but have also 
been taken seriously enough to merit entry into key psychiatric texts.  
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 The Congressional Record is the official record of the proceedings and debates of the United States 
Congress. It is published daily when Congress is in session. 
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Taking these developments a step further, Dean also attempted to found the American 
Metapsychiatric Association (AMPA). He first mooted the idea in 1971, inviting inquiries 
regarding the formation of the AMPA (Dean, 1971, p.662), which attracted some 
supportive comments in subsequent editions of The American Journal of Psychiatry 
(Magier, 1972; Ehrenwald, 1973). For Dean (1975a, p.47) the AMPA objectives were 
“to give special emphasis to the relationship between psychiatry and psychic 
phenomena” and to “replace strangeness, sensationalism, and fraud with logic, 
common sense, and professional responsibility” (Dean, 1975b, p.14). His reference to 
‘fraud’ here inferred that the AMPA may act as a supervisory body to detect, regulate 
and counter the charlatanism and cultish behaviour that abounds in the paranormal 
field (ibid, pp.13-14). By 1975, about two thousand correspondents, including more 
than two hundred psychiatrists/physicians, had expressed an interest in becoming 
AMPA members (Dean, 1975d, p.xx). In 1976, Dean (1976, p.115) reported that efforts 
were still under way to formally establish this body, but he did not mentioned the AMPA 
again in subsequent articles.59 Nevertheless, these various occurrences indicate that 
many psychiatrists at the time believed it was feasible, if not necessary, to consider the 
ramifications of metaphysical phenomena in clinical practice. 
 
Dean’s final enterprise was to advocate for the inclusion of metapsychiatric knowledge 
in mainstream psychiatric training. At the 1975 APA general meeting, in a speech titled 
‘A quest for purpose in psychic research’, he discussed the theory and potential 
application of metapsychiatric research, and highlighted the perceived need, by himself 
and others, “to include psychic subjects in mental health education” (Dean, 1976, 
p.115). Several years later, Dean et al (1980) published the results of research they 
conducted regarding the opinion of medical professionals as to whether psychic studies 
should be included in psychiatric education. Questionnaires were sent to “293 deans of 
medical schools, 109 heads of departments of psychiatry, 261 professors of psychiatry, 
419 residents in psychiatry, and 68 other medical faculty”, and of the two hundred and 
twenty eight respondents, “fifty-eight percent…believed that an understanding of 
psychic phenomena is important to future graduates of psychiatry, and 44% believed 
that psychic factors are important in the healing process” (ibid, p.1247). From these 
results the authors concluded that “including psychic studies in psychiatric education 
would attract more medical students to psychiatry” (ibid). The implications of these 
findings are surprising. They indicate that, despite the shift back to a medical model of 
psychiatry with the 1980 publication of DSM-III, and the attendant materialist spurning 
of ‘non-scientific’ metaphysical matters in psychiatric practice, there was seemingly a 
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 I have been unable to ascertain whether or not efforts to formally establish the AMPA were successful. 
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significant, if not majority, opinion within mainstream American psychiatry as to the 
value of including psychospiritual considerations in clinical training programs.  
 
Over the following year, eight ‘Letters to the Editor’ responding to this research were 
published in The American Journal of Psychiatry; four disapproving and five approving. 
Excerpts from each are listed in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 3 – ‘Letters to the Editor’ in response to Dean et al (1980) 
Comments of Disapproval 
The history of metapsychiatry is that of poorly controlled studies, outright fraud, 
dependence on anecdotal reporting, and repeated failures at replication…Therefore, it 
might be more appropriate to study those who accept such parapsychological 
phenomena (Berman, 1981, p.395). 
I was disturbed by Dr. Dean and associates’ recommendation to include psychic 
studies in residency curricula…I would caution against inclusion of such scientifically 
unfounded ideas…until they have been much more thoroughly studied (Casher, 1981, 
p.395). 
I was surprised by Dr. Dean and associates’ peculiar article…Time and again 
psychiatry has been embarrassed by psychiatrists going strange…It is time that our 
profession learned to deal with these difficult and controversial topics rather than 
indulge in idle speculation that feeds the popular need to believe in the bizarre 
(McDonald, 1981, p.396). 
I strongly disagree with the recommendation of Dr. Dean and associates that psychic 
studies be included in the curriculum of medical education. The subjects of ESP, 
telepathy, precognition, and the like are all interesting matters to chat about but lack a 
scientific basis…I object to such material being offered as medical knowledge (Sturges, 
1981, p.396). 
Comments of Approval 
It is gratifying to see that the Journal gives recognition to the field of 
metapsychiatry…Practicing psychiatrists, as well as those in training, should be made 
aware of and have the opportunity to express interest in the investigation of psychic 
factors in the healing process (Bowen, 1981, p.540). 
The inclusion of metapsychiatry within resident’s training is appealing…Psychic studies 
may provoke the resident by demanding an openness to various theories and 
modalities…Metapsychiatry could be offered as an elective during the fourth 
postgraduate year (Granet, 1981, p.703). 
Metapsychiatry can provide excellent training in complex research design and 
disciplined conceptualization, besides having the potential to add new facts to our 
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relatively inaccurate and inadequate knowledge of human psychology (Twemlow, 
1981, p.1397). 
It takes courage to publically solicit support for unconventional concepts in education. I 
strongly urge that we support Dr. Dean and others who strive to extend our curricula by 
including psychic studies on our residency training programs (Steele, 1981, p.1398). 
I think it is important to teach psychiatric residents about issues relating to psychic 
phenomena…including these kinds of themes in the postgraduate psychiatric 
curriculum would have great value in attracting some medical students into the field 
(Ruiz, 1981, p.1515). 
 
In response to the four critics, Dean (1981, p.396) argued the legitimacy of his “interest 
in nonpsychotic paranormal (psychic) phenomena” by calling attention to some of his 
more renowned publications on the subject, highlighting the occurrence of APA panels 
on metapsychiatry, and noting an endorsement of his work by Swiss psychiatrist 
Manfred Bleuler,60 who observed that “there are strong trends towards similar 
teachings as the ones of Professor Dean in Europe”. It is evident from Bleuler’s 
comment that the readiness to accept psychospiritual considerations into the body of 
psychiatric knowledge and research was not simply an American idiosyncrasy, but was 
also supported within European mainstream psychiatry. Dean seemingly published no 
further articles on metapsychiatry beyond this point; however, news articles indicate 
that he continued his campaign about psychic education for several more years 
(Rothman, 1982, p.20; American Press, 1984, p.16; Harakas, 1985, p.1). Despite 
strong seeming support for including psychic studies in psychiatric training, Dean’s 
efforts to this effect were unsuccessful, and the term metapsychiatry disappeared from 
psychiatric literature during the early 1980s. 
 
6.2.2.2 Metapsychiatry, psychosis and healing 
A key driving rationale behind Dean’s endeavour to establish a confluence between 
psychiatry and ultraconscious phenomena, via the vessel of metapsychiatry, was that 
of furthering healing. Although he made few allusions to psychotic illnesses per se 
throughout his considerable literature on ultraconsciousness and metapsychiatry, there 
is some evidence he believed that psychiatrists educated in metaphysical realities 
would be better able to diagnostically differentiate between psychotic and mystical 
occurrences. For instance, Dean (1973, p.1037) asserted that, “we psychiatrists are 
conditioned to equate hallucinations with schizophrenia and other psychoses, but a 
great many non-psychotic individuals also hear voices, see visions, and have 
supernatural experiences”. Elsewhere he noted resemblances between “psychogenic 
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 Manfred Bleuler was the son of Eugen Bleuler, the psychiatrist who coined the term ‘schizophrenia’. 
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culture-bound reactive syndromes...usually associated with primitive societies” and “our 
psychiatric concepts of acute schizophrenic episodes” (Dean & Thong, 1975, pp.271-
272). Indeed, as a clinical “first step”, he advocated the idea that psychiatrists ask all 
patients about their potential metaphysical experiences, and that the resulting data be 
collated in order to advance the field’s understanding of ultraconscious phenomena 
(Dean, 1970a, p.36; 1970b, p.61; 1973, p.1038; 1975a, p.46). Hence, he highlighted 
the potential for developing psychiatric practices steeped in ultraconscious (or 
metapsychiatric) understanding, whereby a knowledge base could be established for 
making differential diagnoses, and for informing therapeutic approaches.  
 
The central thrust of Dean’s thinking in terms of metapsychiatry was that of the implicit 
healing power of ultraconscious faculties. In regards to forms of psychopathology, he 
maintained that “a common denominator underlies them all”, which he identified as a 
composite of two ultraconscious faculties; namely, “the charisma of the therapist and 
the faith of the patient, both of which apparently involve a suprasensory, suprarational 
level of mentation” (Dean & Thong, 1972, p.91). He further posited that these faculties 
could be harnessed for advancing therapeutic practices along a spectrum of diverse 
cultural settings, “from the native witch doctor at one extreme to the academically 
trained psychiatry at the other” (ibid). Dean (1976, p.119) later identified five common 
denominators in ultraconscious healing capacity: 
 
(1) Nature’s remarkable self-reparative mechanisms. (2) The awesome 
power of suggestion. (3) The reputation and therapeutic personality 
(charisma) of the therapist. (4) The expectant faith of the patient. (5) The 
growing belief in a mysterious transfer of energy between healer and 
patient. 
 
He saw the healing efficacy of medical interventions as secondary to these facilities 
(Rothman, 1982, p.20). Hence, from this perspective, the metapsychiatrist, through his 
or her understanding of ultraconscious phenomena and personal development of 
ultraconscious capacities, would ostensibly be better equipped than conventional 
psychiatrists to diagnose and remediate mental illnesses, and to foster in patients a 
state of advanced mental health that embodies the latent psychospiritual qualities of 
the ultraconscious.  
 
This outlook exemplifies the type of psychiatric thinking that is possible when stepping 
beyond the strictures of materialist thinking, for it conceptually enables a 
rapprochement between metaphysical and scientific worldviews. Furthermore, such an 
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approach bridges the putative gap between traditional shamanism and modern 
psychiatry, for each is seen as a different, but equally valid, cultural manifestation along 
a therapeutic continuum. Ideally, the metapsychiatrist would become adept at moving 
fluidly between these therapeutic paradigms and bring the best of both medical and 
psychospiritual considerations into clinical settings.  
 
In sum, the above overview of Dean’s metapsychiatric project demonstrates that 
psychospiritual considerations are not utterly foreign to mainstream psychiatric thinking 
and terminology. Indeed, the existence of metapsychiatry within the historical stream of 
conventional psychiatry is of import, for it represents an unprecedented step towards 
the potential incorporation of psychospiritual knowledge into psychiatric thinking and 
practice. Additionally, it heralded the prospective emergence of a new chapter in 
psychiatric treatment approaches through harnessing the alleged healing potential of 
ultraconscious knowledge and capacities. Although not incorporated into psychiatric 
teaching and practice, metapsychiatry did engender considerable interest in, and 
support from, many psychiatrists, thus indicating that psychospiritual and biological 
approaches are not necessarily antithetical.61 Be this as it may, the rising tide of post 
DSM-III medical psychiatry appears to have eclipsed metapsychiatry and its 
psychospiritual viewpoint. However, this does not mean such a viewpoint has been 
invalidated. My examination in Focal Settings Three and Four of psychosis and related 
psychospiritual factors, both within, and beyond, psychiatric thinking, demonstrates that 
a holistic investigative approach may likely result in better understanding psychosis and 
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 See Appendix Four for an overview of the American mystic Franklin Merrell-Wolff’s critical appraisal of 
Dean’s work on metapsychiatry. Although Dean promoted metapsychiatry as a rapprochement between 
psychiatry and mysticism, and unflaggingly attempted to institute metapsychiatry as a professional body, 
he never personally experienced psi phenomena or any other mystical occurrences (Dean, 1965, p.471). 
Unlike Bucke, whose work was born of direct mystical experience, Dean’s view was more a theoretical 
construct born of secondary observation and literature study. In this sense, his construct of 
metapsychiatry, despite its merits, was a treatise about mysticism and lacked input from the standpoint of 
somebody who had direct mystical experience. As a mystic, Merrell-Wolff’s appraisal offers an insider’s 
perspective on both the merits and shortcomings of Dean’s work in light of metaphysical experience and 
knowledge. He also highlights the importance of incorporating mystic considerations into psychiatric 
epistemology and identifies some problems that are implicit to this venture. Although Merrell-Wolff’s critical 
appraisal is tangential to the core focus here in Focal Setting Two, it provides an introductory foray into 
matters  pertaining to better understanding the differences and commonalties between psychospiritual and 
psychotic experiences, which are further explored in Focal Setting Three. 
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6.3 The 1976 GAP report on mysticism 
This section provides an explication and critical appraisal of the Group for the 
Advancement of Psychiatry’s (GAP) report on mysticism. The GAP investigation and 
report constitutes a significant milestone in the consideration of psychospiritual matters 
by mainstream psychiatry, for it represents the only official attempt within global 
psychiatric research to comprehensively appraise the nature of mysticism, and how it 
might relate to clinical practice and thinking.62 Also, the GAP authors’ attempted to 
formulate a typology for differentiating psychotic from mystical experiences. This 
constitutes a significant breakthrough in psychiatric thinking for doing so intrinsically 
validates the existence of psychospiritual realities. However, a critical appraisal of this 
typology indicates that it embodied flaws which are reflective of axiomatic psychiatric 
assumptions. Regardless, the GAP report process of attempting to understand 
mysticism from a psychiatric perspective indicates that such an enterprise is possible. 
 
6.3.1 The GAP report: Rationale and objectives 
In 1976, a year after Stanley Dean published his book Psychiatry and Mysticism, the 
Committee on Psychiatry and Religion, a branch of GAP, published a report titled 
Mysticism: Spiritual Quest or Psychic Disorder? (GAP, 1976).63 The committee was 
comprised of six “psychoanalytically oriented psychiatrists” (Frank, 1977, p.1057), with 
input also invited from several past members, consultants and committee guests (GAP, 
1976, p.711). As such, this venture represented an eclectic appraisal of views from 
various epistemological standpoints. It is pertinent to note, however, that the chief 
investigators were psychoanalytic psychiatrists; hence, the report’s findings generally 
reflected interpretations from a psychoanalytic perspective. 
 
What initiated the GAP endeavour and report? As the secondary title of the report 
suggests, the committee’s primary objective was to “contribute to an understanding of 
the psychology of mysticism” because of “the fact that mysticism has become a 
significant force in our time” (ibid, p.713). Here, the term ‘significant force’ refers to a 
social trend of the time whereby a growing number of American “young people” were 
being attracted to “mystical movements” (pp.811-812). Surprisingly, apart from a 
passing reference to the fact that the subject of mysticism drew “the largest audience 
ever to attend a meeting of the American Psychiatric Association” (p.815), the report 
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 A search of The American Journal of Psychiatry, The British Journal of Psychiatry, European Psychiatry 
and the World Psychiatric Association’s journal World Psychiatry reveal that no other investigations akin to 
the one conducted on mysticism by the GAP team have been undertaken.   
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 While the acronym GAP is used henceforth in both discussion and intext citations, the endtext reference 
is listed as Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. 
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makes no mention of Dean’s work or the formal adoption of his term ‘metapsychiatry’ 
into psychiatric vocabulary. However, whereas Dean’s theories regarding 
metapsychiatry and ultraconsciousness had very little to say about psychotic states, 
the GAP report attempted to redress the problem of differentiating between psychotic 
and psychospiritual experiences. 
 
6.3.2 Critical appraisal of the GAP report 
Did the GAP report fulfil its stated objective of providing an informed appraisal of the 
psychology of mysticism and subsequently enhance psychiatry’s understanding of the 
phenomenon? The answer to this question is a matter of opinion; therefore, the 
opinions of two noteworthy commentators will be used to scope and structure a 
response - namely, a book review by Professor Jerome Frank and a critical review by 
Professor Arthur Deikman.64 These commentators are noteworthy because their 
reviews constitute the only apparent published responses to the GAP report at the 
time. Also, Frank gave the report a glowing commendation, while Deikman was mostly 
condemnatory; hence, a closer examination of these conflicting views provides a 
balanced evaluation of the GAP report and its contribution to better understanding 
mystic and psychotic experience. 
 
Frank proffered a brief one column review of the GAP report in The American Journal 
of Psychiatry. Much of this consisted of a synopsis of the report’s structure and 
conceptual focus, though his closing comments were very commendatory. For 
instance, as a clinical empiricist, he praised the authors for prudently confining their 
investigation to the “consideration of features that can be empirically studied” and 
observed that the document “offers much fascinating information, objectively presented 
and thoughtfully discussed” (Frank, 1977, pp.1057-1058). Overall, he concluded that 
the report “can be highly recommended as an introduction to the psychology of 
mysticism” (ibid, p.1058). Intriguingly, Frank’s (p.1057) justification for praising the 
report’s empirical felicity was his understanding that “when all is said and done, 
essential features of the mystical experience remain inexplicable in terms of Western 
cosmology”. Hence, his reasoning was incongruously that, because mysticism is 
ultimately ineffable, the GAP authors wisely chose to reduce their scope of research to 
that which could be clinically observed.  
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 Jerome Frank was an American “clinician scholar” and hailed in his obituary as “a giant in the field of 
psychotherapy research” (The JHU Gazette, 2005). Arthur Deikman (2012) is a Professor of Psychiatry 
and “a pioneer in the scientific investigation of meditation, the mystical experience, and consciousness”. 
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While Frank considered the GAP report to be an informative boon to clinical psychiatry, 
Deikman was less glowing in his four page critical review in the Association for 
Humanistic Psychology Newsletter. Although he concurred with Frank in observing that 
“certain of the sections, especially those on Christian and Hindu mysticism, show an 
objectivity and scholarship that are quite commendable” (Deikman, 1978, p.16), 
beyond this, he was very critical. Indeed, in stark contrast to Frank’s view that the 
report is ‘highly recommended as an introduction to the psychology of mysticism’, 
Deikman (ibid) concluded that “as a whole…the report displays extreme parochialism, 
a lack of discrimination, and naive arrogance in its approach to the subject”. It is 
apposite to closer examine why Deikman drew this conclusion for his critical appraisal 
of the report highlights some key issues regarding the prospective introduction of 
psychospiritual matters into psychiatry.  
  
Deikman’s chief criticism of the GAP report was the authors’ failure to discriminate 
between mystical experience proper and its attendant metaphysical phenomena. He 
remonstrated that they “have selectively ignored the central issues of mysticism and 
have made traditional interpretations of the secondary phenomena” and that the report 
“emphasizes lurid, visionary phenomena which lend themselves readily to standard 
psychiatric interpretations” (pp.18, 16). To clarify, he further argued that the essence of 
mysticism was to transcend the indirect sensate and cognitive modes of construing 
reality and to ultimately achieve a spiritual state of consciousness whereby there is an 
“immediate knowledge of reality” (p.17). In neglecting to establish this critical distinction 
as a cornerstone for examining mysticism, the GAP report, in Deikman’s view, failed to 
fulfil its objective of educating psychiatry about this phenomenon.  
 
To confuse lower level sensory-emotional experiences with the 
transcendent ‘Knowledge’ that is the goal of mysticism seriously limits the 
usefulness of the report and tends to perpetuate in the reader the ignorant 
parochial position that was standard in most psychiatric writings before the 
GAP publication and now, unfortunately, is likely to be reinforced (p.17). 
 
This is a legitimate criticism, for the mystical literature abounds with quotes from 
mystics underscoring this distinction. Hence, Frank’s acclaim of the report’s empirical 
utility arguably demonstrated a poor understanding of the essential nature of 
mysticism, because the mystic domain is ultimately beyond empirical measure. 
 
However, while Deikman was ultimately correct in criticising the GAP authors for their 
biased narrow focus, he appears not to have considered that mysticism can also be 
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viewed in terms of a journey. For instance, the GAP authors’ understanding of 
mysticism was partly based on Underhill’s notion of “the mystic way” (GAP, 1976, 
pp.720-722); a term which infers the key developmental stages that mystic adherents 
pass through during their unfolding passage towards spiritual illumination (Underhill, 
1912, p.96). From this perspective both the path and the goal are composite parts of 
the mystic process, hence, the mystic way is a journey of incremental spiritual 
development that features both the experience of spiritual illumination and the 
antecedent passage to achieving it. This journey can often include experiences of 
psychic phenomena (e.g. voices and visions) which are analogous to psychiatric 
symptoms of psychosis (e.g. auditory and visual hallucinations) (ibid, p.319). In this 
context, the GAP authors’ focus on ‘visionary phenomena which lend themselves 
readily to standard psychiatric interpretations’ was justified. 
 
Deikman’s other main bone of contention with the GAP report was its strong 
psychoanalytic bias. Indeed, the GAP authors acknowledged that their interpretations 
were informed by a “psychoanalytic orientation” (GAP, 1976, p.816). However, what 
they clearly saw as a legitimate methodological approach, Deikman (1978, p.18) saw 
as ideological parochialism which he disparagingly referred to as “monotonous clouds 
of reductionism”. He subsequently concluded that “our profession, when it comes to 
mysticism, does not feel the need to ask serious questions about its own assumptions, 
nor to take the devil's advocate's position toward its too-easy conclusions” (ibid). It 
appears this admonition has merit for there was a definitive trend in the report towards 
psychoanalytic reductionism. For instance, the GAP authors (1976, p.731) maintained 
that mystics who “show good object relations” in their attempt to escape a problematic 
world “show less psychopathology than those who do not maintain them” [italics 
added]. Arguably, this depicts mysticism as a form of morbid escapism and infers that 
all mystics exhibit some degree of psychopathology, but less so if good object relations 
are upheld. In a similar reductive and biased vein they concluded that;  
 
at some point...the mystical defence breaks down. Then troublesome 
symptoms may appear, or possibly frank depression or psychosis...The 
psychiatrist will find mystical phenomena of interest because they can 
demonstrate forms of behaviour intermediate between normality and frank 
psychosis; a form of ego regression in the service of defense against 
internal or external stress; and a paradox of the return of repressed 
regression in unconventional expressions of love (ibid).  
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This not only portrays mysticism as an unconscious psychological defence mechanism 
and form of escapism, but also identifies it as a phase of quasi-psychopathology that 
some people may pass through in their decline from normalcy to madness.  
 
The GAP authors’ appraisal of mysticism beyond this point was replete with comments 
and conclusions of similar psychoanalytic ilk, particularly in comparative context of 
psychotic symptoms, as understood by psychoanalytic psychiatry. For instance, they 
described mystic trance states as “hallucinatory experiences” (p.776) and further 
deduced that:  
 Mystic and schizophrenic experience share in common a sense that “the 
external world has been removed from the individual’s awareness and 
therefore seems destroyed” (p.778); 
 In such experiences “the sense of reality is usually transferred from the 
outside inward with the permission of an indulgent ego” (ibid); 
 This can be understood as problem-solving displacement whereby the 
“fantasy represents a reunion of some kind” with an alienated other, usually 
the person’s parents (ibid); 
 Whereas “schizophrenic detachment...is usually precipitated by some 
disappointment in relations with other individuals”, mystical detachment can 
also be “a way of escaping” unsettling and oppressive “community 
demands” (p.779);  
 Trance, for both the schizophrenic and the mystic: i) represents “the 
psychic functioning of an infant”; ii) is a means for “hallucinating the 
fulfilment of his needs”; and iii) is therefore a form of “primary narcissism” 
that can establish a predisposition to mental illness (pp.779-780). 
Having unpacked this line of reasoning, the GAP authors (p.784) concluded by defining 
“the mystical way of life” as;  
 
exemplified in religious mysticism, contains two components: first, a 
minimizing of one’s sensitivity to external reality and a complementary 
maximizing of sensitivity to inner ‘reality’ by partial regression to primary 
narcissism; second, the deployment of one or more of the manoeuvres 
commonly used to ward of depression. 
 
It is evident here that the GAP authors have presented a reductive and biased 
interpretation of mysticism that reflects psychoanalytic ideology.  
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Overall, then, the GAP authors’ distorted depiction of mystic experience as essentially 
psychopathological arguably shows a near absence of the objectivity for which Frank 
applauded the report. Hence, it appears Deikman’s criticism was accurate and justified. 
Indeed, such reductive distortion is common to both psychoanalytic and medical 
psychiatry and creates a formidable barrier to enabling psychiatry to be truly objective 
in considering psychospiritual matters in context of better understanding psychosis.  
 
6.3.3 GAP typology for differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences 
Despite the GAP report’s apparent flaws, the authors’ effort to compose a typology of 
indicators for differentiating between psychotic and psychospiritual experiences was 
arguably a new and significant contribution to psychiatry. Whereas the works of Bucke 
and Dean on mysticism were primarily independent ventures, the GAP review was 
formally sanctioned by American mainstream psychiatry’s governing body, the APA. 
Indeed, according to Grof (2000, p.216), the GAP report represents “the kindest 
judgement about mysticism that has so far come from official academic circles”. Albeit 
rudimentary, and reflective of the aforementioned psychoanalytic bias, this still 
constituted a progressive step, for no such formally sanctioned differential diagnosis 
attempt had previously occurred within mainstream psychiatry. The GAP authors 
(p.784) maintained that, although both the schizophrenic and mystic appear to engage 
in a similar form of regressive escapism, they differ in three significant ways:  
 
First, [the mystic’s] retreat is facultative rather than obligatory; second, it is 
particular rather than complete...; third, he finds it possible, frequently 
desirable, to associate with others who share his view of the world – that is, 
he participates in mystical fraternities, while the schizophrenic rarely is able 
to form or maintain similar affectionate ties with others.  
 
Although these points of discernment are seemingly sound, upon closer examination it 
is evident they are not absolute differential diagnosis markers. 
 
The first point proposes that a ‘retreat’, or regressive trance state, is intentionally 
attained by the mystic, but involuntarily arrived at by the schizophrenic. Further to this 
the authors maintained that “when regression becomes obligatory to the extent that the 
subject cannot by an act of will prevent or reverse it, we consider him psychotic” 
(p.780). Thus, they contend that the presence or absence of regressive autonomy 
discerns the mystic from the psychotic state respectively. Although this proposition may 
appear cogent within the fabric of its own psychoanalytic reasoning, its veracity as a 
fixed point for diagnostic differentiation can be disputed. Counter to the authors’ claim, 
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a rudimentary examination of the literature pertaining to mysticism shows that mystic 
trance states are often involuntary. Indeed, a chief resource used by the authors to 
inform their description of mysticism (i.e. Underhill’s Mysticism) explains that mystics 
experience both “voluntary and involuntary trances” (Underhill, 1912, p.428), while, 
more recently, Lukoff et al (1998, p.34) suggest that one of the defining features of the 
mystical experience is “the sense of lacking control over the event”. Similarly, the 
nineteenth century Indian mystic Sri Ramakrishna, whom the GAP authors (1976, 
p.748) identify as “one of the greatest mystics of all time”, experienced frequent, 
sudden and involuntary numinous trance states (Swami Budhananda, 1971).65 Hence, 
mystic and psychotic experience evidently cannot be fully differentiated according to 
whether the ‘retreat is facultative rather than obligatory’. 
 
The veracity of the second differentiation point is also questionable. In regards to this 
point, the GAP authors reasoned that the atypical phenomenon of mystic trance 
represents a regressive ‘retreat’. This line of thinking is unsubstantiated and 
speculative, as is the related suggestion that the mystic and psychotic can be 
differentiated according to whether the trance/retreat/regression is ‘particular rather 
than complete’. It assumes that regression represents a gradual trajectory of 
deepening psychopathology, and hence divests mystic experience (regression) of any 
transcendental or healing attributes. However, psychological models exist that 
conceive of regression as playing a salutary role in a larger psychodynamic 
developmental process; a process which Washburn (1988) refers to as “regression in 
the service of transcendence”.66 Similarly, Prince & Savage (1966, p.70) hypothesise 
that “mystical states are examples of regressions in the service of the ego”. When 
considered in this light the notion of differentiating between ‘particular’ and ‘complete’ 
regression is rendered unsound.   
 
Of the three points of differentiation proffered by the authors, the third point is the least 
credible. To reiterate, they proposed that the mystic, who ‘participates in mystical 
fraternities’, can be differentiated from the schizophrenic, who ‘rarely is able to form or 
maintain similar affectionate ties with others’. Although history shows that spiritual 
followings, religious denominations, and entire religions have stemmed from the 
numinous experiences of a mystic (Cunningham, 2011a, p.9; Merrell-Wolff, 1994, 
                                                          
65
 This issue is examined more fully in my Chapter Nine content analysis (see Section 9.3.1).  
66
 ‘Regression in the service of transcendence’ is a transpersonal notion which refers to the apparently 
regressive nature of psychosis actually being, in many instances, a psychic movement towards some form 
of psychological or psychospiritual healing or transcendence. This notion is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Ten, Section 10.6. 
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p.173), these are generally the result of people being drawn to the mystic, and/or the 
mystic sharing his or her revelations with others. Therefore, it is not a case of 
‘escapism’, as the GAP authors (1976, p.786) claim, whereby the mystic “reinforces his 
retreat and overcomes the loneliness which it would create by joining with others to 
form an elite, democratic, and abstemious mystical fraternity”. Additionally, the validity 
of this proposed point of differentiation is also undermined by the fact that many 
mystics have chosen a hermitic lifestyle of contemplative solitude over social 
interaction. For instance, the Christian mystic text titled The Cloud of Unknowing holds 
that there are four “degrees” of living that progressively take the adherent closer to 
union with God (Underhill, 1970, p.59). The penultimate of these is “the third degree 
and manner of living, the which is called Singular...[the] solitary form and manner of 
living, thou mayest learn to lift up the foot of thy love; and step towards that state and 
degree of living that is perfect, and the last state of all” (ibid, p.60). Here the ‘Singular’ 
or solitary spiritual path is advocated as an advanced stage of mystic maturity. In light 
of these critical points of evaluation, it appears the GAP authors’ third proposed 
differentiator is also untenable. 
 
As already mentioned, a detailed consideration of problematic issues pertaining to the 
idea of differentiating between psychotic and psychospiritual experiences is undertaken 
in Chapter Nine. The above appraisal of the GAP authors’ proposed typology is a 
prelude to this and demonstrates that such an enterprise is fraught with ambiguous 
tensions. Although it is clear that psychiatry can acknowledge the existence of 
psychospiritual realities, the challenging implications of this for clinical thinking and 
practice are not easy to resolve. Indeed, they call to question the fundamental 
assumptions and diagnostic practices upon which psychiatry is based. Arguably, the 
solution to this conundrum is not for psychiatry to disregard psychospiritual 
considerations or attempt to force-fit them into a limited modality of psychiatric thinking, 
but to contemplate how it might interrogate its axiomatic assumptions in order to 
accommodate psychospiritual knowledge.  
 
6.4 Conclusion 
While the discipline of psychiatry has traditionally eschewed the consideration of 
psychospiritual determinants in psychosis research, it is evident from the instances 
examined above that such avoidance is a matter of choice rather than empirical 
necessity. The work of Bucke and Dean especially demonstrate that psychiatry can, 
and probably should, include metaphysical research within its epistemological ambit. 
This view is supported by Chapter Seven’s further investigation of this matter, from 
1980 to present date.      
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Chapter Seven 
An Historical Overview of Psychospiritual Considerations by Psychiatry: 
Part Two: Post-1980 
 
7.0 Introduction 
Here, the challenge instigated in Chapter Six is continued by identifying post-1980 
instances of psychiatry’s understanding of psychopathology being significantly 
influenced by psychospiritual factors. This entails an examination of:  
i) the psychospiritual roots of DSM-IV’s ‘religious and spiritual problem’ 
category;  
ii) contemporary neuropsychiatric research into human psychospiritual 
experiences;  
iii) ‘spiritual’ psychiatric special interest groups; and  
iv) mainstream psychiatrists who endorse the inclusion of psychospiritual 
considerations in psychiatric research. 
 
7.1 DSM-IV V-Code 62.89: Religious or spiritual problem 
The renaissance of medical psychiatry in America did not result in the complete 
occlusion of psychospiritual considerations from the discipline’s research agenda. After 
Dean’s promotion of metapsychiatry and the GAP report on mysticism in the 1970s, the 
next significant event of this nature occurred with the 1994 inclusion in DSM-IV of a 
new diagnostic category titled ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ (V62.89). However, the 
genesis of this idea began about ten years earlier with clinician David Lukoff’s work on 
mysticism and psychosis. The ensuing historical and critical overview of this category’s 
developmental trajectory, from its transpersonal roots, to its adaption and final inclusion 
in DSM-IV, and subsequent re-adaptation in DSM-5, provides further evidence of 
psychiatry’s engagement with psychospiritual issues. It also elucidates some inherent 
problematic issues in psychiatry’s endeavour to reconcile psychospiritual realities 
within its clinical framework, particularly in terms of diagnostically differentiating 
between psychotic disorders and normative cultural-religious-spiritual experiences. 
 
7.1.1 What is V-Code 62.89? 
The DSM-IV V62.89 category of ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ was included in the 
DSM to enable clinicians to account for factors that related to, but were not part of, a 
mental disorder. It applied to “other conditions or problems that may be a focus of 
clinical attention”, such as: 
1) The problem is the focus of diagnosis or treatment and the individual 
has no mental disorder; 
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2) The individual has a mental disorder but it is unrelated to the problem; 
3) The individual has a mental disorder but it is related to the problem, 
but the problem is sufficiently severe to warrant independent clinical 
attention (APA, 1994, p.675). 
The inclusion of this category in DSM-IV represented a rudimentary but important step 
by psychiatry towards acknowledging the value of psychospiritual considerations to 
clinical practice. The new V62.89 V-Code was part of an innovative suite of 
developments whereby clinicians were encouraged to exercise “cultural sensitivity” in 
diagnostic practices (Turner et al, 1995, pp.441-442).67 Indeed, Harold Pincus, the 
vice-chairman of the DSM-IV task force asserted that the introduction of V62.89 was “a 
sign of the profession’s growing sensitivity not only to religion but to cultural diversity 
generally” (McIntyre, 1994, p.3). Hence, V62.89 entered DSM-IV as one of several 
measures developed to enhance the clinician’s awareness of cultural considerations 
when diagnosing and treating patients. 
 
The advent of V62.89 in DSM-IV has been hailed by many commentators as an 
important event in psychiatric diagnostics. For instance, it has been variously referred 
to as “a significant breakthrough” (Turner et al, 1995, p.443), “a major innovation” (Lu 
et al, 1997a, p.76) and “a significant first step towards explicit delineation of spiritual 
clinical foci” (Scott et al, 2003, p.163). Furthermore,  Scotton (2011, p.199) described it 
as the product of a “groundbreaking effort in the period preceding the release of DSM-
IV” to contend with the “embarrassing situation” in psychiatric diagnostics “of having to 
label normative spiritual and religious experiences...as being grossly pathological if not 
outright psychotic”. This latter comment by Scotton calls attention to a fundamental 
precipitating factor in the formulation of V62.89. While the DSM-IV authors depicted 
V62.89 as a culturally sensitive diagnostic category, they failed to explain that the initial 
impetus for its creation came from a group of transpersonal-oriented clinicians. This 
group aimed to redress: i) the problem of non-psychopathological symptoms relating to 
spiritual practices and crises being misdiagnosed as mental disorders; and ii) the 
“iatrogenic harm” that can result from such misdiagnoses (Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1992, 
p.673). An examination of the development and eventual inclusion of V62.89 as a 
DSM-IV diagnostic category further elucidates the existent tensions between the 
worldviews of medical psychiatry and metaphysics, and how these may enhance or 
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 These are listed in Chapter Five, Section 5.4.2. 
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7.1.2 From Lukoff’s MEPF to V62.89: A chronology of key developments 
The notion of “Mystical Experiences with Psychotic Features” (MEPF), formulated by 
American clinical psychologist David Lukoff (1985), was the transpersonal seed-idea 
from which V62.89 ultimately emerged as a formal diagnostic category in medical 
psychiatry. Brown (2005, p.7) explains that “when transpersonal psychology 
developed, it acknowledged and sought to understand spiritual and transcendent 
experiences in actualizing the highest human developmental potential”. It was from this 
transpersonal context that the idea for formulating V62.89 arose. Lukoff was one of 
many transpersonal-oriented clinicians affiliated with the Spiritual Emergence Network 
(SEN),68 which provided therapeutic support for people experiencing “spiritual 
emergencies”; a term designating “forms of distress associated with spiritual practices 
and experiences” (Lukoff et al, 1998, p.22). His involvement with SEN subsequently 
inspired the formulation of MEPF as a proposed diagnostic category that delineated 
“the overlap between mystical experiences and psychotic states” (Lukoff, 1985, p.156). 
Lukoff developed a simple model consisting of two overlapping circles; one symbolising 
‘Mystical Experiences’, the other ‘Psychotic Episodes’, with the common overlapping 
region representing two diagnostic categories - ‘Mystical Experiences with Psychotic 
Features’ (MEPF) and ‘Psychotic Disorders with Mystical Features’ (PDMF) (see 
Figure 1).  
 
For Lukoff, both of these proposed categories were applicable to situations in which a 
clinician might exercise diagnostic discernment regarding the possible psychospiritual 
dimensions of a seeming case of psychotic disorder. His main focus at this point, 
however, was structuring MEPF as a clinically robust diagnostic category. Adopting the 
DSM-III “empirical descriptive approach” as a guiding model (ibid, p.161), he composed 
a flowchart of operational diagnostic criteria69 which “are intended to allow cases of 
positively-transforming psychotic episodes to be recognised with a high degree of 
accuracy” (p.160). Overall, Lukoff’s original proposal was concerned with preventing 
misdiagnosis and iatrogenic harm by training clinicians to differentiate healthy or 
distressing psychospiritual experiences from psychotic episodes, and/or to identify 
situations of possible overlap between them. At this juncture there was no 
                                                          
68
 The Spiritual Emergence Network was originally established in 1980 as the Spiritual Emergency 
Network. SEN was founded by the American clinicians Christina Grof, a psychotherapist, and Stanislav 
Grof, a psychiatrist (Grof & Grof, 1989, p.xiv). The association was formed “in response to the lack of 
understanding and respect for psychospiritual growth in the mental health profession” (Spiritual 
Emergence Network, n.d.). The Grofs’ notion of ‘spiritual emergency’ is examined in Chapter Eight, 
Section 8.2. 
69
 A copy of this flowchart is included in Chapter Eight, Section 8.3 (see Figure 2), which further examines 
Lukoff’s work in context of the issue of discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. 
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consideration of the cultural and religious factors that later took precedence in the 




Between 1985 and 1994, several further developments transpired before culminating in 
the DSM task force’s acceptance of the proposed new V-Code. Having formulated 
MEPF as a diagnostic category, Lukoff (1988, p.135) next likened it to the DSM-III-R V-
Code titled ‘Uncomplicated Bereavement’, which enabled clinicians to diagnose 
depression related to major losses in life (e.g. the death of a loved one) as “a normal 
reaction” (APA, 1987, p.361). In light of the intrinsic resemblance between MEPF and 
Uncomplicated Bereavement, Lukoff (1988, p.135) concluded that;  
 
individuals in the midst of a tumultuous spiritual emergence may appear to 
have a mental disorder if viewed out of their context, but are actually 
undergoing a transformative process. Delineating both the areas of overlap 
and nonoverlap between specific diagnostic categories and discrete 
transpersonal states of consciousness could yield some guidelines for 
clinicians faced with the task of differentiating mental disorders from 
spiritual emergencies. 
 
In order to further bolster the efficacy of MEPF as a diagnostic category, Lukoff (1988, 
pp.114-128; 1985, pp.171-176) presented case studies of two patients he had worked 
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with from a transpersonal perspective. Both had been diagnosed as having a psychotic 
disorder, yet an appraisal of descriptions of their respective experiences, and the 
meanings they attributed to these experiences, demonstrated that they were 
candidates for a being diagnosed with MEPF, for their beliefs, though apparently 
psychotic, were generally of transpersonal or mystical nature (ibid). Finally, using the 
DSM-III-R bereavement V-Code as a precedent, (Lukoff et al, 1998, p.26) notified the 
DSM-IV task force in 1991 to say they were submitting a V-Code category titled 
‘Psychospiritual Conflict’ for prospective inclusion in DSM-IV as a “nonpathological 
category for a distressing and disruptive experience”. Even at this advanced stage, the 
proposed diagnostic context was scoped to the psychospiritual-psychotic nexus, with 
seemingly no allusion to religious or cultural considerations. 
 
Religious considerations were apparently not incorporated into their proposal until after 
the DSM task force had been notified of the impending submission of a psychospiritual 
V-Code. In order to “obtain greater support”, Lukoff et al (ibid) subsequently decided to 
add “psychoreligious problems” to their proposal and over the ensuing months they 
conducted two extensive literature reviews on psychoreligious and psychospiritual 
research (Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1992; Lukoff et al, 1993). In the first of these reviews 
they explained that, in 1985, “Lukoff proposed a diagnostic category, Mystical 
Experience with Psychotic Features (MEPF), to identify intense religious experiences 
that present as psychotic-like episodes” [italics added] (Lukoff, Turner & Lu, 1992, 
p.43). However, in his 1985 proposal, Lukoff originally spoke of mystical rather than 
religious experiences, hence the sudden emphasis on a ‘religious’ context was 
seemingly part of their endeavour to sway the DSM authors to accept their V-Code 
category proposal.  
 
A further step in formulating the V-Code was to associate it with the notion of cultural 
sensitivity. An article published at the time by key task force members stressed that 
“the DSM-IV must not be culture specific but instead be applicable cross culturally” 
(Frances, First, et al, 1991, p.409). Hence, Lukoff and company proceeded to anchor 
their proposal within a cultural context, undoubtedly as a measure to further enhance 
the likelihood of securing the task force’s approval. After May 1991, Lukoff, Turner & Lu 
(1992, p.44) began to investigate and consider the “cultural sensitivity implications” for 
both psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems. The end result of this process was 
the publication of an article aptly titled ‘Toward a more culturally sensitive DSM-IV: 
Psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems’ (Lukoff, Lu & Turner, 1992), thus deftly 
linking their particular V-Code focus with the emergent cultural considerations for DSM-
IV. In this article they argued that;  
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in theory, research, and practice, mental health professionals have tended 
to ignore or pathologize the religious and spiritual dimensions of life. This 
represents a type of cultural insensitivity toward individuals who have 
religious and spiritual experiences in both Western and non-Western 
cultures (ibid, p.673).  
 
This statement, situated psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems squarely within 
the realm of cultural sensitivity, as did their assertion that “the religious and spiritual 
dimensions of culture are among the most important factors that structure human 
experience, beliefs, values, behaviour, and illness patterns” (ibid). Here, they also 
included Western religious and spiritual dimensions under the generic umbrella of 
‘culture’ (ibid), presumably to emphasise that Western people who experience 
distressing transpersonal events or spiritual emergencies also warrant clinical cultural 
sensitivity when being assessed. Regardless, strongly linking the proposed V-Code to 
cultural sensitivity appears to have played a vital role in its eventual acceptance, for as 
stated above, it was later adopted by the task force as one of four innovations to help 
foster cultural sensitivity in DSM-IV. 
 
A formal V-Code proposal was finally submitted to the DSM-IV task force in December 
1991, with definitions for psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems. The word 
‘conflict’ had been substituted with ‘problem’ to complement DSM-III-R V-Code 
terminology, and the authors “stressed the need for this new diagnosis to improve the 
cultural sensitivity of the DSM-IV” (Lukoff et al, 1998, pp.26-27). The working definitions 
in the submitted proposal were: 
 
Psychoreligious problems are experiences that a person finds troubling or 
distressing and that involve the beliefs and practices of an organized 
church or religious institution. Examples include loss or questioning of a 
firmly held faith, change in denominational membership, conversion to a 
new faith, and intensification of adherence to religious practices and 
orthodoxy. 
Psychospiritual problems are experiences that a person finds troubling or 
distressing and that involve that person's relationship with a transcendent 
being or force. These problems are not necessarily related to the beliefs 
and practices of an organized church or religious institution. Examples 
include near-death experience and mystical experience. This category can 
be used when the focus of treatment or diagnosis is a psychoreligious or 
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psychospiritual problem that is not attributable to a mental disorder (ibid, 
p.27). 
 
The second definition provided much latitude for the clinical consideration of a broad 
range of ostensible transpersonal experiences and incorporated the original notion of 
MEPF via the use of ‘mystical experience’ as a specific example of a psychospiritual 
problem. Like Dean’s metapsychiatry proposal,70 this clearly aimed to expand the 
parameters of psychiatric thinking for it encouraged clinicians to consider mystical, 
parapsychological and psychospiritual experiences as innately human, rather than as 
probable signs of psychopathology. 
 
The DSM task force’s response to this initial V-code draft appears to have either 
missed, or dismissed, the raison d’être of the proposed category; particularly its 
psychospiritual aspect. After reviewing the proposal the task force maintained that 
psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems might best be subsumed under an 
existing DSM-III-R axis I category (e.g. adjustment disorder) or a V-Code category (e.g. 
identity problem) (Turner et al, 1995, pp.436-437). Hence, in reductively situating these 
experiences under the umbrella of minor psychiatric categories, the task force 
seemingly failed to appreciate the essential idea from which the proposed V-Code 
stemmed; that is, the significance, legitimacy and value of transpersonal, religious and 
psychospiritual domains of human experience, and their related problems. Lukoff and 
associates counterargued by:  
i) pointing out that subsuming the V-Code would subvert its basic aim to 
“anchor the nonpathological end of the differential diagnostic spectrum 
regarding religious or spiritual problems”; and  
ii) contending that the existent DSM-III-R categories did not provide the 
clinician with apposite information regarding the nature and treatment of 
religious and spiritual problems (ibid, p.437).  
Hence, they reaffirmed that a fundamental aim of the proposed V-Code was to address 
situations of human distress, in the form psychoreligious and psychospiritual problems, 
which were not recognised within DSM diagnostics. The above counterarguments also 
subtly reasserted that religion and spirituality are not subsidiary to the likes of 
adjustment disorders or identity problems, but exist as primary realms of reality in their 
own right.  
 
                                                          
70
 Surprisingly, despite the similarity between Lukoff’s and Dean’s respective visions for validating 
mysticism within psychiatric epistemology, Dean is not cited in any of the numerous articles published by 
Lukoff and company. 
108 
Despite the task force’s initial reservations about accepting the new V-Code category, 
Lukoff and company gained support from the APA Committee on Religion and 
Psychiatry as well as the National Institute for Mental Health (NIMH) Workgroup on 
Culture and Diagnosis (Lukoff et al 1998, p.27). The latter group played a key formative 
role in instituting the DSM-IV cultural innovations (Mezzich et al, 1999, p.457), and 
likely influenced the task force’s final decision to adopt a revised version of the V-Code. 
The task force formally announced its acceptance of the proposed V-Code in January 
1993, though the title was changed from “psychoreligious or psychospiritual problem” 
to the simplified ‘religious or spiritual problem”, so as to maintain congruence with other 
V-Code titles (Turner et al, 1995, p.436). The revised definition proposed that: 
 
This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is a religious 
or spiritual problem. Examples include distressing experiences that involve 
loss or questioning of faith, problems associated with conversion to a new 
faith, or questioning of other spiritual values which may not necessarily be 
related to an organized church or religious institution (Lukoff et al, 1995, 
p.469; Task Force on DSM-IV, 1993, p.U:8). 
 
Due to the significant changes to their original submission, Lukoff and company 
challenged this revised definition, but were unsuccessful (Turner et al, 1995, p.436). 
The above definition was subsequently introduced into DSM-IV in 1994 as V62.89 
‘Religious or spiritual problem’ (APA, 1994, p.685), then, in 2000, replicated in DSM-IV-
TR (APA, 2000, p.741). This event constituted both a progressive step and a failing for 
American psychiatry. To have included the word ‘spiritual’ at all in a category heading 
was a novel development, however, divesting the category of its original transpersonal 
meaning and purpose seemingly reflected an unwillingness, or inability, to fully accept 
the reality of psychospiritual realities. 
 
Issues of semantics aside, the task force’s approval of the V62.89 ‘Religious or spiritual 
problem’ category precipitated a wave of interest in the subject. As Lukoff et al (1993, 
p.12) noted at the time; 
 
an increasing number of presentations addressing religious or spiritual 
issues in clinical practice are being made at the American Psychiatric 
Association Annual Meetings. In 1993, there were at least a dozen 
workshops, courses and symposia in the scientific program. Topics 
included: ‘Religious Issues in Residency Training’, ‘Transpersonal 
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Psychiatry’, ‘Existential and Spiritual Issues in PTSD Treatment’, and a 
‘Practicum on Spiritual Issues in Treatment’. 
 
This mirrored the similar upsurge of clinical interest in metaphysical matters that 
occurred during the 1970s with Dean’s introduction of the notions of metapsychiatry 
and ultraconsciousness, and further demonstrates the capacity for mainstream 
psychiatry to consider the ramifications of such matters in clinical practice. 
 
7.1.3 V62.89 and the ‘spiritual’ problem 
Although the inclusion of V62.89 ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ in DSM-IV marked a 
breakthrough and a triumph in terms of establishing a clinical platform for considering 
religious or spiritual problems in psychiatric diagnostics, the revised definition 
seemingly stripped Lukoff and company’s V-Code proposal of both its intended use as 
a differential diagnosis category, and its essential transpersonal meaning. For instance, 
whereas the original proposal centred on enabling the clinician to make a differential 
diagnosis between psychospiritual and psychopathological experiences, V62.89 was 
ostensibly limited to considering the clinical implications of dilemmas and difficulties 
relating to a person’s religious and spiritual beliefs and practices. Additionally, apart 
from the word ‘spiritual’, all metaphysical language and meaning was expunged from 
the V62.89 definition. Yet the original definition depicted psychospiritual problems as 
‘experiences that a person finds troubling or distressing and that involve that person's 
relationship with a transcendent being or force’, with mystical experiences proffered as 
an example. Indeed, Lukoff and company specifically chose the term ‘psychospiritual 
problems’ to differentiate them from the questing and questioning of standard 
spirituality (Turner et el, 1995, p.442). For this reason, Lu et al (1997b, p.1012) 
conclude that “the name change to ‘religious or spiritual problem’ might result in the 
loss of conceptual clarity that could aid the differential diagnosis and referral process”. 
Teodorescu (c2008a) also critically remarked that “the DSM revision committee 
changed the name of the diagnosis as well as excluded spiritual emergencies as 
proposed by Lukoff, Lu and Turner, turning it into a more general and less specific 
diagnosis”. It therefore appears that the V62.89 definition portrays a spiritual problem 
as pertaining only to everyday spirituality and does not include experiences relating to 
mysticism, transcendent beings or forces, and psychotic-like spiritual emergencies. 
 
It is unclear whether the task force intended the term ‘spiritual values’ to incorporate 
metaphysical considerations, but the fact that they purposefully removed any related 
terminology suggests not. Regardless, after the publication of DSM-IV, Lukoff and 
company continued to maintain that V62.89 was applicable as a ‘spiritual problem’ 
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category that enabled a psychiatrist to consider whether or not a person’s distress was 
associated with transpersonal experiences or crises.71 Yet, despite these repeated 
assertions, Turner acknowledged in a 2005 interview that while the task force authors 
“allowed the word spiritual to be used” despite their discomfort in doing so, they also  
stripped the V-Code of its essential intended meaning “by dropping the words Mystical 
and NDEs” (Herrick, 2008, p.82). Arguably, then, the modified DSM-IV version of 
‘spiritual’ appears to be a psychologised and shallow clinical idiom, with a scope of 
meaning  limited to everyday religious issues or spiritual anxieties, and devoid of 
deeper mystical connotations and application. If so, the DSM-IV ‘Religious or spiritual 
problem’ category did not have the clinical scope for diagnostically differentiating 
psychospiritual from psychotic experiences. The essential transpersonal vision and 
meaning of Lukoff and company’s ‘psychospiritual problems’ definition was lost when 
modified by the DSM-IV task force. Furthermore, their aim to encourage psychiatry to 
recognise the veracity of mystic realities was also seemingly thwarted, for the task 
force reluctantly allowed the word ‘spiritual’ into the manual only after having divested it 
of its essential mystical associations. 
 
7.1.4 DSM-5 and the ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ 
With the advent of the DSM-5 review process, Lukoff and associates again attempted 
to have the ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ category invested with its original 
transpersonal scope and depth of meaning. In 2006, a symposium was held in which 
many “well-known clinicians and researchers” gathered to consider “the spiritual and 
religious aspects of major diagnostic categories including psychotic disorders”, and 
related issues of differential diagnosis (Peteet et al, 2011a, pp.xvii-xviii). A Spirituality 
White Paper Group was subsequently established (Lukoff et al, 2010, p.424) and they 
published the findings and decisions of the symposium in a book titled Religious and 
Spiritual Issues in Psychiatric Diagnosis: A Research Agenda for DSM-V (Peteet et al, 
2011b). In this book, Lukoff et al (2011, p.192) proposed an updated V62.89 definition 
that reflects “current peer-reviewed research on religious or spiritual problems by 
including mention of the additional types of problems identified in the literature”. The 
proposed definition essentially reiterated the original, though with the added 
specification of several spiritual problems:  
 
This category can be used when the focus of clinical attention is a religious 
or spiritual problem. Examples include distressing experiences that involve 
                                                          
71
 For example see - Lukoff et al, 2010; Lukoff, 2009, p.138; Lukoff, 2007, p.637; Lukoff, 2001, p.1; Yang 
et al, 2006, p.169; Lukoff & Lu, 1999, p.470; Lukoff et al, 1999, p.68; Lukoff et al, 1998, pp.32-39; Lu et al, 
1997a, p.76; Lukoff et al, 1996, pp.236-239; Lukoff et al, 1995, p.475; Turner et al, 1995, pp.439-441. 
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loss or questioning of faith; changes in membership practices, and beliefs 
(including conversion); New Religious Movements and cults; and life 
threatening terminal illness. Examples of spiritual problems include mystical 
experiences, near-death experiences, psychic experiences, alien abduction 
experiences, meditation and spiritual practice-related experiences, 
possession experiences, and questioning of other spiritual values which 
may not necessarily be related to an organized church or religious 
institution (ibid). 
 
This definition, again, endorses a category that recognises the existence of non-
psychopathological psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences and enables clinical 
scope for considering these in diagnostic practice. Lukoff and company (2010, p.441) 
further recommended that in DSM-5 “research is needed to answer remaining 
questions about the complex relationship between religion/spirituality and psychiatric 
disorders”, particularly when considering “the value laden and culturally conditioned 
nature of psychiatric diagnosis”. In their view, such research necessitates critically 
examining “a variety of unusual experiences which appear to challenge our 
understanding of the world, such as mystical experiences” (ibid, p.426). These 
recommendations called upon psychiatry to extend its philosophical and 
epistemological bounds to enable the serious consideration of transpersonal 
phenomena in psychiatric diagnostics, particularly in context of discerning between 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences. 
 
Despite the considerable body of literature substantiating the existence of 
psychospiritual realities and noting the importance for psychiatry to investigate them in 
order to better understand the complexity of states of human consciousness, it appears 
the DSM-5 task force was reticent, or unable, to seriously adopt such considerations 
into its worldview. Although the category of ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ was included 
in DSM-5 (APA, 2013, p.725), the appeal by Lukoff and colleagues to upgrade its 
definition so as to represent a wide array of psychospiritual phenomena and 
experiences was largely unsuccessful. For instance, the present DSM-5 definition is a 
verbatim replication of that in DSM-IV, but is now placed in a subsection titled 
‘Problems Related to Other Psychosocial, Personal, and Environmental 
Circumstances’ (ibid). This clearly construes ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ dynamics 
as being circumstantial to psychosocial, personal, and environmental factors and, 
therefore, is a representation far removed from the original transpersonal meaning 
intended by Lukoff and colleagues.  
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Intriguingly, the words ‘spiritual’ and ‘spirituality’ are used prolifically throughout the 
DSM-5 manual, despite the task force’s apparent reticence to invest this category with 
a broader scope of transpersonal meaning and application. This is a particularly 
noteworthy event, for it is the first time the word ‘spirituality’ has appeared within the 
DSM manuals. It ostensibly signifies a small but significant step towards the formal 
acknowledgment by mainstream psychiatry of a psychospiritual domain of being 
human. These particular usages, however, are conceptually and diagnostically 
unrelated to the ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ category, for they appear only in the 
manual’s revised Cultural Formulation chapter (pp.749-759) where they denote an 
aspect of “cultural identity” (pp.749, 753), and their application is restricted to cultural 
diagnostic considerations. For example, the text advises that patients may proffer a 
“spiritual reason” as the cause of their problem and that “cultural variation in symptoms 
and in explanatory models associated with these cultural concepts may lead clinicians 
to misjudge the severity of a problem or assign the wrong diagnosis (e.g., unfamiliar 
spiritual explanations may be misunderstood as psychosis)” (pp.752, 758-759). This is 
a fascinating development. For one, it demonstrates that mainstream psychiatry can 
incorporate psychospiritual considerations into its conceptual and operational 
framework. Also, the engagement with spiritual matters in the Cultural Formulation 
chapter seemingly reflects the transpersonal thinking expressed by Lukoff and 
colleagues in their V-Code proposal; which begs the questions – Why did the task force 
include psychospiritual considerations, within psychotic context, in the DSM-5 Cultural 
Formulation chapter, when approval of essentially the same in the proposed ‘Religious 
or spiritual problem’ category has been denied since the early 1990s? Is it because 
psychospiritual determinants in psychosis can be acknowledged for psychiatric patients 
from ‘other’ cultures, but not for mainstream Western patient populations? If so, why 
can unfamiliar spiritual explanations be misdiagnosed as psychosis in ‘other’ cultural 
contexts, but not in a Western cultural context? This question reflects the psychiatric 
‘cross-cultural conundrum’ issue examined in Chapter Twelve, Section 12.1. 
 
Overall, Lukoff and company’s V-Code proposal, and the subsequent introduction of a 
‘Religious or spiritual problem’ category into the psychiatric lexicon, has seen 
psychospiritual matters invested with some clinical legitimacy, albeit limited. Although 
the essential transpersonal meaning of their original proposal has been edited from the 
final DSM product, the fact that this category has been accepted into the DSM series at 
all constitutes additional evidence that psychiatry can engage psychospiritual realities 
within its remit. Furthermore, despite the recent and growing trend towards biomedical 
thinking within American and global psychiatry, the ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ 
category, and cultural instructions for discerning psychotic from psychotic-like 
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psychospiritual experiences, have been included in DSM-5. Indeed, as is evidenced in 
the ensuing section, this attention to psychospiritual matters within mainstream 
psychiatry appears to be a growing phenomenon. 
 
7.2 Contemporary outlooks on psychospiritual matters in global psychiatry  
Since the 1990s, and particularly over the past decade, emergent pockets of 
attentiveness to psychospiritual areas of human life have occurred within global 
mainstream psychiatry. For instance, in an American context, psychiatrist John Peteet, 
chair of the APA's Corresponding Committee on Religion, Spirituality and Psychiatry, 
claims that “recognition of the value of religious and spiritual beliefs and practices in 
mental health treatment has grown in recent years” (Moran, 2007, p.10). The 
Committee’s code of commitments states that “psychiatrists should foster recovery by 
making treatment decisions with patients in ways that respect and take into meaningful 
consideration their cultural, religious/spiritual, and personal ideals” (APA, 2006). 
Similarly, Stoddard (2012, p.544), an APA Board of Trustees member, affirms that 
“there is increased recognition in clinical care and in research in psychiatry of the 
importance of religion and spirituality in our patients’ lives”. Additionally, the APA’s 
Position Statement on Diversity upholds that “the American Psychiatric Association 
supports the development of cultural diversity among its membership and within the 
field of psychiatry”, which includes issues regarding “religious/spiritual beliefs” (APA, 
1999). In fact, the aforementioned book titled Religious and Spiritual Issues in 
Psychiatric Diagnosis (Peteet et al, 2011b) is a psychiatric text dedicated entirely to 
considering, and making clinical recommendations about, psychospiritual and religious 
matters in relation to key diagnostic categories such as depression, schizophrenia and 
psychotic disorders, substance use disorders, anxiety related disorders, post-traumatic 
stress, personality disorders, and child and adolescent psychopathology. These 
developments within American psychiatry represent initial but significant steps in 
extending its epistemological horizons to enable the investigation of possible 
psychospiritual determinants in psychopathology and psychosis.  
 
There has also been a recent emergence of psychiatric interest in psychospiritual 
matters in other contexts. For instance, there have been attempts by some 
psychiatrists within the fields of neuroscience and neurotheology to understand human 
spiritual experience in light of medical science. There has also been an endeavour by 
some psychiatrists to examine mystical and metaphysical occurrences as ontological 




7.2.1 Neuroscience and neurotheology 
Within the field of medicine there has been a longstanding and entrenched resistance 
to studying phenomena beyond the theoretical bounds set by empirical science. 
Research is restricted to that which is objective, observable, measurable and 
replicable, while subjective experiences and states of consciousness, whether 
apparently normal or abnormal, are relegated to the dubious status of ‘anecdotal’. As 
neuropsychiatrist Peter Fenwick (2009, p.170) wryly observes, “science puts its fingers 
to its lips and is largely silent when the question of consciousness arises…The peep 
show of the private world of the individual’s mind should not be included in our 
theories”. Despite this reticence, the fields of neuroscience and neurotheology have 
made some preliminary headway in the scientific study of religion and spirituality.  
 
7.2.1.1 Neuroscience and psychiatry 
Neuroscience, as a medical discipline, generally endorses the materialist 
understanding that consciousness is epiphenomenal to the physical body and its 
organs. Ipso facto, states of psychospiritual consciousness, if accepted as real, are 
generally also overlooked by neuroscience. Recently, however, there has been some 
interest in investigating this subject, though in keeping with the fundamental premise 
that “religious experience is brain-based” (Saver & Rabin, 1997, p.195). Therefore, 
through the use of technology such as neuroimaging, it is theoretically possible to 
identify and measure changes in brain activity that correlate with subjective reports 
made by people about spiritual experiences, particularly in structured practices such as 
prayer or meditation (Fenwick, 2011, pp.2, 4). According to Fenwick (ibid, p.7), the 
empirical verification of such correlative brain activity constitutes “the beginning of a 
definite neuroscience of spirituality and spiritual experience”. Although such 
neuroscientific thinking is couched in the language of reductive materialism, it does 
acknowledge the veracity of psychospiritual experience and, in so doing, brings it into 
the fold of legitimate scientific research. 
 
Neuropsychiatry, as a branch of neuroscientific research, has also opened its scope of 
investigation to include psychospiritual considerations. Essentially, in this context, the 
envisioned task for neuropsychiatry is to “delineate the distinctive neural substrates of 
religious experience and their alteration in brain disorders” and to “review data that 
have been collected on religious experience in normal individuals and in different 
neurologic and neuropsychiatric syndromes” so that “a preliminary unifying model of 
the brain basis of religious experience may be constructed” (Saver & Rabin, 1997, 
p.195). Hence, in order to refine diagnostic practices, neuropsychiatry aims to identify 
discrete neurological activity that corresponds with reported religio- psychospiritual and 
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psychopathological experiences. For instance, Perroud (2009, p.48) has proposed the 
idea of measuring neurotransmitter concentrations to ascertain whether “seritonergic 
and dopaminergic systems” flux in association with psychospiritual experiences, and  
maintains that such research “could help to understand the complex link between 
psychiatric disorders and spirituality”. Fenwick (2009, p.185) also observes that 
neuroscience has not only established a correlation between spiritual practices and 
neurological activity, but that these practices also have a beneficial impact on “brain 
function” and in fostering “an improvement in mental and physical health”. This 
suggests the therapeutic value of such research and arguably substantiates Dean’s 
assertion thirty years beforehand regarding the potential mental health benefits 
associated with the study and practice of metapsychiatry. Arguably, further such 
neuropsychiatric investigation of psychospiritual matters may enable new insights into 
the nature of both mystic and psychotic states of consciousness. 
 
7.2.1.2 Neurotheology and psychiatry  
Neurotheology is a neuroscience adjunct which practices the biological investigation of 
metaphysical experiences. Beauregard & O’Leary (2007, p.208) succinctly define 
‘neurotheology’ as a discipline that “analyses the biological basis of spirituality”, while 
Newberg (2010, p.1) defines it as “a unique field of scholarship that seeks to 
understand the relationship specifically between the brain and theology, and more 
broadly between the mind and religion”. According to Miller (2001), neurotheology is a 
multidisciplinary body of research that includes “medicine, psychiatry, psychology, 
physics, complexity, chemistry, biology, philosophy, mathematics, computer science, 
genetics, theology, consciousness studies and several social sciences”, while 
Beauregard & Paquette (2006, p.186) refer to it as “spiritual neuroscience”, which they 
describe as “a field of scientific investigation at the crossroads of psychology, religion 
and spirituality, and neuroscience”. Fundamentally, then, neurotheology aims to 
ascertain if spiritual experience is centred in the brain and is intrinsic to human nature. 
As Newberg et al (2002, p.176) hypothesise; 
 
All human beings have a brain, and all of these brains work in a very similar 
fashion. So if we are ever going to get a sense of the universal aspects of 
religion, then the brain might be the best place to start. 
 
Therefore, on the whole, it is a discipline that endorses what Muller (2008) refers to as 
a “bottom up” approach, whereby “explanations for religious belief and spirituality 
offered by neurotheologians…derive from a science that sees our lives as being largely 
determined by biological factors”. As in standard neuroscience, neurotheological 
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research involves using brain scanning technology72 to ascertain whether correlations 
exist between spiritual experiences and localised brain activity. This not only includes 
an examination of mystical, shamanic and religious experiences, but also specific 
trance induction practices such as meditation, prayer, yoga, relaxation, dancing, 
chanting, hyperventilation (Horgan, 2004, p.74). Although Cohen (2005, p.134) 
derisively refers to neurotheology as “robing religion in the raiment of science”, in a 
positive sense it represents an attempt by science to take spirituality seriously, albeit by 
reducing the spiritual experience to measurable pockets of brain activity.  
 
As a relatively new discipline, it appears that neurotheology has not yet been adopted 
into the body of psychiatric and neuropsychiatric research. As Miller notes above, 
however, psychiatry is included within its multidisciplinary remit, and it appears that 
neurotheological research is indeed of some relevance to psychiatry. For example, 
findings in the field indicate that religious/spiritual matters and occurrences “are based 
not on delusional ideas but on experiences that are neurologically real” (Newberg et al, 
2002, p.126). Also, d’Aquili & Newberg (1999, p.207) envisage that, through 
neurotheological technology and findings “it is possible…mystical experiences may 
finally be clearly differentiated from any type of psychopathology”. Hence, there is 
apparent scope for neurotheological research to be extended into the field of 
psychiatric research to assist in better understanding the nature of psychospiritual 
matters in relation to psychotic experiences, to redress the apparent problem of 
discerning psychospiritual from psychopathological experiences, and to reduce the 
incidence of misdiagnosis. 
 
An intriguing development within neurotheology, which is of profound relevance to 
psychiatry, is the questioning of the axiomatic materialist assumption as to the physical 
primacy of reality. Despite the materialist basis of neuroscientific and neurotheological 
thinking, there are some researchers in these fields who have stepped beyond this 
premise to pose the question - Are psychospiritual experiences caused by, or the 
cause of, brain changes? As Newberg (2010, p.126) acknowledges, a conundrum in 
neurotheological research is whether brain scan results show “the brain creating an 
experience or responding to one?”. Further to this, Newberg & Lee (2005, p.481) 
caution that “care must be taken to avoid...reducing spiritual experiences only to 
neurophysiological mechanisms”, while Cunningham (2011b, p.227) maintains that 
“religious experience...cannot be anchored to an anatomically separate area of the 
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 Neurotheological research instruments include electroencephalography (EEG), positron emission 
tomography (PET), single photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) and functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) (Newberg, 2010, pp.122-123). 
117 
brain”. Newberg & Lee (2005, p.484) raise the same issue in the context of God - “If the 
brain activity changes during a mystical communion with God, it is not clear whether 
the brain activity caused that experience or responded to that experience”. Indeed, in 
their book titled The Spiritual Brain: A Neuroscientist’s Case for the Existence of the 
Soul, Beauregard & O’Leary (2007, p.289-295) dedicate a chapter to exploring the 
research question - ‘Did God Create the Brain or Does the Brain Create God?’. Here, 
they propose:  
i) the need for “a new scientific frame of reference” with a research compass 
reaching beyond the limits of “dogmatic materialist scientism”; and  
ii) that such scientific research considers that “mystical experience from 
various spiritual traditions indicates that the nature of mind, consciousness, 
and reality as well as the meaning of life can be apprehended through an 
intuitive, unitive, and experiential form of knowing” (ibid, p.294).  
This is a radical proposal, for it repositions the locus of scientific investigation into 
subjective realms that have traditionally been perceived as unscientific. It also infers 
the possibility of psychospiritual primacy, and therefore represents a tentative step in 
scientific research to reconcile the tension between materialist and metaphysical 
thinking. In fact, Cook (2004, p.150) describes neurotheology as a field of research that 
aims to understand “the functioning of the mind/brain in relation to God or ultimate 
reality” [italics added], which clearly accords primacy to the psychospiritual domain. 
This idea of the brain responding to rather than causing psychospiritual experiences, 
challenges the basic tenets of conventional science. By extrapolation, it also opens to 
the possibility that, as a state of consciousness, psychosis may likewise be the product 
of psychospiritual determinants, and that brain activity patterns observed in psychotic 
patients by neuropsychiatry may be of a correlatory and not a causal nature. 
 
7.2.2 Psychospiritual ventures within mainstream psychiatry 
Since the 1994 advent of DSM-IV, there have been several attempts by psychiatrists to 
incorporate psychospiritual considerations into psychiatric thinking and practice. These 
ventures have all been driven by the view that an investigation of psychospiritual 
matters by psychiatry is important. An overview of some of these further demonstrates 
that, despite the predominant biogenic predisposition of contemporary mainstream 
psychiatry, it is possible to seriously consider psychospiritual matters in clinical thinking 
and practice, for many psychiatrists have done so. In fact, this appears to be an 





7.2.2.1 International Association for Spiritual Psychiatry 
Despite the DSM-IV task force’s inability to fully accept Lukoff and colleagues 
transpersonal V-Code category, psychiatrists elsewhere in the world were evidently 
able to embrace such psychospiritual ideas. A salient case in point was the 
establishment of the International Association for Spiritual Psychiatry (IASP) in 1994. 
IASP was founded by French psychiatrist Jean-Marc Mantel and its guiding maxim was 
"psychiatry, medicine of the soul" (IASP, 2005). Horopciuc & Petrea (1994) define the 
IASP notion of ‘spiritual psychiatry’ as a practice that “foresees mental pathology as an 
opportune junction of human spirituality with a full study of the self”. The association 
began with a global membership of 250 clinicians who endorsed the aims of promoting 
“the integration of the spiritual dimension into modern medicine, psychology and 
psychiatry” and participating in “the creation of a psycho-spiritual medicine integrating 
scientific thought and mystical insight” (ibid). In pragmatic terms, Mantel (2004, pp.5, 6) 
depicted the spiritual psychiatrist as a spiritual practitioner-cum-clinician, who endorsed 
the moderate use of medication as an adjunct to psychotherapeutic guidance, and who 
aimed not only to remedy a presenting psychiatric problem, but ultimately, to foster a 
person’s spiritual development. He aspired to instigate “the advent of a psychiatry 
which places the psychic crisis in a wider context, that of man in search of himself” and 
foresaw that “psychiatry will then be able to fully inhabit its function, that of an 
awakener of consciousness and an artisan of peace” (ibid, p.6). As utopian and 
farfetched as this may seem from the perspective of orthodox psychiatry, such an 
approach has been exemplified in Tibetan psychiatry whereby the entire therapeutic 
system is founded upon the psychospiritual knowledge and maturity of practitioners.73  
 
IASP disbanded in 2002, however, its outcomes were quite substantial during its eight 
years of operation. For example, it published a biannual journal and conducted a 
variety of activities, including “conferences, lectures, workshops, creation of psycho-
spiritual medicine centers, forum Internet [sic] on spiritual approaches to medicine, 
psychology and psychiatry, cooperation with other associations, etc.” (IASP, 2005). 
Hence, as a modality of ‘spiritual psychiatry’ it demonstrated the feasibility of 
incorporating psychospiritual understandings into researching and therapeutically 
responding to instances of psychosis. My investigation throughout Focal Settings Three 
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 Chapter Thirteen provides a comprehensive critical investigation of Tibetan psychiatry and its 
understanding of psychosis.  
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7.2.2.2 Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group  
Another significant development in ‘spiritual psychiatry’ was the 1999 inauguration of 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group 
(SPSIG). Whereas IASP constituted an independent body of clinicians, SPSIG is 
affiliated with, and endorsed by, the Royal College of Psychiatrists (RCP) which is “the 
professional and educational body for psychiatrists in the United Kingdom” (Royal 
College of Psychiatrists, 2013). The growth of SPSIG’s membership since then 
indicates a definitive professional interest in the interface between psychiatry and 
spirituality. For instance, in 2005 there were about 900 SPSIG members (Eagger, 
2006), but by 2012 this had increased to a membership of 3000 (Cook, 2012), which 
represents about eighteen percent of the total 16,321 RCP members for that year 
(Cameron, 2012, p.15). Subsequently, Dein et al (2010, p.64) have asserted that; 
 
the burgeoning interest in this field, from within the profession and from 
service users alike, supports our view that an understanding of the 
relationship of spirituality and religion to mental health, far from being an 
optional extra, should be counted as essential to good clinical practice. 
 
Whereas Lukoff struggled in vain to see mystical concepts introduced into the 
American DSM manuals, these are explored openly within UK psychiatry. 
 
The SPSIG research scope is broad and eclectic. It includes mental health issues 
relating to “the problem of good and evil and a wide range of specific experiences 
invested with spiritual meaning including birth, death and near-death, mystical and 
trance states and varieties of religious experience” (SPSIG, 2013). Indeed, the website 
archive page features about two hundred papers submitted by members and guests 
which discuss a vast range of psychospiritual-related issues. For instance, Crowley 
(2007) notes the need to differentiate psychotic from mystical experiences and spiritual 
emergencies. Mitchell (2010, p.4) correspondingly highlights the problematic point that 
it is “impossible to differentiate between mystical experiences and psychosis solely on 
the basis of phenomenological description”, while Randal & Argyle (2005) address both 
of these issues. Other topics examined, which are normally pathologised or ignored by 
psychiatry, are: parapsychology (Pandarakalam, 2007), prayer (Raji, 2004; Fenwick, 
2004), transpersonal psychiatry (Read, 2007), kundalini (Sourial, 2007; Coghlan, 
2007),74 God (Coghlan, 2003; Lawrence, 2002), meditation (Sharma, 2008), 
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 Definitions of kundalini vary significantly among commentators on this phenomenon. However, it 
generally refers to a psychospiritual force that can emerge within the body, and in some instances, create 
symptoms that mimic those of psychosis. 
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“regression in the service of transcendence” (Read, 2011, p.11), and spirit possession 
(Sanderson, 2012, 2003; Loewenthal, 2012).75 All of these, when seriously considered, 
represent domains or states of experience and consciousness that ostensibly 
challenge medical psychiatry to reconsider its worldview for understanding, discerning, 
diagnosing and treating psychotic disorders, and indeed, for defining mental illness.  
 
As indicated above, a principal area of research and commentary for SPSIG is the 
relationship between spirituality and psychosis, and how this may shape psychiatric 
epistemology and diagnostic practices. The following list of article titles provides a 
snapshot of some key SPSIG research topics in relation to this:  
 ‘Symptoms of spiritual crisis and the therapeusis of healing’ (Brandon, 2010) 
 ‘Spiritual aspects of psychosis and recovery’ (Mitchell, 2010) 
 ‘What proportion of psychiatrists take a spiritual history?’ (Nazir, 2010) 
 ‘Lack of spiritual practice - an important risk factor for suffering from distress’ 
(Kohls & Walach, 2008) 
 ‘Personal religious or spiritual beliefs, and the experience of hearing voices, 
having strong beliefs, or other experiences affecting mental wellbeing and 
general functioning’ (Marriot, 2008) 
 ‘Furthering the spiritual dimension of psychiatry in the United Kingdom’ 
(Powell, 2007) 
 ‘Psychosis and spirituality: The journey of an idea’ (Clarke, 2006) 
 ‘Psychosis or spiritual emergence? - Consideration of the transpersonal 
perspective within psychiatry’ (Crowley, 2006) 
 ‘‘Spiritual emergency’ – a useful explanatory model?: A literature review and 
discussion paper’ (Randal & Argyle, 2005) 
 ‘Telepathy, parapsychology and psychiatry’ (Beddow, 2004) 
 ‘Mysterious ways: Spirituality and British psychiatry in the 20th century’ 
(Sims, 2003) 
 ‘Examining our spiritual spectacles: Dangers and pitfalls’ (Raheja, 2001) 
 
The view that spirituality should be central, rather than peripheral, to psychiatric 
thinking, training and practice is also emphasised in a recommendation made in the 
SPSIG position statement – “Religion and spirituality and their relationship to the 
diagnosis, aetiology and treatment of psychiatric disorders should be considered as 
essential components of both psychiatric training and continuing professional 
                                                          
75
 The phenomenon of spiritual possession in context of psychotic experience is thoroughly examined in 
Chapters Twelve and Thirteen. 
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development” (Cook, 2011, p.10). This proposal is also affirmed verbatim in the official 
“statement on spirituality and religion in psychiatry” formulated by the World Psychiatric 
Association Section on Religion, Spirituality and Psychiatry (Verhagen & Cook, 2010, 
p.630). Overall, the SPSIG exemplifies the capacity for mainstream psychiatry to 
seriously investigate psychospiritual matters in relation to psychopathology and 
psychosis. The robust example set by this mainstream psychiatric entity dispels the 
prevailing clinical view that psychospiritual matters are beyond the investigative remit of 
medical psychiatry.  
 
7.2.2.3 Further examples of psychospiritual interests in psychiatry  
Contemporary psychiatric interest in psychospiritual matters is not only confined to 
groups such as IASP and SPSIG. A considerable and growing body of literature 
indicates that psychiatrists worldwide are considering this issue. The views expressed 
largely fall into two broad camps: one, that psychiatry as a discipline is deficient if 
psychospiritual experiences and concerns are not included in its remit; and two, that 
there is a subsequent need for psychospiritual materials to be included in psychiatric 
training.  
 
In regards to the first idea, psychiatry is seen as deficient in several ways. For instance, 
Fabrega Jr (2000) describes contemporary medical psychiatry as the product “of a non-
spiritual worldview” which consequently endorses “a secular, reductionistic credo of 
diagnosis and practice”. Additionally, he maintains its excessive reliance on 
pharmaceutical interventions results in a failure to consider “the essential cultural, 
religious and spiritual meanings that are integral to the experience and diagnosis of 
psychopathology” (ibid). Similarly, Dein et al (2010, p.64) submit that a spiritually 
sensitive model of psychiatric assessment should include “an enquiry into meaning” 
rather than simply check-listing symptoms. Huguelet et al (2006, p.371) consider doing 
so to be essential because, in their view, understanding people’s religious and 
psychospiritual beliefs are often vital for helping them contend with psychotic beliefs 
and experiences. Keks & D'Souza (2003, pp.170, 171) likewise assert that it is 
“essential that spirituality be taken seriously in the supportive management of patients 
with psychoses. Spirituality can be used constructively to help recovery and 
reintegration from psychosis”. The views of such commentators arguably indicate that 
medical psychiatry’s poor comprehension of psychospiritual matters not only impedes 
the delivery of optimal therapeutic support, but may also result in misguided and 
harmful interventions. Other commentators have expressed the view that the reductive 
model of medical psychiatry fails to recognise the interconnectivity between all aspects 
of life, including psychopathology. From this perspective, mental health and mental 
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illness are not discrete states of being, but holistically interpenetrate each other. For 
example, Kingdon et al (2010, pp.246, 242) propose that “a continuum exists between 
psychoticism, normality and spirituality” and, therefore, “the experience of 
hallucinations, visual or auditory or both, can be among the most interesting areas 
where spirituality and psychosis merge”. Combined, these views suggest that the 
instigation of psychiatric practice which is sensitive to psychospiritual issues calls for 
more than the incidental consideration of a ‘Religious or spiritual problem’ category. It 
seemingly necessitates a major paradigm shift. 
 
Finally, in regards to the second idea, several commentators draw attention to the 
urgent need for psychospiritual skills and training in psychiatry. For example, Ng (2007, 
p.65) notes that, at present, “psychiatrists in general are probably not well placed to 
assess religious and spiritual beliefs”. Similarly, Yang et al (2006, p.173) report that 
“clinicians increasingly acknowledge that they need to take patients’ lives and spiritual 
experiences into account, yet few have been trained in assessing or working with 
spiritual issues”. In light of this situation, D'souza & George (2006, p.409) suggest that 
effective clinical assessment and support practices must consider all aspects of the 
holistic body-mind-spirit matrix of human nature and that “clinicians should employ a 
variety of spiritually informed therapeutic tools to facilitate the patient’s coping ability, 
thus enhancing well-being and recovery”. Indeed, they recommend that “all medical 
students and graduates should be trained to take a spiritual history as part of history 
taking”, including those studying psychiatry (ibid, p.410). In this regard, the RCP have 
taken a proactive step by offering an online continuing professional development 
module titled Exploring Spirituality with People Who Use Mental Health Services,76 
which states: 
 
This module will help you to develop your awareness of patients’ spiritual 
health needs. We aim to provide an outline of the current thinking and 
literature on this topic, and motivate you to incorporate this aspect of care 
into your practice. The module will also enable you to consider your own 
spiritual development, and will provide some helpful tools to assist you in 
taking a spiritual history (Eagger & Ferdinando, 2013). 
 
                                                          
76
 This training program appears to be the culmination of a series of publications in the UK regarding the 
value and necessity of incorporating ‘spirituality’ into the mental health sector thinking and practices. For 
example see - Taken Seriously: Report of the Somerset Spirituality Project (Mental Health Foundation, 
2002); Inspiring Hope: Recognising the Importance of Spirituality in a Whole Person Approach to Mental 
Health (Gilbert et al, 2003); Spirituality, Values and Mental Health: Jewels for the Journey (Coyte et al, 
2007). 
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This is a progressive development, for it not only demonstrates the feasibility of 
implementing psychospiritual training within mainstream psychiatry, (which, thirty five 
years earlier, Stanley Dean called for as an adjunct to metapsychiatry), but also 
addresses the notion that the effectiveness of this in psychiatric practice is relative to a 
clinician’s own level of psychospiritual development. Indeed, some psychiatrists believe 
that the discipline’s continuation is dependent on such developments. For instance, 
Wilkie’s (2004, p.15) argues that “psychiatry that fails to acknowledge the presence 
and relevance of the spiritual reality in people’s lives is not going to last much longer”, 
while, in a similar vein, D'souza & George (2006, p.411) envisage that the investigation 
of psychospiritual matters “in time may well come to be seen as the salvation of 
biomedicine”. Regardless of the validity of such predictions, and the prevailing aversion 
within mainstream psychiatry to ascribing clinical importance to psychospiritual matters, 
there evidently exists within the discipline an emergent interest in the potential clinical 
relevance of such matters. 
 
7.3 Conclusion 
In light of psychiatry’s perennial disregard of possible psychospiritual determinants in 
psychopathology and psychosis research, my primary Focal Setting Two aim has been 
to demonstrate the existence and feasibility of such research within psychiatry. 
Arguably, in identifying many such significant instances, this objective has been 
fulfilled. Indeed, the ground for continuing such research has already been established 
by Bucke, Dean, Lukoff, neuroscientific studies and psychiatric special interest groups. 
Focal Setting Three goes a step further to propose the seeming necessity of such 
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Focal Setting Three critically investigates the problem of discerning psychotic from non-
psychopathological psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences and questions whether 
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Chapter Eight 
Psychopathological or Psychospiritual:  
Early to Present Models 
 
8.0 Introduction 
This chapter represents a conceptual sea-change in showing that psychospiritual 
experiences often include psychotic-like occurrences. An introductory overview of 
literature pertaining to this issue is provided and an examination of the first 
comprehensive attempts to elicit a list of differentiating factors is undertaken. As 
Cunningham (2015) notes, psychiatry “does not recognize the difference between 
mystical and psychotic experiences”. Hence, this chapter demonstrates how 
psychospiritual knowledge can offer potential new ways to understand psychosis and 
challenges psychiatry’s materialist-based assumptions regarding the nature of 
psychopathology. 
 
8.1 Discerning psychospiritual from psychopathological  
The issue of discerning psychopathological from psychospiritual experiences in 
psychiatric practice has already been touched upon in Focal Setting Two. Bucke, 
Dean, the GAP authors, and Lukoff and company have all addressed this within a 
psychiatric context. However, the recognition of parallels and differences between 
psychopathological and psychospiritual states of consciousness is not new. Indeed, a 
wealth of texts exist in which authors have wrestled with the question of mapping 
convergences and divergences between psychopathological (psychotic) and 
psychospiritual (psychotic-like) experiences. For example, in ancient Greek literature, 
Socrates (in Plato’s Phaedrus) claimed that “there is a divine as well as a human 
madness” (Long & Macleane, 1868, p.40). However, while many contemporary 
investigators also note similarities and differences between psychotic and 
psychospiritual experiences, they mostly hold the common assumption that these are 
discrete phenomena.77 This is exemplified by Douglas-Smith (1971, pp.553-554) who 
concludes, after conducting an empirical study on religious mysticism, that the mystical 
experience “appears to be sui generis” and, therefore, distinct from psychotic disorders. 
Dodds (1951, p.68) similarly notes that “the dividing line between common insanity and 
prophetic madness is…hard to draw”, thus inferring there is a dividing line despite the 
difficulty in discerning it.   
 
                                                          
77
 A content analysis of this body of literature is undertaken in Chapter Nine.  
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The notion of differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences, and the 
difficulty in doing so, constitutes a significant challenge to accepted psychiatric 
assumptions about the nature of ‘psychopathology’. For instance, it is assumed that 
psychopathology (mental illness) stands in contradistinction to normalcy (mental 
health), and it is the job of psychiatry to identify and remedy the former. If, however, the 
existence of anomalous, non-psychopathological, psychotic-like mystical experiences 
is accepted, then this adds a problematic variable to the diagnostic formula, for such 
experiences are neither normal nor insane. A vexing question raised by this new 
dynamic is - If it seems like madness, but is not, then what, exactly, defines madness in 
contradistinction to non-madness? There appears to be no definitive answer to this 
question. Hence, the introduction of psychospiritual considerations into the diagnostic 
mix renders the fundamental psychiatric notion of psychopathology obscure and 
difficult to operationalise. This may partially explain why conventional psychiatry has 
generally eschewed the question, and the difficulty, of distinguishing 
psychopathological from psychospiritual experiences. To do so would likely unveil a 
host of intractable complexities that may destabilise accepted clinical and diagnostic 
views as to what is and is not psychotic. Such potential epistemological problems, 
however, do not justify avoiding the conundrums and ambiguities that invariably arise 
from trying to discriminate between psychotic and spiritual experiences. Rather, they 
present potential opportunities to better understand the enigma of psychosis by 
bringing to light new ideas for consideration, and alternative ways to consider 
traditional viewpoints. My later investigations throughout Chapters Nine and Ten 
support this line of thinking. 
 
8.2 The Grofs’ notion of spiritual emergency 
Comprehensive attempts to formulate diagnostic criteria to differentiate between 
psychopathological and psychospiritual experiences is a relatively recent occurrence. 
Two pioneers in this field of investigation are the American psychiatrist Stanislav Grof 
and psychotherapist Christina Grof. Their extensive research into spiritual emergencies 
constitutes a significant challenge for psychiatry to examine and reconsider its basic 
epistemological assumptions about the nature of reality and psychopathology. They 
coined the term “spiritual emergency” to designate apparent non-psychotic 
psychospiritual experiences (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.18), but also referred to these as a 
“transpersonal crisis” (Grof, 1983, p.32) and a “psychospiritual crisis” (Grof, 2008a, 
2000). It is their view that, rather than maintain the common psychiatric practice of 
equating mystical experiences with madness, there is a need to “reevaluate the 
relationship between psychiatry, spirituality, and psychosis” (Grof & Grof, 1989, p.xii). 
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Hence, they believe it is imperative for psychiatry to differentiate between non-
psychopathological spiritual emergencies and genuine psychotic experiences.  
 
Stanislav Grof’s conceptualisation of this term was directly influenced by three sources. 
First, his involvement in research over a twenty year period (1950s to 1970s) on the 
metaphysical similarities between psychotic experiences and those precipitated by 
ingesting the hallucinogen LSD, in which a differentiation was made between “model 
psychosis” (i.e. LSD-induced hallucinogenic experiences) and “naturally occurring 
psychoses” (Grof, 1972;1975, p.1). Second, Maslow’s (1963, 1962) idea of peak 
experiences. And third, the work of Italian psychiatrist and transpersonal practitioner 
Roberto Assagioli (1965, pp.40-42) who developed a therapeutic approach called 
‘psychosynthesis’, which included the notion of a potential “crises” attendant to 
“spiritual awakening” that may be mistakenly identified as psychotic. It is unclear, 
however, when the term ‘spiritual emergency’ was first coined. Christina Grof states 
that a psychotic-like episode she experienced in May 1976 was referred to by her and 
Stanislav as a “spiritual emergency” (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.18). Whether or not this 
infers the term was created by both of them is not elucidated. Nor is it clear if it was 
fashioned at the time of this incident, or later, in retrospect.78 
 
The notion of spiritual development is common to many, if not all, global cultures. 
According to Grof & Grof (1989, p.x), this can occur in two general forms; either as a 
benign “spiritual emergence” or the more dangerous “spiritual emergency”. In their 
view, ‘spiritual emergence’ is a natural human evolutionary and developmental 
process, which they define as; 
 
the movement of an individual to a more expanded way of being that 
involves enhanced emotional and psychosomatic health, greater freedom 
of personal choices, and a sense of deeper connection with other people, 
nature and the cosmos. An important part of this development is an 
increasing awareness of the spiritual dimension in one's life and in the 
universal scheme of things (Grof & Grof, 1995, pp.40-41). 
    
They explain that spiritual emergences often occur in an unobtrusive way and are 
easily integrated by a person into the flow and fabric of his or her everyday life. 
However, they can also emerge in a manner that is sudden, intense and overwhelming, 
                                                          
78
 The earliest use I can find is in an unpublished 1977 manuscript titled - ‘The concept of spiritual 
emergency: Understanding and treatment of transpersonal crises’ (Grof & Grof, 1977). My attempt to 
procure a copy of this document from the authors was unsuccessful. 
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and in such instances, a spiritual emergence can become a spiritual emergency (see 
Table 4): 
 
People who are in such a crisis are bombarded with inner experiences that 
abruptly challenge their old beliefs and ways of existing, and their 
relationship with reality shifts very rapidly. Suddenly they feel 
uncomfortable in the formerly familiar world and may find it difficult to meet 
the demands of everyday life. They can have great problems distinguishing 
their inner visionary world from the external world of daily reality (Grof & 
Grof, 1995, pp.42-43). 
 
Table 4 – The Grofs’ typology of differences between spiritual emergence and spiritual 
emergency  
Spiritual Emergence Spiritual Emergency 
Inner experiences are fluid, mild easy to 
integrate. 
Inner experiences are dynamic, jarring, 
difficult to integrate. 
New spiritual insights are welcome, 
desirable, expansive. 
New spiritual insights may be 
philosophically challenging and 
threatening. 
Gradual infusion of ideas and Insights into 
life.  
Overwhelming influx of experiences and 
insights. 
Experiences of energy that are contained 
and are easily manageable. 
Experiences of jolting tremors, shaking, 
energy disruptive to daily life. 
Easy differentiation between internal and 
external experience and transition from 
one to other. 
Sometimes difficult to distinguish between 
internal and external experiences, or 
simultaneous occurrence of both. 
Ease in incorporating nonordinary states 
of consciousness into daily life. 
Inner experiences interrupt and disturb 
daily life. 
Slow gradual change in awareness of self 
and world. 
Abrupt, rapid shift in perception of self and 
world. 
Excitement about inner experiences as 
they arise and willingness and ability to 
co-operate with them. 
Ambivalence toward inner experiences, 
and unwillingness or inability to co-
operate with them using guidance. 
Accepting attitude toward change. Resistance to change. 
Ease in giving up control. Need to be in control. 
Trust in process. Dislike, mistrust in process. 
Difficult experiences treated as 
opportunities for change. 
Difficult experiences are overwhelming, 
often unwelcome. 
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Positive experiences accepted as gifts. Positive experiences are difficult to 
accept, seem undeserved, can be painful. 
Infrequent need to discuss experiences. Frequent urgent need to discuss 
experiences. 
Discriminating when communicating about 
process (when, how, with whom). 
Indiscriminate communication about 
process (when, how, with whom). 
(Source - Grof & Grof, 1995, p.45) 
A spiritual emergency, then, is an extreme form of spiritual emergence that appears to 
mimic psychosis, but is actually a potential process for spiritual development. Indeed, 
in fashioning the term ‘spiritual emergency’ the Grofs (1989, p.x) intended that it denote 
both a “crisis and an opportunity”. In other words, although it constitutes a crisis 
situation, it is not, ipso facto, psychopathological. 
 
The Grof’s highlighted the critical importance of understanding spiritual emergencies 
and discerning them from psychoses in psychiatric practice. They asserted that; 
 
episodes of nonordinary states of consciousness cover a very wide 
spectrum, from purely spiritual states without any pathological features to 
conditions that are clearly biological in nature and require medical 
treatment. It is extremely important to take a balanced approach and to be 
able to differentiate spiritual emergencies from genuine psychoses (Grof & 
Grof, 1989, p.xiii).  
 
Furthermore, they maintain that, in failing to make this differentiation, psychiatry has 
been inadvertently pathologising and thwarting potential transformation processes 
through the inappropriate use of medical treatments (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.52). If so, it 
seems that such misdiagnosis and misplaced treatment can ironically have the 
iatrogenic effect of turning a spiritual emergency into a state of psychopathology 
 
To address the issue of ambiguity between psychopathology and spiritual emergency, 
and the related likelihood of misdiagnosis, the Grofs proposed that a balanced 
approach be adopted. They identified and described ten forms of spiritual emergency 
(see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 – Types of spiritual emergency as identified by the Grofs 
Type of spiritual emergency Description 
Shamanic crisis During initiation throughout many cultures 
neophyte shamans experience “a dramatic 
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involuntary visionary state” in which they “typically 
undergo a journey into the underworld, the realm of 
the dead, where they are attacked by demons and 
exposed to horrendous tortures and ordeals”. 
Similar experiences can occur in Western settings 
and may be a form of “psychospiritual crisis” rather 
than psychopathological. 
Awakening of Kundalini In Indian mystical tradition kundalini “is the 
generative cosmic energy, feminine in nature, that 
is responsible for the creation of the cosmos”. It 
lays latent in the human “subtle or energetic body” 
and can be activated via spiritual practices or occur 
spontaneously. This can result in an array of bodily 
events such as “intense sensations of energy and 
heat streaming up the spine”, shaking, spasms, 
phantom pains; emotional symptoms such as 
“powerful waves of…anxiety, anger, sadness, or 
joy and ecstatic rapture”; and psychospiritual 
experiences such as “visions of brilliant light or 
various archetypal beings and a variety of 
internally perceived sounds…[and] powerful 
experiences of what seem to be memories from 
past lives”.  
Episodes of unitive 
consciousness (‘peak 
experiences’) 
Maslow’s mystical states of consciousness or 
‘peak experiences’ in which people “have a sense 
of overcoming the usual fragmentation of the mind 
and body and feel that we have reached a state of 
unity and wholeness”.  
Psychological renewal through 
return to the center 
American psychiatrist John Weir Perry (1999) 
coined the term “renewal process”. This designates 
a crisis situation in which people “experience their 
psyche as a colossal battlefield where a cosmic 
combat is being played out between the forces of 
Good and Evil, or Light and Darkness”. This 
renewal process can manifest in a host of bizarre 
ways which look like, and are often identified as, 
psychotic phenomena.  
Crisis of psychic opening “An increase in intuitive abilities and the 
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occurrence of psychic or paranormal phenomena 
are very common during spiritual emergencies of 
all kinds. However, in some instances, the influx of 
information from nonordinary sources, such as 
precognition, telepathy, or clairvoyance, becomes 
so overwhelming and confusing that it dominates 
the picture and constitutes a major problem, in and 
of itself”. 
Past-life experiences “Past-life experiences can complicate life in several 
different ways. Before their content emerges fully 
into consciousness and reveals itself, one can be 
haunted in everyday life by strange emotions, 
physical feelings, and visions without knowing 
where these are coming from or what they mean. 
Experienced out of context, these experiences 
naturally appear incomprehensible and irrational”. 
Communication with spirit guides 
and ‘channeling’ 
Spirit guides “are usually perceived as discarnate 
humans, suprahuman entities, or deities existing 
on higher planes of consciousness and endowed 
with extraordinary wisdom”. In ‘channeling’ a 
person “person transmits to others messages 
received from a source that appears to be external 
to his or her individual….Experiences of 
channeling can precipitate a serious psychological 
and spiritual crisis. One possibility is that the 
individual involved can interpret the experience as 
an indication of beginning insanity. This is 
particularly likely if the channeling involves hearing 
voices, a well-known symptom of paranoid 
schizophrenia”. 
Near-death experiences (NDEs) NDEs occur when a person is near death, or 
pronounced dead, yet recover to report an 
experience which may include: floating above the 
scene in a conscious yet disembodied form, “a 
review of their entire lives…[and/or] passing 
through a dark tunnel or funnel toward a divine 
light of supernatural brilliance and beauty….Near-
death experiences very frequently lead to spiritual 
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emergencies…[and] can radically undermine the 
worldview of the people involved, because it 
catapults them abruptly and without warning into a 
reality that is diametrically different”. 
Close encounters with UFOs and 
alien abduction experiences 
“The experiences of encounters with extra-
terrestrial spacecrafts and of abduction by alien 
beings can often precipitate serious emotional and 
intellectual crises that have much in common with 
spiritual emergencies….C. G. Jung…suggested 
that these phenomena might be archetypal visions 
originating in the collective unconscious of 
humanity, rather than psychotic hallucinations or 
visits by extraterrestrials from distant civilizations”. 
Possession states “People in this type of transpersonal crisis have a 
distinct feeling that their psyche and body have 
been invaded and that they are being controlled by 
an evil entity or energy with personal 
characteristics. They perceive it as coming from 
outside their own personality and as being hostile 
and disturbing…The problem manifests as serious 
psychopathology…This condition clearly belongs in 
the category of ‘spiritual emergency’ in spite of the 
fact that it involves negative energies and is 
associated with many objectionable forms of 
behaviour”. 
(Source – Grof, 2000)79 
It is very likely that a person would be presumed psychotic if he or she reported any of 
the above experiences in a clinical setting, especially if distressed. However, in positing 
the possibility of non-psychopathological psychotic-like phenomena, the Grofs’ notion 
of spiritual emergency challenges the traditional diagnostic picture of psychosis. 
Although they acknowledge the existence of psychopathology they also suggest that its 
presenting signs and symptoms may, in fact, be indicative of a psychospiritual 
79
 The description for each type of spiritual emergency in the above table is a composite of my quoting, 
paraphrasing and/or summarising Grof’s description of the same in his book titled Psychology of the 
Future: Lessons from Modern Consciousness Research (Grof, 2000). These types of spiritual emergency 
have also been listed and discussed elsewhere in the literature (for example, see – Grof, 2008a; Grof & 
Grof, 1995, 1989; Bragdon, 1990). Also, Park (1991) overviews them in his doctoral dissertation, with a 
specific focus on kundalini, while Goretzki (2007) provides a thoroughgoing description and appraisal of 
each in her doctoral dissertation. 
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occurrence in the form of spiritual emergency. This raises the obvious question – How 
can a psychiatrist differentiate between instances of spiritual emergence/emergency 
and psychopathology if the symptoms of both are so similar? 
 
In response to this pressing question, the Grofs fashioned an observation-based 
taxonomy of factors which differentiate a psychiatric disorder from a spiritual 
emergence (see Table 6). They structured this to address both medical and 
psychological considerations.  
 
Table 6 – The Groffs’ differentiation taxonomy between spiritual emergence and 
psychiatric disorders 
Psychiatric Disorder Spiritual Emergence (SE) 80 
Characteristics of the process indicating 
need for medical approach to the problem. 
Characteristics of the process suggesting 
that the strategy for SE might work.81 
Criteria of a Medical Nature 
Clinical examination and laboratory tests 
detect a physical disease that causes 
psychological changes. 
Negative results of clinical examination 
and laboratory tests for a physical 
disease. 
Clinical examination and laboratory tests 
detect a disease process of the brain that 
causes psychological changes 
(neurological reflexes, cerebrospinal fluid, 
X ray, etc.). 
Negative results of clinical examinations 
and laboratory tests for pathological 
process afflicting the brain. 
 
Specific psychological tests indicate 
organic impairment of the brain. 
Negative results of psychological tests for 
organic impairment. 
Impairment of intellect and memory, 
clouded consciousness, problems with 
basic orientation (name, time, place), poor 
co-ordination. 
Intellect and memory qualitatively 
challenged but intact, consciousness 
usually clear, good basic orientation, co-
ordination not seriously impaired. 
Confusion, disorganization, and defective 
intellectual functioning interfere with 
communication and co-operation. 
Ability to communicate and co-operate 
(occasional deep involvement in the inner 
process might be a problem). 
Criteria of a Psychological Nature 
Personal history shows serious difficulties Adequate pre-episode functioning as 
                                                          
80
 The Grofs appear to have used the term ‘spiritual emergence’ here to infer both spiritual emergences 
and spiritual emergencies. 
81
 Therapeutic approaches for spiritual emergences are generally of a holistic and psychosocial nature 
(see, for example – Grof, 2008a; Grof & Grof, c2007; Lukoff, 2007; Grof, 1994; Bragdon, 1990). 
134 
in interpersonal relationships since 
childhood, inability to make friends and 
have intimate sexual relationships, poor 
social adjustment, usually long history of 
psychiatric problems. 
evidenced by interpersonal skills, some 
success in school and vocation, network 
of friends, and ability to have sexual 
relationships; no serious psychiatric 
history. 
Poorly organized and defined content of 
the process, unqualified changes of 
emotions and behaviour, unspecific 
organization of psychological functions, 
lack of meaning of any kind, no indication 
of direction development, loosening of 
associations, incoherence. 
Sequences of biographical memories, 
themes of birth and death, transpersonal 
experiences, possible insight that the 
process is healing or spiritual in nature, 
change and development of themes, often 
definable progression, incidence of true 
synchronicities (evident to others). 
Autistic withdrawal, aggressivity, or 
controlling and manipulative behaviour 
interferes with a good working relationship 
and makes co-operation impossible. 
Ability to relate and co-operate, often even 
during episodes of dramatic experiences 
that occur spontaneously or in the course 
of psychotherapeutic work. 
Inability to see the process as an 
intrapsychic affair, confusion between the 
inner experiences and the outer world, 
excessive use of projection and blaming, 
‘acting out’. 
Awareness of the intrapsychic nature of 
the process, satisfactory ability to 
distinguish between the inner and the 
outer, ‘owning’ the process, ability to keep 
it internalized. 
Basic mistrust, perception of the world 
and all people as hostile, delusions of 
persecution, acoustic hallucinations of 
enemies (‘voices’) with a very unpleasant 
content. 
Sufficient trust to accept help and co-
operate; persecutory delusions and 
‘voices’ absent. 
 
Violations of basic rules of therapy (‘not to 
hurt oneself or anyone else, not to destroy 
property’), destructive and self-destructive 
(suicidal or self-mutilating) impulses and a 
tendency to act on them without warning. 
Ability to honour basic rules of therapy, 
absence of destructive or self-destructive 
ideas and tendencies, or ability to talk 
about them and to accept precautionary 
measures. 
Behaviour endangering health and 
causing serious concerns (refusal to eat 
or drink for prolonged periods of time, 
neglect of basic hygienic rules). 
Good co-operation in things related to 
physical health, basic maintenance, and 
hygienic rules. 
 
(Source – Grof & Grof, 1995, pp.314-315) 
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While others have made similar attempts to identify points of differentiation between 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences,82 the Grofs’ taxonomy was marked by its 
comprehensive diagnostic detail which was informed by Stanislav Grof’s psychiatric 
expertise. Such thinking by a psychiatrist was uncommon for, apart from some simple 
issues pertaining to religious or cultural belief, mainstream psychiatry generally viewed 
the full psychospiritual gamut as suspect. 
 
The Grofs also identified an inherent and critical limitation to this project. In 
contradistinction to their key objective of identifying differential criteria they 
paradoxically acknowledged the ultimate impossibility of doing so. Although they 
asserted the necessity for psychiatry to recognise the phenomenon of spiritual 
emergencies in order to prevent mistaken diagnoses, they also recognised that such a 
task was impossible for the discipline in its extant form. For instance, they noted that 
“the term psychosis is not accurately and objectively defined in contemporary 
psychiatry. Until that happens, it will be impossible to offer a sharper delineation 
between the two conditions” (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.53). Psychiatry’s inability to 
delineate the clinical boundaries of psychosis has been an enduring problem; however, 
this is amplified by the idea of discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences 
for it raises difficult questions that seemingly have no ready solutions. How might 
psychotic instances be differentiated from manifold other types of anomalous, yet non-
psychopathological, states of consciousness? Indeed, is it possible to absolutely 
differentiate them, and if not, does the use of diagnostic categories and criteria actually 
detract from better understanding the perplexing phenomenon of so-called psychosis? 
The emergence of such questions is intrinsic to introducing psychospiritual 
considerations into the field of psychiatric research, and while it is understandable that 
their challenge to psychiatry’s basic assumptions and practices may cause 
consternation, such a challenge can equally be seen as an opportunity to develop new 
ways of understanding the enigma of psychosis and the unknown depths of human 
consciousness.  
 
A related issue of ‘impossibility’ raised by the Grofs concerns the conceptual 
foundations upon which mainstream psychiatry rests. In responding to inquiries from 
“many mental health professionals” about how to make a definitive differential 
diagnosis in clinical practice, Grof (2008b) acknowledged that “it is in principle 
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 For instance, see Lukoff’s diagnostic flow chart in Section 8.3. Also, in Appendix Six, I provide a collation 
of tabled models for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences proposed by twelve of the 
authors from my Chapter Nine content analysis. These tabled models demonstrate the diversity of ideas 
in, and the complexity of the task of, striving to identify psychotic versus psychospiritual characteristic 
features.  
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impossible to make such differentiation according to the standards used in somatic 
medicine”. This conclusion pertains to the dichotomy in psychiatry between organic and 
functional psychoses. Organic psychoses result from proven anatomical causes such 
as “encephalitis, brain tumors, or dementias” (Grof, 2008b) and subsequently belong 
“unquestionably in the domain of medicine” (Grof & Grof, 1989, p.3). By contrast, 
functional psychoses, which constitute the predominant form of psychotic states, are 
disorders for which “no medical explanation has been found in spite of the focused 
efforts of generations of researchers from various fields” (ibid, pp.3-4). Yet, rather than 
accepting the aetiological obscurity of functional psychoses, and/or considering their 
possible psychological aetiology, psychiatry instead assumes “a pathological process 
in the brain yet to be discovered by future research” (Grof, 2008b). However, Grof (ibid) 
maintains that “functional psychoses are not defined medically but psychologically”, 
and consequently “it is impossible to provide a rigorous differential diagnosis between 
psychospiritual crisis (‘spiritual emergency’) and psychosis in the way it is done in 
medical practice in relation to different forms of encephalitis, brain tumors, or 
dementias”. Indeed, he asserts that in the absence of establishing clear aetiology in 
functional psychoses, “there is no reason to refer to these conditions as ‘mental 
diseases’” (ibid). This proposition effectively refutes psychiatry’s core understanding of 
functional psychosis as being intrinsically psychopathological. In light of this seemingly 
intractable dilemma, Grof (ibid) has proposed that his taxonomy of differential criteria 
be used not for making absolute clinical distinctions between psychopathological and 
psychospiritual experiences, but for generally determining whether the optimal 
therapeutic approach is to support, or pharmacologically suppress, the symptoms. 
 
In sum, it appears the Grofs’ work has made an important contribution to the venture of 
better understanding the manifold anomalous states of consciousness which are 
generally (mis)diagnosed as psychoses. Importantly, they have called to question 
standard psychiatric perceptions of psychosis through their work on the apparent need 
to discern psychospiritual from psychopathological experiences. Articulating the close 
phenomenological parallels between the two clearly challenges psychiatry to revisit its 
primary assumptions about the nature and aetiology of psychosis. Indeed, the 
materialist belief regarding the biological aetiology of all psychoses effectively 
precludes the serious consideration by medical psychiatry of possible psychospiritual 
determinants in psychosis. Yet, accepting the psychogenesis of psychosis is also 
problematic. Because functional psychoses and spiritual emergencies are both 
ostensibly psychic phenomena, it seems the quest to demarcate them is inherently 
impossible. Arguably, these conundrums indicate the need for psychiatry to relinquish 
old convictions about the bio-pathological nature of psychosis, and to accept the 
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seeming reality that such enigmatic experiences are round pegs that cannot be 
hammered into the square holes of materialist ideology. As Jung (1960, p.158) 
maintained over a century ago,83 “only beyond the brain, beyond the anatomical 
substrate, do we reach what is important for us - the psyche; as indefinable as ever, 
still eluding all explanation, no matter how ingenious”. From this perspective it seems 
pathways to better understanding psychosis may be initiated, not via pathology-based 
differential diagnosis, but by the open heuristic investigation of ‘psychotic’ and 
psychotic-like experiences. 
 
8.3 David Lukoff and MEPF 
David Lukoff also made a ground-breaking attempt to create a system for discerning 
psychospiritual from psychotic experiences. An examination of his notion of Mystical 
Experiences with Psychotic Features (MEPF) has already been undertaken in Chapter 
Seven. However, in addition to formulating this proposed diagnostic category, Lukoff 
(1985, pp.162-163) created a flow chart (see Figure 2) for diagnostically differentiating 
“mystical experiences from psychotic disorders”. Although his notion of MEPF was 
informed and inspired by the Grofs’ work on discerning spiritual emergencies from 
psychoses, his model differed significantly from theirs in that it sought to establish a 
rapprochement between traditional psychiatric and transpersonal approaches to 
diagnosing anomalous psychic experiences. Whereas the Grofs fashioned a binary 
taxonomy which generally mirrored the schism between materialist and transpersonal 
approaches to psychiatry, Lukoff created an operationalised system that mimicked the 
DSM diagnostic approach.  
 
Lukoff’s diagnostic flow chart represents the most sophisticated effort to date to create 
an operationalised system for differentiating psychoses from potentially ‘growthful’ 
psychospiritual experiences, while simultaneously attempting to establish a 
rapprochement between psychiatric and transpersonal modes of understanding. 
Additionally, he has endeavoured to formulate a spectrum of diagnostic entities to 
account for various mixed manifestations of psychotic and mystical experiences. Yet, in 
terms of limitations, his entire system, including the vital category of MEPF, does not 
account for the possibility of a purely mystical experience with no psychotic features. 
Also, despite his laudable attempt to reconcile the diagnostic problems inherent to 
discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences, the essential core question 
seemingly remains unresolved - If non-psychotic psychospiritual experiences mimic 
symptoms essential for diagnosing psychotic disorders, how is it possible, or is it 
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 Although this quote appears in the 1960 version of Jung’s Collected Works, he originally made the 
comment in 1908 at an academic lecture in Zurich. 
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possible, to distinguish the two? Chapters Nine and Ten further explore this conundrum 




The common occurrence of psychotic-like features in psychospiritual experiences 
posits a significant challenge to psychiatry, as it calls for better understanding of both 
psychotic and psychospiritual instances, in order to discern them. While psychiatry’s 
recognition of this issue is limited to simply considering cross-cultural factors, the Grofs 
and Lukoff recognised the necessity to formulate differential diagnostic criteria to avoid 
misdiagnosis. Each subsequently created a proposed differential diagnostic system for 
psychiatric use based on robust psychospiritual research. However, their work is not 
unique. My ensuing Chapter Nine content analysis illustrates the widespread existence 







Discerning Psychosis from Psychospiritual Experiences 
 
9.0 Introduction 
Here, I undertake a content analysis of literature whereby commentators identify and 
discuss prospective criteria for discerning between psychotic and psychotic-like 
psychospiritual experiences. My study, which is based loosely on de Menezes Junior & 
Moreira-Almeida’s (2009) meta-analysis, aims to identify the top nine differentiation 
criteria identified by seventy authors. However, whereas their study aimed to formulate 
a prospective list of differential diagnostic criteria, my study also aims to contest the 
psychopathological validity of each identified criterion. This further challenges 
psychiatry’s assumption that diagnostically categorising signs of psychopathology is an 
effective model for construing and better understanding psychosis.   
 
9.1 The de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida (2009) study 
The work of de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida (2009) represents the most 
comprehensive meta-analysis of literature published to date in the field of discerning 
psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. Their endeavour aimed to “identify criteria 
to allow the elaboration of a differential diagnosis between spiritual experiences and 
psychotic and dissociative disorders” (ibid, p.69). This included a review of the work of 
Grof, Lukoff, and many other key commentators from this field of research. Their 
analysis of these materials elicited a number of criteria “that could indicate an 
appropriate distinction between spiritual experiences and psychotic and dissociative 
disorders” (pp.83-84). From these, the topmost nine criteria were collated and listed in 
descending order of incidence according to the number of times each was identified by 
authors as being indicative of a psychospiritual, rather than a psychotic, experience. 
These were:  
 Lack of suffering (thirteen authors)  
 Lack of functional impairment (eleven authors)  
 The experience has a short duration and occurs sporadically (ten authors) 
 A critical attitude exists regarding the objective reality of the experience (nine 
authors) 
 Compatibility with the patient’s cultural background (eight authors) 
 Absence of comorbidities (five authors) 
 Control over the experience (five authors) 
 The experience promotes personal growth over time (five authors) 
 The experience is directed towards others (three authors) (pp.88-89). 
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Hence, according to de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida’s findings, an absence of 
suffering and functional impairment, concomitant with short, sporadic duration of an 
anomalous experience, is highly indicative of a psychospiritual experience. Conversely, 
an anomalous experience of long duration, involving suffering, and functional 
impairment, is highly indicative of a psychopathological or psychotic experience.  
 
Due to its comprehensive and current nature, de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida’s 
meta-analysis represents a significant and laudable development in the quest to 
understand the similarities and differences between psychospiritual and psychotic 
experiences. In particular, it steps beyond the traditional psychiatric practice of viewing 
psychospiritual experiences as either psychotic or psychopathologically suspect, to 
consider them as valid human experiences. However, despite these advancements, 
their adoption of a psychopathology-based diagnostic approach is arguably flawed, for 
this presumes that psychotic and psychotic-like experiences can be cleanly 
differentiated. It is my proposition, however, that such differentiation is ultimately not 
possible. Hence, despite the progressive merits of de Menezes Junior & Moreira-
Almeida’s research, in the bigger picture it arguably works to obscure, rather than 
facilitate, a better understanding of anomalous states of human consciousness. To 
support this claim, I have conducted my own comprehensive literature analysis which 
challenges the veracity of the psychopathology-based diagnostic approach adopted by 
de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida, and many others, in this field of inquiry.  
 
9.2 Content analysis: Psychotic versus psychospiritual experiences  
While the general endeavour by commentators to discern psychotic from 
psychospiritual experiences has been a progressive development, an apparent 
fundamental flaw is that such research has adopted and replicated psychiatry’s 
approach of diagnostic dualism which assumes that psychopathology is discernible 
from mental health. Ipso facto, it is assumed that psychosis can be differentiated from 
psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences. Therefore, while the aim of my content 
analysis mirrors that of de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida in that it endeavours to 
elicit a list of key differentiation criteria, beyond this it differed markedly. For instance, 
whereas they compiled a list of nine key psychospiritual criteria, I have compiled a list 
of nine key psychotic criteria (see Table 7). And while they adopted their criteria as a 
diagnostic tool for proposed use in discerning psychotic from psychospiritual 
experiences, I have challenged the veracity of the criteria identified by authors in my 
study to demonstrate their diagnostic invalidity. By critiquing each criterion in turn I aim 
to show that none are absolute indicators of psychopathology, hence, none work to 
discern psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. Doing so has worked to challenge 
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the soundness of psychiatry’s fundamental notion of psychopathology and to raise 
questions which potentially point to new ways of researching psychosis. If the notion of 
psychopathology is shown to be essentially dubious, then how is it possible to use 
psychopathology-based diagnostic approach to discern psychotic from psychospiritual 
experiences? Would the use of a heuristic approach, that eschews assumptions of 
psychopathology, open new pathways to better understanding psychosis and 
psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences? This research initiative sets the stage for 
Focal Setting Four which further argues that absolute differentiation is not possible. 
 
9.2.1 Methodological overview 
My research entailed undertaking a content analysis of texts that tackle the issue of 
discerning psychospiritual from psychotic experiences and eliciting from these a list of 
the topmost nine key differentiation criteria identified by authors. I used an open-ended 
and process-oriented approach to elicit a corpus of literature for appraisal.84 This 
enabled me to garner seventy texts that identified possible characteristics for 
differentiating psychospiritual from psychotic experiences.85 These texts formed the 
resource base for my content analysis. By adopting this approach, and not limiting my 
resource pool to items obtained through a targeted keyword-search, I aimed to 
establish a broader spectrum of findings for analysis than did de Menezes Junior & 
Moreira-Almeida’s study. My subsequent content analysis identified nine psychotic 
criteria which were then discussed and critically appraised to challenge the validity of 
psychopathology-based differential diagnostics.  
 
9.2.2 General findings 
In total, an examination of the seventy texts elicited one hundred and ninety three 
criteria identified by authors as being psychopathologically indicative of a psychotic 
rather than psychospiritual experiences.86 My study, therefore, seems to corroborate 
Jackson & Fulford’s (1997, p.60) expectation that attempts to phenomenologically 
discern psychopathological from psychospiritual experiences would likely elicit “a 
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 My dissertation research process has involved reading and reviewing a vast body literature across many 
disciplines over a period of years, and has also necessitated the creation of a thematic and coded 
category system. One coded category is of literature in which authors engaged the subject of differential 
diagnosis in context of the psychosis-psychospiritual nexus. I drew upon this as a primary literature source 
for my critical appraisal. On the whole, to avoid duplication, I chose only items in which commentators 
proffered their own views on the issue of differentiation and excluded articles which simply reiterated the 
findings of others. My inclusion of the work of de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida is an exception for it 
represents the most comprehensive literature review in this research field. 
85
 Table A2 in Appendix Five lists the citations for all seventy texts examined in, and provides a picture of 
the nature and scope of materials that have informed, my content analysis. 
86
 The topmost nine of these are listed below in Section 9.2.3 then critically examined in Section 9.3. 
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bewildering variety of forms”. This kaleidoscopic body of views arguably indicates the 
high degree of ambiguity that exists within the field of psychosis research.  
 
The preponderance (about ninety percent) of criteria identified by authors mirrored the 
picture of psychosis as understood by traditional psychiatry. For example, ten authors 
indicated that DSM or ICD diagnostic criteria generally served to differentiate psychotic 
from psychospiritual experiences, while others specifically identified the presence of 
paranoia (n=9), negative affect (n=9), poor insight (n=8) and risk of harm to self or 
others (n=8) as differentiators. The psychogenic thinking of psychoanalytic 
psychiatry/psychology also featured among criteria with some authors positing that a 
psychotic rather than a psychospiritual experience is indicated by the presence of 
unresolved stress, trauma and tension. These findings arguably indicate the high 
degree to which the research field of discerning psychotic from psychospiritual 
experiences has been influenced by the psychiatric modus operandi of identifying 
diagnostic signs and symptoms of psychopathology. 
 
Despite this trend toward replicating a traditional psychiatric model of understanding, a 
considerable number of authors identified differentiation criteria of a metaphysical 
nature. For instance, seventeen authors (about twenty five percent) suggested that the 
absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers87 was indicative of a psychotic rather 
than a psychospiritual experience.88 This criterion exemplifies the challenge that 
psychospiritual considerations can proffer to a psychiatric worldview anchored in the 
binary thinking of materialism, for it ostensibly implies that psychosis is not 
psychopathological per se, nor stands in psychopathological contradistinction to 
psychospiritual experiences. Rather, it can be seen as a psychospiritual event gone 
awry due to an absence of the requisite skills and teachers that may otherwise enable 
a person to understand and integrate anomalous and dynamic psychic experiences.  
 
9.2.3 Top nine criteria identified by authors 
As explained above, my content analysis of seventy texts entailed a process of eliciting 
the top nine criteria which authors identified as being characteristic of psychotic 
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 The notion of ‘psychospiritual teachers’ generally infers psychospiritual adepts who have the expertise to 
provide guidance for people undergoing psychotic-like spiritual emergence experiences. For example, 
transpersonal-oriented clinicians and therapists, religious counsellors, shamanic practitioners, monks, 
nuns, mystics, etc. 
88
 This criterion is further examined below in Section 9.3.6, while other significant items of a metaphysical 
nature identified by authors are examined in Chapter Ten. 
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experiences, in contradistinction to psychospiritual experiences. These were then 
ordered in descending sequence of incidence (see Table 7).89 
 
Table 7 - Top nine psychosis criteria identified by authors 
Ranking Psychosis Criteria # 
1 Loss of agency or control 33 
2 Social dysfunction 23 
3 Ego-related issues 23 
4 Experience lacks a developmental nature 22 
5 Culturally or religiously aberrant beliefs and experiences 19 
6 Absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers 17 
7 Hearing voices 16 
8 Social isolation 16 
9 Generally negative experience 12 
Note 
# = frequency of identification of a criterion by authors 
 
Seven of these items correspond with the signs and symptoms of psychosis described 
in mainstream psychiatric literature. In decreasing order of frequency, these are: loss of 
agency or control (n=33); social dysfunction (n=23); ego-related issues (n=23); 
culturally or religiously aberrant beliefs and experiences (n=19); hearing voices (n=16); 
social isolation (n=16); and generally negative experience (n=12). Two of these nine 
psychotic differentiators do not feature in psychiatric descriptions of psychosis, namely, 
that the experience lacks a developmental nature (n=22), and that the experience 
results from an absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers (n=17). These two 
latter items are of particular interest as they open potential new vistas for better 
understanding the nature of psychosis. Each of these is discussed throughout my 
critical examination below in Section 9.3. 
 
In terms of comparison between the findings of my and de Menezes Junior & Moreira-
Almeida’s study, all but one of their nine psychospiritual indicators also appear in my 
study, albeit as psychopathological counterpoints (see Table 8). By ‘psychopathological 
counterpoint’ I mean incidents whereby a psychospiritual criterion in their findings 
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 Of the seventy articles, twelve include a proposed typology for differentiating psychotic from 
psychospiritual experiences (see – Austin, 1998; Chadwick, 2001; DeHoff, 2012; Eeles et al, 2003; 
Greenwell, 2002; Grof & Grof, 1995; Jackson, 2001; Kemp, 2000; Nelson, 2000; Siegler et al, 1969; 
Siglag, 1986; Watkins, 2010). These typologies are collated in Appendix Six. However, the Grofs’ typology 
is excluded from the appendix as it already appears above in Chapter Eight, Section 8.2, Table 4. 
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inversely correlates with a psychotic criterion in my findings. For example, the 
psychospiritual indicator of ‘lack of suffering’ in their study inversely correlates with the 
psychotic indicator of ‘generally negative experience’ in my study, functional 
impairment with social dysfunction, control with loss of control, and so on. 
 
Table 8 – Comparative topmost nine criteria by de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida 
and Spittles 






1 Lack of suffering Generally negative experience 9 
2 Lack of functional impairment   
 
Social dysfunction 2 
3 The experience has a short 
duration and occurs 
sporadically 
Long duration of experience * 
4 A critical attitude exists 
regarding the objective reality 
of the experience 
Lacking insight * 
5 Compatibility with the patient’s 
cultural background  
Culturally or religiously 
aberrant beliefs 
5 
6 Absence of comorbidities 
 
N/A * 
7 Control over the experience  
 
Loss of agency or control 1 
8 The experience promotes 
personal growth over time 
Experience lacks a 
developmental nature  
4 
9 The experience is directed 
towards others 
Egocentric experience (focus 
on ‘me’, not others) 
* 
Note 
* = does not appear in my topmost nine criteria 
N/A = not applicable. Does not appear at all in my findings. 
 
While our respective studies have utilised different approaches for sourcing materials 
(i.e. targeted versus open-ended), and have focussed on divergent differentiation 
criteria (i.e. psychospiritual verses psychotic), they have elicited markedly similar 
results. Overall, then, it appears the findings of my study largely parallel their findings.  
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The correlation between our respective study findings ostensibly supports the notion 
that psychotic and psychospiritual experiences are discrete occurrences that should be 
diagnostically differentiated. However, the ensuing critical examination of my study’s 
topmost nine ‘psychotic’ criteria disputes this, for it seems all so-called characteristic 
‘psychotic’ symptoms can also appear within a psychospiritual context. Therefore, none 
are ultimately effective for diagnostic differentiation purposes. This suggests that 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences are not discrete, but are inextricably 
interconnected and indiscernible. If so, this challenges the idea that psychosis is a pure 
form of psychopathology that can be diagnostically distinguished from non-
psychopathological psychospiritual experiences. It also proffers a challenge to 
psychiatry’s fundamental modus operandi of psychopathology-seeking, for if there are 
no unequivocal criteria for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual instances, how is it 
possible to unmistakably identify ‘psychosis’ as a form of psychopathology? 
 
9.3 Elucidating and challenging the top nine criteria identified by authors 
Whereas de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida’s response to the issue of discerning 
psychotic from psychospiritual experiences was to conduct a meta-analysis in order to 
identify nine differentiation criteria, my response has been to elicit and challenge the 
veracity of nine differentiation criteria and, in so doing, concomitantly challenge the 
efficacy of using a differential diagnostic approach to resolve this issue. Throughout 
this section, then, a twofold examination of each of the topmost nine criteria is 
undertaken. First, each criterion is elucidated and discussed in context of its 
identification by authors as signifying psychotic rather than psychospiritual 
experiences. This serves to further demonstrate the complex parallels between 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences, and supports the idea that the former may 
be better understood via consideration of the latter. While doing so seems to 
corroborate claims by authors as to the psychopathological nature of each criterion, 
this is not the intention, for examples from psychospiritual texts are then examined in 
order to challenge the psychopathological veracity of each proposed criterion. Doing so 
does not negate the apparent parallels between psychotic and psychospiritual 
experiences, but demonstrates a fundamental flaw in utilising the psychiatric differential 
diagnosis approach to redress this issue. Demonstrating that all the criteria identified 
by authors can occur within both psychotic and psychospiritual contexts negates their 
validity as proposed psychopathological indicators. Overall, this works to support my 
proposal that using a heuristic approach, which eschews psychiatry’s approach of 
psychopathology-seeking, may open research pathways that enable a better 
understanding of psychosis. 
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9.3.1 Criterion One findings: General loss of agency or control 
The loss of personal agency refers to anomalous experiences that are seemingly 
outside a person’s conscious control. The terms ‘agency’ and ‘control’ were used 
variously and interchangeably by authors. For the sake of simplicity, I have hyphenated 
the two as ‘agency-control’ throughout this section. About forty seven percent of 
authors identified this as indicative of psychotic rather than psychospiritual 
experiences. This is exemplified in Jackson & Fulford’s (1997, p.55) observation that 
“in the case of pathological psychotic phenomena, there is a radical failure of action. In 
the case of spiritual psychotic phenomena, action is radically enhanced”.90 Hence, in 
this view, psychopathology is evident in agency incapacitation, as opposed to 
psychospiritual experiences whereby such agency is not only accessible but 
heightened. Other authors proffered similar views. For instance, the earliest reference 
to loss of agency-control as a psychopathological indicator was by John Perceval 
(1840, p.274), who, in reflection on his own psychosis, spoke of “his imagination not 
being under his own control”. Likewise, Arieti (1961, p.20) referred to the “passive 
agent” of schizophrenic states, Noll (1983, p.450) observed that psychotic experiences 
“are clearly beyond the control of the experiencer”, and Jackson (2001, p.170) held that 
the content of psychosis is “involitional”. The general thinking here is that people are 
passive victims of psychopathology as opposed to their being able to exercise agency-
control in psychospiritual instances. 
 
Some authors identified loss of agency-control as the transpersonal crux of diagnostic 
differentiation. For instance, Stephen & Suryani (2000, p.6) noted that a lack of agency-
control in exercising “autonomous imagination” delineates the schizophrenic from the 
shaman. The notion of ‘autonomous imagination’ is defined by Stephen (1997, pp.337-
338) as “a continuous stream-of-imagery thought taking place in the mind, although 
mostly outside conscious awareness. At regular intervals, it spontaneously enters 
consciousness in the form of sleep dreams; and under certain conditions…may result 
in waking visions and other hallucinations”. She maintains that, while hallucinatory 
forms of autonomous imagination are mostly involuntary, it is possible with “special 
training”, as in the case of shamanism, to establish intentional access to and control of 
these states of consciousness (ibid, p.338). This is akin to Robbins’ (2011) notion of 
primordial mental activity (PMA).91 He argued that florid psychosis occurs when PMA is 
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 Jackson & Fulford’s unusual idea of non-pathological psychosis (i.e. psychospiritual experience as 
benign ‘psychosis’) is discussed in Chapter Ten, Section 10.5.2).  
91
 Michael Robbins’ hypothesis of PMA represents a merging of anthropological and psychoanalytic 
thinking. He defines PMA as; 
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uncontrolled and “comes to have a life of its own”, and that the acquisition of skills to 
navigate this domain of consciousness can make the difference between 
psychopathological and healthy outcomes (ibid, pp.129-130, 111). Several other 
authors also identified the inability to enter anomalous states of consciousness at will 
as discerning the psychotic person from the shamanic or spiritual adept (McGhee, 
2002, p.346; Noll, 1983, p.450; Wapnick, 1969, p.65). Indeed, Noll (1983) maintained 
that the presence or absence of such controlled mastery is the ultimate defining feature 
separating psychotic from shamanic experience. 
 
One author identified the Zen Buddhist notion of ‘nen’92 as being centrally pertinent to 
the loss of agency-control in psychosis. From a Zen Buddhist perspective, the nature 
and degree of individual agency-control is pivotal to differentiating psychospiritual 
experience from psychosis. In terms of the former, Sekida (1985, p.113) maintains that 
spiritual Enlightenment, or “one-eon nen”, occurs when “the student induces the steady 
succession of first nen-actions, with no reflecting upon them in the form of second nen, 
and no self-consciousness in the form of third nen”. Hence, in advanced meditative 
practice, the third and second nen are intentionally rendered dormant so that “the first 
nen receives stimuli from the external world without restriction…Everything is direct, 
fresh, impressive, and overwhelmingly abundant” (ibid, p.179). However, as Sekida 
                                                                                                                                                                          
a normal way that mind works both in learning and expression that is qualitatively different 
from rational realistic self-reflective thought. It appears to have a distinctive neurological 
circuitry and to be present from the onset of life. It is driven by somatic sensation and affect, 
it is enactive and concrete, holistic and de-centered, and produces states of belief and 
actualization that disregard time and logical causality and does not distinguish internal from 
external reality (Robbins, 2012, p.258). 
 
He maintains that this modality of human consciousness has a broad scope of expression, including 
dreaming, creativity, infancy, psychospiritual experiences and psychosis (ibid, p.259). 
92
 The notion of ‘nen’ is highly complex and is discussed at length, and in its myriad permutations, by Zen 
master Katsuki Sekida in his book Zen Training (1985). According to Sekida (ibid, p.17), the Japanese 
word ‘nen’ cannot be translated literally into English, but loosely denotes a specific type of mind-action or 
“thought impulse”. He explains that nen is composed of three interrelated stages of nen-action which 
“alternate with each other, from moment to moment, and we may feel as if they were arising 
simultaneously” (p.108). Hence, upon closer inspection, that which appears to be a single mind-action is 
actually comprised of three actions in rapid ‘simultaneous’ succession:  
i) the unconscious, outward-looking, non-reflective “pure sensation” (the first nen); 
ii) the unconscious, inward-looking, reflective recognition of the first nen (the second nen); and  
iii) the consolidation of these two actions into a single act of perception and understanding via 
the “recognition of ourselves becoming aware of the observation” (the third nen) (pp.109-
114).  
The ongoing systemic networking of multitudes of nen-actions, then, constitutes the basis of human 
perception, subjectivity and reality-making capacity.   
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(ibid) further explains, for people experiencing psychosis the integrating role of third 
nen is somehow rendered dysfunctional. Consequently, the first nen is, 
 
overwhelmed with stimuli…Thronging ideas, the kind of religious devotion 
in which one feels overcome by the love of God, cases of mental confusion 
in which the patient experiences so much stimulation that he cannot 
respond to it all – these are all symptomatic of the uncontrolled release of 
the first nen.93 
 
According to this phenomenological description from Zen tradition, while the Zen 
Enlightenment experience results from a deliberate and systematic eclipsing of the 
third and second nen, psychotic experience results from an involuntary malfunction in 
all three nen, beginning with the collapse, or fracturing, of the third nen due to 
unbearable internal stressors, or other impinging factors, then psychopathologically 
transferring to the second and first nen (pp.179-182). In other words, the inadvertent 
occurrence of nen malfunction in psychosis psychopathologically differentiates it from 
the conscious and controlled actions leading to psychospiritual illumination.94 Here, 
again, it is the loss of personal agency-control, and not the psychotic-like nature of the 
experience per se, which discerns it as being psychopathological. This examination of 
nen also provides a sophisticated example of how human cognition and psychosis can 
be understood beyond the investigative scope of Western medical psychiatry. 
 
9.3.1.1     Criterion One rebuttal 
The above examples seem to corroborate the idea that a loss of agency-control 
constitutes a valid criterion for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. 
However, commentators within and beyond my body of critical analysis texts have 
made the counter observation that the activation of agency-control is integral to 
psychotic experience while psychospiritual experiences are characterised by a loss of 
agency-control. For example, Pahnke & Richards (1966, pp.188, 190) refer to the 
“spontaneously-occurring experiences recorded in the literature of mysticism” and 
maintain that these can devolve into psychotic paranoia “when one attempts to control 
the experience instead of passively yielding to whatever develops”. Hence, from this 
perspective, it is not the absence, but the application, of agency-control which can turn 
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 The relationship between psychotic-like experiences and the intentional acquisition of psychospiritual 
skills represents an important body of knowledge that lies beyond psychiatry’s epistemological bounds. 
This is discussed below in more detail in Section 9.3.6.  
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a psychospiritual experience into a psychotic experience. Other research also 
proposes that agency-control may play an active role in psychotic formation. For 
instance, in their recent investigation into the role of agency in psychosis, Jones, 
Shattell et al (2016, p.332) describe “multiple ways in which participants experienced 
themselves as actively involved in the onset and subsequent development and 
elaboration of (positive) psychotic symptoms”. Contrary to the prevailing view that 
psychosis is marked by a loss of agency-control, this research suggests that it may 
play an integral role in psychotic process and formations.  
 
Conversely, some commentators speak of the involuntary nature of psychospiritual 
experiences. This is evident in Grof’s (2000) observation that people experiencing 
spiritual emergency possession states can have “a distinct feeling that their psyche and 
body have been invaded and that they are being controlled by an evil entity or energy 
with personal characteristics. They perceive it as coming from outside their own 
personality and as being hostile and disturbing”. Here, a loss of agency and control is 
identified as common to spiritual emergencies. Indeed, references to unbidden and 
uncontrollable spiritual experiences abound within the mystical literature. For example, 
James (1905, p.382), identifies passivity as a defining characteristic of mystic 
experience, whereby “the mystic feels as if his own will were in abeyance”. Similarly, 
Laibelman (2004, p.396) refers to the “uncontrollable mystical encounter”, while 
Underhill (1912, p.458) speaks of the “uncontrollable psychic and spiritual states” that 
may be experienced on the mystic path.95 Hence, it appears that loss or presence of 
agency can occur in both psychotic and psychospiritual experience.  
 
In sum, it appears that ‘loss of agency and control’ is a dubious criterion for 
differentiating psychopathology from psychospirituality. Despite the fact that this 
criterion was most frequently identified by the authors in my study as being indicative of 
psychosis, there are numerous examples in the literature which counter its veracity. 
Indeed, different commentators have incongruously observed that loss of agency-
control is inherent to both psychotic and psychospiritual experiences. In light of this 
paradoxical mix of views, it consequently appears that the experience of ‘loss of 
agency and control’ is not uniquely psychopathological and is therefore invalid as a 
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 I have engaged this issue earlier in my appraisal of the GAP report. See Section 6.3.3 for further 
examples of the perceived involuntary nature of mystical experiences. 
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9.3.2 Criterion Two findings: Social dysfunction 
About one third of authors in my study identified social dysfunction as differentiating 
psychotic from psychospiritual instances. Essentially, this criterion reflects the view that 
social dysfunction is a key gauge of psychopathology. In mainstream psychiatry it is 
seen as a principal adverse consequence and defining feature of psychotic disorders, 
particularly schizophrenia (APA, 2013, pp.98, 104). My use of the term here, however, 
refers only to the inability of persons to maintain their usual vocational and recreational 
activities (i.e. work, studies, hobbies, interests, etc.).96 One of the earliest examples 
was by Boisen (1936, p.160), who noted that “the case is hopeless” (i.e. psychotic 
rather than psychospiritual) if a person is unable to uphold economic and social 
concerns. Lukoff (1985, pp.165-166) also espoused the view that people “meet the 
criteria for a psychotic state” when showing “widespread deficiencies in handling the 
everyday commonsense tasks involved in independent living”. Zaehner (1961, p.89), 
proffered the more relative assessment that “the difference, it would appear, is only one 
of degree, not of kind”. Hence, in his understanding, social dysfunction resulting from 
altered states of consciousness is not psychopathological per se, but only if the 
experience, and attendant social dysfunction, is protracted. However, most authors 
who identified this as a differentiation criterion seemed to reflect the psychiatric 
understanding that social dysfunction is typically indicative of psychosis when co-
occurring with certain anomalous symptoms.  
 
9.3.2.1     Criterion Two rebuttal 
Despite the prevailing identification of social dysfunction as a key differentiation 
criterion by authors, it is seemingly not an unequivocal indicator of psychopathology, 
for both long and short bouts of social incapacitation have been recognised in mystical 
literature as commonplace along the path of spiritual development. Indeed, Grof & Grof 
(1995, p.45) maintain that the disruption of “daily life” is a feature common of spiritual 
emergencies. This is corroborated by Ho (2016, p.185), a clinical psychologist who 
observed in his personal experiences of apparent psychotic mania that while 
“psychiatric symptoms have indeed incurred occupational and social costs”, this was a 
temporary aspect of a larger transformative process resulting in “gains in creativity, 
literary–artistic–esthetic sensibilities, and capacity to enjoy life; and in health, physical, 
mental, and spiritual”. He further maintains that “spirituality and madness coexist in a 
dialectical relationship” and understood his experiences to be inextricable expressions 
of both madness and spirituality (ibid, p.183). As such, while his social function was 
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expressions of apparent psychopathology. 
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compromised in one context of understanding, it was ultimately enriched in another.97 
Hence, it appears, the differentiation criterion of ‘social dysfunction’ is not a universal 
signifier of psychopathology, for it is common to both psychotic and psychospiritual 
experiences. Even if, as suggested by Zaehner, duration of social dysfunction is 
adopted as a relative differentiator, then the questions still remain – Beyond what 
extent of social dysfunction is psychopathology deemed to be diagnosable? Why is this 
so? And how does one decide whether an experience is psychotic or psychospiritual 
prior to this ambiguous time juncture? 
 
9.3.3 Criterion Three findings: Ego-related issues 
The general reasoning behind this criterion is that certain forms of ego-related issues 
can discern psychotic from transformative psychospiritual experiences. This was 
identified as a differentiator in assorted psychopathological contexts by about one third 
of authors. Some earlier versions of this were understood in terms of ego 
fragmentation. For instance, Siegler et al (1969, p.956) depicted a simple binary model 
of differentiation which contrasted the transpersonal experience of the “feeling of being 
at one with the world” to the psychotic experience of “no-self ego fragmentation”. 
Wapnick (1969, p.64) endorsed a similar dualistic view of fragmentation but added an 
element of complexity via the metaphor of “shell attachment and transcendence”. He 
maintained that, while the schizophrenic is rendered dysfunctional when his or her 
“protective shell has been suddenly and prematurely broken”, the mystic “through his 
long training process, is able to slough the shell off gradually” (ibid). Again, this depicts 
psychosis as something that can occur in the absence of psychospiritual skills and 
training, which is an understanding utterly absent from psychiatric thinking.  
 
Several other authors identified ego weakness as a criterion for discerning 
psychopathology. Proponents of this view generally seemed to believe that psychotic 
collapse results from a fundamental weakness in ego integrity. For instance, Meher 
Baba, (1988, p.3) referred to the “inherent psychic weakness…of the mind in ordinary 
madness”, while Carroll (2007, p.242) maintained that “the difference between a mystic 
and a mentally ill person revolves around the basic state of health of their ego”. The 
thinking here is that people exhibiting ego weakness are unable to integrate or 
withstand the psychic intensity of mystic experiences and consequently descend into 
madness. For example, Greeley (1974, p.81) held that for “a personality that is weak or 
badly integrated…a mystical experience may be enough to unhinge it completely”. 
Similarly, Siglag (1986, p.74) explained that a “strong ego is reported as being present 
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preceding the mystical experience, but the etiology of schizophrenia indicates a 
weakened or poorly developed ego as leading to that type of experience”. More 
recently, Goretzki et al (2009, p.91) concluded that a possible “difference between 
people having psychosis and people having only spiritual emergency” is that the latter 
possesses a “strong ego-complex”. From a developmental perspective, these views 
strongly parallel those of the above ego fragmentation criterion, as both suggest that 
psychosis can result from not being able to withstand or integrate psychospiritual 
experiences due to ego weakness, whereas having a strong ego can result in a 
positive experience of personal growth.  
 
From another perspective, some authors maintained that the presence of ego inflation 
differentiates psychotic from psychospiritual instances. Here, contrary to notions of ego 
breakdown, psychopathology is envisaged as dysfunctional ego expansion. Authors 
subscribing to this view claimed that, whereas healthy psychospiritual experiences are 
marked by a person exhibiting equanimity and humility, psychosis is marked by the 
presence of ego inflation. For example, Zaehner (1961, p.100) maintained that, in 
contrast to mystical experience which “deposes the mere ego from its previous 
supremacy”, people in psychosis can “exhibit a limitless expansion of the ego”. 
Similarly, Watkins, (2010, p.216) observed that the humility of the mystic stands in 
contradistinction to the egocentric psychotic who displays “an inflated or grossly 
exaggerated sense of self-importance that culminates in development of grandiose 
delusional beliefs”. This reflects conventional psychiatric thinking, for DSM-5 identifies 
grandiose delusions as “one of the key features that define the psychotic disorders” 
(APA, 2013, p.87). Hence, it represents another instance whereby authors in my study 
have selected a classic psychiatric psychotic indicator as a differentiation criterion. 
 
Two further forms of ego-related issues identified by authors as discerning psychotic 
from psychospiritual occurrences were egocentricity and ego grasping. In terms of 
egocentricity, several authors maintained that, whereas psychospiritual experience is 
other-oriented, a person experiencing psychosis is self-absorbed. For example, Brown 
(2005, p.56) posits that “in the mystical states the intuitions appeared to emerge from 
the self towards the world, whereas in the psychotic states the intuitions tended to 
revolve around the intents of the world towards the self”. Jackson (2001, p.170) also 
distinguished the “humility” and “altruism” of spiritual experience from the “self-
centredness” of psychotic experience, and Watson (2010, pp.216, 218) contrasted 
psychospiritual “humility” and “selflessness” with psychotic “self-importance” and 
“narcissistically constricted ‘all about me’ attitude”. In terms of ego grasping, several 
authors saw this as indicative of psychopathology, in contradistinction to the letting go 
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of ego in psychospiritual experiences. For example, Nelson (1994, p.349) stated that 
the schizophrenic “desperately clutches his ego”, while Stifler et al (1993, p.371) 
concluded in their empirical study on “psychotics and contemplatives” that “the most 
striking difference between these two groups was their respective levels of ‘ego-
grasping orientation’” and that “a clear relationship between ego grasping and 
psychosis is demonstrated”. This view is presumably based on the prevailing wisdom in 
mystical literature that the achievement of spiritual Enlightenment entails relinquishing 
one’s ego grasp on life and surrendering to the deeper Self. Regardless, the overall 
idea of ego-related issues was seen by many authors in my study as central to 
discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. 
 
9.3.3.1     Criterion Three rebuttal 
While the above correlation of ‘ego-related issues’ with psychopathology appears to 
have merit, this criterion ultimately fails in that such issues also occur in context of 
psychospiritual experiences. Consider, for example, the experience of spiritual 
emergence or emergency. As already mentioned above, the Grofs depict such 
experiences as processes of potential personal development and transformation, 
hence, it stands to reason that they may naturally involve egocentric manifestations of 
fragmentation, weakness, inflation, grasping or defence. Indeed, Assagioli (1989, p.35) 
maintains that the initial phase of a spiritual awakening process may often entail “self-
centeredness…and inflating the personal ego”, though this gradually passes as the 
experience is integrated. It therefore appears that, for many people, the transition from 
a lower to a higher state of consciousness may entail various dynamics of ego 
disruption. For instance, Varga (2011, p.281) observes that contending with “ego 
inflation” is a stage that many people must pass through when integrating kundalini 
experiences. In terms of shamanic processes, Rock et al (2008, p.63) note that people 
with weaker or “thinner” ego-boundaries are inherently more susceptible to trance 
induction via “shamanic-like stimulus” than those who have stronger or “thicker” ego 
boundaries. In context of spirit possession in traditional initiation processes, Prince 
(1974, p.324) similarly speaks of the “ego dissolution” that precedes an eventual 
“growing up”. Hence, it appears that the criterion of ‘ego-related issues’ is not 
intrinsically psychotic because ego upheaval and confusion can also commonly occur 
in psychospiritual experiences and transformative processes. 
 
9.3.4 Criterion Four findings: The experience lacks a developmental nature  
The idea that anomalous or psychotic-like experiences may reflect a positive 
developmental process is absent from the epistemology of medical psychiatry. Hence, 
it is particularly pertinent that this notion featured as the fourth highest indicator of 
154 
psychosis in my study, and was identified by about thirty one percent of authors. 
Indeed, its counterpart that ‘the experience promotes personal growth over time’ also 
appears among de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida’s top criteria of psychospiritual 
experiences. Arguably, the high incidence of this item in both studies indicates both the 
potential and importance for psychiatrists to look beyond the limited purview of 
diagnostic psychopathology and to incorporate psychospiritual knowledge into their 
epistemology.  
 
All authors who identified this differentiator concurred that psychosis is indicated by an 
absence of personal development. However, this was generally, and intriguingly, 
identified in context of the outcome of an experience. That is, a good outcome reflects 
personal development, and is thus a psychospiritual experience, while a bad outcome 
reflects an absence of personal development, and is thus a psychotic experience. For 
instance, in one of the earliest expressions of this view, Boisen (1936, p.ix) stated quite 
simply that “the difference lies in the outcome. Where the attempt is successful and 
some degree of victory is won, it is commonly recognised as religious experience. 
Where it is unsuccessful or indeterminate, it is commonly spoken of as ‘insanity’”. Sims 
(1997, p.81) likewise identified the absence of personal development as “a crucial 
difference” between psychotic and psychospiritual experiences. Watkins (2010, pp.216-
220) adopted Boisen’s developmental idea as a benchmark for formulating a typology 
of seven criteria to clinically discern psychospiritual from psychotic experiences, 
namely: peace versus agitation; growth versus stagnation; humility versus inflation; 
balance versus preoccupation; free will versus compulsion; legitimacy versus 
eccentricity; and inclusiveness versus isolation.98 From his perspective, all psychoses 
represent “potentially transformative psychospiritual crises”, hence, he counsels that 
“sufficient time should be allowed for the initial impact of a crisis to subside since 
episodes which eventually prove spiritually enriching or transformative are sometimes 
marked by agitation, preoccupation, and inflation during the early phases” (ibid, pp.xiii, 
215). Similarly, Brett (2002, p.322) saw the absence of a developmental outcome as 
the ultimate differentiating factor, but also noted that an essential commonality between 
psychospiritual and psychotic experiences is that each constitutes a state “in which the 
form of experience is altered from normal consciousness”. She consequently 
concluded that “phenomena occurring in a spiritual context may be identical to those 
traditionally viewed as symptoms of psychosis, but cannot be seen as psychotic in 
themselves” (ibid). In other words, this suggests that psychopathology is not identifiable 
in the form or content of an anomalous experience, but in the outcome. Finally, (Carroll, 
2007) understood such development in evolutionary terms, whereby psychosis 
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represents non-developmental psychopathology as opposed to the evolutionary 
advancement inherent in psychospiritual experiences. Again, this depicts the outcome 
of an anomalous experience as the ultimate criterion for differentiation purposes. 
 
This criterion proffers an intrinsic challenge to conventional psychiatric thinking and 
practice. For one, the notion that differentiation is dependent on outcome seemingly 
renders diagnostic practice tentative and relatively obsolete, as psychopathology 
cannot be identified until after an unspecified period of observation. At what point, and 
why, can an experience be identified as psychopathological? There is no answer to this 
question as the timeline and nature of each person’s prospective developmental 
process is unique. However, in light of this conundrum, Jackson (2010, pp.152-153) 
maintains that the nature of the outcome is not inherent, but strongly dependent on 
whether or not a host of internal and external stressors and dynamics are redressed. 
He subsequently warns that “this indicates the potential for clinical interventions which 
increase stress, either through invalidating the individual’s experience, or through 
sometimes unavoidable measures such as compulsory hospitalisation, to be iatrogenic” 
(ibid). This thinking reflects the Grofs’ (1995, p.52) concern that, in circumstances of 
spiritual emergency, psychiatric treatment interventions, based on pathologising rather 
than seeking to better understand anomalous experiences, may not only result in 
misdiagnosis, but may inadvertently curtail the developmental process and cause a 
psychotic outcome. 
 
The idea that psychiatric intervention, based on a poor understanding of 
psychospiritual matters, may precipitate a psychopathological outcome, arguably 
supports the necessity for creating an effective differential diagnosis system. Indeed, 
research conducted by Brett et al (2007) demonstrates a significant correlation 
between the way in which an anomalous experience is understood (by the person 
having the experience, and others) and consequent clinical outcomes. Their research 
indicated “the potential to elicit information that may clarify the nature of the continuum 
of psychotic and psychotic-like experiences” (ibid, p.s29).  Subsequent similar research 
conducted by Brett (2010, p.162) found that “anomaly-related distress” in participants 
was reduced through “appraising anomalies within a ‘spiritual’ framework” and through 
having “a higher level of perceived social support and/or understanding regarding the 
anomalies”. Hence, most participants held that investing their respective anomalous 
experiences with value and meaning was very important. As one person stated, “the 
one thing that is really important…is to have faith in something that is 
unbelievable…I’ve got to cling to the view that it is a positive experience, when I’m 
being told everyday by doctors and nurses that I should feel sorry for myself” (p.163). 
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Interestingly, Brett (p.173) concluded that this finding “undermines the utility of 
distinguishing transformative crisis from other forms of psychotic experience”. She 
maintained that the therapeutic benefit people may derive from appreciating the 
“purposeful” aspect of an anomalous experience is undermined if such experiences are 
labelled as psychopathological (ibid). In such instances the experience would appear to 
lack a developmental nature and, according to many authors in my study, would be 
grounds for diagnosing psychosis. This beggars the question – To what degree does 
the act of psychopathology-seeking create the psychopathology it is looking for? 
 
9.3.4.1     Criterion Four rebuttal 
The idea that psychopathology is identifiable via the absence of a developmental 
outcome is both promising and problematic. In terms of promise, the idea of beneficent 
and transformative psychotic-like experiences opens to possible new ways of 
understanding and therapeutically responding to psychosis. As Watkins suggests 
above, it may be that most, if not all, psychoses represent a transformative 
psychospiritual experience in potential. If so, then the optimal psychiatric task is, 
arguably, not to differentiate and diagnose psychopathology, but rather, to identify and 
foster latent developmental potentialities via a deeper understanding of anomalous and 
psychospiritual phenomena, and to circumvent deleterious clinical outcomes which 
may stem from lack of supportive understanding. While the notion of considering the 
developmental nature of psychotic-like experiences has apparent merit, it’s validity as a 
differentiation criterion is dubious and problematic. For one, it is impractical in terms of 
application because a diagnostic decision cannot be made until the nature of the 
outcome is ascertained. This constitutes a situation whereby outcome is antecedent to 
diagnosis, which is contrary to standard diagnostic practices. Furthermore, this problem 
is compounded by the aforementioned issue of duration, for it raises the question – At 
what point in time can the developmental potential of a psychotic-like episode be 
deemed to have failed and thus enable the diagnosis of psychosis to be made? The 
duration of a psychospiritual developmental process is not fixed and, in some 
instances, such a process can last for years.99 Hence, the designation of any time 
frame beyond which psychopathology is indicated is unavoidably arbitrary and runs the 
risk of misdiagnosis. It also risks stemming the developmental potential of the process 
and inadvertently precipitating psychosis.  
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Therefore, it appears the tautological idea that a psychotic-like experience which lacks 
a developmental nature is ipso facto psychotic is unfeasible as a differentiation criterion 
for the developmental duration of the process cannot be known until a developmental 
outcome occurs. If, however, psychotic-like experiences are viewed as psychospiritual 
development processes in potential, then the notion of discernment and related 
diagnostic dilemmas become redundant. A suggested alternative is to put aside notions 
of psychopathology and differential diagnostics to adopt an inquisitive heuristic 
approach which may elicit insights that lead to a better understanding of the complex 
and enigmatic nature of the deeper human psyche. 
 
9.3.5 Criterion Five findings: Culturally or religiously aberrant beliefs and experiences 
This criterion sits squarely within the diagnostic rubric of conventional psychiatric 
thinking. DSM-III inaugurated the consideration of cultural concerns in diagnostic 
practices and interest in this area has advanced with each updated edition. For 
instance, the recently published DSM-5 explains that “the boundaries between 
normality and pathology vary across cultures…Hence, the level at which an experience 
becomes problematic or pathological will differ…[and] awareness of the significance of 
culture may correct mistaken interpretations of psychopathology” (APA, 2013, p.14). In 
terms of schizophrenia, the diagnosing clinician is advised to be aware that “ideas that 
appear to be delusional in one culture (e.g. witchcraft) may be commonly held in 
another. In some cultures, visual or auditory hallucinations with a religious content (e.g. 
hearing God’s voice) are a normal part of religious experience” (ibid, p.103). Bizarre 
delusions, however, are conceptualised as culturally errant. DSM-5 states that 
“delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not understandable to 
same-culture peers” (p.87). Similarly, the diagnostic criteria listed for Schizotypal 
Personality Disorder include phenomena that transgress the basic laws of materialism; 
namely the presence of “odd beliefs or magical thinking that influences behavior and is 
inconsistent with subcultural norms (e.g., superstitiousness, belief in clairvoyance, 
telepathy, or “sixth sense” (pp.103, 655). In DSM-5, magical thinking is defined as “the 
erroneous belief that one’s thoughts, words, or actions will cause or prevent a specific 
outcome in some way that defies commonly understood laws of cause and effect” 
(p.824). Hence, while cultural sensitivity is endorsed by psychiatry, it is also made clear 
that experiences and beliefs that significantly deviate from religious, cultural, social, 
and materialist norms are deemed indicative of psychopathology. 
 
The above psychiatric thinking was generally mirrored by commentators within my 
literature review. Consideration of the extent to which an experience deviates from 
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cultural norms was identified by about twenty seven percent of authors as a criterion for 
differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. For example, Johnson & 
Friedman (2008, p.523) suggested that clinicians “compare idiosyncratic behavior and 
beliefs to normative practices in religious/spiritual community” when making a 
differential diagnosis between psychotic and “Religious/Spiritual/Transpersonal” 
experiences. Similarly, Siddle et al (2002, p.132) proposed asking the diagnostic 
question – “Are any religious ideas expressed likely to be unacceptable to the patient’s 
peers? Would nonpsychotic churchgoing religious people also find these ideas 
unacceptable?”. Watkins (2010, p.218) observed that psychoses “are often highly 
idiosyncratic, eccentric, or bizarre and diverge substantially from generally accepted 
standards”, while Noll (1983, p.452) identified “magical thinking” as a culturally deviant 
indicator of psychopathology. It therefore appears that psychiatry’s notion of exercising 
cultural sensitivity in diagnostic considerations has generally been adopted by many 
commentators attempting to discern psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. 
 
9.3.5.1     Criterion Five rebuttal 
Although exercising cultural discernment is evidently a progressive development in 
discerning madness from normalcy, and psychotic from transpersonal experiences, 
particularly in terms of reducing the risk of mistaken diagnoses, this practice is not 
without its logical problems. For example, medical psychiatry considers experiences 
such as hallucinations, spirit possession, and various types of magical thinking (e.g. 
telepathy, clairvoyance, etc.) to be psychopathological misapprehensions of reality. 
From a materialist stance, which medical psychiatry represents, such experiences defy 
‘commonly understood laws of cause and effect’ and are, therefore, 
psychopathological. The tenets of materialism reflect a physical view regarding the 
nature and laws of reality, whereby beliefs and experiences of a metaphysical nature 
are considered intrinsically delusory and/or psychopathological because they 
transgress the laws of reality. It, therefore, seems counterintuitive, in a cultural context, 
to suggest such experiences are not psychopathological per se, but only so if deviating 
from the norms of a given cultural milieu. This is exemplified in the DSM-5 Guidebook’s 
diagnostic suggestion for Brief Psychotic Disorder that: 
 
The diagnosis does not apply when the psychotic symptoms appear to 
have developed in response to culturally sanctioned activities, such as 
Qigong, a Chinese health-enhancing practice that can reportedly lead to 
transient psychosis. This is an important consideration, because psychotic-
like phenomena are reported to occur during extended religious or 
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ceremonial rituals in several non-Western cultures (Black & Grant, 2014, 
p.69). 
 
Arguably, this instruction tacitly suggests that madness is ultimately defined more by 
cultural considerations than biological or psychological malfunction, as culture seems 
to be a key point of clinical reference when deciding what is mad and what is not. While 
psychiatry obviously does not intend this meaning, its cultural relativism seemingly runs 
counter to its materialist and deterministic model for diagnosing psychopathology. A 
further problem with this criterion is that its proponents do not explain why deviance 
from culturally sanctioned psychospiritual norms is psychopathological. What, exactly, 
defines such purported psychopathology? This was not explained by authors who 
maintained this differentiating view in my study and nor has it been explicated or 
substantiated by DSM authors.  
 
The veracity of this criterion is also challenged by descriptions within psychospiritual 
research texts of culturally or religiously aberrant beliefs and experiences occurring in a 
non-psychopathological context. Take, for example, the phenomenon of hearing 
voices. The literature is replete with reports of so-called auditory hallucinations being 
experienced by psychiatric patients, religious adherents, and many ‘normal’ people 
within mainstream modern society.100 What is it, then, that specifically denotes voice 
hearing as psychopathological when doing so is common in psychiatric, cross-cultural 
and secular contexts? Indeed, the apparent heterogeneity of voice hearing is reflected 
in a multifaceted study of anomalous experiences conducted by Brett (2010, p.166) 
which found that symptoms of ostensible psychopathology occurred “across the 
clinical-non-clinical spectrum”. Subsequently, she concluded that “externalising 
appraisals do not define psychotic disorder” (ibid). If voice hearing is common within 
and beyond culturally or religiously sanctioned circumstances, then proposing that it is 
psychopathological, except in culturally normative instances, is seemingly unsound. 
 
The same principle applies to the phenomenon of extrasensory perception. Although 
the DSM-5 authors consider reported experiences by patients of extrasensory 
perception to be psychopathological ‘magical thinking’, such experiences are actually 
heterogeneous across the sociocultural spectrum. This is evidenced in the work of 
several authors examined above who identified extrasensory perception as a legitimate 
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psychospiritual phenomenon.101 Hence, in considering these examples, it seems 
conjectural to propose that a behaviour or belief is psychotic, rather than 
psychospiritual, merely on the grounds that it is not culturally normative. 
 
9.3.6 Criterion Six findings: Absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers 
The notion that a paucity of psychospiritual skills and teaching differentiates psychotic 
from psychospiritual outcomes was identified by about twenty four percent of authors in 
my study. This criterion was identified in two broad contexts; namely, guided social 
support and unguided personal experimentation. In terms of the former, the view is that 
people can become psychotic due to a lack of cultural support and understanding 
and/or through not receiving the requisite guidance and training from a spiritual teacher 
or adept. For instance, Wilber (1975, p.122) noted that “some individuals diagnosed as 
schizophrenic may indeed be psychologically lost...for want of an adequate guide”, 
while Greyson (1993, p.46) warned that “kundalini should only be awakened by a 
gradual process under the guidance of someone who has first-hand experience with it; 
otherwise, a kundalini awakening in a body and soul not properly prepared can 
produce negative effects, including psychosis”. From a sociological perspective, 
Greeley (1974, p.87) saw the absence of spiritually-informed understanding and 
guidance within a cultural milieu as a form of ignorance which can result in the creation 
of madness. He posed the question - “If a person is told he’s a ‘nut’ or ‘crazy’ for having 
such an interlude, could he not in fact become mentally disturbed within that context of 
conflict and judgement?” (ibid). Hence, he suggests that some instances of mental 
illness can be precipitated via suggestion, whereby a person experiencing a psychotic-
like episode is rendered mentally ill through psychiatric labelling and the stigmatisation 
and distress that this causes.  
 
Similarly, from an anthropological perspective, Silverman (1967, p.29) observed that a 
person experiencing a shamanic crisis in a traditional society is culturally bolstered by 
“emotional supports and the modes of collective solutions”, while, conversely, “supports 
are all too often completely unavailable to the schizophrenic in our culture”. 
Interestingly, he further argued that it is not the absence of guidance and support per 
se that can tip a shamanic crisis into a psychosis, but rather, the overwhelming 
“pervasiveness of the anxiety” that may result from such absence (ibid). This is an 
intriguing observation that warrants further investigation and lends credence to my 
argument that a better understanding of psychosis may be gained through the 
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 For example, Dean’s metapsychiatry (Chapter Six, Section 6.2.2), Grof’s spiritual emergence (Chapter 
Eight, Section 8.2), and Lukoff’s Mystical Experiences with Psychotic Features (Chapter Eight, Section 
8.3). 
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consideration of a diversity of psychospiritual views. Are some instances of psychosis 
precipitated by the intense anxiety generated in not having access to the 
psychospiritual knowledge, guidance and social support which might enable a person 
to navigate through stormy transpersonal experiences? This question conceptually 
shifts the essential locus of psychopathology from the individual to the social body in 
which he or she lives. From this perspective, psychopathology may be the result of a 
person experiencing transpersonal states of consciousness within a society that offers 
little in terms of psychospiritual knowledge and guidance. 
 
Some authors also depicted this criterion in context of personal experimentation 
independent of spiritual teachers or guidance. The earliest instance of this was by the 
philosopher Immanuel Kant (1964 [1798], p.17) in his book titled The Classification of 
Mental Disorders, in which he alluded to a practice whereby researchers wilfully induce 
an altered state of consciousness that “approaches derangement” in order to study and 
better understand psychopathology via firsthand experience. He warned that in such 
experiments “an artificial insanity can easily become a real one” (ibid). Although he 
does not explicitly say that an absence of psychospiritual training can result in 
madness, he does infer that the careless or unskilled engagement in such practices 
can lead to insanity. This suggests that insanity may be caused not only by an absence 
of psychospiritual orientation skills, but also by the inept and uncontrolled application of 
the same. Another exemplary instance is evident in Jung’s (1968, p.49) 
experimentation with a method of self-exploration he called active imagination, which 
he describes as “a sequence of fantasies produced by deliberate concentration”. After 
sixteen years (1914-1930) of such experimentation, Jung (2009, p.360) concluded that 
“to the superficial observer, it will appear like madness. It would also have developed 
into one, had I not been able to absorb the overpowering force of the original 
experiences”. And, indeed, in light of Western standards of normalcy Jung’s (2009) 
record of his forays into the realms of active imagination throughout Liber Novus do 
read like madness. However, it was his capacity to employ a framework of self-
composed meditative practices which enabled him to absorb, rather than be absorbed 
by, the mythic content of his active imaginations. For him, this was the difference 
between facilitating a transformative experience and sliding into psychosis.  
 
This criterion is of particular significance because it brings to light a concept that is 
utterly absent from the thinking and practice of mainstream psychiatry. The idea that 
the acquisition and application of psychospiritual skills may play a fundamental and 
determining role in psychosis is far removed from the prevailing psychiatric standpoint, 
which generally endorses the notion of biological causality. In identifying this criterion, 
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authors do not attribute causality to the presence of a putative anatomical dysfunction 
or anomaly, but rather, to the absence of particular psychospiritual abilities and 
tutelage. Hence, psychopathology is not seen as implicit and biologically embedded, 
but as relative to the presence or absence of a framework of psychospiritual 
understanding, skills, knowledge and support. Ostensibly, the presence of such a 
framework may enable a person to navigate, and indeed, flourish through anomalous 
states of consciousness. Conversely, the absence of the same may default into 
psychopathology.  
 
The idea that inadequate psychospiritual guidance and skills procurement can 
ostensibly result in a psychotic outcome is typified in Campbell’s (1972) metaphorical 
depiction of psychotic ‘drowning’ versus psychospiritual ‘swimming’. He maintained that 
“our schizophrenic patient is actually experiencing inadvertently that same beatific 
ocean deep which the yogi and saint are ever striving to enjoy: except that, whereas 
they are swimming in it, he is drowning” (ibid, pp.219-220). Elsewhere, he highlights 
the pivotal importance of psychospiritual teachers and skills acquisition by explaining 
that "the mystic, endowed by native talents…and following, stage by stage, the 
instructions of a master, enters the waters and finds he can swim; whereas the 
schizophrenic, unprepared, unguided, and ungifted, has fallen or has intentionally 
plunged, and is drowning" (p.209). Essentially, these metaphorical statements speak of 
whether or not a person has acquired the techniques of transcendence to enable him 
or her to integrate and navigate metaphysical domains of reality. As such, psychosis is 
not depicted as a form of psychopathology per se, but as an experiential anomaly 
resulting from the absence of adequate psychospiritual ‘swimming lessons’. This poses 
intriguing new possible pathways to better understanding the metaphysical depths 
which ostensibly underlay the relationship between psychotic and psychospiritual 
experiences.  
 
Some commentators have referred to such transcendence techniques as ‘technologies 
of consciousness’; a term denoting the practical techniques used for fostering 
psychospiritual development. They are fundamental to the cultural epistemologies of 
many societies. For instance, Wheelwell (1997, p.536) states that “spiritual practices, 
like insight (vipashyana) meditation and (zen) koans, are...technologies of 
consciousness, designed to access the road towards freedom”, while Stutchbury 
(2004, p.77) holds that “cutting edge mind-science research draws on the dialogue 
developing between western scientific neuroscience and the ‘technologies of 
consciousness’ of Tibetan Buddhism”. Indeed, Wilber (1984, p.20) asserts that such 
practices constitute a form of scientific pursuit, as does Sri Aurobindo (1999, p.7) who 
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explains that Yogic methods, “like the operations of Science, are formed upon a 
knowledge developed and confirmed by regular experiment, practical analysis and 
constant result”. Furthermore, Rao (2005a, p.15) explains that “mental technologies 
like meditation and spiritual counseling are tools for spiritual development, which have 
measurable effects on one’s life and wellness”, including issues pertaining to “mental 
illness and psychopathology” (2005b, p.36). Apart from some emergent forms of 
transpersonal psychology, such technologies are all but absent from Western 
psychological and psychiatric practices. 
 
The notion of psychospiritual training practices is seemingly of considerable pertinence 
to better understanding psychosis. In fact, Sekida (1985, p.126) refers to Zen Buddhist 
meditation as a structured “self-operated psychiatric method”, which simultaneously 
facilitates self-actualisation while circumventing psychopathology. To what degree, 
then, does the general absence of such knowledge, skills and guidance within 
industrialised societies, and mainstream psychiatry, result in psychotic states that may 
have been prevented? Is there scope for psychiatry to place more emphasis on 
preventing psychotic episodes by drawing on knowledge from psychospiritual traditions 
and practices? This issue arguably proffers a challenge and opportunity to psychiatry. 
The challenge is to consider the possibility that psychiatry’s failure to better understand 
and incorporate psychospiritual knowledge into its epistemology can ironically result in 
iatrogenic outcomes, whereby ill-informed remedial measures cause, rather than 
prevent, psychosis. The opportunity is for psychiatry to broaden its worldview to 
incorporate ancient and well-tested psychospiritual knowledge systems into its 
understanding of, and therapeutic responses to, psychosis. 
 
9.3.6.1     Criterion Six rebuttal 
Although it is evident that the absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers can 
result in seeming psychosis this is not to say it constitutes a diagnostic criterion for 
discerning psychotic from psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences. In fact, 
psychospiritual adherents within many training modalities commonly become, or 
appear to become, psychotic, in the presence of skills and/or teachers. For instance, 
Dyga & Stupak (2015, p.51) report that in a survey conducted with Buddhist meditation 
teachers it was acknowledged that “psychosis can develop at either the initial or the 
advanced stages of practice”. Indeed, as already noted above, the DSM-5 Guidebook 
recognises that psychotic-like episodes can result from the practice of Qigong; a view 
which is supported by Ng’s (1999) research into the phenomenon of “Qigong-induced 
psychoses” occurring amongst Qigong students. It therefore appears that instances of 
psychosis can occur regardless of the absence, or presence, of psychospiritual skills or 
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teachers. Furthermore, to suggest that the absence of psychospiritual skills and/or 
teachers is diagnostically indicative of probable psychosis, inversely suggests that non-
psychotic anomalous experiences occur only in the presence of such aptitude and 
tutelage. However, as already discussed in Chapter Eight, eruptive psychotic-like 
psychospiritual experiences, or spiritual emergencies, can occur spontaneously in the 
absence of psychospiritual skills and/or teachers. Overall, then, it is evident that while 
the absence of psychospiritual aptitude and tutelage can play a role in precipitating 
apparent psychotic experiences, this is not universal and consequently refutes its 
status as a differential diagnostic criterion.  
 
9.3.7 Criterion Seven findings: Hearing voices 
This criterion, which was identified by about twenty three percent of authors, reflects 
the thinking of classic textbook psychiatry. However, eleven (about sixteen percent) of 
these maintained that only hostile voices evidenced psychosis. The view that hearing 
voices, or having auditory hallucinations, constitutes a key diagnostic indicator of 
psychotic disorders has prevailed throughout DSM editions since the manual’s 
inception. In DSM-5 it continues to feature as a primary diagnostic criterion in all 
psychotic disorders, except catatonia (APA, 2013, pp.87-122). When considering the 
centrality of this criterion to diagnosing psychotic disorders, it is significant that about 
seventy seven percent of authors did not identify it as a differentiator. This is possibly 
because they saw the phenomenon as common to both psychotic and psychospiritual 
experiences, and therefore, not a clear item of differentiation. Although none of the 
authors inferred that voice hearing per se is invariably psychotic, they all mirrored 
psychiatric thinking in identifying it as a general criterion of psychopathology. 
 
Interestingly, most authors in my study contrasted this criterion against the visual 
hallucinations of psychospiritual experiences (i.e. psychotic auditory hallucinations 
versus non-psychopathological visual hallucinations).102 For instance, Austin (1998, 
p.31) described the mystical path as including hallucinatory phenomena which are “in 
general, more visual; not threatening” compared to schizophrenic process where such 
phenomena are “in general, more auditory; can be threatening”, while Jackson (2001, 
p.170) contrasted the “benign” and visual “pseudo hallucinations” of psychospiritual 
experience with the “malignant” and auditory “true hallucinations” of psychotic 
experience. This juxtaposition of psychotic auditory hallucinations against non-
psychotic visual hallucinations constitutes a step beyond psychiatry’s general view that, 
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 There was one exception to this common view. In his schema of “comparison between the healthy, 
mystic and psychotic person” Kemp (2000, p.162) listed both visions and voices as being indicative of 
psychotic experience. 
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minus cultural exceptions, all hallucinatory experience is ostensibly psychotic. The 
notion of a non-psychotic hallucination poses a conceptual and semantic quandary 
because, in the psychiatric domain, the term ‘hallucination’ generally denotes 
psychopathology. If, for argument’s sake, psychiatry were to accept the veracity of this 
particular distinction it would subsequently require a significant redrafting of the 
definition of ‘hallucination’. It would also command an explanation as to why hearing a 
voice, or voices, that nobody else can hear is psychopathological, while seeing 
something that nobody else can see, is not? This question also holds for the authors 
cited above because, despite their diagnostic assertions, none have provided such an 
explanation.  
 
Other authors suggested that it is not the nature of the hallucination, but the nature of 
the voice, which differentiates psychopathological from psychospiritual experiences. 
This occurred in four contexts. First, was the view that critical voices are psychotic 
while benevolent voices are psychospiritual. For example, Noll (1983, p.453) noted 
that, in contrast to “the nagging, accusatory, and intrusive ‘voices’ that plague the 
schizophrenic”, the shaman hears voices that are “usually of a positive, helpful, healing 
nature”.103 Second, and similar to the first, is the view that command voices are 
psychotic while non-command, or instructive, voices are psychospiritual. Nelson (1994, 
p.249) explicated this clearly in comparing schizophrenic states to instances of 
“regression in the service of transcendence” (RIST),104 in which “hallucinated voices 
that sometimes accompany RIST are of the higher order, and though they may advise, 
they never command”. In other words, psychopathology here pivots on whether the 
voice represents coercion or counsel. Third, was the view that a psychospiritual 
experience of voices involves some degree of control whereas a psychotic experience 
of voices does not (Watkins, 2010, p.217; Noll, 1983, p.453). This is similar to the first 
differentiation criterion discussed above in Section 9.3.1. Finally, three authors posited 
the differentiation as one of external versus internal voices; the former symptomatic of 
psychosis, and the latter, of kundalini experiences (Greenwell, 2002; Greyson, 1993, 
p.48; Sannella, 1987, p.109). Again, none of these views are bolstered by an 
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 For similar views see - Clarke, 2000, p.14; Stephen & Suryani, 2000, p.23. 
104
 Nelson (1994, p.247) defines RIST as “a natural healing process that lowers defences against 
confronting unresolved impediments to higher consciousness” through which “the outcome can be 
madness as well as enlightenment”. This and related notions are examined in Chapter Ten, Section 10.6. 
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9.3.7.1     Criterion Seven rebuttal 
While this mix of perspectives work to shine an edifying light on the complex nature of 
the phenomenon of voice hearing, it simultaneously casts a cloud of perplexity over the 
clinical endeavour (be it psychiatric or otherwise) to definitively discern 
psychopathology from normalcy. It also portrays a clear fallibility in attempting to 
understand psychosis through the limited, and limiting, conceptual lens of binary 
diagnostics and psychopathology. Indeed, there are many contexts of voice hearing 
experience which challenge psychiatry’s designation of auditory hallucinations as a 
primary psychotic diagnostic criterion. A broader examination of these in Chapter 
Eleven demonstrates the difficultly, if not the impossibility, of delineating its 
psychopathological parameters.  
 
9.3.8 Criterion Eight findings: Social isolation 
As noted above in Section 9.3.2, social isolation is adjunct to social dysfunction in 
psychiatric diagnostics. A common characteristic of intense anomalous experiences is 
that they can result in social isolation. About twenty three percent of authors in my 
study identified this as differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. For 
instance, early in this field of research Siegler et al (1969, p.956) fashioned a typology 
for differentiating psychodelic [sic] from psychotic experiences,105 and noted that, in 
psychospiritual experiences, there is typically a “feeling that one can join the company 
of other enlightened people”, while in psychotic experiences there is a “feeling that one 
is less and less human, more and more isolated”. Similarly, in his doctoral research on 
mystical versus schizophrenic experience, Siglag (1986, p.74) found that, for most 
people, a mystical experience “enhances their ability to contribute to the community” 
while those diagnosed with schizophrenia tend to “withdraw from relationships with 
other people”. Most commentators in my study proffered a similar such picture of 
differentiation. 
 
9.3.8.1     Criterion Eight rebuttal 
Despite the common view that social isolation differentiates psychotic from 
psychospiritual experiences, this is arguably not an unequivocal sign of 
psychopathology. For instance, in his study of mystic versus psychotic experiences, 
Wapnick (1969) conducted a comparative analysis of two personal accounts of 
anomalous experiences; one, the diary of the sixteenth century Spanish mystic St. 
Teresa of Avila, and the other, the diary of a 1940s psychiatric patient, Lara Jefferson. 
                                                          
105
 In their research, the authors conducted a detailed analysis of psychiatrist R. D. Laing’s book The 
Politics of Experience (1967), from which they fashioned their typology. See Appendix Six, Table A12 for a 
copy of this typology. 
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He subsequently observed that, unlike Lara, “Teresa was able to maintain some 
degree of social contact, though living in a cloister. Moreover, her decisions to isolate 
herself were within her conscious control” (ibid, p.63). This seemingly indicates that, in 
Wapnick’s view, it is not social isolation per se that denotes psychopathology, but the 
loss of intentional choice to do so. It also appears that social isolation, by choice or 
default, may feature in psychospiritual experiences. For instance, Cashwell et al (2007, 
pp.141, 144) list “social isolation” as a defining feature of what they call “spiritual 
bypass”, which is a term denoting an attempt to “resolve a spiritual emergency at the 
spiritual level only”. Further to the notion of spiritual emergency, Randal & Argyle 
(2005, p.8) make the observation that, rather than being a definitive outcome of 
psychotic experiences, social isolation can often be the product of stigmatisation 
stemming from a psychospiritual experience being misdiagnosed as psychotic. Each of 
these views arguably challenges the suggestion that social isolation is a criterion for 
differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. 
 
9.3.9 Criterion Nine findings: Generally negative experience 
This criterion, which was posited by about seventeen percent of authors, represents 
the view that psychotic and psychospiritual experiences are generally discernible in 
that the former is negative in nature, and the latter is positive. For instance, in contrast 
to the professed positive nature of psychospiritual experiences, Johnson & Friedman 
(2008, p.523) claimed that “psychopathology is often characterized by greater…terror”, 
while Siegler et al (1969, p.956) portrayed psychotic experience as one where “the 
future is the realm of anxiety and danger”. In terms of schizophrenia, Hunt (2007, 
p.216) described a “painful sense of deletion of presence and inner vitality”, Nelson 
(1994, p.348) held that schizophrenic persons are distressingly confronted with “an 
incomprehensible universe”, and Siglag (1986, p.138) observed that they “experience 
terror, fear, depression, and a sense of insecurity”. These depict various negative 
outcomes as being emblematic of psychotic experience.  
 
9.3.9.1     Criterion Nine rebuttal 
Although this criterion may appear to be plausible, it seems ultimately to be a value 
judgment as the literature is rife with examples of protracted periods of negative 
experience in a psychospiritual context. For example, a pervasive aspect of the 
transformation process in mysticism is aptly referred to as “the dark night of the soul” 
(Underhill, 1912), while Krishna’s (1977) autobiographical account of his transformative 
kundalini process involved many lengthy bouts of severe physical and psychic 
suffering, over a twenty year period, before he was finally able to integrate the 
experience. Hence, it seems simplistic to suggest that negative experience is indicative 
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of psychopathology in contrast to the supposed positive effect of a psychospiritual 
experience. Negative and positive experiences, of long and short duration, commonly 
feature in both psychospiritual and psychotic events. 
 
9.4 Conclusion 
The task of discerning psychotic from psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences is 
complex and seemingly impossible. Indeed, I have demonstrated that each of the 
topmost nine criteria identified by authors as characteristically psychotic, are 
conversely identified by others as typically psychospiritual. Arguably, this impasse 
shows the inaptness of employing psychiatry’s psychopathology-seeking approach in 
the field of psychospiritual research. Rather than trying to discern psychotic from 
psychospiritual experiences, adopting an open-ended heuristic approach that aims to 
better understand their commonalities may be a more fruitful investigative path. 
Chapter Ten examines seven further themes elicited from my content analysis that 








New Conceptual Pathways 
 
10.0  Introduction 
This chapter continues my content analysis process by examining seven themes 
identified by authors which extend beyond classical psychiatric thinking and ostensibly 
offer new conceptual pathways to better understanding psychosis. This includes the 
idea that it appears ultimately impossible to differentiate psychotic from psychotic-like 
psychospiritual experiences. Hence, this chapter also works to conceptually segue into 
Focal Setting Four which challenges the veracity of adopting psychiatry’s binary model 
of differential diagnosis and psychopathology-seeking as an investigative approach for 
understanding psychosis in light of psychospiritual considerations. 
 
10.1  The validity problem  
A common issue authors alluded to throughout my content analysis literature was that 
which I have called ‘the validity problem’. Essentially, the validity problem is 
characterised by the question - What substantiates the asserted psychopathology of 
differentiation criteria identified by various commentators? Several authors in my study 
spoke to this question. This is exemplified in Kemp’s (2000, p.58) critical view that – “If 
neither psychosis nor mysticism can be pinned down and defined, how is it possible to 
equate the two? To verify the equation of two variables, they must both be 
instantiated”. Many other authors reflected this observation. For instance, Ortolf (1994, 
p.10) argued that “effective differential criteria require clear, well-substantiated 
operationalizations” in order to better understand, and discern between, psychotic and 
mystic phenomena. de Menezes Junior & Moreira-Almeida (2009, p.88) also noted in 
their study that “there is a scarcity of empirical studies that prospectively test the 
differentiating criteria of what would be a spiritual experience and what would be a 
mental disorder”. Likewise, Johnson & Friedman (2008, p.513) alluded to the “lack of 
empirical support” for “diagnostic suggestions” within the literature pertaining to 
discerning psychotic from mystical experiences and suggested that “it would be useful 
to develop sound empirical approaches” (ibid, p.522), while Jackson & Fulford (1997, 
p.60, fn.2) highlighted the issue of ambiguous definition in their observation that, “the 
clinical concept of ‘psychosis’ is notoriously broad in scope, so much so that 
psychiatrists have sometimes sought to abandon it altogether…There is no agreement, 
either, on the criteria for the genuinely mystical”. Others also expressed the belief that 
attributions of psychopathology in the literature are assumptive and hence lack 
demonstrated validity (Marzanski & Bratton, 2002, p.360; Jackson & Fulford, 1997, 
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p.53; Noll, 1983, p.455). Such views seemingly constitute a significant challenge to 
diagnostic practices because they legitimately point out that, in the absence of 
empirical substantiation, proposed psychopathological differentiation criteria are 
rendered speculative and provisional. It therefore appears that Johnson & Friedman’s 
suggestion regarding the need to formulate sound empirical approaches within this field 
of diagnostics is prudent.   
 
As demonstrated throughout Chapter Nine, however, seeking to establish empirically 
valid diagnostic criteria for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences is 
seemingly an impossible task because all such criteria can appear in both types of 
experiences. This arguably suggests that the two states of consciousness share a 
common psychic ground and that an open-ended approach of phenomenological 
investigation, that sidesteps the practice of pinpointing psychopathology, might lead to 
an epistemic breakthrough in this field of research. Indeed, the entire differentiation 
enterprise is modelled on psychiatry’s a priori acceptance of the unsubstantiated notion 
that distinct forms of psychopathology exist. Ironically, then, the materialist approach of 
bifurcating diagnostics, when applied to the field of psychic disturbances and 
anomalies, is seemingly rendered invalid at the outset, for it fails to substantiate the 
psychopathology of the criteria used as differential measures. In other words, such 
criteria reflect axiomatic suppositions that have not been empirically validated. 
American neuroscientist Steven Hyman (2010, p.157) derisively refers to this type of 
thinking as “an unintended epistemic prison” and remonstrates that it has been 
“palpably impeding scientific progress” in American psychiatric research since the 1980 
inauguration of a medical model with DSM-III. He further maintains that the reified 
nature of diagnostic entities has “controlled the research questions [investigators] could 
ask, and perhaps, even imagine” (ibid). Although Hyman clearly means this in context 
of the scientific approach that governs psychiatric research, this can arguably apply to 
other contexts. For instance, it could equally be proposed that reductive psychiatry’s 
epistemic prison impedes better understanding psychosis by proscribing the asking, 
and even the imagining, of investigative research questions regarding possible 
psychospiritual considerations. 
 
As demonstrated throughout Chapter Nine, even when psychospiritual considerations 
are included in clinical diagnostics, the scope of understanding generally reflects, and 
is limited by, unsubstantiated axiomatic assumptions regarding psychopathology that 
guide conventional psychiatric practice. Such an approach assumes, without validation, 
that psychotic experiences are psychopathologically distinct from psychospiritual 
experiences. Consequently, it precludes a heuristic investigation of the possibility that 
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the two experiences are not essentially different, but share common roots and are 
therefore indistinguishable. 
 
10.2  Issues of ontology 
In my study a variety of issues pertaining to the experience of ontological distress and 
distortion were identified as a differentiation criterion by authors.106 For instance, 
psychotic experience was described as marked by “estrangement from self” (Siegler et 
al, 1969, p.956), “a sense of insecurity” of self (Siglag, 1986, p.138), and “the 
experience of feeling as though one is separated from the world by a thick, glass wall, 
being trapped in a silent, unreal room” (Pahnke & Richards, 1966, p.188). Similarly, 
Clarke (2000, p.14) proposed that the “well-foundedness or otherwise of the self of the 
individual undergoing the experience” discerns whether an experience becomes 
psychotic or not. Examples of other proffered ontological psychosis differentiators 
were:  
 withdrawal from the external world into the self (Stephen & Suryani, 2000, p.26; 
Grof & Grof, 1995, p.315; Nelson, 1994, p.249);  
 being unable to discern outer from inner reality (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.315; Noll, 
1983, p.452);  
 the experience of outer and inner reality being sundered (Austin, 1998, p.31; 
Wapnick, 1966, p.69);  
 impairment to time-space orientation (Grof & Grof, 1995, p.315);  
 monocular focus (Cantlie, 2014, p.109);107 and 
 “a situation of ontological insecurity” due to an upheaval of a person’s “urdoxa” 
(Brett, 2002, p.327).108 
All of these criteria ostensibly reflect the general notion that the psychotic process is 
evidenced by the experience of ontological distress and distortion. 
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 In total, about forty four percent of authors discussed an ontological-type psychotic manifestation. 
However, these were diverse in nature so I sub-categorised them into eighteen different criteria. In other 
words, I did not identify ‘issues of ontology’ as a criterion in itself, but as an umbrella category composed 
of multiple criteria. 
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 Cantlie (2014, p.109) maintains that the Indian sadhu can be discerned from “the ordinary madman” in 
that “the sadhus are aware both of the life they left and the life that, for whatever motives, they have now 
decided to adopt. Their focus is binocular”. Extrapolating from this, I coined the term ‘monocular focus’ to 
designate the psychotic person’s ostensible conflation of past and present experience. 
108
 Brett (2002, p.325) defines ordoxa as “a primordial, unshakeable certainty in the fundamental features 
or dimensions of the world and myself”, which, when shaken, or ill-formed, can result in a person feeling 
dislocated from his or her ‘self’. 
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In the field of psychosis research, a key and original thinker along these lines is the 
Scottish psychiatrist Ronald Laing who adapted the works of existential philosophers to 
formulate the idea that psychotic experience is fundamentally one of what he called 
‘ontological insecurity’. According to Laing (1990, p.42), in a state of ontological 
insecurity; 
 
the individual…may feel more unreal than real; in a literal sense, more 
dead than alive; precariously differentiated from the rest of the world, so 
that his identity and autonomy are always in question. He may lack the 
experience of his own temporal continuity. He may not possess an over-
riding sense of personal consistency or cohesiveness. He may feel more 
insubstantial than substantial, and unable to assume that the stuff he is 
made of is genuine, good, valuable. And he may feel his self as partially 
divorced from his body. 
 
Hence, his notion of ontological insecurity denotes an extensive impairment to a 
person’s fundamental ground of being. He further maintains that the key to 
understanding “how certain psychoses can develop” lay in comprehending the 
dynamics of the respective existential states of ontological security and insecurity 
(ibid).109 He therefore depicts the phenomenon of ontological insecurity as fundamental 
to understanding and defining psychotic experience.  
 
Issues and questions of ontology in psychosis research, then, clearly open to different 
ways of understanding than those which guide medical psychiatry’s inquiry into the 
nature of psychosis. For instance, medical psychiatry aims to objectively identify 
psychopathological symptoms and configure these into psychotic diagnostic criteria. 
Such an approach generally deems a psychotic person’s subjective and transpersonal 
experiences to be incidental and therefore not pertinent to examination. With 
ontological considerations, however, the investigative gaze turns inwards to question 
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 Laing (1990, pp.41-42) describes the state of ontological security as follows: 
 
The individual, then, may experience his own being as real, alive, whole; as differentiated 
from the rest of the world in ordinary circumstances so clearly that his identity and autonomy 
are never in question; as a continuum in time; as having an inner consistency, substantiality, 
genuineness, and worth; as spatially coextensive with the body; and, usually, as having 
begun in or around birth and liable to extinction with death. He thus has a firm core of 
ontological security. 
 
A more detailed examination of Laing’s work is undertaken later in Section 10.6.3 below. 
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the nature of subjective experience. Doing so raises questions that probe beyond the 
limited objective scope of psychiatric observation and inquiry. What is the generic 
nature of human ontology and of the different cultural ontologies therein? What is the 
nature of the different states of being that appear to exist within the psychotic ‘world’? 
What is the relationship between the subjective and physical self in psychotic 
experience? Can psychosis be understood merely as the presence of a 
psychopathological ‘brokenness’, or may it possibly be the consequence of an absence 
of the necessary psycho-social-spiritual skills, capacities, instruction and understanding 
for optimal mental health?  
 
Such questions and thinking are alien to medical materialism yet they do exist within 
the worldviews of other cultures and traditions. For example, this is exemplified in 
Sekida’s (1985, p.183) phenomenological description of how psychosis is precipitated 
by nen malfunction. 
 
In the case of the psychotic person, the sequence of three nen actions…is 
deranged because of the malfunction or fatigue of the reflecting action, 
especially that of the third nen. This must necessarily be followed by the 
third nen’s failure to perform normally its identifying function, and by the 
progressive isolation of the nen from each other. The first nen, especially, 
becomes isolated in this way. Hence, the psychotic often fails to identify his 
own sensations, perceptions, and mood as his own and begins to feel 
alienated from himself.  
 
This is not to say that the Zen notion of nen function is the final word on the cause and 
nature of psychosis, but it certainly demonstrates a worldview that offers conceptual 
avenues for better understanding psychosis beyond psychiatry’s assumptions of 
reductive psychopathology, biological aetiology and incomprehensibility. Additionally, 
and importantly, an understanding of the effective role of nen in shaping human 
perception and cognition is the product of close subjective investigation, as is the view 
that psychosis is caused my nen malfunction. This exemplifies how heuristic research 
into the phenomenological nuances of human subjectivity can foster a better 
understanding of the apparent connection between psychotic and psychospiritual 
experiences. 
 
10.3 Anomalies of the mythic/subliminal domain 
The mythic domain denotes the deeper realm of human consciousness. Although there 
is a considerable body of literature in which authors attempt to better understand the 
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nature of psychosis from a mythic perspective, the focus here is primarily on 
observations made by Jung and other authors in my study who addressed this issue in 
terms of differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. Jung (1966, p.66) 
broadly refers to this domain as the “collective unconscious” from which the myths of all 
cultures and religions have emerged. In his earlier work he defined the unconscious as 
“the foundation on which consciousness is built” and “the sum of all psychic processes 
below the threshold of consciousness” (Jung, 1914, p.964); thus it represents the 
primordial source of the human psyche. Later, he coined the term ‘collective 
unconscious’ to denote the domain of consciousness shared by all humanity which is 
comprised of “subliminal perceptions, thoughts feelings…subliminal vestiges of archaic 
functions that exist a priori…[and] subliminal combinations in symbolic form, not yet 
capable of becoming conscious” (Jung, 1966, pp.303-304). For Jung, this is an actual 
domain of reality – “It too is a world, but a world of images” (ibid, p.298). He 
subsequently chose the term “archetype” to infer “archaic or…primordial types, that is, 
with universal images that have existed since the remotest times” (Jung, 1968, pp.4-5). 
Hence, his notion of the collective unconscious essentially speaks of the 
psychospiritual realm of human consciousness. 
 
Unlike the psychotic-versus-mystical binary envisioned by most commentators in my 
study, from a Jungian perspective, psychosis does not stand in contradistinction to 
mystical experience, but represents the psychopathological outcome of individuals’ 
unsound or ruptured relationships with their psychospiritual depths. Jung (1969, p.69) 
maintains that the difference between the normal person and the psychotic person is 
that the former is psychically anchored within “the directness and directedness of the 
conscious mind”, while the latter is “under the direct influence of the unconscious”. 
Elsewhere he explains that “if the unconscious simply rides roughshod over the 
conscious mind, a psychotic condition develops” (Jung, 1966, p.162). This depicts 
psychosis as an uncontrolled irruption of unconscious archetypal content into the 
conscious mind. Further to this, Jung (1968, p.39) suggests that, for people 
predisposed towards psychosis, it may happen that “the archetypal images, which are 
endowed with a certain autonomy anyway on account of their natural numinosity, will 
escape from conscious control altogether and become completely independent, thus 
producing the phenomena of possession”. Indeed, he holds that “they undoubtedly 
belong to the material that comes to light in schizophrenia” (ibid, p.287). In further 
reference to schizophrenia he proposes that “the unconscious usurps the reality 
function [of the conscious mind] and substitutes its own reality. Unconscious thoughts 
become audible as voices, or are perceived as visions or body-hallucinations, or they 
manifest themselves in senseless, unshakable judgments upheld in the face of reality” 
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(Jung, 1966, pp.282-283). Hence, what mainstream psychiatry sees as the diagnostic 
symptoms of psychosis, Jung depicts as unconscious archetypal forms or forces that 
have flooded and supplanted the conscious mind. This fundamentally represents a 
psychospiritual understanding of the nature and cause of psychosis. 
 
In light of this viewpoint, the difference between psychotic and psychospiritual 
experience lies in the nature of a person’s relationship with his or her irruptive 
unconscious materials. A person experiencing psychosis is overwhelmed by this influx 
and mistakenly attempts to translate it literally via his or her framework of conscious 
reality. Conversely, in psychospiritual instances, a person is able to maintain a 
measure of psychic equanimity and, in recognising it as an experience of the 
unconscious, attempts to grasp its meaning symbolically. Subsequently, Jung (1966, 
pp.217, 283) exhorts that “we must not concretize our fantasies” and explains that “it 
would be real insanity only if the contents of the unconscious became a reality that took 
the place of conscious reality; in other words, if they were to be believed without 
reserve”. Other authors in my study also identified such concretisation as evidencing 
psychosis. For instance, Hunt (2007, p.217) perceived “the literalization of metaphoric 
understanding” to be a form of “pathological hyperreflexivity”, while Goretzki et al 
(2009, p.91) observed that psychotic persons act literally on the “powerful archetypal 
forces that swamp” them. Interestingly, over a half century before Jung, Perceval 
(1840, p.274) discussed this phenomenon in reflecting upon his own psychotic 
experience. He reported that;  
 
the spirit speaks poetically, but the man understands it literally. Thus you 
will hear one lunatic declare that he is made of iron, and that nothing can 
break him…The meaning of the spirit is, that this man is strong as iron…but 
the lunatic takes the literal sense.  
 
Like Jung, Perceval understood psychopathology to be not in the form of the 
experience itself (i.e. delusional ideation), but in the misinterpretation of the content of 
subliminal ideas or imagery. From this perspective, psychotic interpretations of reality 
can generally be understood to reflect the inability, or unpreparedness, to discern 
between conscious and unconscious mental material. 
 
Jung’s mythological take on psychotic experience also brings to light potential material 
for making better sense of what Jaspers has called the ‘ununderstandability’ of 
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psychosis.110 For instance, on a 1956 internationally broadcasted radio symposium 
Jung (1960, p.250) stated that:  
 
In…psychopathology, I feel that the most pressing need is a deeper and 
more comprehensive knowledge of the complex psychic structures which 
confront the psychotherapist. We know far too little about the contents and 
the meaning of pathological mental products…This is particularly true of the 
psychology of schizophrenia. Our knowledge of this commonest of all 
mental diseases is still in a very unsatisfactory state. 
 
This arguably suggests that the more clinicians are informed about the depths and 
dimensions of human psychic life, both conceptually and experientially, the less 
incomprehensible psychosis becomes. Is it possible that the attainment of a ‘more 
comprehensive knowledge’ about human psychic structures may change the present 
picture of psychopathology? For instance, are ‘incomprehensible’ psychotic symptoms 
such as delusions and hallucinations psychopathological per se, or are they normal 
and natural within their native domain of the unconscious mind? Rather than dismiss 
the content of delusions as ‘incomprehensible’ and clinically unimportant, might it be 
therapeutically more effective to attempt to engage and understand them as 
meaningful mythic or symbolic material? The later examination of Jungian psychiatrist 
John Weir Perry’s work111 indicates that this question can be answered in the 
affirmative. 
 
Finally, and importantly, although Jung depicts psychosis as a form of psychopathology 
and differentiates between healthy and unhealthy engagement with unconscious 
content, it appears his model of understanding essentially undermines the binary logic 
that drives the whole enterprise of distinguishing between psychotic and 
psychospiritual experiences. There appears to be an underlying assumption in this field 
of research that, although psychotic and psychospiritual experiences share many 
similarities, they are ontologically distinct. Hence, the conceptual and diagnostic task is 
to identify and map differentiation criteria. But what if they are inextricably wedded and, 
ultimately, cannot be differentiated? As demonstrated throughout this section, it seems 
Jung’s view leans away from strict binary and differential thinking to indicate a common 
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 In my study, eleven authors (about sixteen percent) identified the presence of incomprehensible beliefs 
and behaviour as indicative of psychotic rather than psychospiritual experience.  
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 See Chapter Eleven, Section 11.3 for an elucidation on Perry’s work concerning the meaningful and 
functional nature of ‘psychotic delusions’. This further demonstrates how that which is ordinarily seen as 
incomprehensible may reveal meaning when investigated from a psychospiritual perspective. 
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source for both types of experience, for he depicts psychotic, mystic and mythic 
manifestations as all stemming from the unconscious or subliminal mind. 
Consequently, the attempt to formulate differential diagnostic criteria seems a dubious 
enterprise, particularly when based on reductive and dualistic medical notions of 
psychopathology. Arguably, a non-pathologising approach of inquiry might be more 
effective in trying to better understand the nature and causes of psychosis, and to 
inform apposite, holistic, therapeutic practices.  
 
10.4 Divine madness 
References to the experience of divine madness, or God-intoxication, are replete 
throughout both secular and religious texts. In my content analysis this idea was 
posited by Meher Baba (1988, p.9) who speaks of discerning between “ordinary 
madness” and “divine madness”. From a psychiatric perspective, experiences of divine 
madness are likely to be diagnosed as grandiose type psychotic delusions (APA, 2013, 
p.91). However, from a transpersonal perspective they are understood as reflecting a 
genuine, though often distorted, exposure to mystic states of consciousness. For 
instance, Nelson (1994, p.349) refers to the “godlike” schizophrenic experience 
whereby a person “expresses his power over reality as the quintessence of madness: 
‘I’m God, but you’re not!’”. Jung (1966, pp.274-275) also adopts the notion of 
‘godlikeness’ from Goethe’s Faust (2001) to denote situations whereby “the patient’s 
condition consists in his attributing to himself qualities or values which obviously do not 
belong to him, for to be ‘godlike’ is to be like a spirit superior to the spirit of man”. He 
describes this as a “serious misunderstanding” and a “question of inflation” which 
occurs when “the ego has appropriated something that does not belong to it…Thus he 
becomes a superman, superior to all others, a demigod at the very least. ‘I and the 
Father are one’” (ibid, pp.228-229). Hence, in such situations it is not the ‘delusional’ 
belief per se that constitutes psychopathology, but the act of literal rather than symbolic 
interpretation that makes it so. Likewise, Assagioli (1965, p.45) maintains that “the key 
to an understanding” of so-called grandiose delusions is to be aware that: 
  
The fatal error of all who fall victim to these illusions is to attribute to their 
personal ego or ‘self’ the qualities and powers of the Self. In philosophical 
terms, it is a case of confusion between an absolute and a relative truth, 
between the metaphysical and the empirical levels of reality; in religious 
terms, between God and the ‘soul’.  
 
In other words, the mystic experience of ‘God being within me and all others’ is 
mistakenly and egocentrically translated by a psychotic person as meaning ‘I am God’. 
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Here, the presumed cause of seeming disorder is not the presence of a biological 
aberration, but the absence of an ability to correctly interpret overwhelming influxes of 
mystic consciousness. This arguably suggests a psychospiritual aetiology of psychosis. 
 
The transition from divine madness to mystic illumination is generally orchestrated 
through tutelage from a psychospiritual master in technologies of consciousness. For 
example, in speaking of his extensive experience working with God-intoxicated people 
called “masts”, Meher Baba (1988, pp.9, 11) explains that in instances of ordinary 
madness “the person can, through suitable treatment and healing, only return to the 
normality of the ordinary functioning of consciousness”, whereas, a person in the thralls 
of divine madness, when aided by “the directive help of the Master”, will eventually 
“emerge into a supra-normal state of new integration and harmony”; a state of 
“unimpeachable sanity”. Hence, in his view, it is essential for psychotic-like instances of 
divine madness to be guided by an adept in technologies of consciousness so that they 
may fulfil their transformative potential. However, such support is impossible if 
psychospiritual considerations are not central to the epistemology of any given healing 
tradition. This is the case with mainstream Western psychology (and psychiatry). As 
Kiran Kumar et al (2005, p.108) explain, “in modern psychology due to non-recognition 
of the possibility of a transcendent Self, all the discussions on self terminate at the level 
of bio-psycho-social identity”. Subsequently, the mainstream therapeutic trajectory of 
modern psychology is “self-actualisation”, while for Indian psychology, it is “Self-
realization” (ibid, p.120). Whereas the former aims at maintaining secular normality the 
latter aims to transcend this (see Figure 3). 
 




An item of particular interest here is the notion that the state of normal consciousness, 
from which some people psychotically stray and hopefully return to via therapeutic 
recovery practices, is seen from a mystic viewpoint as a dubious form of ego-based 
sanity (i.e. quasi-sanity), in that it fails to fully apprehend larger and deeper 
psychospiritual reality. This idea is commonly iterated throughout psychospiritual 
literature and has profound ramifications for better understanding psychosis. If 
psychosis is a form of psychopathology intrinsically characterised by a person being 
out of touch with normal reality, yet normal reality is likewise out of touch with a larger 
mystic reality, then what is the benchmark for identifying true psychopathology? Here, 
both psychosis and normality are out of touch with reality in their unique respective 
ways. Therefore, rather than perceiving ostensible psychopathology in purely negative 
terms (i.e. as a morbid departure from normality or sanity, to which one should be 
returned as soon as possible), it may also be viewed as a potentially positive indication 
(i.e. a prospective step towards transcending the limitations of normality to achieve a 
state of enhanced sanity). Indeed, there are manifold psychotic-like forms of 
transpersonal experience which manifest along a vast spectrum of human states of 
consciousness. Further research by psychiatry into the notion of divine madness may 
advance knowledge about the nature of psychosis, normality, and many other unknown 
or poorly understood transpersonal states of human consciousness.  
 
10.5 Non-psychopathological psychotic experiences 
Traditionally, the term ‘psychosis’ denotes a form of psychopathology. Even within 
fields of research that recognise the legitimacy of psychospiritual realities a strong 
trend exists towards discerning between benign transpersonal and psychopathological 
psychotic experiences. However, in my study two authors unconventionally referred to 
psychospiritual experiences as benign forms of psychosis. Although these are atypical 
instances, it is apposite to examine them as they demonstrate the complexity of 
attempting to understand psychosis in relation and contradistinction to psychotic-like 
psychospiritual experiences.  
 
10.5.1 Carroll (2007) and benign psychosis 
The first instance is Carroll’s (2007) proposed model for discerning malignant from 
benign psychosis. Her model depicts a spectrum of altered states of consciousness 
(ASC) ranging from regressive and malignant psychotic states at one end through to 
evolutionary and benign psychotic states at the other, with “average ego 
consciousness” midway between (ibid, p.74) (see Figure 4). She describes this as a 
model of “inner experiences that shed the light of consciousness on particular aspects 
of the unconscious mind” (p.73). 
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Figure 4 – Carroll’s spectrum of ASC from malignant-to-benign psychosis 
 
             (Source – Carroll, 2007, p.74) 
 
Intriguingly, she places the term ‘psychosis’ at both ends of the spectrum and explains 
that:  “If we drew consciousness on a continuum, we would place the ASCs associated 
with common types of madness (regression and malignant psychosis) at one end of the 
spectrum and mystical (transcendence and benign psychosis) at the opposite end” 
(p.74). Her use of the word ‘psychosis’ here to represent a ‘mystical state’ is puzzling, 
for commentators in this field of research predominantly use the two terms divergently 
to connote experiences on opposite sides of the insane-sane divide. Regarding this 
seeming anomaly Carroll explains that;   
 
I use the word 'psychosis' on both ends of the spectrum to mean inner 
chaos, a disconnect from consensual reality and/or a loss of personal 
identity…the term 'malignant psychosis' refers to an ego that hasn't 
reached an average adult level of development and is therefore not well 
equipped to handle challenges thrown by unconscious forces…Whereas a 
'benign psychosis' refers to a temporary state of chaos experienced by a 
healthy, adult ego that has served the person well until the moment of 
overwhelm happened  (Carroll, 22/10/2014, personal communication).112 
 
Hence, her ‘benign psychosis’ seems to correlate with the Grofs’ ‘spiritual emergency’, 
whereby a person’s ego is temporarily destabilised by an uncontrolled influx of 
transpersonal content. Interestingly, however, while the Grofs distinguish a psychosis 
from a spiritual emergency, Carroll depicts both as types of ‘psychosis’, with the former 
being frankly psychopathological (malignant) and the latter being quasi-
psychopathological or problematic (benign). In a positive light, this potentially 
represents a ‘loosening’ of the strictly morbid meaning usually implied by the word 
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 I contacted the author, Marlyse Carroll, to seek clarification on this puzzling issue. 
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‘psychosis’, and might therefore be seen as a constructive step towards investing the 
word with a broader range of connotation (i.e. malignant-to-benign), which, in turn, may 
lead to a diminishment of the word’s stigmatising effect. On the other hand, referring to 
an experience of spiritual emergency as a type of psychosis might work to invest the 
former with the inherent psychopathological status of the latter. Overall, then, Carroll’s 
transposition of the term ‘psychosis’ into a psychospiritual context arguably works to 
obfuscate, rather than clarify, a better understanding the nature of both psychotic and 
psychospiritual phenomena. 
 
10.5.2 Jackson & Fulford (1997) and benign psychosis 
Jackson & Fulford (1997) also moot the idea of ‘benign psychosis’ in their seminal 
paper titled ‘Spiritual experience and psychopathology’. Their context of meaning, 
however, differs significantly from Carroll’s, who saw ‘benign psychosis’ as denoting 
chaotic psychotic-like states of psychospiritual imbalance in contradistinction to classic 
psychosis. According to Jackson & Fulford (ibid, p.43), a primary aim of their research 
was to determine whether “psychotic phenomena can occur in the context of benign 
spiritual experiences, and if so, to explain the significance of this occurrence”. This 
suggests that psychospiritual experiences can include the benign play of actual 
psychotic phenomena. Accordingly, their paper expounds on their observation that 
“phenomena which in a medical context would probably be diagnosed as psychotic 
symptoms, may occur in the context of non-pathological, and indeed essentially 
benign, spiritual experiences”, which they call “‘psychotic phenomena’ as distinct from 
‘psychotic symptoms’” (p.41).113 Hence, their notion of “non-pathological psychotic 
experiences”, which they also call “spiritual psychotic experiences” (pp.41, 42), infers 
psychotic phenomena as opposed to classic psychotic symptoms. Further to this, they 
explain that while psychotic symptoms are the “proper object of medical treatment”, 
psychotic phenomena are essentially a psychospiritual concern (p.42). They 
subsequently argue that “pathological and spiritual psychotic phenomena cannot be 
distinguished” by using standard psychiatric descriptive, categorical or diagnostic 
systems, but by discerning “the way in which psychotic phenomena themselves are 
embedded in the values and beliefs of the person concerned” (ibid). Their depiction of 
values and beliefs as core differentiation focal points opens an intriguing new possible 
research door for understanding the psychosis-versus-psychospiritual conundrum. 
 
In relation to the issue of values and beliefs, Jackson & Fulford (p.55) make the 
significant observation that people experiencing psychotic-like phenomena can often 
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 The findings in Jackson’s (1991) doctoral dissertation titled ‘A study of the relationship between 
psychotic and religious experience’ informed their formulation of this idea.  
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maintain highly functional lives. Indeed, their functionality may be increased as a direct 
result of the experience. The authors note that “in the case of pathological psychotic 
phenomena, there is a radical failure of action...In the case of spiritual psychotic 
phenomena, action is radically enhanced” (p.55).114 Hence, it appears that in 
psychospiritual instances, people who exhibit classic psychotic symptoms can 
experience a gain, rather than loss, of functionality. This raises a challenging question - 
Is the sole evaluation of symptoms effective in discerning psychotic from 
psychospiritual experiences (if, indeed, such a distinction can ultimately be made)? 
Jackson & Fulford (p.56) believe not and argue that “these phenomena cannot be 
distinguished by form and content alone, at least as these have traditionally been 
understood”. They propose that the distinction pivots on whether a person’s capacity-
to-action fails, or is enhanced, in the face of anomalous beliefs and experiences. 
Whereas a failure of action indicates a psychopathological psychotic experience, action 
enhancement indicates a non-psychopathological (psychospiritual) psychotic 
experience (p.55). They further hold that this capacity-to-action “is embedded in the 
individual's values and beliefs” (p.57). Hence, it is not the psychotic form or content of a 
belief, but a failure to ascribe value to this belief, that indicates psychopathology. In the 
absence of such value, both action and functionality are undermined. Conversely, the 
capacity to ascribe value results in enhanced action and functionality. 
 
To substantiate this idea Jackson & Fulford proffer the example of ‘Simon’, an 
undiagnosed participant in their study, who exhibited classic psychotic symptoms of 
religious delusions, paranoia, and thought insertion. Though apparently psychotic from 
a psychiatric framework of understanding, his delusional ideation actually enabled him;  
 
to succeed as a high-achieving black person in a predominantly white, 
racist context. He had high self-esteem, firm moral convictions, and a 
strong sense of purpose in life. His beliefs then, whilst unusual in content, 
and psychotic in form, were essentially affirming, and if anything increased 
rather that detracted from his ability to function effectively (p.46). 
 
This suggests that a deeper investigation into the nature of beliefs, values, capacity-to-
action and functionality in psychotic-like experiences may enable the development of 
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 Although I have already quoted this in Chapter Nine, Section 9.3.1, it bears repeating here in light of the 
discussion on values, beliefs and functionality. The important subject of functionality is further examined in 
Chapter Eleven, Section 11.2.2 in context of the apparently common situation whereby psychotic 
delusions serve a function-enhancing role in people’s lives. 
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potentially effective psychosocial and psychospiritual therapeutic responses that 
complement, or supersede, the prevailing biomedical treatment model. 
 
10.5.3 The promise of the notion of non-psychopathological psychotic experiences 
It appears that the notion of benign, psychospiritual, non-psychopathological 
‘psychosis’ offers prospective new investigative avenues for understanding psychosis. 
Importantly, both Carroll and Jackson & Fulford depict benign psychosis as an 
anomalous experience, or state of being, that mimics the symptomatology of malignant 
psychosis, yet is non-psychopathological due to its developmental potential or action-
enhancing nature. Although the use of the term ‘psychosis’ in a non-pathological 
context is fraught with conceptual and semantic ambiguities, and a more neutral term 
might be preferable, this does not alter the valuable essence of the idea that people 
can have anomalous experiences that are ostensibly indistinguishable from classic 
psychosis. Indeed, many of these people, as Jackson & Fulford demonstrate, thrive 
because of, and not despite, their apparent traits of psychopathology.  
 
Despite Carroll’s and Jackson & Fulford’s intriguing insights and novel use of the word 
‘psychotic’ in non-psychotic contexts, like other authors in my study, they viewed mad 
and mystic experiences as separate states of being and ultimately sought to discern 
psychopathological (malignant) from psychospiritual (benign) experiences. According 
to Marzanski & Bratton (2002, p.360), however, proponents of this differentiating view 
“presuppose rather than explain the distinction”. In other words, although this clinical 
approach is commonplace, it is actually theoretical and unsubstantiated and fails to 
consider the possibility that instances of malignant and benign ‘psychosis’ may be 
intrinsically wedded and indistinguishable. Indeed, the ensuing section on the notion of 
‘regression in the service of transcendence’ lends credence to this possibility.  
 
10.6 Regression in the service of transcendence 
A significant theme evident in my content analysis was the mooted possibility that 
psychosis may represent a disruptive but integral aspect of a larger developmental or 
healing process. Several key proponents of the idea of self-healing psychosis are 
investigated below, both within and beyond the scope of my content analysis.115 While 
some of these endorse a model which seeks to discern psychosis proper from a 
psychosis-like healing process, others perceive all instances of psychosis as healing 
processes in potential. My aim here is to further demonstrate the edifying value of 
exploring psychospiritual understandings of psychosis and to segue into Focal Setting 
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 While the work of Nelson and Jung featured in my content analysis, that of Washburn, Laing and Perry 
did not. 
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Four which argues that psychotic and psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences are 
ultimately indistinguishable.  
 
10.6.1 Nelson (1994) and psychotic regression in the service of transcendence 
Within the scope of my critical analysis literature, Nelson (1994, p.33) used the term 
“regression in the service of transcendence” (RIST) to formally represent the idea and 
possibility of psychosis being integral to a psychospiritual renewal process. He 
maintains that regression is a natural human psychic process that can manifest in 
various forms, including as a “necessary preparation for emergence into higher states 
of consciousness, including spiritual levels” (ibid). Regression in such instances is in 
the service of transcendence whereby a person “symbolically dies to his old life, to be 
reborn to a higher mode of functioning that subsumes the lower mode” (p.246). 
However, Nelson (ibid) also claims that RIST may devolve into psychosis if the ego is 
overwhelmed by exposure to the contents of the deeper psyche in the form of 
“menacing hallucinations that render him unable to go on with ordinary life. It can 
destroy his ego and degenerate into malignant regression” (ibid).116 While he notes that 
hallucinatory experiences are common to RIST (p.246), he also warns that “the 
outcome can be madness as well as enlightenment” (p.247). According to Nelson, 
then, while psychotic-like experiences are integral to RIST, these are not necessarily 
representative of psychosis per se. He subsequently formulated a comprehensive list 
of criteria for discerning psychotic from psychotic-like RIST experiences (pp.248-
249).117 He also cautions that “unless there is physical danger of harm, antipsychotic 
medicines should generally be avoided in RIST, for they can freeze the process at a 
partially regressed level and foster long term dependence on medicine” (p.247). In 
other words, in some instances psychosis may result from, rather than be remedied or 
prevented by, the use of anti-psychotic medications. If true, this highlights the 
pragmatic importance for psychiatry to consider possible psychospiritual determinants 
in its interventions with psychotic-like occurrences, for failure to do so may unwittingly 
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 Although Nelson does not use the actual term ‘psychosis’ here, his reference to ‘malignant regression’ 
infers psychosis. Indeed, his book is replete with instances of such a construal. For instance, he refers to 
“malignant psychotic regressions that permanently submerge the self in primitive areas of the psyche” 
(Nelson, 1994, p.xx). 
117
 See Appendix Six, Table A11.   
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10.6.2 Washburn (1988) and psychotic regression in the service of transcendence 
The term ‘regression in the service of transcendence’ did not originate with Nelson. It 
was first coined by transpersonal theorist Michael Washburn in his book titled The Ego 
and the Dynamic Ground (1988), which argues that; 
  
the ego early in life separates itself from the deep psyche (the Dynamic 
Ground) and, therefore, must later in life spiral back to the deep psyche if, 
reunited with the original bases of its being, it is to achieve higher, whole-
psyche integration (Washburn, 2003, p.ix). 
 
However, both have used the term to reflect essentially the same meaning. Like 
Nelson, Washburn (ibid, p.157) acknowledges that psychopathological psychosis often 
occurs independent of RIST, and also warns that RIST can lead to either psychosis or 
transcendence (2003, p.82; 1988, p.37). Both authors also note that RIST is marked by 
psychotic-like occurrences which can be mistaken for signs of psychopathology. On 
this point, Washburn (1988, p.157) states that “typical among the tribulations of this 
period are”: 
 
(1) strange physical symptoms; (2) bizarre and morbid states of 
consciousness; (3) dread and estrangement (or strangeness)…(4) 
disturbance of thought processes; (5) loss of control of personality; (6) 
eruption of the instincts; and (7) recurrence of the ego/Ground conflict, with 
danger of ego death. 
 
However, whereas Nelson proffered a list of differentiation criteria in response to the 
issue of the marked similarity between features of RIST and psychosis, Washburn did 
not. Also, while Washburn generally remained within the scope of transpersonal theory, 
Nelson (1994, p.xxi), as a psychiatrist, wrote with the aim of “reintegrating spiritual 
psychologies with modern science”. In building on Washburn’s work, Nelson has 
demonstrated the capacity for transpersonal theory and considerations to be integrated 
into psychiatric epistemology and diagnostic practice. 
 
10.6.3 Laing (1972) and the ‘psychotic’ metanoiac journey 
Both Nelson’s and Washburn’s thinking were informed by the work of Laing who also 
endorses the notion of benign and/or transformative processes marked by psychotic-
like features. Laing was a key exponent of the emergent 1960s radical psychiatry 
movement, and his existential-phenomenological approach to understanding psychotic 
experience is profound and complex. Therefore, it is apposite to first examine some 
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key aspects of this before continuing to explore his views on the regressive-
transformative nature of psychosis. From an existential perspective, Laing (1972, 
pp.11, 15) proffers the paradigm-changing hypothesis that schizophrenia “may itself be 
a resource a human being calls upon when all else seems impossible” and that for 
such people psychosis represents “a desperate strategy of liberation within the 
microsocial situation he finds himself”. Indeed, while he acknowledges that the term 
‘schizophrenia’ is a “social fact”, in that it is a psychiatric construct for depicting an 
apparent form of psychopathology, he also maintains that “to be mad is not necessarily 
to be ill” (1967, pp.100, 113). Elaborating on this point he explains that; 
 
‘schizophrenia’ is a diagnosis, a label applied by some people to others. 
This does not prove that the labelled person is subject to an essentially 
pathological process, of unknown nature and origin, going on in his or her 
body…But it does establish as a social fact that the person labelled is one 
of Them (p.99). 
 
He consequently concludes that “there is no such ‘condition’ as ‘schizophrenia’ but the 
label is a social fact and the social fact a political event” (p.100). In his view, then, 
schizophrenia is not an actual form of psychopathology that occurs in people. Rather, it 
is a clinical construct based on the unsubstantiated aetiological assumption of “a subtle 
underlying organic process” (p.87). Further to this he contends that “it is wrong to 
impute to someone a hypothetical disease of unknown etiology and undiscovered 
pathology unless he can prove otherwise” (p.87), and elsewhere that “those people 
who make this set of attributions have to prove that it refers to something real. My 
summary of the evidence to date, is that they have not done so” (1972, p.13). Ipso 
facto, schizophrenia as a social construct is not real in an ontological sense; only as a 
social fact and political event.  
 
He further maintains that the existential phenomenon which psychiatry calls 
‘schizophrenia’ “has little to do with the clinical examination, diagnosis, prognosis and 
prescriptions for therapy” (1967, p.107) and that “just about everything that can be 
known about the psychopathology of schizophrenia or of schizophrenia as a 
disease…are all ways of not understanding” the experience, or the person who is 
having it (1990, p.33). For him, that which is called ‘schizophrenia’, or ‘psychosis’, may 
be better understood as a “natural healing process” (1967, p.105). Hence, he did not 
view psychosis as psychopathological per se, but as a meaningful process which, 
under the right circumstances, may fulfil its natural healing potential. 
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Laing’s view on the transformative potential of so-called ‘psychosis’ differs from the 
bifurcating view held by other commentators in this field of research. He refers to 
psychosis as a “metanoiac voyage”, which he understands to be “a potential healing 
process” and a “voyage of discovery into self of a potentially revolutionary nature and 
with a potentially liberating outcome” (Laing, 1972, p.12). Hence, while other 
proponents of this view have sought to differentiate psychosis from potentially 
transformative psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences, Laing sees all psychotic 
experiences as intrinsic processes of potential renewal. In this light he asserts that 
“madness need not be all breakdown. It is also breakthrough” (1965, p.9). According to 
Thornton (2005, p.8), Laing’s term ‘metanoia’ is meant to connote “an intense 
experience that brings one as close to the edge of sanity as possible before emerging. 
It is a spiritual experience”. Indeed, Laing (1967, pp.108-109) explains that psychosis 
“may be judged to be invalidly mad or to be validly mystical…It is on the existential 
meaning of such unusual experience that I wish to focus”. This arguably depicts 
metanoia as being ‘validly mystical’ and suggests that the various metanoiac 
manifestations of psychosis may be better understood via an existential-
phenomenological lens of inquiry. Laing (1990, p.34) explains that this approach aims 
to elicit a subjective “understanding of the patient’s existential position…to know how 
the patient is experiencing himself and the world, including oneself”. This is an act of 
trying to empathically understand a psychotic person, rather than viewing him or her in 
an objective, diagnostic and clinical manner. Furthermore, he describes the psychotic 
person as one who “muddles ego with self, inner with outer, natural and supernatural. 
Nevertheless, he often can be to us, even through his profound wretchedness and 
disintegration, the hierophant of the sacred” (Laing, 1967, pp.109-110). This also 
places psychotic metanoiac manifestations within the compass of ‘the sacred’ and 
arguably sets the conceptual stage for bringing psychiatric and psychospiritual 
worldviews together. 
 
In context of ‘regression in the service of transcendence’, Laing sees the psychotic 
metanoiac voyage as a dialectical process comprised of both regressive and 
transformative components. Hence, a period of regression is followed by “neo-genesis, 
a new movement forward whose principles and regularities we know very little about” 
(Laing, 1972, pp.16, 18). As such, he maintains that psychosis ideally represents an 
inherent healing process whereby a person journeys into, and returns from, an “inner 
world” (1967, p.103). He notes, however, that due to Western society’s and 
psychiatry’s poor understanding of such matters, the healing potential of this process is 
hampered by a lack of proficient guides (ibid). Instead, in Laing’s (p.106) view, people 
experiencing psychosis are subjected by psychiatry to a “degradation ceremonial”, in 
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contrast to the apposite therapeutic response of an “initiation ceremonial through which 
the person will be guided with full social encouragement and sanction into inner space 
and time, by people who have been there and back again”.118 Subsequently, he 
proposes a “sequence of experiential stepping stones” (p.107) for structuring an 
initiation ceremonial and guiding a person into and through psychosis.119 
 
This is a ground-breaking idea in Western psychiatric epistemology. Especially coming 
from a psychiatrist, for it demonstrates how an existential-phenomenological approach 
to better understanding psychosis can elicit technologies of consciousness for use in 
new therapeutic approaches in psychiatry. Likewise, his proposal that people who have 
been into and through psychosis should act as guides for others experiencing the 
same, is seemingly an idea ahead of its time. Indeed, he makes the revolutionary 
observation that “schizophrenics have more to teach psychiatrists about the inner world 
than psychiatrists their patients” (1967, p.91). Concomitant to this he argues that the 
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  Laing (1967, pp.101, 106) describes the differences between a degradation and initiation ceremonial 
as follows: 
 
Degradation Ceremonial - The ‘committed’ person labelled as patient, and specifically as 
‘schizophrenic’, is degraded from full existential status as human agent and responsible 
person, no longer in possession of his own definition of himself, unable to retain his own 
possessions, precluded from the exercise of his discretion and whom he meets, what he 
does. His time is no longer his own and the space he occupies no longer of his choosing. 
After being subjected to a degradation ceremonial known as psychiatric examination he is 
bereft of his civil liberties in being imprisoned in a total institution know as a ‘mental hospital’. 
More completely, more radically than anywhere else in our society, he is invalidated as a 
human being. 
 
Initiation Ceremonial - Instead of the degradation ceremonial of psychiatric examination, 
diagnosis and prognostication, we need, for those who are ready for it, an initiation 
ceremonial, through which the person will be guided with full social encouragement and 
sanction, into inner space and time, by people who have been there and back again. 
Psychiatrically, this would appear as ex-patients helping future patients to go mad.  
 
119
   For Laing (1967, p.106), the steps of an initiation ceremonial are:  
i) a voyage from outer to inner; ii) from life to a kind of death; iii) from going forward to going 
back; iv) from temporal movement to temporal standstill; v) from mundane time to aeonic 
time; vi) from the ego to the self; vii) from being outside (post-birth) back into the womb of all 
things (pre-birth)…and then subsequently a return voyage from…1) inner to outer; 2) from 
death to life; 3) from the movement back to a movement once more forward; 4) from 
immortality back to mortality; 5) from eternity back to time; 6) from self to a new ego; 7) from 
a cosmic foetalisation to an existential rebirth. 
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role of the psychiatrist is to “assist the movement of what is called ‘an acute 
schizophrenic episode’ instead of arresting it” (Laing, 1972, p.15). He also maintains, 
like Nelson, that pharmaceutical treatment can thwart the psychotic renewal process 
and, indeed, that all conventional psychiatric modalities of “‘treating’ the patient” reflect 
a gross misunderstanding of the psychotic process at hand (Laing, 1967, p.102). He 
consequently asserts that conventional psychiatric practices are mostly 
counterproductive and often iatrogenic (ibid). Overall, then, Laing’s way of 
understanding psychosis proffers a root and branch challenge to psychiatric 
epistemology and practice and also to proponents of the idea of diagnostically 
discerning between psychotic and psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences. If all 
instances of psychosis are healing journeys in potential then it appears impossible to 
delineate the psychopathological markers necessary for differential diagnosis. Indeed, 
what is there to differentiate if the psychotic-like features are integral to the process of 
transformative upheaval? 
 
10.6.4 Perry (1974) and the self-healing potential of ‘psychosis’ 
The work of psychiatrist John Weir Perry, which builds on Jungian concepts and 
theories regarding the psychotic process, brings a unique perspective to potential ways 
of better understanding psychosis. This is particularly so in regards to his insightful and 
meaningful construal of delusions, which are supposedly incomprehensible. For Perry 
(1974, p.21), psychosis is an archetypal “renewal process” that fundamentally aims to 
serve the function of precipitating self-healing and development. As he explains; 
 
the dynamics of the psychotic episode, as I see it, center upon the image of 
the self, of the way the individual experiences herself. When it is too limited, 
isolated, one-sided, or debased, this ‘self-image’ becomes due for a 
reorganization, and various compensatory mechanisms come into play 
(ibid, p.20).  
 
He depicts this as occurring at different interrelated levels of being. For instance, at an 
ego level he sees the so-called ‘psychotic’120 process working to contend “with the 
pressing emotional issues to which the psyche needs to respond” in order to free-up a 
life damaged, retarded, or ossified by unresolved traumas and problems (p.79). At a 
psychosocial level ‘psychosis’ represents an attempt by the psyche to “compensate the 
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 Perry generally places inverted commas around psychiatric words such as ‘psychosis’ and ‘delusions’ 
to highlight and rebut their inherent psychopathological meaning. He is in effect saying ‘so-called 
psychosis or delusions’. In order to maintain congruency with his context of meaning and understanding I 
henceforth do the same throughout this section in which his views are appraised.   
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culture’s biases” which can delimit the ego’s innate creative capacity to the extent that 
it “suffers from a constricted consciousness that has been educated out of its needed 
contact with the natural elements of the psychic life” (pp.107, 11). And at a 
psychospiritual level Perry (1999, p.vii) sees ‘psychosis’ as “nature’s way of healing a 
restricted emotional development and of liberating certain vitally needed functions – in 
short, a spiritual awakening”. He further notes that this functional capacity is inherent to 
both ‘psychotic’ and mystical experiences (p.27). Hence, from this perspective, 
‘psychosis’ is understood to be a natural, autonomous and potentially remedial act by 
the deeper psyche which aims:  
i) to reconcile and reconstitute a person’s overly stultified and conflicted ego 
life;  
ii) to circumvent psychic blocks created by conservative cultural norms so as 
to enact latent human capacities; and  
iii) to foster the evolutionary and spiritual development of individuals and 
societies. 
 In this, Perry’s depiction of personal, social and psychospiritual levels of renewal in 
‘psychotic’ processes approximates Laing’s thinking, but with a Jungian-transpersonal 
rather than an existential-political focus. Both views, however, make a valuable, albeit 
different, contribution to this field of research. 
 
The idea of ‘psychosis’ being potentially remedial and essentially functional is 
antithetical to the psychopathological depiction of ‘psychosis’ endorsed by psychiatry. 
Yet, Perry (1974, p.23) maintains that a ‘psychotic’ episode is not psychopathological 
per se, but represents a ‘normal’ personality which is “in profound need of 
reorganization”. Here, contrary to psychiatric thinking, he identifies the ‘normal’ 
personality as the locus of affliction or psychopathological disorder, which ‘psychosis’, 
as a natural psychic function, aims to remediate. In other words, whereas a psychiatric 
treatment approach aims to bring ‘psychotic’ people back to ‘normal’, Perry sees 
‘psychosis’ as innately striving to remediate and transcend a dysfunctional state of 
‘normal’. In this light he asserts that “certain psychic states, presently treated as acute 
‘psychotic’ sickness, should instead be honoured as valid operations of the visionary 
mind playing its rightful part in the spiritual development of individuals and of cultures” 
(Perry, 1999, p.viii). Like aforementioned commentators, he also warns that without 
apposite social understanding and empathic therapeutic support a renewal process can 
become stuck in “the disruptiveness of a chaos without transformation” (pp.108, 111). 
Indeed, the veracity and therapeutic efficacy of his views about ‘psychosis’ is 
seemingly supported by the effectiveness of his empathic approach in practice. For 
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example, in reporting on therapeutic outcomes at his Diabasis facility,121 Perry (p.164) 
notes that “our most surprising finding in the cases of early acute episode was that 
grossly ‘psychotic’ clients have usually come into a coherent and reality-oriented state 
spontaneously within two to six days, without need for medications”. Arguably, this 
outcome, combined with repeated warnings by other commentators regarding the 
capacity for traditional psychiatric interventions to thwart the healing potential in 
‘psychotic’ processes, raises the question as to whether some, if not all, instances of 
psychosis, are innate and functional attempts at self-healing?  
 
10.6.5 Jung (1969) and the transcendent function 
Jung’s conceptualisation of the transcendent function and his application of active 
imagination fundamentally informed his works. His years of experimentation with active 
imagination are described in his Liber Novus (2009) (more commonly known as The 
Red Book) which, according to Shamdasani (2009, p.221), is “nothing less than the 
central book in his oeuvre”. Jung (1969, pp.69, 82) defines the transcendent function 
as arising “from the union of conscious and unconscious contents” and as “the 
collaboration of conscious and unconscious data”. He describes active imagination as 
“the hermeneutic treatment of creative fantasies” and asserts that his use of this in self-
experimentation “resulted in a synthesis of the individual with the collective psyche” 
(Jung, 1966, p.521). Indeed, for Jung (1965, pp.178, 192), the use of active 
imagination was a “scientific experiment”, and he maintains that “all my works, all my 
creativity, has come from those initial fantasies”. Hence, it appears that active 
imagination formed the crucible from which Jung’s voluminous and influential works 
emerged.  
 
For Jung, active imagination was not an exercise in make-believe, but a foray into an 
extant domain of psychic existence. In addressing this issue he asserts that “the 
scientific credo of our time has developed a superstitious phobia about fantasy. But the 
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 Perry (1999, p.159) describes Diabasis as; 
 
a residence facility that lived through three years and more of inpatient work with acute 
‘schizophrenic’ episodes in young adults without the use of medications…Its purpose was to 
provide a home in which the clients might have the opportunity to experience with full 
awareness their deepest processes during their intense turmoil. 
 
It is beyond this dissertation’s scope to provide a fuller appraisal of the therapeutic efficacy of Perry’s 
model for working with ‘psychotic’ people (for more on this, see – Cornwall, 2002; Perry, 1999, 1987; 
O’Callaghan, 1982). The chief aim here is to support my argument that it is possible to better understand 
psychosis beyond the views endorsed by medical psychiatry, especially through the lens of psychospiritual 
considerations. 
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real is what works. The fantasies of the unconscious work - there can be no doubt 
about that" (Jung, 1966, p.217). Further to this, when commenting on the parallels 
between active imagination and psychosis, he explains that “the reason why the 
involvement looks very much like a psychosis is that the patient is integrating the same 
fantasy-material to which the insane person falls victim because he cannot integrate it 
but is swallowed up by it” (Jung, 1970, p.531). He proposes that initiating the 
transcendent function via active imagination is a potential “a third way” of contending 
with exposure to unconscious materials, other than the common and unbalanced 
responses of regression or inflation (Jung, 1966, p.521). In other words, this suggests 
that, through engagement with and synthesis of unconscious material, the horizons of 
conscious awareness may be incrementally broadened. As such, what was once 
unconscious becomes integrated into the scope of ordinary cognisance, in an ongoing 
dialectical process of self-individuation. 
 
This constitutes an exemplary example of psychotic and psychospiritual contents being 
depicted as sharing the same source and substance. Phenomenologically, the only 
difference between the two is that psychosis occurs when a person fails to integrate 
unconscious materials while transcendence occurs when such integration is 
successful. Indeed, Jung (1939, p.1003) states that when exposed to unmediated 
unconscious content the person who becomes psychotic “is really drowned in a flood of 
insurmountably strong forces and thought forms”; which is strikingly similar to 
Campbell’s metaphor of swimming versus drowning.122 In Jung’s case, it is the effective 
application of innate skills that enables him to keep his head above the turbulent waters 
of the unconscious in which he found himself immersed when practicing active 
imagination.   
 
If Jung is correct, then the intrinsic similarities between psychotic and psychospiritual 
states of being mean that they cannot be distinguished in traditional diagnostic terms. 
From his experiential description it appears the line separating the two is very tenuous 
and blurry, if, indeed, it exists in any reified sense at all. For instance, in recollecting his 
own forays into the unconscious he explains that: 
 
One is assailed by the fear that perhaps this is madness. This is how 
madness begins, this is madness...You cannot get conscious of these 
unconscious facts without giving yourself to them. If you can overcome your 
fear of the unconscious and can let yourself go down, then these facts take 
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 I discussed Campbell’s metaphor of swimming versus drowning in Chapter Nine, Section 9.3.6. 
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on a life of their own. You can be gripped by these ideas so much that you 
really go mad, or nearly so (Jung, 1970, p.97).  
 
This plainly portrays his personal struggle at the interface between integration and 
madness, where it seems madness and sanity are indistinguishable. A similar view is 
iterated by Jung’s translator, Richard Hull, who, after reading Jung’s Liber Novus 
commented that;  
 
there can be no doubt that Jung has gone through everything that an 
insane person goes through, and more…The only difference between him 
and a regular inmate is his astounding capacity to stand off from the 
terrifying reality of his visions, to observe and understand what was 
happening, and to hammer out of his experience a system of therapy that 
works. But for this unique achievement he'd be as mad as a hatter 
(Shamdasani quoting Hull, 2009, p.221, fn.257). 
 
Hence, from a Jungian perspective, it appears that the contents of the unconscious are 
not psychotic per se. Rather, circumventing a psychotic outcome depends on a person 
having a particular fortitude and navigational skill set, or, as Jung (1939, p.1004) puts 
it, “whether the individual can stand a certain panic, or the chronic strain of a psyche at 
war with itself”. This paints a markedly different picture of psychosis than that posited 
by conventional psychiatry and psychology, and opens a vast and largely unexplored 
domain for possible future investigation into the enigmatic vicissitudes of ‘psychotic’ 
experience. 
 
10.7 Psychosis as indistinguishable from psychotic-like renewal processes 
To reiterate, a common approach by commentators in the field of researching psychotic 
and psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences has been to attempt to diagnostically 
differentiate between them. Jackson (2010, p.140) refers to this as the “spiritual-
psychotic paradox” and muses:   
 
How can two categories of experience, which are defined partly in terms of 
their opposite pragmatic effects, be so closely related as to suggest the 
presence of a common underlying process? What determines whether a 
particular individual’s experience falls one side of the line or the other? 
 
This line of inquiry is seemingly based on the materialist assumption that the two states 
are discrete, which logically leads to the question – How do we discern between that 
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which is psychotic and that which looks psychotic but is not? This question, and the 
unsubstantiated assumption upon which it is based, arguably works to limit ways in 
which psychosis may be understood. Such binary thinking is an apparent extrapolation 
from psychiatry’s belief that mental illness and mental health are separate states of 
being. Ipso facto, it can subsequently be concluded that psychosis and psychotic-like 
psychospiritual processes must also be different and differentiated. In terms of opening 
possible new ways for understanding Jackson’s ‘spiritual-psychotic paradox’, it is 
arguably apposite to ask questions such as – Why do we need to discern between that 
which is psychotic and that which looks psychotic but is not? What is it, exactly, that 
substantiates the need to do so? Is it possible that they are integral to each other and 
cannot be differentiated? If psychosis can manifest as integral to a larger 
transformative process then how can it be psychopathological? Is such healing 
potential latent in all psychotic instances, or only some? Indeed, there are 
commentators within the broader literature on this issue who seem to suggest the 
impossibility of discerning a psychopathological state of psychosis from a healthful 
psychotic-like psychospiritual experience.  
 
Several authors in my content analysis proffered views proposing that psychotic and 
psychospiritual experiences share an essentially common nature. Podvoll (1979, 
pp.589, 586), for example, speaks of “the mystic and psychotic paths as converging” 
and his hyphenated reference to “a mystical-psychotic experience” clearly identifies the 
two as coterminous. He subsequently maintains that “a complete understanding of the 
psychotic experience must include knowledge of the desire and methods to transcend 
the…pre-psychotic personality”. Like Perry, he suggests that the ultimate psychotic 
trajectory is one which aims to transcend the normal ego-self. Arguably, then, the 
corresponding therapeutic task for clinicians is to help enable the fulfilment of this 
process. Indeed, Podvoll (ibid, p.586) holds that “the important distinction is not 
between what is pathological and what is normal but…what constitutes the difference 
between ‘spiritual defeat and spiritual victory’”. This depicts both incidents as 
essentially psychospiritual in nature, with psychosis as a form of spiritual defeat 
presumably resulting from a lack of spiritual guidance and/or skills. Boisen (1936, 
p.298) similarly speaks of “a definite relationship between the mystical and the 
pathological”. He perceives both as “nature’s attempts…to effect reorganization of the 
personality” and claims that the distinction is “to be drawn solely in terms of the results 
achieved” (ibid, pp.81, 298). Arguably, this understanding suggests the ultimate 
impossibility of substantiating the psychopathological status of psychosis. 
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Whereas Focal Setting Three has chiefly focussed on binary models and concepts for 
differentiating psychotic from psychospiritual experiences, (punctuated by critical 
analysis challenging this view), Focal Setting Four explores the idea that these states 
of being are essentially indistinguishable. It is therefore prudent, in closing, to provide 
quotes from commentators which depict an apparent common source for psychotic and 
psychotic-like states of consciousness. These are presented in chronological order to 
demonstrate that such thinking has existed within various disciplines over time. 
 “The shaman differs from an ordinary patient…in possessing an extremely 
great power of mastering himself…[and though often] on the verge of 
insanity…the shaman never passes this verge” (Czaplicka 1914, pp.169, 
172); 
 “The power of understanding is exhibited not when madness is absent but 
when it is mastered” (Schelling, 1942, fn. 27, p.148); 
 “the mentally ill patient proves to be an unsuccessful mystic or, better, the 
caricature of a mystic” (Eliade, 1964, p.27); 
 “Mystical experience always carries a potential risk of psychosis…Those 
sensitive enough to taste mysticism are often sensitive enough to fall into 
psychosis” (Clark, 1966, p.79); 
 “The entire mystic path may be understood to be a strengthening process 
whereby the mystic gradually develops the ‘muscles’ to withstand the 
experiences of this ‘inner world’…The schizophrenic undergoes no such 
training or strengthening. His ‘muscles’ are undeveloped and when ‘thrown’ 
into this ‘inner world’ he is overwhelmed” (Wapnick, 1969, pp.63, 64); 
 “Mysticism is fusion without confusion; schizophrenia is fusion with 
confusion” (Wilber, 1975, p.123); 
 “The psychological basis of insanity is the same basis for enlightenment. It 
all depends on whether or not it is accepted and comprehended and 
ultimately worked with as the key to liberation” (Clifford, 1984, pp.138-139); 
 “Both the madman and the mystic have been cast upon the sea of the 
prepersonal unconscious” (Washburn, 1988, p.184); 
 “There may be a great deal of variation in the very nature or ‘stuff’ of 
consciousness within the human species itself. This would then explain why 
the mystic experiences the world in a different way as compared to others. 
Simultaneously, this view would also be able to account for the difference in 
consciousness of the psychotic” (Varma, 2005, p.205); 
 “In some sense, a psychotic is a failed mystic. Perhaps the same latent 
capabilities are activated in both psychosis and mysticism but, in the case 
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of psychosis, a person is unable to psychologically integrate the 
experiences” (Barušs, 2007, p.39). 
Each of these authors arguably suggests a basic and common psychic or 
psychospiritual source in which, or from which, both psychospiritual and psychotic 
experiences may result.  
 
Furthermore, in regard to “metaphysical delusions”, Jaspers (1997 v1, p.108) maintains 
that “religious experience remains what it is, whether it occurs in saint or psychotic or 
whether the person in whom it occurs is both at once”. This arguably connotes the 
common nature and, conceivably, the common source of mystic and psychotic 
experiences. Indeed, Goretzki et al (2009) conducted empirical research to ascertain 
whether or not there is a clear difference between psychotic experiences and spiritual 
emergencies. They found the two states chiefly differ in that spiritual emergencies “are 
‘managed’” via psychospiritual interventions that support their developmental trajectory, 
and subsequently concluded that “there is a strong relationship between self-report of 
experience of many psychotic symptoms, self-report of psychosis, and spiritual 
emergency, to an extent that suggests that they may be different aspects of the same 
thing” (ibid, pp.91-92). Further research in this field may shed new light not only on the 
seeming possibility of psychotic and psychospiritual interconnectivity, but also on a 
deeper understanding of the nature of human consciousness. 
 
10.8 Conclusion  
This chapter facilitates a conceptual transition from Focal Setting Three to Focal 
Setting Four. Whereas the former introduces and examines issues pertaining to 
discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences, the latter argues that such 
differentiation is seemingly impossible. The questionable validity of psychiatric 
diagnostic criteria illustrated throughout this Focal Setting Three intrinsically challenges 
differentiation practices, for how does one discern two poorly understood phenomena 
from each another? Additionally, as shown in Focal Setting Four, the notion that 
psychosis may reflect innate human capacities, including non-psychopathological 
healing processes of renewal, further suggests that reductive diagnostic practices may 






















Focal Setting Four argues that, in the absence of deep metaphysical knowledge, it is 
ultimately impossible to discern culturally normative psychotic-like experiences from 








Hearing Voices and Delusions 
 
11.0 Introduction  
In psychiatric diagnostics voice hearing and delusions are considered quintessential 
psychotic symptoms. I have illustrated, in Focal Setting Three, that psychotic and non-
psychotic psychospiritual experiences often share seemingly identical characteristics 
and then argued the impossibility of discerning psychopathological from psychospiritual 
instances. Extending from this, I undertake a critical appraisal here of the phenomena 
of voice hearing and delusions to demonstrate that they cannot be definitively 
substantiated as psychotic diagnostic criteria. Showing that these two core psychotic 
features commonly occur in non-psychopathological instances undermines their 
diagnostic veracity and represents a significant challenge to the psychiatric picture of 
psychosis. If voice-hearing and delusional ideation are core defining features of 
psychosis, and it is not possible to absolutely discern psychotic from non-psychotic 
instances, then how can a diagnosis of psychosis be made with certitude? Does the 
psychiatric psychopathological model of reductionist diagnostics ultimately serve to 
impede, rather than advance, a better understanding of psychosis? 
 
11.1 The psychopathology of hearing voices? 
Is the experience of voice hearing essentially indicative of psychopathology? Generally, 
auditory hallucinations, or hearing voices, have been viewed as psychopathological 
within the psychiatric literature, and while the authors of the latest DSM manual 
acknowledge that “hallucinations may be a normal part of religious experience in 
certain cultural contexts” (APA, 2013, p.88) the term ‘hallucination’ is primarily 
understood, and used throughout the text, as depicting psychopathology. However, 
there exists a growing body of evidence that challenges this assumption. For instance, 
in his book titled Hearing Voices: A Common Human Experience (1998), John Watkins 
provides a thoroughgoing appraisal of this issue with numerous examples of normal, 
non-psychopathological voice hearing. He notes that the term ‘hallucination’ generally 
infers psychopathology because, being “based on a strictly materialist view of the world 
it makes no allowance for the possibility that it might sometimes be quite normal for 
human beings to have vivid sensory experiences in the absence of an external physical 
stimulus” (ibid, p.266). However, despite the fact that hearing voices is “often 
considered to be one of the classic hallmarks of severe mental disorder” (p.5), his 
extensive research reveals that voice hearing frequently occurs within the normal 
population. Some famous voice hearers listed by Watkins (p.30) are Freud, Jung, 
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Gandhi, Socrates, William Blake, and Martin Luther King. In light of his overall findings 
he draws the conclusion that; 
 
the tendency of mainstream psychiatry to focus almost exclusively on the 
biological aspects of schizophrenia…has resulted in a neglect of the vitally 
important psychological, social and spiritual aspects of this condition…The 
whole question of the personal meaning and significance of the voices of 
schizophrenia remains virtually unexplored (p.111). 
 
Ironically, this suggests that medical psychiatry’s reductive thinking works to discount 
or ignore pathways of inquiry that may reveal answers to the fundamental question it 
aims to resolve as a discipline. That is, what is the true nature of psychosis and its 
component symptomatology? In light of the seeming fact that voice hearing can occur 
in both psychotic and normal circumstances, it appears the psychiatric belief that voice 
hearing is simply the errant effect of faulty brain-wiring is illogical. This infers that all 
voice hearing experiences are psychopathological, when it is clear that, in many 
instances, they are not. 
 
11.1.1   Voice hearing in mainstream society 
As stated above, it appears that voice hearing is a natural human experience that can 
occur in both normal and anomalous contexts? Indeed a non-psychopathological view 
of voice hearing is not new to psychiatric or scientific inquiry. For instance, in the mid-
nineteenth century the French psychiatrist Alexandre De Boismont (1859, p.70) noted 
that hallucinatory experiences, including voice hearing, were commonplace among 
sane people and that “the hallucination of the sound mind may be seen to glide into the 
hallucination of insanity, without its [sic] being possible always to point out the 
boundary which separates the one condition from the other”. This paradoxically 
acknowledges the notion of ‘sane hallucinatory experience’, which, apart from a few 
cultural exceptions, is absent from contemporary psychiatry. That De Boismont 
perceived his investigation of hallucinations to be of a scientific nature is evident in his 
comment that “the intelligent reader ought now to recognize the scientific character of 
our opinion, and to perceive that it is based on a legitimate induction from a principle 
inherent in the nature of man” (ibid, p.339). Additionally, his book’s opening sentence 
clearly portrayed his recognition of the fundamental psychospiritual context of 
hallucinatory experience – “At all epochs in the history of man, in every climate, under 
the most opposite forms of government, and with every variety of religion, we 
constantly find the same belief in spirits and apparitions” (p.1). He subsequently 
maintained that the global ubiquity of hallucinations over millennia “renders their study 
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of the highest importance” (p.8). Rather than depicting hallucinations (including the 
auditory variety) as reified and meaningless diagnostic criteria to be used for discerning 
states of psychopathology, he described them as natural human phenomena that occur 
in both states of sanity and insanity. Furthermore, he held that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to discern sane from insane voice hearing and that it is imperative that 
psychiatry strives to attain a deeper understanding of such experiences. Intriguingly, 
this view from nascent psychiatry is ostensibly closer to better understanding the 
nature of psychosis, and its attendant symptomatology, than is contemporary 
psychiatry with its strong biogenic focus. 
 
De Boismont, however, has not been the only investigator to view voice hearing as 
being common to both normality and insanity. Later in the nineteenth century, two 
censuses were conducted by psychologists seeking to provide empirical data regarding 
the incidence of hallucinatory experiences among sane people. First, Gurney et al 
(1886a, p.xxxi) undertook research in 1883 which sought to ascertain the incidence of 
“transient hallucinations of the sane” via the methodology of a census. They found that 
“of the 5705 persons who have been asked the question,123 it appears that 96 have, 
within the last 12 years, when awake, experienced an auditory hallucination of a voice” 
(Gurney et al, 1886b, p.12). This is about 1.7 percent of respondents. Soon after, 
Sidgwick et al (1894, p.25) conducted another census over a three year period with 
seventeen thousand people, which included a “statistical inquiry into the spontaneous 
hallucinations of the sane”.124 Their findings showed that, of the seventeen thousand 
people who participated in the census, five hundred and fifty three sane people (about 
3.3 percent) indicated that they had heard voices (ibid, pp.40-41). The findings of these 
empirical studies contest the prevailing psychiatric practice of identifying auditory 
hallucinations as characteristically psychotic, for they evidence the longstanding 
awareness that voice hearing is relatively common among the sane.   
                                                          
123
 The census question was: 
 
Since January 1, 1874, have you when in good health, free from anxiety, and completely 
awake had a vivid impression of seeing or being touched by a human being, or of hearing a 
voice or sound which suggested a human presence, when no one was there ? Yes or no ? 
(Gurney et al, 1886b, p.7). 
 
124
 The census question was: 
 
Have you ever, when believing yourself to be completely awake, had a vivid impression of 
seeing or being touched by a living being or inanimate object, or hearing a voice; which 
impression, so far as you could discover, was not due to any external physical cause? 
(Sidgwick et al, 1894, p.33). 
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More recent empirical research corroborates this. For instance, Posey & Losch (1983) 
presented three hundred and seventy five college students with a questionnaire which 
asked for a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ response to a list of fourteen different types of voice hearing 
experiences. A total of 71 percent of students “reported some experience with brief, 
auditory hallucinations of the voice type in wakeful situations” (ibid, p.99), none of 
which showed signs of psychosis according to clinical profiles conducted to assess 
possible psychopathology (p.106). Furthermore, in his comparative appraisal of 
Sidgwick et al’s findings and the NIMH Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program 
data,125 Tien (1991, p.292) concluded that there is an “incidence of 10-30 cases per 
1000 people per year” for hallucinations within the general population. These results of 
a 1-to-3 percent incidence reflect those of Gurney et al and Sidgewick et al one 
hundred years earlier. Finally, in their empirical research into the incidence of voice 
hearing in “normal child populations”, Pearson et al (2001, pp.401, 406) suggested the 
likelihood of “a continuum of non-pathological hallucinatory experiences from children 
to adults in the normal population”, while in a recent appraisal of epidemiological 
literature Sommer et al (2010, p.633) concluded that “epidemiological studies suggest 
that auditory verbal hallucinations (AVH) occur in approximately 10%–15% of the 
general population, of whom only a small proportion has a clinically relevant psychotic 
disorder”. Combined, these clinical views and studies, spanning a period of about 170 
years, strongly suggest that the phenomenon of voice hearing is not intrinsically 
psychopathological. 
 
11.1.2 Hearing Voices Network: Coping and recovery 
Psychiatry’s view that voice hearing is a key diagnostic indicator of psychotic 
experience is further challenged by the advent and global proliferation of the Hearing 
Voices Network (HVN). This global movement emerged from an incident in 1987 
whereby Dutch psychiatrist, Marius Romme, was persuaded by his patient, Patsy 
Hage, to put aside his psychopathological beliefs regarding auditory hallucinations and 
consider the possibility that the voices she heard were real (Escher & Romme, 2012, 
p.385). This led to him discovering that Hage’s feelings of being overwhelmed by the 
voices were alleviated when she was enabled to share her experiences with other 
voice hearers (ibid). Subsequently, Romme and Hage appeared on a Dutch television 
program and invited other voice hearers to contact them, which resulted in four 
hundred and fifty responses; three hundred from people who struggled to cope with 
                                                          
125
 According to the Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research (2016) “the Epidemiologic 
Catchment Area (ECA) program of research was initiated…to collect data on the prevalence and incidence 
of mental disorders and on the use of and need for services by the mentally ill”. 
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their voices, and one hundred and fifty from people who had developed ways of coping 
with them (Romme & Escher, 1989, p.209). A questionnaire was then sent to each 
person in the latter group to ascertain the nature of their respective coping skills. From 
this, twenty respondents, who were particularly clear in elucidating their structured 
coping strategies, were selected as key presenters at a hearing voices congress held 
in October 1987 in the Netherlands (ibid, p.210). At the congress, an organisation 
called ‘Resonance’ was established and conducted further research into the presence 
or absence of coping skills in voice hearers, which, in turn, led to the formation of the 
first HVN group in the UK in 1988 (Escher & Romme, 2012, p.386). Since then, the 
number of HVN groups has expanded exponentially with hundreds established 
throughout twenty three countries (Intervoice, 2015a).  
 
This is a development of considerable consequence for it demonstrates that alternative 
understandings of, and remedial approaches to, voice hearing are possible. The 
significance of the HVN phenomenon is further marked by the fact that two of its basic 
tenets are divergent from classic psychiatric assumptions regarding voice hearing, 
namely:  
i) that “hearing voices is a normal though unusual and personal variation of 
human experience”; and  
ii) that “the problem is not hearing voices but the difficulty to cope with the 
experience” (Intervoice, 2015b).  
Indeed, the UK HVN Position Statement on DSM 5 & Psychiatric Diagnoses affirms 
that “rather than seeing voices, visions and extreme states as symptoms of an 
underlying illness, we believe it is helpful to view than as meaningful experiences”, 
which subsequently calls for “seeing mental distress as human and, ultimately, 
understandable” (Hearing Voices Network, 2015). These occurrences and views 
represent a major conceptual challenge to psychiatry’s depiction of voice hearing as 
being innately psychopathological, and as a key diagnostic criterion for identifying 
psychosis.  
 
The therapeutic efficacy of HVN groups and approaches also challenges the validity of 
psychiatry’s psychopathological understanding of voice hearing. Because psychiatry 
views voice hearing as unreal, the possibility that people can learn coping skills to 
mitigate and/or regulate them does not enter the field of clinical reckoning. It is evident, 
however, from the work of unconventional psychiatrists such as Romme, that a 
different approach to understanding voice hearing is both possible and efficacious. In 
their initial research, Romme & Escher (1989, p.210) observed that learning to cope 
with voices involved three general phases: 
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i) The startling phase: the usually sudden onset, primarily as a frightening 
experience; 
ii) The phase of organization: the process of selection and communication 
with the voices; and 
iii) The stabilization phase: the period in which a more continuous way of 
handling the voices is acquired. 
Additionally, four broad coping strategies employed by voice hearers were identified as 
“distraction, ignoring the voices, selective listening to them, and setting limits on their 
influence” (Romme et al, 1992, p.99). Within these four coping approaches, however, 
particular types of strategies are idiosyncratic and manifold (for example, see Hearing 
Voices Network Australia, 2013; Hearing Voices Network, 2012). Furthermore, for 
practitioners who employ the HVN model it is essential to: 
i) “make allowance for the fact that voice hearers actually do hear voices”;  
ii) “accept the reality of the experience”; and  
iii) “accept the possibility of hearing voices as nonpathologic” (Escher & 
Romme, 2012, p.392).  
This is opposite to standard psychiatric practice where the assertion by persons that 
their voices are real is perceived by clinicians as signifying a psychopathological lack of 
insight. However, Romme and company found that accepting the reality of voices is an 
essential precursor to enabling the teaching, learning and application of coping skills. 
 
A growing body of empirical research indicates that HVN groups, and the use of coping 
skills by voice hearers, have positive therapeutic outcomes. For instance, Wykes et al 
(1999, p.180) found that a group of people diagnosed with schizophrenia demonstrated 
increased control over voices, decreased distress levels, and increased effectiveness 
in applying coping strategies after only six sessions of cognitive-behavioural skills 
training within a twenty four week period. In light of the application of coping strategies, 
Wykes (2004, p.38) later concluded that “there is ample evidence that factors other 
than biology have an effect on the experience of auditory hallucinations”. Meddings et 
al (2004) also conducted an evaluation of a UK HVN group two years after its formation 
to find participants experienced a decrease in their incidence and duration of 
hospitalisation, and an increase in empowerment, proficiency in skills application, self-
esteem and  social/vocational functionality. Beavan (2007, p.141), in her doctoral 
research project which examined adult voice hearing experiences in the New Zealand 
adult population, found that on a seven-point likert scale for rating the effectiveness of 
coping strategies, “the majority of strategies (68.4%) had an average rating of at least 
four, indicating that on the whole, participants found the strategies they used to be at 
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least somewhat effective”.126 These are but a few examples, from a considerable body 
of research, that demonstrate beneficial outcomes of HVN groups and/or coping 
practices for voice hearers.127 
 
There also exists a growing qualitative literature in which people provide personal 
accounts regarding the efficacy of using coping skills to contend with the distress and 
disruption of their voice hearing experiences. For example, an edited book by Romme 
et al (2009) titled Living with Voices: 50 Stories of Recovery presents an exemplary 
collection of such instances. The authors assert that “this book demonstrates that it is 
entirely possible to overcome problems with hearing voices and take back control of 
one’s life” (ibid, p.1). They further claim that the first person accounts throughout the 
book, many of which are related by long term psychiatric patients, prove that people 
can “overcome the disabling social and psychiatric attitudes towards voice hearing” 
(p.2). Indeed, it is their view that people who embark on such a recovery process learn 
that “their voices are not a sign of madness but a reaction to problems in their lives that 
they couldn’t cope with…and that they therefore make sense” (ibid). Hence, there 
appears to be substantial evidence suggesting that HVN and other skills training 
groups have therapeutic efficacy for diagnosed and undiagnosed voice hearers alike.  
 
A final important point is the difference between how psychiatry and HVN understand 
recovery. For psychiatry, full recovery occurs only when voice hearing ceases and 
functionality is restored. However, a guiding principle of the hearing voices movement 
is that “‘recovery’ is not about getting rid of voices but about the person understanding 
their voices in relation to their life experiences, and the person changing their 
relationship with their voices so that the voices become harmless and/or helpful” 
(Dillon, 2010, p.35). In other words, rather than being clinically construed as unreal and 
incomprehensible, voice hearing can be appreciated as real, comprehensible, 
manageable, and meaningful. Therefore, the effectiveness of the HVN approach calls 
to question the veracity of psychiatry’s core belief that voice hearing is essentially 
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 In her measure, “1 indicated ‘not effective at all’ and 7 indicated ‘very effective’” (Beavan, 2007, p.140). 
127
 For further examples see – Beavan et al, 2017; Longden et al, 2017; Dos Santos & Beavan, 2015; 
Oakland & Berry, 2015; Leff et al, 2014; van der Gaag et al, 2014; Dillon & Hornstein, 2013; Howard et al, 
2013; Milligan et al, 2013; Corstens et al, 2012; Goldsmith, 2012; Casstevens et al, 2006; Coleman & 
Smith, 2006; Meddings et al, 2006; Haddock et al, 1996. 
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11.2 The psychopathology of delusions? 
As is the case with ‘auditory hallucinations’, the presence of delusional thoughts is also 
understood by psychiatry to be a key characteristic of psychotic disorders. In fact, in 
DSM-5 their presence is listed as the first of five domains of “abnormalities” that define 
“schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders” (APA, 2013, p.87). Therefore, 
unlike voice hearing, which can occur in both normal and psychospiritual contexts, it 
evidently appears that delusional ideation is particular to psychotic states and is 
undeniably psychopathological. This is seemingly exemplified in Schreber’s (1988) 
book titled Memoirs of My Nervous Illness128 which abounds with autobiographical 
accounts of experiences and beliefs that, from the perspective of consensus reality and 
psychiatry, are completely insane. For instance, he believed himself to be the victim of 
“soul murder” (ibid, p.35) and that God had transformed him into a woman with breasts 
and female genitals (p.181). His memoir is also replete with accounts of assorted 
“miracles” caused by “rays” of a psychospiritual nature which manifested in his body 
and the world around him. This included the belief that he was the last real living 
person and that “the few human shapes I saw apart from myself…were only ‘fleeting-
improvised-men’ created by miracle” (p.85). Schreber maintained these beliefs with 
utter conviction for years.  
 
A contemporary, yet equally bizarre example is provided by Chadwick (2010, p.70) in 
recounting his reasoning immediately prior to stepping in front of a bus (fortunately he 
survived to tell the tale): 
 
New King’s Road in Fulham obviously was the perfect location for my 
nemesis. Me, the Antichrist, must be destroyed on ‘the road of the new 
king’. When I was dead, Satan, ‘the old king’ would be thrust out of my 
mind and Jesus, ‘the new king’ would come into the world to reign. As 
usual, it all fitted so well it surely had to be true! This was no delusion, this 
was really happening! 
 
At face value, such beliefs and assertions certainly appear to be psychopathological. 
However, upon closer examination, it becomes evident that this psychiatric view 
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 At the time of his first episode of ‘nervous illness’ in 1884, Daniel Schreber was the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the state of Saxony, in Germany. His Memoirs, which was first published in 1903, is an 
account of his second episode of ‘nervous illness’ from 1893-1902 (Schreber, 1988, pp.xii, 2-4). This book 
subsequently influenced the thinking of luminaries such as Freud, Jung, Kraepelin, Bleuler and Jaspers 
and had considerable impact upon the development of psychoanalytic and psychiatric theory. Indeed, in a 
1910 letter to Jung, Freud affectionately referred to him as “the wonderful Schreber, who ought to have 
been made a professor of psychiatry and director of a mental hospital” (McGuire, 1974, p.113). 
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represents a very limited understanding of a phenomenon that is enigmatic and 
fascinating, though potentially lethal. 
 
There are three features which essentially characterise delusions as 
psychopathological. These are: 
1. Incorrigibility – This refers to the unshakable conviction people hold 
regarding the reality of their beliefs despite all proffered evidence and 
argument to the contrary. In this context, the DSM-5 glossary defines 
“delusional conviction” as “a false belief based on incorrect inference about 
external reality that is firmly held despite what almost everyone else 
believes” (APA, 2013, p.819). The manual also explains that “the distinction 
between a delusion and a strongly held idea is sometimes difficult to make 
and depends in part on the degree of conviction with which the belief is 
held despite clear or reasonable contradictory evidence regarding its 
veracity” (ibid, p.87). While, ‘conviction’ and ‘incorrigibility’ represent two 
distinct nuances of delusional ideation, they are fundamentally interrelated 
and, therefore, examined below as a composite phenomenon. 
2. Dysfunctionality – In psychiatry, a diagnostic corollary to delusional ideation 
is the degree to which the beliefs undermine a person’s capacity to function 
normally. As stated in DSM-5, “when poor psychosocial functioning is 
present, delusional beliefs themselves often play a significant role” (p.93). 
Indeed, an essential diagnostic criterion for schizophrenia is that the “level 
of functioning in one or more major areas, such as work, interpersonal 
relations, or self-care, is markedly below the level achieved prior to onset” 
(pp.99-100). 
3. Incomprehensibility - It is a commonly held supposition in psychiatry that, 
beyond their phenomenological form, the nature and content of delusions 
are bizarre, incomprehensible, and meaningless. As explained in DSM-5, 
“delusions are deemed bizarre if they are clearly implausible and not 
understandable to same-culture peers and do not derive from ordinary life 
experiences” (p.87).  
The critical appraisal below of each of these three key delusional features aims to 
challenge the veracity of ‘delusions’ as a psychotic diagnostic criterion. This 
correspondingly suggests that a better understanding of unusual beliefs (delusions) is 





11.2.1 The incorrigibility of delusions? 
In terms of incorrigibility, psychopathology has long been seen by psychiatry as evident 
when a person maintains a resolute belief that is at odds with consensus reality and 
rationality. Indeed, the French psychiatrist Jean-Étienne Dominique Esquirol (1845, 
p.xi) noted the “tenacious” nature of delusions in 1838 in that such psychopathological 
beliefs were held with utter conviction despite their apparent illusoriness. Zaehner 
(1961, pp.89-90) also explains that, for the person experiencing delusional psychosis 
“fantasy is fact: indeed it is a great deal more real than the majority of things that pass 
for fact in everyday life…For him they really are, and nothing can persuade him that 
they are not”. The futility of trying to refute such beliefs is cleverly depicted by Torrey 
(2013, p.25) in his analogy that “reasoning with people about their delusions is like 
trying to bail out the ocean with a bucket”. However, as Jaspers (1997 v1, p.105) 
explained, “delusion proper is incorrigible because of an alteration of personality, the 
nature of which we are so far unable to describe, let alone formulate into a concept, 
though we are driven to make some such supposition”. In other words, psychiatry’s 
depiction of delusional incorrigibility as typically psychotic is assumed, but is not 
ultimately substantiated. 
 
It appears, however, that the psychopathological status of so-called delusional 
incorrigibility is questionable because such conviction of belief is also common to 
psychospiritual contexts. For instance, as Podvoll (1979, p.575) notes, “ecstatic states 
have always been greatly esteemed by both mystics and the insane…These 
experiences are frequently seen as ultimate and irrefutable, and ideas contained within 
them may reach the level of full conviction”. Indeed, during his experiments with active 
imagination Jung (2009, p.338) reported that, although his rational everyday mind 
regarded his experiences with suspicion, he was often swayed by their compelling 
veracity:  
 
Through uniting with the self we reach the God. I must say this, not with 
reference to the opinions of the ancients or this or that authority but 
because I have experienced it. It has happened thus in me…I wish I could 
say it was a deception and only too willingly would I disown this experience. 
But I cannot deny that it has seized me beyond all measure and steadily 
goes on working in me…I recognize the God by the unshakeableness of 
the experience.  
 
There is a marked parallel here between Jung’s reported experience of God-
identification and the frequent occurrence of the same, or similar, during psychotic 
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episodes. Hence, it seems that, rather than being an incomprehensible and 
quintessential marker of psychosis, the act of maintaining unusual beliefs with utter 
conviction may be a manifestation of a deep psychic function that is yet to be 
understood by Western psychiatry.  
 
While the unshakable nature of seemingly psychotic beliefs appears beyond 
understanding within the conceptual framework of materialism, this phenomenon can 
be better understood from a psychospiritual perspective. Throughout his works, 
Merrell-Wolff describes intricacies of subjective psychic experience which provide 
possible insight into psychospiritual mechanisms underpinning the incorrigible 
conviction of beliefs common to both mystic and psychotic states. For example, he 
maintains that a “marked characteristic” of peak mystical states of consciousness is 
that the person who experiences them “is above doubt. He is not believing, but 
KNOWING…His knowledge carries an authority, or rather this knowledge, this 
consciousness, carries an authority that is more than ordinary” (Merrell-Wolff, 1938, 
p.38). Here he alludes to a supramental state of human consciousness with an 
immediacy of knowledge, or knowing, that transcends the normal process of belief 
formation via incremental rational deduction. According to Merrell-Wolff (1995, pp.188-
189), the apperception of reality from this perspective “carries with it a superlative order 
of assurance – one knows without doubt that here is Truth...One has found a base 
upon which to stand against the opinion of the whole world, if necessary”. Clearly, this 
view, if considered free of its mystical context, could well reflect incorrigible psychotic 
delusions. 
 
Sri Aurobindo similarly discusses the human mystic capacity for directly experiencing 
knowledge, in contrast to the normal and abstracted mode of reality perception and 
knowledge formation. He describes conventional “indirect knowledge” as an inferior 
mental act of “groping and seeking” that is facilitated by “logical processes of 
deduction, induction, all kinds of inference” (Sri Aurobindo, 1999, p.482). In 
contradistinction, he refers to the “spontaneous certitude” and the “true and direct 
knowledge” of mystical experience which “begins with the opening of the psychical 
consciousness and the psychical faculties” (ibid, pp.477, 893). Even though expressed 
using different terminology, this essentially mirrors Merrell-Wolff’s contention, and while 
neither of these two psychospiritual authorities suggest there is a correlation between 
mystic certitude and the incorrigible delusions of psychosis, the similarities between the 
two states of consciousness, in terms of conviction of ‘knowing’, begs the question – 
Does psychotic delusional incorrigibility stem from the same psychic structures that 
facilitate the certitude of mystic ‘knowing’? Although this is a speculative proposition, it 
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proffers a potential line of investigation beyond the psychiatric view that bizarre beliefs 
held with unshakable conviction are inherently psychopathological. This aside, it 
appears that both mystic and delusional experiences share a similar incorrigibility of 
conviction, therefore, it is not diagnostically sound to claim that delusional incorrigibility 
is absolutely indicative of psychosis. 
 
11.2.2 The dysfunctionality of delusions? 
As with incorrigibility, presuming a fundamental correlation between delusions, 
dysfunctionality and psychopathology is also questionable. Although it is well 
documented that delusional beliefs can often result in psychosocial dysfunction, this is 
not universal, as there are reported instances whereby people maintain highly 
functional lives while harbouring beliefs that, from a psychiatric perspective, would 
constitute classic psychotic delusions. Such is the case for Elyn Saks (2013), a law 
professor at the University of Southern California, and a diagnosed schizophrenic who 
continues to have “delusions crowding my mind” despite her high level of functionality 
and professionalism.129 According to Saks (ibid), “conventional psychiatric thinking and 
its diagnostic categories say that people like me don’t exist”, yet she participated in a 
research project evaluating the coping strategies of 20 people in Los Angeles who 
“were able to maintain a high level of daily responsibility despite active, ongoing 
symptoms of schizophrenia”; particularly delusions.130 Although the type of research 
conducted by Saks and company is exceptional in the mental health sector, the many 
instances of ‘functional-psychopathology’ they discovered in the Los Angeles area 
possibly reflects a relatively common but unrecognised phenomenon. 
 
Indeed, this is seemingly indicated by research showing the presence of psychiatric-
type delusions in the normal population. For instance, van Os et al (2000, p.16) found 
that “4.2% of the general population had psychiatrist-rated evidence of delusions or 
hallucinations”, while, in light of the frequency of delusions and hallucinations among 
mainstream children and adolescent populations, Kelleher et al (2012, p.1861) 
concluded that “the relatively high prevalence of these symptoms would suggest a lack 
of specificity in terms of risk for psychosis”. Similarly, in a meta-analysis of empirical 
studies of the prevalence of delusions in clinical and non-clinical populations, Freeman 
(2006, p.191) found that “approximately 1% to 3% of the nonclinical population have 
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 Saks relates her personal journey from schizophrenia diagnosis to professorship in her autobiography 
titled The Centre Cannot Hold (2007). 
130
 Saks (2013) describes the research group, which was conducted in Los Angeles, as consisting of 
“graduate students, managers, technicians and professionals, including a doctor, lawyer, psychologist and 
chief executive of a nonprofit group”. (For more details about this project see - Glynn et al, 2010; Marder et 
al, 2009, p.232). 
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delusions of a level of severity comparable to clinical cases of psychosis”. Also, in their 
measure of “delusional ideation in the normal population”, Peters et al (1999, pp.553, 
562) found that about 10 percent of “healthy individuals” showed higher scores than 
deluded psychiatric patients. They subsequently proposed that there are “differences 
that enable the former to function adequately in society, while the latter suffered a 
severe breakdown and required hospitalization” (ibid, p.562). Consequent to this 
finding, Peters (2001, p.207) argued that “what makes people cross the psychotic 
‘threshold’ is not necessarily the content but the consequences of their beliefs: it is not 
what you believe, it is how you believe it”. Indeed, in considering the ambiguous nature 
of delusional beliefs, psychiatrist Joseph Pierre (2001, p.170) proposes that the DSM 
definition for ‘delusion’ should include mention that “delusional thinking can span the 
continuum from normalcy to pathology, but is not alone indicative of mental illness or 
psychiatric disorder” and, therefore, should only be “an appropriate target for clinical 
attention” if it causes undue distress or dysfunction. Arguably, then, the existence of 
highly functional ‘delusional’ people suggests that delusional ideation is not 
psychopathological per se. Rather, as with voice hearers, it seems the difference 
between a person’s capacity to function, or not, is dependent on their ability to attain 
and apply skills for coping with bizarre beliefs.  
 
Although groups teaching coping skills for delusional ideation are few in comparison to 
the proliferate Hearing Voices Network, there has been a nascent development in this 
area. The key initiator of this project is Tamasin Knight, a UK medical doctor who, 
inspired by the work of Romme and the Hearing Voices Network, considered the 
possibility of transposing the same support and training framework into context of 
learning to cope with overwhelming delusions (Knight, 2010, p.21). This enterprise first 
took the form of a research project conducted from 2001-2003 which aimed to 
“determine methods of helping people cope with beliefs that others may consider to be 
unusual” and which identified a raft of effective coping strategies used by such people 
(Knight, 2009, p.12). From this emerged the establishment of a weekly “unusual 
beliefs” group in 2003 which, according to a 2005 follow-up qualitative evaluation, had 
effectively established a support forum with diverse benefits for participants (pp.36-37). 
For instance, Knight (p.7) notes that while “mainstream psychiatric treatment attempts 
to remove or reduce conviction in these beliefs”, group members actually derived many 
benefits from sharing their unusual beliefs and experiences in a non-judgemental 
setting. Examples of such benefits are: not having their beliefs “dismissed as illness” 
and clinically labelled; feeling supported my members to disclose “issues they may be 
too afraid to discuss with psychiatric professionals for fear of the consequences”; 
“reduced anxiety”; “a sense of safety”; “able to speak freely”; a “sense of belonging and 
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reducing isolation”; and having “a space where people who have had a crisis or 
breakdown could explore the factors that may have led up to it” (pp.37-39). Although 
such groups remain few in number, and there appears to be no evidence-based 
evaluation as to their general efficacy, it is anecdotally evident that they enable 
therapeutic benefits.  
 
While unusual beliefs groups are evidently beneficial, do they provide coping skills that 
enable people to contend with overwhelming delusions and improve functionality? 
According to UK clinical psychologist, Rufus May (2007a, p.30; 2007b, p.124), they do, 
for he has observed that, as a result of the support and coping skills provided in his 
unusual belief groups, participants have developed enhanced levels of functionality. 
This anecdotally suggests the efficacy of learning and using coping skills to contend 
with disabling beliefs. Indeed, empirical research conducted by Turkington et al (2015, 
pp.56, 57) with a group of psychiatric patients demonstrates that the judicious use of 
cognitive behavioural therapy can decrease the overall level of belief conviction in 
patients and improve their social functioning “to a marked degree”. This seems to 
indicate that psychopathological dysfunction is characterised more by the absence of 
coping skills than the presence of ‘delusions’ per se.  
 
If so, then medical psychiatry’s depiction of delusions as being essentially 
characteristic of psychosis is questionable. Although such unusual beliefs are often 
distressing or destructive and can lead to dysfunction, this appears to not be universal, 
but relative to the degree to which psychosocial support and coping skills have been 
provided and acquired. It is subsequently plausible to suggest that, in context of 
dysfunctionality, psychiatry’s depiction of delusions as essentially psychopathological is 
more prescriptive supposition than clinical fact. 
 
11.2.3 The incomprehensibility of delusions? 
Are delusions as incomprehensible as psychiatry presumes and asserts them to be? It 
seems not, for the possibility of appreciating them beyond the limited purview of clinical 
diagnostics has already been demonstrated above. For instance, it appears:  
i) there is a marked commonality between delusional and mystical 
incorrigibility which may indicate they share a common psychic source;  
ii) psychotic-like delusions occur, and are indistinguishable, within both 
psychiatric and normal populations; and  
iii) it is possible to circumvent the social dysfunction that often stems from 
delusional beliefs via the acquisition and application of coping skills.  
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Already, these three possibilities establish lines of potential investigation which move 
beyond the superficial psychiatric depiction of delusional ideation as a static diagnostic 
criterion. Yet there are various other views and theories that open further potential 
pathways for better understanding the nature of the phenomenon of harbouring 
unusual beliefs. 
 
Intriguingly, while psychiatry sees a strong causal link between delusions and 
dysfunctionality, many commentators understand delusions to serve a functional 
purpose. This view was exemplified eighty years ago in Boisen’s (1936, p.29) appraisal 
of delusions, and beliefs in general, as “attempts to organize our experience in such a 
way that we can go on living and functioning in the world of men”. He also observes 
that, despite their unusual appearances in comparison to normal beliefs, delusions 
serve the function of preventing a person from “going to pieces” and to “maintain a 
certain degree of integration and poise” (ibid). Others similarly see delusions as a 
functional attempt to establish a semblance of existential stability in the face of the 
chaos and collapse of psychosis. For instance, Siegler et al (1969, p.956) see 
delusions as being pragmatic though “desperate attempts” to make sense of “thought 
changes” in psychotic states, while Brett (2002, p.329) likewise suggests that, in 
psychosis, when “the previous frameworks of meaning have been eroded”, there is a 
need for the “emergence of new patterns of meaning” in the form of delusions. From a 
slightly different perspective, Deikman (1971, p.486) describes delusional formation as 
a default strategy for contending with the chaos of an unresolved spiritual emergency. 
He notes that, whereas the mystic resolves such crises through spiritual 
transformation, “the psychotic person… creates a delusion to achieve a partial ordering 
and control”. Finally, some commentators view delusions as fulfilling a functional and 
efficacious role. For example, from a psychodynamic and cognitive psychology 
perspective delusions are seen as serving the unconscious function of circumventing 
irresolvable and painful psychic states and life events (Martindale, 2015, p.61; 
Turkington et al, 2015, p.51). Inasmuch, they are partially remedial in nature. Black 
(2008, p.80), however, takes this idea a step further to propose that “the developed 
delusional system…should be considered as an attempt at recovery rather than the 
primary illness” because its chief purpose is to establish meaning in the midst of chaos.  
 
Each of these views steps beyond the psychiatric depiction of delusions as being 
essentially incomprehensible. To the contrary, they perceive delusions as being 
meaningful or functional in one way or another. For instance, delusional formation can 
be understood as an unconscious attempt on behalf of the self or psyche to make 
sense of a chaotic and overwhelming psychotic or psychospiritual experience. Hence, 
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in this light, the formation of delusions can be understood as an unconscious act that 
serves a functional purpose; a possibility which is lost to medical psychiatry’s view that 
delusions are incomprehensible and psychopathological things. This poses the 
intriguing possibility that, while delusions appear to be psychopathological at face 
value, they may paradoxically represent a self-healing gesture at an unconscious or 
transpersonal level. This idea is supported in the ensuing section’s examination of 
Perry’s model for understanding so-called delusions.  
 
11.3 John Weir Perry and better understanding delusions 
As discussed in Chapter Ten, Section 10.6.4, Perry endorses the view that psychosis 
can be seen as a process of self-healing and transformative renewal. However, he also 
understands this process of renewal to be fundamentally driven by that which 
psychiatry refers to as ‘incomprehensible delusions’. Perry (1974, p.2) eschews the 
“shackles of medical thinking with its special taste for signs and symptoms of 
pathology” in favour of an open-ended phenomenological investigative approach. From 
his training in Jungian psychotherapy, and his observations of, and interactions with, 
many ‘psychotic’131 people over many years, he came to understand ‘delusions’ as 
constituting archetypal formations that reflect the “language of the unconscious, 
emotional psyche” (ibid, p.11). Hence, he rejects the term ‘delusions’ with its 
psychopathological meaning and clinical assumptions. Instead, he has coined the term 
“affect-images” to signify the mythic-type ideation that is central to the renewal process 
(Perry, 1999, p.xv). As he explains – “When activated, an archetype manifests in the 
form of an emotion and an image and a pattern of behaviour; its charge of energy is 
intense. I have suggested the term affect-image to designate these forms” (ibid). The 
idea of ‘delusions’ as affect-images invests the supposed incomprehensibility of such 
phenomena with evident and profound meaning. Whereas psychiatry sees a 
‘delusional’ experience as being an inscrutable psychopathological symptom, Perry 
understands this to be a potentially functional dynamic that is native to the deeper 
human psyche.  
 
Further to this, Perry (1974, p.140) maintains that affect-images, or ‘delusions’, serve 
the purpose of facilitating “some very much needed changes in the organization of the 
self and the emotional life”. He explains that, 
 
the image renders the meaning of the emotion, while the emotion lends the 
dynamism to its image. On this account the images lead to the lost affects. 
                                                          
131
 Again, as in Chapter Ten, throughout this section I adopt Perry’s practice of placing inverted commas 
around psychiatric words such as ‘psychosis’ and ‘delusions’. 
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They are the means by which the affects become processed in nature’s 
own way, unfamiliar as it is to us (ibid, p.141). 
 
Here, Perry adds a further layer of meaning in terms of the general nature and 
functional dynamics of the phenomenon of ‘psychotic delusions’. Far from being 
incomprehensible and psychopathological, he construes them as natural archetypal 
forms which play a principal role in a psychic process of attempted self-actuation and 
remediation. Although ‘delusions’ appear abnormal in context of mainstream normalcy, 
if Perry is correct, then they are not ‘false’ as psychiatry claims, nor even abnormal in 
an absolute sense, because they are real and normal within context of archetypal 
psychic processes. Analogously speaking, then, rather than being seen as 
incomprehensible and illogical, ‘delusions’ may be likened to a ‘foreign language’ which 
clinicians ideally need to learn and understand if they are to respond with apposite 
therapeutic effectiveness.  
 
In general, Perry’s description of the ‘psychotic’ process is essentially psychospiritual in 
that it is orchestrated through archetypal dynamics of the transpersonal self. This 
principle applies also to affect-images. According to Perry (1999, p.129) affect-images 
“have the function of implementing the processes of the spirit: of liberating and 
transforming its energies, which will then slip out of the old structures lingering on the 
recent past and into new ones geared to the near future”. Significantly, however, he 
does not see this view as being incompatible with biomedical psychiatric thinking for he 
perceives a holistic and correlative relationship between psyche and soma (ibid, 
p.145). Subsequently, he endorses a holistic view in regards to aetiology and believes 
that ascribing specific causal primacy to psyche or body is erroneous (ibid). This 
represents an unusual stance, for, while most psychiatric commentators promote the 
view of a biological aetiology in psychosis, Perry seems to suggest a mixed aetiology in 
psychosis where physical and psychic-cum-psychospiritual causes are not separate, 
but co-causal. In other words, he suggests a matrix of causality wherein body, mind 
and spirit are inextricably interactive and cannot be isolated from each other. 
 
It is evident, thus far, that Perry’s characterisation of a ‘psychotic delusion’ as an affect-
image ostensibly invests this phenomenon with meaning that challenges its psychiatric 
status as a key psychopathological diagnostic criterion. Indeed, if Perry is correct, then 
far from being psychopathological in nature, such ‘delusions’ or ‘affect-images’ may 
conversely represent an intrinsic and poorly understood recovery process of psychic 
renewal. Indeed, after years of working with ‘psychotic’ people he came to believe that 
the apparent inscrutable chaos of the ‘psychotic’ process may in fact be following 
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“some sort of order or groundplan” (Perry, 1974, p.28). By analysing his case notes he 
elicited ten apparent thematic categories of ‘psychotic’ affect-images that he 
understood to represent “some form of drama or ritual performance” which unfurled in 
the form of a mythological psychic process (ibid, pp.28-29) (see Table 9). 
 
Table 9 - Perry’s ten thematic categories of affect-images 
Category Description 
A. Center A location is established at a world center or cosmic axis 
(point where sky world, regular world, and underworld 
meet; between opposing halves of the world; center of 
attention). 
B. Death Themes of dismemberment or sacrifice are scattered 
throughout and make themselves evident in drawings 
(crucifixion, pounding or chopping up, tortures, limbs or 
bones rearranged, poisoning). A predominant delusional 
statement is that of having died and of being in an afterlife 
state (people look like living dead; in hell or in heaven; or 
in prison as equivalent to death). 
C. Return to Beginnings A regression is expressed that takes the person back to 
the beginnings of time and the creation of the cosmos 
(Garden of Eden, waters of the abyss, early steps of 
evolution, primitive tribal society, creation of the planets). 
There is a parallel regression, of course, to emotions, 
behaviour, and associations of infancy (surrounded by 
parent figures; crawling, suckling; needs for touch and 
texture; oral needs). 
D. Cosmic Conflict There arises a world conflict of cosmic import between 
forces of good and evil, or light and darkness, or order 
and chaos (surprisingly often expressed nowadays as 
democracy and communism; Armageddon, or the triumph 
of the Antichrist; destruction or end of the world, or the 
Last Judgement; intrigues, plots, spying, poisoning – for 
all to gain world supremacy).  
E. Threat of Opposite There is a feeling of a threat from the opposite sex, a fear 
of being overcome by it, or turned into it (drugs to turn 
one into the opposite; identifications with figures of the 
other sex; supremacy of the other sex; moves to 
eradicate the other sex). 
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F. Apotheosis The person experiences an apotheosis as royalty or 
divinity (as a king or a queen, deity or saint, hero or 
heroine, messiah). 
G. Sacred Marriage The person enters upon a sacred marriage of ritual or 
mythological character (royal marriage, perhaps 
incestuous; marriage with God or Goddess; as Virgin 
Mother, who conceives by the spirit). 
H. New Birth A new birth takes place or is expected of a super-human 
child or of oneself (ideas of rebirth; Divine Child, Infant 
Savior, Prince, or Reconciler of the division of the world). 
I. New Society A new order of society is envisioned, of an ideal or sacred 
quality (a New Jerusalem, Last Paradise, Utopia, World 
Peace; a New Age, a New Heaven and New Earth). 
J. Quadrated World A fourfold structure of the world or cosmos is established, 
usually in the form of a quadrated circle (four continents 
or quarters; four political factions, governments, or 
nations; four races or religions; four persons of the 
godhead; four elements or states of being). 
(Source – Perry, 1974, pp.29-30) 
Perry explains that, although these themes are not present in all ‘psychotic’ instances, 
and do not occur as prescriptive and sequential patterns, they do seemingly unfold in a 
broad developmental trajectory whereby “the themes of the regression and cosmic 
conflict tend to come early, and those of new birth, new social order” generally occur 
later (p.30). Furthermore, he warns against reifying these themes and stresses that 
they “must be understood to be purely arbitrary assignments and arrangements for 
purposes of descriptive study and formulation” (p.28). Hence, he sees them as 
heuristic and provisional concepts that may be used to guide a progressive 
understanding of ‘psychotic’ experience and to correspondingly formulate psychiatric 
theories and practices which work with, rather than against, what may potentially be a 
renewal process.  
 
Arguably, then, Perry’s notion of ‘psychosis’ as representing a meaningful psychic, or 
psychospiritual, renewal process, proffers a feasible alternative to conventional 
psychiatry’s understanding of psychosis as an intrinsically psychopathological 
occurrence which is marked and identified by certain incomprehensible diagnostic 
criteria, such as bizarre delusions. Indeed, Perry’s model apparently invests so-called 
‘incomprehensible psychotic delusions’ with meaningful explanations regarding their 
form, content and course.  As such, it is possible that further research in this direction 
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may yield an enhanced understanding as to the nature and possible functional 
potentialities of such experiences. 
 
11.4 Conclusion  
It is evident voice hearing and delusions can occur in non-psychopathological forms 
identical to, yet indiscernible from, psychotic manifestations. This questions the 
diagnostic veracity of these primary psychotic symptoms and psychiatry’s modus 
operandi of reductive psychopathology–seeking. If voice hearing and delusional 
ideation are not definitively psychotic then how can psychosis be diagnosed? Perry’s 
answer to this conundrum is to abandon psychiatry’s diagnostic and psychopathology–
seeking approach and, instead, investigate the possibility that ‘psychosis’ represents a 
meaningful renewal process. I continue examining this diagnostic conundrum 
throughout Chapter Twelve in context of cross-cultural and psychospiritual 






Chapter Twelve continues Chapter Eleven’s trajectory of inquiry by critically examining 
psychiatric diagnostics within a cross-cultural context. Here, the conundrum of squaring 
psychiatric materialism with metaphysical cultural relativity is explored - What 
substantiates the psychiatric view that an anomalous experience deemed psychotic in 
a Western context can be viewed as non-psychotic and normative in another cultural 
context? It is shown that psychotic-like experiences are commonly reported in relation 
to traditional healing, shamanic initiatory processes, and spirit possession. Cross-
cultural conundrums resulting from Western rationality and cognicentrism are also 
examined. The aim here is to further challenge the veracity of psychiatric diagnostic 
and psychopathology-seeking practices by demonstrating, though a cross-cultural lens, 
the seeming impossibility of discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences.  
 
12.1 Psychiatry and the cross-cultural conundrum 
It has become accepted practice within mainstream psychiatry to assert that 
psychospiritual beliefs or experiences deemed psychotic in one cultural setting may be 
normative in another. Upon closer investigation, however, it appears illogical to 
proclaim that a given experience is intrinsically psychotic in a mainstream Western 
cultural context but not psychotic in context of other cultural psychosocial or 
psychospiritual norms. For instance, the proposal that hearing voices is psychotic for 
mainstream Westerners, but not Indigenous healers, fails to explain the 
phenomenological nature of the voices in each instance. Is psychiatry suggesting that 
Western psychotic voice hearing is ‘out of touch with reality’, but Indigenous shamanic 
voice hearing is not? If so, what is the difference between non-real voices and real 
voices? Does culturally normative voice hearing constitute an experience whereby 
people are in communication with invisible disembodied entities? If spirits are real, then 
why are they only real in non-Western contexts, beyond which they are deemed 
imaginary or insane? What discerns the culturally valid hearing of spirit voices from 
psychotic voice hearing (i.e. what differentiates those who are really hearing the voices 
of spirits from those who are having psychotic auditory hallucinations)? Such critical 
questions are neither posed nor answered by psychiatry. 
 
12.1.1 The epiphenomenal problem 
At the core of this conundrum is the question of what is, and is not, real. As discussed 
in Chapter Two, Section 2.3, medical psychiatry is based on the materialist assumption 
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that mind is epiphenomenal to physicality; hence, psychopathology is reflective of an 
anatomical malfunction, probably in the brain. In such a worldview, metaphysical 
realities do not actually exist, regardless of cultural context. This is seemingly evident in 
the DSM-5 authors’ (2013, p.758-759) suggestion that “connections between cultural 
concepts may help identify…underlying biological substrates”. Although DSM-5 also 
explains that “cultural concepts are important to psychiatric diagnosis” because they 
enable clinicians to “avoid misdiagnosis…(e.g., unfamiliar spiritual explanations may be 
misunderstood as psychosis)” (ibid, p.758), it appears that psychospiritual cultural 
explanations are ultimately deemed to be the epiphenomenal and presumably fanciful 
products of ‘underlying biological substrates’. As such, psychiatry has seemingly 
anchored cultural relativity within the fabric of biological determinism, and diagnostic 
differentiation is achieved by observing degrees of distress or divergence from cultural 
norms. This, however, fails to phenomenologically explain what, exactly, differentiates 
psychotic from non-psychotic ‘spiritual explanations’.  
 
That these ‘spiritual explanations’ may be indicative of actual psychospiritual realities 
does not seem to feature in the medical psychiatric purview. As Sanderson (2003, p.2) 
observes, “the established scientific view that consciousness is a by-product of brain 
activity has had the effect of imposing a selective blindness on our thinking”. Indeed, 
from a quantum physics perspective it is understood that “looking for consciousness in 
the brain is like looking inside a radio for the announcer” (Haramein in Vacariu, 2016, 
p.137). Hence, the axiomatic materialist assumptions upon which psychiatry is founded 
establish a limited scope of investigative inquiry that proscribe questions such as – Do 
the ‘unfamiliar spiritual explanations’ within other cultures signify something that is 
ontologically real? If so, can they also be real in mainstream Western contexts, and if 
so, what does this say of our core beliefs regarding psychopathology anchored in 
biological determinism? Rather than attempting to empirically categorise cross-cultural 
and psychospiritual explanations, an investigation of their phenomenology might better 
guide an understanding of psychosis within psychiatric research. To what degree, then, 
are the conundrums that cross-cultural considerations present to psychiatry the result 
of its failure to consider the possibility that the expression and experience of 
psychospiritual states of consciousness may be generically inherent to the human 
psyche and, therefore, can appear in all cultures? For example, if spirits do 
ontologically exist, then the notion that psychopathology is indicated by deviation from 
cultural norms becomes redundant because it is feasible to suppose that all people 
within all cultural settings can potentially be subject to influence by spirits. The same 
theoretical reasoning also pertains to other forms of psychospiritual experience.  
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12.1.2 The problem of cognicentrism 
A related cross-cultural issue which arguably limits psychiatry’s capacity to consider 
psychospiritual explanations of psychotic-like experiences is that it has adopted and 
operates by the Western cultural assumption that rationality is a superior faculty of 
perception and knowledge formation. This is known as ‘cognicentrism’, which Walsh 
(1993, p.740) defines as “the tendency to assume that one's own usual state is 
optimal”. Ackerknecht (1943, p.55), however, refers to such assumptions as “faulty 
conclusions” in that they “spring from the supposition that a society is only able to 
function normally insofar as it is rational. History proves that this ‘criterion of rationality’ 
is but a delusion”. Further to this, Waldram et al (2006, p.129) assert that “rationality 
must be understood to be a culture specific notion; one culture’s rational thought is not 
necessarily the same as another’s. Indeed, the rational thought that underlies scientific 
inquiry and biomedical practice is but one type of thought”. In discussing the pros and 
cons of the rational function from a mystic perspective, Sri Aurobindo (2005, pp.13, 66-
67) acknowledges that “the rationalistic tendency of Materialism has done mankind this 
great service”, but he also notes it is limited in that “rational action is incapable of 
knowing what is, it only knows what appears to be, it has no plummet by which it can 
sound the depths of being, it can only survey the field of becoming”. It can hence be 
argued that while rationality is a valid and valuable form of cognition, it is limited in its 
scope of apprehension, and therefore, can be blind to aspects of reality that are 
accessible via other human cognitive capacities. However, it appears the limitations 
inherent to rationality are ironically compounded by cognicentrism because the belief in 
rational superiority proscribes awareness of its limitations. It also obviates the serious 
investigation of ‘irrational’ notions regarding psychospiritual realities and their possible 
influence in psychotic experiences. 
 
This has significant implications for better understanding psychotic and psychotic-like 
experiences. For instance, a basic characteristic of rationality is to depict reality in 
terms of bifurcated opposites; a practice which is exemplified in psychiatric diagnostics. 
On this point, Noll (1983, p.447) asserts that “the psychological states involved in 
shamanism and schizophrenia have been imprisoned in the limiting context of the 
abnormal/normal or pathological/non-pathological dichotomy, the familiar either/or 
criterion of cognicentrist thought”. It appears, then, that the rules of rationalism, 
combined with cognicentrism, limit the ways in which reality can be understood and 
construed, and consequently  proscribe dialectical considerations such as the idea that 
psychotic-like occurrences may be integral aspects of a larger transformation process. 
Therefore, despite the merits and validity of rationalism, when it is coupled with 
cognicentrism, the exploration of ‘irrational’ (i.e. metaphysical) domains of reality are 
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seemingly deemed unworthy of consideration and overlooked. For psychiatry, this 
translates into the formation of a binary diagnostic model (i.e. psychopathology versus 
non-psychopathology) and also essentially denies the consideration of possible 
psychospiritual determinants in psychosis. 
 
12.1.3 Explicating the cross-cultural challenge 
The idea that psychotic-like experiences may possibly reflect psychospiritual 
developmental processes raises the critical and challenging question – To what degree 
does psychiatry inadvertently pathologise that which is potentially healing and 
transformative and consequently employ treatment approaches that may do more harm 
than good? If a shamanic initiatory process, or transpersonal transformative process, is 
facilitated through psychic or ‘psychotic’ upheaval, and if this is a phenomenon native 
to the human psyche and common to all cultures, then pathologising this process, and 
attempting to curtail or reverse it via enforced hospitalisation and medication, may 
indeed result in iatrogenic harm. 
 
In light of these considerations, the ensuing investigation further challenges the 
veracity of psychiatry’s psychopathology-based diagnostic model of understanding by 
examining various psychotic-like psychospiritual phenomena and experiences within 
the cultural contexts of:  
i) psychospiritual experiences of traditional healers;  
ii) the shamanic initiatory process; and  
iii) the phenomenon of spirit possession.  
The aim here is to look deeply into these experiences in order to elicit a better 
understanding of their nature and ontological reality and to subsequently demonstrate 
the seeming impossibility of formulating differential diagnostic criteria in such instances. 
This, by no means, constitutes a full investigation of the innumerable forms of cross-
cultural, psychotic-like, psychospiritual experiences. However, it demonstrates that 
such research is possible, and adds weight to the idea that better understanding 
psychosis requires better understanding the many psychospiritual realities that exist 
beyond the conceptual horizons of psychiatric materialism, biological determinism, 
cognicentrism and psychopathology-seeking. 
 
12.2 Psychospiritual experiences of traditional healers 
An examination of various cross-cultural understandings regarding anomalous 
psychospiritual experiences proffers a further and considerable challenge to the 
diagnostic psychopathology model. Indeed, the anthropological and cross-cultural 
literature is replete with examples of culturally normative psychotic-like experiences 
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amongst traditional healers which have seemingly occurred within all cultures 
throughout the history of humanity. Citing a few such examples suffices to demonstrate 
the conundrum they pose for psychiatry because, at face value, from a psychiatric 
perspective, they exemplify definitive signs and symptoms of psychotic disorders. It is 
apposite to keep in mind that the following reported observations and experiences are 
not only similar to those observed and reported in psychotic experiences, but are 
essentially indistinguishable from them. For instance, from an early anthropological 
perspective, Benedict (1934, p.60) observes that traditional healers exhibiting what 
appear, by psychiatric standards, to be psychotic “delusions of grandeur or of 
persecution”, are able to “function at ease and with honor” within their own cultural 
settings. Similarly, Kroeber (1940, p.204) explains that amongst northern Californian 
Native American societies, it is common for shamanic practitioners to experience 
seizures, and both auditory and visual hallucinations.  
 
Indeed, first-person accounts from contemporary Native American traditional healers 
corroborate these anthropological observations. For example, in describing a healing 
ceremony she conducted for a person suffering from apparent spirit possession, the 
Karuk medicine woman, Tela Star Hawk Lake, states that “I could see the bad spirit in 
a psychic way…a weird-looking creature that was half-human, with large bat like wings, 
terrible red eyes, and long claws” (Star Hawk Lake, 1996, p.102). Her Karuk shaman 
husband, Medicine Grizzlybear Lake (1991, p.139), likewise attests to the common 
occurrence of spiritual causes in “such psychopathological cases as autism [and] 
juvenile schizophrenia” and proffers the example of an autistic girl who “was locked in a 
spiritual dimension under the protective custody of the Little People”. Both of these 
shamanic practitioners have achieved healing outcomes when working with such 
possession cases by utilising traditional psychospiritual skills and understandings. 
However, if they were to relate the same experiences to a psychiatrist in a clinical 
setting, independent of a culturally normative context, they would probably be 
diagnosed as exhibiting clear signs of hallucinatory or delusional behaviour. This 
beggars the question – If their exorcism approaches have achieved healing outcomes 
with ostensible spirit possession cases, then, are the spirits real, and if so, how might a 
psychiatrist discern between psychotic and valid reports from patients about being 
tormented or possessed by spirits? 
 
Another example of Native American healing experience, comparable to psychotic 
magical thinking in psychiatric understanding, is the ability to engage in two-way 
communication with non-human creatures and other natural or spiritual forms and 
forces. For example, the Chippewa medicine man Sun Bear asserts that “we can talk to 
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the trees, to the Earth, to the Creator…We’ve been doing it for thousands of years. It’s 
not supernatural. It’s perfectly natural (Sun Bear et al, 1983, p.208). Similarly, the 
Lakota medicine man, Frank Fools Crow (in Mails, 1990, pp.183, 184), maintains that a 
transformative experience he had during a vision quest ceremony resulted in;  
 
my ability to talk with animals, birds, and thunder beings…I also have a 
special song that has been given to me to use when I want to talk to the 
winds, clouds, and thunder, to stop the rain, or to split the clouds.  
 
Further to this, Fools Crow reports the ‘magical’ appearance of objects in his body that 
he uses in healing practices. He claims that after a visit to a sacred site “I now have 
seven small stones in my body…One is in my back…the rest are just under the skin of 
my left arm and hand” (ibid, p.183). Although such experiences may sound bizarre by 
mainstream Western standards, and potentially psychotic by psychiatric standards, it is 
pertinent to note that the above-described capacities and experiences are not 
presented as symbolic or imaginative, but as real. These examples represent just some 
of the many phenomena reported by Indigenous healers (and religious mystics) 
worldwide that are actualised, either intentionally or spontaneously, when following 
prescribed traditional psychospiritual practices.  
 
Traditional Australian Indigenous healers relate having similar experiences and 
powers. For instance, three traditional healers (ngangkari) from the Anangu 
Pitjantjatjara Yankuntjatjara lands of the Central Desert region in South Australia have 
recently shared their experiences to enlighten non-Indigenous Australians about their 
cultural and spiritual ways. As with their Native American counterparts this includes 
interactions and communications with ‘the spirit world’. For instance, Andy Tjilari 
explains that, at night “the ngangkaris' spirit bodies begin to fly around and to visit the 
sleeping spirits of other people to make sure all is well”, while Naomi Kantjuriny states 
that “at night I see spirits. The kurunpa spirits talk to me” (Kantjuriny et al, 2013, p.20). 
Intriguingly, like Fools Crow, these healers also speak of power objects entering their 
bodies. In discussing power objects called ‘mapanpa’;132 Maringka Burton explains that;  
                                                          
132
 Andy Tjilari describes ‘mapanpa’ as follows: 
 
While all the ngangkari are gathered in the special camps, hundreds of mapanpa will come 
flying in. Mapanpa are special, powerful tools. They hit the ground with small explosions, 
"boom, boom, boom!" The ngangkari dash around collecting up the objects: kanti that look 
like sharp stone blades, kuuti that resemble black shiny round tektites, and tarka - slivers of 
bone. Each ngangkari gathers up the pieces he wants. These pieces become his own 
property (Kantjuriny et al, 2013, p.20). 
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my mapanpa live in my body. I am a painter, and when I paint, my 
mapanpa move right up into my shoulder and sit up there, out of the way. If 
somebody comes to me, needing help, I would have to ease my mapanpa 
back into my hands again. Sometimes I would push them from one arm to 
the other (ibid). 
 
Again, from the mindset of Western materialism these reported experiences may 
appear to be supernatural, superstitious, or psychopathological, yet, for these 
traditional healers, such reports reflect real experiences whereby access has been 
gained to psychospiritual domains of reality through their respective cultural initiatory 
training processes. 
 
While psychiatry’s recent attention to, and acceptance of, culturally normative 
psychotic-like experiences is commendable, this falls short of addressing the 
conundrums posed by introducing cultural relativity into the epistemological bounds of 
a discipline governed by the tenets of medical materialism. However, while this is a 
challenging task, such an undertaking is possible. For instance, the successful 
collaboration between the Māori spiritual healer, Wiremu NiaNia, and psychiatrist, 
Allister Bush, demonstrates the viability and efficacy of psychiatry and Indigenous 
healers working together in mental health practice. Their recently published book titled 
Collaborative and Indigenous Mental Health Therapy offers an exemplary portrayal of 
how “bicultural partnership frameworks can augment mental health treatment by 
balancing local imperatives with sound and careful psychiatric care” (NiaNia et al, 
2017, backcover). Throughout this book, NiaNia and Bush relate their respective 
stories about working together with people undergoing psychotic-like experiences. In 
each instance, NiaNia offers a traditional spiritual perspective, and Bush a psychiatric 
perspective, about the nature of each person’s experience and the effective outcomes 
resulting from working collaboratively. As NiaNia explains: 
 
The key for me is understanding. If Allister is able to develop that 
understanding of wairua and consider that alongside his other knowledge as 
a psychiatrist, then he is capable of looking outside the box of Western 
thinking. He’ll never be a Māori, but he can be a healer in the broad sense 
                                                                                                                                                                          
 
References to the occurrence and use of flying stones also exist within a traditional Native American 
shamanic context (Albers, 2003; Standing Bear, 1978, p.215-216; Densmore, 1918, pp.205-206). 
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of the word, because having that awareness that a problem could be 
spiritual may have a healing effect for a young person (ibid, p.163). 
  
The Māori word ‘wairua’ roughly translates as ‘spiritual’ and, in light of his own 
‘supernatural’ capacities of perceiving things invisible to others, NiaNia further asserts 
the importance for psychiatry to understand that psychotic-like experiences may have 
wairua explanations (p.2). He explains that from a Western psychiatric viewpoint; 
 
I would be in danger of being misdiagnosed. I could have been labelled as 
having hallucinations or being psychotic. And I strongly believe this has 
been a problem for many of our people...I’m not suggesting mental illness 
doesn’t exist. But far too often the wairua side, the spiritual side, has gone 
unrecognised, which has had very negative outcomes for us as Māori (ibid). 
  
It therefore appears that the conceptual tension created by bringing these two 
worldviews together arguably represents an opportunity for psychiatry to consider the 
possible validity of metaphysical realities and to reconsider its traditional understanding 
of psychosis as a form of psychopathology whereby people appear to be ‘out of touch 
with reality’.  
 
12.3  Psychosis and the shamanic initiatory process 
The shamanic initiatory process133 refers to the developmental and transformative 
training process through which a person becomes a shaman. In a general sense, 
Krippner (2007, p.20) describes shamans as practitioners who “attempt to modify 
dysfunctional attitudes, behaviors, and experiences” within their sociocultural 
environments. However, he further notes that they are healers who attend to a 
community’s “spiritual needs” and who “deliberately shift their phenomenological 
pattern of attention, perception, cognition, and awareness in order to obtain information 
not ordinarily available to members of the social group” (ibid, p.16). In other words, 
integral to their healing practice is the ability to use technologies of consciousness to 
glean psychospiritual insight and guidance about the nature of and therapeutic 
responses to a problematic situation. According to Winkelman (2004, p.152), the 
shamanic initiatory process is essential to providing a shaman-to-be with the requisite 
training and skills for adroitly navigating psychospiritual domains of reality. This often 
                                                          
133
 While I have already discussed similarities between the shamanic initiatory process and Western 
notions of the psychotic process, particularly in light of differentiating shamanic experience from 
psychopathology (for instance, see the Grofs’ notion of ‘shamanic crisis’ in Table 5, Chapter Eight, Section 
8.2), my focus here is to elucidate the seemingly indiscernible and interconnected nature of the two. 
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entails a lengthy period of upheaval which may appear classically psychotic from a 
psychiatric perspective.  
 
The idea that psychotic-like occurrences are natural and integral features of shamanic 
initiatory processes is endorsed by both Indigenous and Western commentators. For 
example, in her doctoral dissertation which explores “Māori ways of understanding 
extra-ordinary experiences and schizophrenia”, Taitimu (2007, p.34) explains that, in 
psychiatry, a person experiencing psychotic-like symptoms is diagnosed as having 
“that thing [schizophrenia], but we would say he was a divine healer. If I ask if a person 
has these things, what would you call them? We would say a healer. But they say 
sickness and diagnose”. Similarly, the African shaman, Odi Oquosa (in May, 2007b, 
p.123), maintains that “madness is an initiation of a healing process; an awakening of 
the unconscious mind. For this healing to be enabled it is important not to suppress 
these experiences as western psychiatry has tended to do”. In terms of Western 
commentators, Eliade (1958, pp.89, 102) observes that, while the shaman “sometimes 
borders on madness…he has succeeded in integrating into consciousness a 
considerable number of experiences that, for the profane world, are reserved 
for…madness”. Hence, for the shaman, madness is circumvented by understanding 
that psychotic-like occurrences signify a calling to learn how to withstand and navigate 
within metaphysical realities. As Winkelman (2004, p.152) notes, rather than seeing 
psychotic-like occurrences as psychopathological “the shamanic paradigm provides a 
useful framework for addressing these experiences as natural manifestations of human 
consciousness, and as developmental opportunities” whereby the skilled shamanic 
practitioner “re-interprets symptoms of acute psychosis, emotional disturbance, 
hallucinations, ASC [altered states of consciousness], and interaction with spirits as 
symbolic communications for personal development”. Likewise, in his appraisal of 
shamanic initiatory processes, Robbins (2011, p.110) maintains that psychiatry’s 
understanding of psychosis could be advanced by pondering the question – “Might 
psychosis be thought of as personal disharmony with the cosmos requiring spiritual 
healing”? In this context, the presence of psychotic-like phenomena is not a call to 
identify psychopathology, or to differentiate psychotic from psychospiritual instances, 
but signifies the need to provide a person with support and guidance so that integration 
and transformation can occur.  
 
It is important to clarify, however, that the term ‘shamanic initiatory process’ does not 
only infer instances that occur within cultures where shamanism is practiced. It is my 
contention here that such psychotic-like processes may be intrinsic to human nature 
and can possibly occur within Western society independent of an established shamanic 
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context. For example, African shaman, Malidoma Somé, (in Marohn, 2003, p.170) 
recollects the affront and dismay he experienced when he first visited America and was 
exposed to the treatment of ‘psychotic’ patients in a psychiatric ward:  
 
I was so shocked. That was the first time I was brought face to face with 
what is done here to people exhibiting the same symptoms I've seen in my 
village…‘So this is how the healers who are attempting to be born are 
treated in this culture. What a loss! What a loss that a person who is finally 
being aligned with a power from the other world is just being wasted’.  
 
Here, Somé clearly suggests that psychotic-like shamanic experiences are intrinsic to 
being human and can occur within all cultural settings. This is an idea that extends 
beyond psychiatry’s limited definition of “cultural syndromes” as “clusters of symptoms 
and attributions that tend to co-occur among individuals in specific cultural groups” 
(APA, 2013, p.758), with the general inference being in non-Western contexts. Somé 
(in Russell, 2014, p.265) subsequently maintains that “the easy labelling of clinical 
psychotics…is a reflection of a profound misunderstanding, because the structure of 
the world afforded by people like this has not been studied sufficiently”. In other words, 
a better understanding of the nature of so-called ‘psychosis’ may be gleaned though a 
heuristic investigation of psychospiritual phenomenology which eschews psychiatry’s 
primary focus of seeking to identify and name forms of psychopathology. 
 
The feasibility of such an approach is personified by New Zealand clinical psychologist 
and shaman, Ingo Lambrecht, who draws on both shamanic and traditional Western 
approaches in his therapeutic practice.134 He argues that “our science of 
consciousness is so poor we just have no idea” about shamanic altered states of 
consciousness and, from his own experience, proposes that “the psychological process 
of voluntary culturally determined trance states may be similar to the involuntary 
dissociative or psychotic trance states” (Lambrecht, 2017). Further to this he explains 
that when “shamans have an initiation illness…it could be viewed as a spiritual 
crisis…a strange entanglement of madness and the transformation, finding its 
expression in the ukutwasa of South African sangomas” (Lambrecht, 2015, p.7).135 In 
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 Lambrecht (2017) describes himself as “privileged to undergo an intense shamanic training as a 
sangoma, a South African traditional healer” and notes that his field of expertise and research interests 
include “the relationships between culture, psychosis, and spirituality”. 
135




terms of challenging Western cognicentrism, Lambrecht (2017) describes the shaman 
as “the first psychologist or psychiatrist”. Indeed, he explains that “it is the shaman who 
is waiting for modern Western discourse to wake up and catch up with what has always 
been known in other cultures and for modern Western discourse to bring with it its own 
unique and valuable contributions” (Lambrecht, 2009, p.15). This suggests that, 
contrary to Western science’s stance regarding its superior mode of logical knowledge 
formation, it is seemingly ignorant of knowledge pertaining to psychospiritual domains 
of reality that shamans have long mastered.  
 
Lambrecht, however, appears to have bridged this epistemological gap. As a healer 
who has trained in both shamanic and Western clinical therapeutic modalities he 
demonstrates the possibility of reconciling scientific materialism with cross-cultural 
metaphysical worldviews and, from this dialectical position, forging new ways of 
understanding psychotic-like human experiences beyond the psychiatric approach of 
psychopathology-seeking. This, of course, raises questions as to what essentially 
defines the shamanic initiatory process. Are psychic upheavals that occur in shamanic 
cultures fundamentally the same as those occurring in Western psychotic instances in 
the sense of their transformative potential? Is it this potential that defines them as 
‘shamanic’ or is it the facilitative guidance of a shaman that makes them so? Does this 
suggest that all apparent psychoses are actually shamanic initiatory processes in 
potential? In this sense, does ‘psychosis’, as psychiatry understands it, actually exist? 
Can psychiatric efficacy be advanced by practitioners learning how to utilise 
technologies of consciousness, navigate metaphysical domains of reality, and train 
‘psychotic’ patients to do likewise? These are questions that cannot be answered here. 
However, they characterise the type of speculations and investigations that may arise 
from extending scientific and psychiatric epistemic parameters to include the 
consideration of metaphysical views of reality. 
 
In light of the above, my ensuing investigation aims to support the idea that psychotic-
like experiences may represent potential transformative and healing processes that are 
natural to the human psyche. In this sense, ‘psychotic’ instances seemingly call for a 
therapeutic response of psychospiritual tutelage and not the diagnostic identification of 
psychopathological symptoms. Indeed, from this perspective, the notion of 
‘psychopathology’ becomes highly ambiguous because it is impossible to isolate any 
                                                                                                                                                                          
allows you to take on your new identity, but this process is feared, as it entails madness, 
insane pain, and acts of wild behavior; the more you resist the call, the more severe this 
process is. Death through madness is a real danger in this rebirth needed to become a 
sangoma”. 
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symptom that is definitively psychopathological. This task is undertaken in two 
contexts: 
i) challenging the veracity of key psychiatric symptoms for diagnosing 
psychosis by demonstrating their prevalence in shamanic contexts; and 
ii) challenging the veracity of the notion that the duration of psychotic-like 
episodes differentiates psychopathological from shamanic instances. 
Such investigation also supports my proposal that it is ultimately not possible to 
distinguish between shamanic initiatory and psychotic occurrences. 
 
12.3.1    Psychotic indicators: The veracity of symptoms? 
Contrary to assertions that shamanic and psychotic experiences are discrete, the 
descriptions in Table 10 of experiences occurring during shamanic initiatory processes 
appear identical to those identified by psychiatry as being characteristically psychotic. 
  
Table 10 – Descriptions of shamanic initiatory psychotic-like symptoms 




Thus a Chukchee female shaman, Telpina, according to her own 
statement, had been violently insane…during which time her 
household had taken precautions that she should do no harm to 
the people or to herself (Czaplicka, 1914, p.172). 
Zulu shaman He habitually sheds tears, at first slight, then at last he weeps 
aloud…a man becoming a diviner causes great trouble, for he 
does not sleep, but works constantly with his brain; his sleep is 
merely in snatches, and he wakes up singing many songs…And 
then he leaps about the house like a frog; and the house 
becomes too small for him, and he goes out leaping and singing 
(Benedict, 1934, p.63). 
Native American 
shaman 
All through native northern California the onset of shamanistic 
power is marked by a seizure in which the candidate experiences 
an hallucination—always auditory and usually visual also 
(Kroeber, 1940, p.204). 
Siberian shaman He who is to become a shaman begins to rage like a raving 
madman. He suddenly utters incoherent words, falls unconscious, 
runs through the forests, lives on the bark of trees, throws himself 
into fire and water, lays hold on weapons and wounds himself, in 
such that his family is obliged to keep watch on him. By these 
signs it is recognised that he will become a shaman 




Inspirational medicine men who communicate directly with the 
spirits…exhibit the most blatant forms of psychotic-like behaviors. 
These include grossly non-reality-oriented ideation, abnormal 
perceptual experiences, profound emotional upheavals, and 
bizarre mannerisms…One sees strange meanings in everything 
about one, and one will soon be sure of only one thing - that 
events, people, and places are not what they seem…Causal 
relationships are perceived against a background of magic and 
animism. Everything is now capable of being related to everything 
else in terms of a mental orientation that is grossly subjective. 
New ideas crowded in upon the anxious individual, are 
experienced as real things. Reality becomes something else. 
Chaos prevails. (Silverman, 1967, pp.22, 27). 
Shaman (generic) During the initial crisis…shamans-to-be may experience 
themselves as tormented and controlled by spirits. They may 
exhibit considerable confusion, emotional turmoil, withdrawal from 
society, and a range of unusual and even bizarre behavior such 
as going naked, refusing food, and biting themselves (Walsh, 
1997, p.111). 
Balinese balian When the balian’s life histories are examined in detail, it becomes 
evident that the pattern of disturbance described is in fact far 
closer to chronic psychosis, or schizophrenia...The superficial 
resemblance to the course of schizophrenia is of the greatest 
importance since…from the perspective of Western diagnostic 
categories, the balian described in this article prior to their taking 
up the vocation could be identified as schizophrenic, meeting all 
the major criteria of delusions, hallucinations and disturbed 
behavior (Stephen & Suryani, 2000, p.21). 
South African 
sangoma 
A sangoma…would understandably from a Western psychiatric 
standpoint be considered to have psychotic symptoms, 
dominated by auditory hallucinations and social withdrawal, i.e. 
positive and negative symptoms of schizophrenia…In South 
African shamanism…during the ukuthwasa or initiation illness, the 
voices are experienced as persecutory and are experienced as 
fragmenting the ego (Lambrecht, 2009, pp.6, 11). 
 
These descriptions evidently reflect classic psychiatric symptoms of psychosis such as: 
auditory and visual hallucinations; persecutory voices; bizarre beliefs and delusions; 
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distortions of reality; bizarre and socially deviant behaviour; interpersonal and 
vocational social dysfunction; social isolation; extreme affective states; harm to self, 
others, or property; disrupted  sleep; high levels of anxiety, confusion and distress; 
garbled speech; catatonia; ego fragmentation; hyperreflectivity; and experiencing an 
intensity of meaning and interconnectivity between things and events. However, these 
‘symptoms’ not only resemble psychiatric indicators of psychosis, but have also been 
identified by differential diagnosis proponents as indicating a psychotic rather than a 
shamanic experience. For instance, authors in my content analysis variously suggested 
that psychotic rather than psychospiritual instances are signified by the presence of: 
social isolation or dysfunction; ego anomalies; auditory hallucinations; persecutory 
voices; risk of harm to self or others; bizarre delusions, behaviour and speech; 
aggressive outbursts; and so on. 
 
Hence, it appears that psychiatry’s entire framework of psychotic diagnostic and 
descriptive features can occur within context of a shamanic initiatory process, as can 
all proposed criteria for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. If so, 
then it is plausible to propose that psychotic and psychotic-like psychospiritual 
experiences are ultimately indistinguishable and that there is no solid hook on which to 
hang the hat of psychopathology in either of these camps of understanding. If 
psychopathology cannot be discerned from normative cultural anomalies, or from 
natural transformative psychotic-like experiences, then psychosis cannot be 
substantiated. This is not to deny the existence of distressing and anomalous 
experiences called ‘psychoses’, but suggests that the practices of psychopathology-
seeking and psychopathology–labelling seem to eclipse rather than illuminate the 
nature of such experiences. In light of the seeming reality that the full gamut of 
psychotic-like behaviours and experiences can occur within shamanic and other 
transformative psychospiritual contexts, it is feasible to conclude that psychiatry’s 
model of understanding psychosis through the diagnostic lens of psychopathology-
seeking is questionable. Such an approach seemingly finds only that which it is looking 
for and overlooks the expertise and knowledge of Indigenous healing systems which 
demonstrate a sophisticated understanding of the human psyche and its myriad 
psychospiritual capacities. 
 
12.3.2    Psychotic indicators: The veracity of duration?  
The ambiguity of the issue of ‘duration of experience’ as a differentiation marker has 
already been touched upon in Chapter Nine, Section 9.3.4. However, it warrants further 
examination within a shamanic context because initiatory training and transformation 
processes can entail lengthy periods of psychotic-like experiences. For instance, 
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Czaplicka (1914, p.172) reports a Native American Chukchee shaman who underwent 
three years of psychotic-like disturbances throughout her initiatory process. Similarly, 
Benedict (1934, p.62) observes that the Siberian shamanic initiatory crisis can last for 
several years, and Stephen & Suryani (2000, p.21) note the same in a Balinese 
shamanic context. In a Christian context, the Franciscan mystic Brother John of La 
Verna experienced a protracted state of psychotic-like ecstatic ‘trance’ in which “his 
heart was kindled with the fire of love divine, and this flame lasted in him for full three 
years, in the which time he received marvellous consolations and visitations divine, and 
oftentimes was rapt in God” (Rhys, 1912, p.89). Such instances clearly challenge the 
idea that the duration of an anomalous experience is a criterion for discerning between 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences. They also challenge the veracity of the 
DSM-5 assertion that schizophrenia can be diagnosed if “continuous signs of the 
disturbance persist for at least 6 months” (APA, 2013, p.99). Although the DSM 
includes culturally sensitive considerations to circumvent such diagnostic problems, 
this is based on the presumption that genuine psychopathology is distinct from 
normative psychotic-like cultural experiences. There is no consideration of the 
possibility that spontaneous, psychotic-like, psychic upheavals of transformative 
potential and long duration are native to the human psyche and can therefore occur 
within both Western and non-Western cultural settings.  
 
For contemporary medical psychiatry, a significant dilemma is posed by the notion that 
a psychotic-like psychospiritual upheaval, of long duration, can represent an intrinsic 
developmental function of the human psyche. If true, then many people within Western 
psychiatric settings may likely be diagnosed as schizophrenic or psychotic when they 
are actually exhibiting features of a natural and protracted psychospiritual 
transformative process. A brief examination of three cases in point works to further 
elucidate and support this theoretical view.  
 
First, is the example of Egan Bidois (in Robbins, 2011, pp.99-110), a Māori man who 
was diagnosed as psychotic when overwhelmed by an array of metaphysical 
experiences. These consisted of hearing voices, seeing spirits, and a psychic 
sensitivity that swamped him with unbidden intuitive ‘feelings’ and insights into other 
people’s subjective lives; “their attachments, their histories, their pains” (ibid, p.102). 
From a Māori perspective, such experiences would generally be understood as 
incipient signs of a calling to the vocation of seer or healer; however, circumstances led 
Egan to a psychiatrist where the same experiences were seen as the hallucinations, 
delusions, distress and dysfunction of psychosis (p.103). He was subsequently 
hospitalised and recalls that – “What followed was many years of involvement with the 
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mental health system. No amount of anti-psychotics or western intervention helped. 
Finally I was discharged as being ‘treatment resistant’” (ibid). Upon discharge, he 
returned to his community where he received initiatory training from traditional healers, 
which gradually enabled him to control the overwhelming influx of metaphysical content 
and to become a healer himself. Ten years later, during which time he had no further 
contact with the mental health system, he reported that “I see, hear and feel at levels 
beyond anything I ever have before; well beyond even those that pushed me into 
unwellness” (p.104). Hence, experiences which had once rendered him dysfunctional 
and ‘psychotic’ had become, with appropriate training, experiences and capacities that 
enabled him to operate effectively as a healer. 
 
A second example is that of Alex, an American teenager who, after four years of 
ineffective medical treatment for severe psychotic and depressive symptoms, was 
taken by the African shaman, Malidoma Somé, to a West African village. According to 
Somé (in Marohn, 2003, pp.173-174), after residing eight months in the village, Alex 
“became quite normal” and subsequently stayed in Africa for four years training with 
local healers before returning to America where he completed a psychology degree at 
Harvard University and became a healer in his own right. In regards to Alex’s apparent 
‘psychosis’ Somé explains that “he was reaching out. It was an emergency call. His job 
and his purpose was to be a healer…no one was paying attention to that” (ibid, p.174). 
Arguably, had Alex not undergone shamanic training in Africa then he would likely have 
continued to be a patient in the American psychiatric system. 
 
Similarly, from her personal experience as an American psychiatric patient, Ekhaya 
Esima (2017)136 reports that, “I started having experiences that some would say are 
characteristics of psychosis or mental illness. My experiences included disturbing 
visions, voices, and confusion”. However, after years of being in the mental health 
system she met, and become apprenticed to, an African American sangoma who told 
her she was “gifted” and described her experiences as the “Ancestors  waking her up” 
to her vocation as a healer (Borges & Tomlinson, 2017). Within two years of her 
initiation she had parted ways with the mental health system, and though still 
experiencing visions and voices, these now served her in her capacity as a healer 
(ibid). As with Egan, both Alex and Ekhaya also experienced a protracted period of 
psychotic-like symptoms which were deemed psychopathological by psychiatry and 
unsuccessfully treated accordingly. However, in all instances, when these psychiatric 
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 Ekhaya is one of the two people whose stories are documented in the film CRAZYWISE which explores 
the question - “What can we learn from those who have turned their psychological crisis into a positive 
transformative experience?” (Borges & Tomlinson, 2017). 
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patients were introduced to a shamanic setting where the potential for a psychic 
transition was recognised and supported, the outcome was integrative and positive. 
 
Such instances demonstrate that the duration of psychotic-like experiences is not a 
reliable diagnostic indicator of psychopathology. They also lend credence to the idea 
that apparent shamanic initiatory processes can spontaneously occur within Western 
populations. In sum, then, it is clear that protracted psychotic-like episodes are a 
common feature of shamanic initiatory processes and, presumably, other 
psychospiritual transformative processes. Hence, ‘duration of symptomatology’ is 
apparently not a failsafe criterion for discerning psychotic from psychospiritual 
experiences, or for diagnosing chronic psychotic disorders such as schizophrenia. 
From a shamanic perspective, instances of so-called ‘psychosis’ are not generally seen 
as indicative of severe psychopathology but as a natural and potentially beneficent 
process of developmental transformation which requires skilled support and which can 
be thwarted by well-intentioned but misinformed diagnostic labelling and 
pharmacological interventions. 
 
12.4  Spirits and spirit possession 
Throughout the history of humanity the belief in spirits and spirit possession has been 
ubiquitous. Yet, with the advent of scientific materialism in modern Western societies, 
beliefs in a psychospiritual domain and spiritual entities are commonly deemed 
superstitious, irrational, unempirical and, in the case of psychiatry, indicative of 
possible psychopathology. As observed by Gutberlet (1913, p.43) in his description of 
‘Materialism’ in the Catholic Encyclopedia (1913), “absorption in the study of material 
nature is apt to blind one to the spiritual”. However, it was the conviction of the 
eighteenth century Swiss scientist and mystic Emanuel Swedenborg (2009 [1758], 
p.499) that “the spiritual world cannot be separated from the natural, nor the natural 
world from the spiritual”. Indeed, Swedenborg stated this not as a conceptual 
conviction, but in light of his own metaphysical explorations and experiences. He 
explained later in his life that “it has been granted to me now for many years to speak 
with spirits and to be with them as one of them, even in full wakefulness of the body” 
(Swedenborg, 1905 [1758], p.379). This is not an isolated instance, for research 
conducted in the late 1960s by the American anthropologist Erika Bourguignon (1973, 
pp.10-11, 16-17) regarding the spiritual beliefs and practices of 488 world societies, 
found that ninety percent had “institutionalized forms of altered states of 
consciousness” and seventy four percent maintained a “belief in possession by spirits”. 
Therefore, despite the relatively recent dismissal of spiritual realities by mainstream 
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scientific, psychiatric and psychoanalytic disciplines, it appears the belief in spiritual 
beings and spirit domains still prevails globally. 
 
What, then, might these spirits be, and how do they relate to the phenomenon of 
psychosis? Both of these questions point to a deeper understanding of spirits and so-
called ‘psychosis’ in terms of psychospiritual phenomenology. While psychiatry’s 
acknowledgement of culturally normative and non-psychopathological beliefs in spirit 
possession is evidently a progressive step, it fails to take the logical further step of 
inquiring into the nature of these spirits. This failure is arguably due to the conceptual 
framework of bifurcating rationalism which governs and limits the psychiatric worldview. 
For instance, Huskinson & Schmidt (2010, p.12) maintain that a better understanding of 
spirit possession is curtailed by “the blind endorsement of unwarranted dichotomies”, 
while Samuel (2010, pp.35, 37) argues that “spirit possession and trance seem to fit 
particularly badly into a conceptual framework built around a rigid mind-body 
distinction” and that “reducing of everything to cognitive categories…excludes other 
questions…(e.g. what in fact is spirit possession and how does it operate?)”. It 
therefore appears that understanding spirit possession, and its relation to psychosis, is 
eclipsed by psychiatric rationalism and materialism.   
 
12.4.1   DSM on spirits and spirit possession 
Psychiatry assumes and asserts that spirit possession, outside of normative cultural 
beliefs, is psychopathological. As Sanderson (2003, p.1) points out, this may be 
because “spirit possession, according to contemporary science, is impossible”. 
Generally, psychiatry understands so-called ‘spirit possession’ to be a dissociative 
disorder involving “the splitting off of clusters of mental contents from conscious 
awareness” which may occur as “possession-form presentations” with intrusive 
symptomatology such as “voices; dissociated actions and speech; intrusive thoughts, 
emotions, and impulses” (APA, 2013, pp.820, 292). Indeed, this view has prevailed 
within psychiatric epistemology since the late nineteenth century when the French 
psychiatrist Pierre Janet introduced the notion of dissociation into the clinical lexicon in 
reference to “the existence of double personality and double consciousness as hysteric 
phenomena”, including reported instances of spirit possession (Avdibegović, 2012, 
p.368). Hence, in mainstream Western psychiatric settings, people who claim to be 
possessed by spirits, or attribute their anomalous experiences to spirits influences, are 
likely to be diagnosed as psychopathologically out of touch with reality. 
 
While notions of spirits and spirit possession were absent in DSM I-to-III, they entered 
the sphere of diagnostic considerations in both DSM-IV and DSM-5. Intriguingly, 
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despite the psychotic-like appearance of beliefs in spirit possession, the DSM chiefly 
provides instruction about this phenomenon in terms of cross-cultural considerations 
and dissociative disorders, and not in context of psychotic disorders. This diagnostic 
separation of psychotic and dissociative disorders creates ambiguity in DSM 
references to spirit or trance possession. For instance, while DSM-IV infers a psychotic 
dimension in stating that Dissociative Trance Disorder cannot be diagnosed if an 
ostensible trance possession occurs “exclusively during the course of a Psychotic 
Disorder” (APA, 1994, p.729), the difference between psychotic and dissociative trance 
possession is not explained. Such ambiguity is also reflected in the updated DSM-5 
manual which emphasises that “dissociative identity disorder may be confused with 
schizophrenia or other psychotic disorders” (APA, 2013, p.296), but further instruction 
as to why and how this is so is not provided. Overall, then, the DSM makes only 
tenuous diagnostic links between psychotic disorders and spirit possession.  
 
However, despite the ambiguity of references to spirits and spirit possession in DSM 
psychotic disorder chapters, the broader literature indicates that such experiences can 
often be perceived as psychotic. For example, Pfeifer (1994, p.252) observes that 
“belief in demonic influence has repeatedly been described as a delusion in 
schizophrenic patients” while Teoh & Dass (1973, p.62) also note that unless cross-
cultural considerations are taken into account “one may diagnose spirit possession as 
schizophrenia or other forms of psychosis”. Beyond acknowledging the validity of spirit 
possession in context of culturally accepted norms, psychiatry seems disinterested in 
considering the nature of reported ‘spirits’. However, as is evidenced below, such 
investigation is not only possible, it can glean deeper insights into understanding the 
seemingly conjoint psychotic and psychospiritual dynamics of the human psyche. 
 
12.4.2   Beyond psychiatry: What might these spirits be? 
Outside the purview of medical psychiatry, there exists a significant body of literature 
which proffers both psychosocial and metaphysical explanations as to the nature of 
‘spirits’ and their play in psychotic experiences. Those who have engaged this subject 
appear to fall into two conceptual camps: one, that spirits are ultimately of a 
psychological nature; and two, that spirits exist as actual metaphysical beings. It is 
pertinent to note, in both instances, that spirit possession is seen as effectively ‘real’ in 
that a person’s mind/being is influenced or controlled by an autonomous subliminal or 
supernatural ‘something’.  
 
From a mainstream psychological perspective, purported experiences of spirit 
possession are not seen as real, but generally understood to represent a case of self-
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protective mental dissociation and projection. For example, from a psychodynamic 
viewpoint, Ward & Beaubrun (1980, p.206) describe possession as a form of 
dissociation that offers a person “escape from unpleasant reality, and diminution of guilt 
by projecting blame onto an intruding agent”, while Huskinson (2010, p.85) equates 
“spirit possessions” to “dissociative ego-states”. Similarly, from a sociological and 
anthropological perspective, instances of dissociative ‘spirit possession’ are generally 
understood to represent an unconscious reactive coping mechanism to oppressive 
social mores (e.g. forced marriage and gender inequity) (Child, 2010; Samuel, 2010). 
Such views essentially reflect the understanding of psychoanalytic psychiatry that the 
existence of spirits is scientifically impossible and, therefore, reported instances can be 
explained as psychopathological forms of unconscious dissociation whereby aspects of 
the psyche become autonomous (i.e. spirits). 
 
Other authors in this field of research consider spirits to be ontologically real. For 
instance, from an anthropological perspective, Bourguignon (1973, p.22) observes that 
spirits “may be ancestors, foreigners, or other humans, animals, or spirits that never 
had been embodied in human or animal form”. This clearly depicts spirits as extant 
entities. Betty (2005, p.13) describes spirits as “more or less intelligent beings, 
insensible to us, with a will of their own who seem to bother or oppress us or, in rare 
cases, possess our bodies outright, and with whom we can relate in a variety of ways”. 
She subsequently maintains that psychiatry should heed the “growing evidence for 
demonic possession” (ibid, p.14). Here, Betty seems to call on psychiatry to step 
beyond simply recognising the belief in spirits and spirit possession as culturally 
idiosyncratic, to acknowledge that these may be metaphysical realities which can 
impact upon the mental health of all people. Further to this, Caygill & Culbertson (2010, 
p.44) note that Indigenous Pacific Islanders “complain that western psychiatrists…Do 
not understand how thin is the veil that separates human beings from the ‘invisible’”. 
Indeed, Azaunce (1995, p.255) questions whether the phenomenon of spirit 
possession should be understood as “a major symptom of a mental disorder, such as 
schizophrenia, and…treated with psychotropic medication and psychotherapy”, or 
should “such alternative curative interventions as spiritual healing be more seriously 
examined as viable ways of defining and treating mental illness”? Interestingly, Jaspers 
(1997 v1, pp.107-108) also counselled clinicians to give serious consideration to 
patients’ reports of metaphysical experiences:  
 
Patients may display their delusions in some supra-natural mode and such 
experiences cannot be adjudged true or untrue, correct or false…We have 
to regard this experience as such and not merely as some perverted 
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psychological or psychopathological phenomenon if we really want to 
understand it. 
 
It seems, however, that psychiatry has not adopted this proposal, for it generally 
dismisses the veracity of psychospiritual occurrences, including the possible reality of 
spirits and spirit possession.137  
 
As Jaspers observes above, it is common for psychiatric patients to attribute their 
experiences to psychospiritual influences. Indeed, a significant degree of voice hearers 
understand their experiences in such terms. For example, in a national survey of 
participants in American Hearing Voices groups, Jones et al (2016, pp.110-111) found 
that 84.5 percent of discussion relates to the perceived “religious/spiritual connections” 
of voices, while 68.8 percent pertains to “paranormal phenomena”. Similarly, in terms 
of voice hearing aetiology, Romme & Escher (1989, p.214) found that about 45 percent 
of a sample of twenty voice hearers identified their voices as deriving from “gods or 
spirits”; Jones et al (2003, p.203) found that many mental health service clients 
believed “people may hear voices when a spirit possesses their body”; and 45.5 
percent of respondents interviewed by Beavan (2007, p.91) maintained that the voices 
they heard “belong to other types of beings, e.g., God(s), spirits, guides”. Research 
also indicates that patients have identified the influence of spirits as being a general 
causal factor in psychotic or psychotic-like experiences. For instance, Pfeifer (1994, 
pp.247, 250) found that of the 343 religiously-oriented out-patients interviewed at a 
Swiss psychiatric clinic, 37.6 percent believed in “the possible causation of their 
problems through the influence of evil spirits”, particularly for those diagnosed with 
psychotic disorders. Additionally, Esterberg & Compton (2006, p.223) found that, of the 
family members of hospitalised urban African American schizophrenia patients they 
interviewed, 26.2 percent believed that the cause of schizophrenia was “very likely” to 
be “possession by evil spirits”. It therefore appears spirit possession, or the influence of 
spirits, is a commonly held explanatory belief for people having psychotic-like 
experiences.  
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 There are rare exceptions to this general trend. For instance, a one day conference titled ‘Spirit 
possession and mental health’ was held in London in 2013 and promoted as being “relevant to all 
professionals in the field of Mental Health and Social Care”, including psychiatrists. The conference 
considered “the critical themes and debates on spirit possession from an anthropological, social, 
psychological, medical and religious perspective using a range of illustrative case study, clinical practice 
and research” (Ethnic Health Initiative, 2013). Though an exception to the traditional psychiatric rule, this 
demonstrates the feasibility of Western clinicians learning about metaphysical realities.  
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Although such widespread belief does not prove the existence of spirits, nor does 
psychiatry’s disbelief prove their non-existence. Arguably, then, the ubiquitous belief in 
spirits across cultures constitutes grounds for psychiatry to at least consider the 
possibility that such spirits exist. In fact, Bourguignon (1973, pp.11, 12) concludes that, 
in light of the prevalence of trance induction in societies throughout the world, the 
human ability to experience altered states of consciousness is “a psychobiological 
capacity of the species, and thus universal”. If the capacity for trance induction is 
universal then it is logical to suggest that the spirits people report communicating with 
in altered states of consciousness, including psychosis, may represent a real and 
universal phenomenon. The ensuing sections, then, further investigate views on the 
nature of spirits, and their play in psychosis, in context of:  
i) Carl Jung’s psychoanalytic understanding; and  
ii) psychologist Wilson van Dusen’s unique phenomenological research.  
Both share in common the explication of a psychospiritual theory of mind in relation to 
spirits and psychosis, though each differs in its nuanced understanding of the nature of 
spirits. Also, their respective works demonstrate the feasibility of conducting robust 
research into the prospect that humans have the universal capacity to access 
psychospiritual domains and, concomitantly, into investigating the possibility that the 
altered state of consciousness called ‘psychosis’ may, in part, or full, reflect the 
influence of spirits or psychospiritual determinants. 
 
This line of investigation ostensibly proffers a plausible solution to the conundrum of 
how, exactly, does deviance from cultural norms constitute psychopathology? 
Arguably, this conundrum results from psychiatry’s attempt to force-fit cross-cultural 
considerations into a bifurcating model of diagnostics, while failing to provide a cogent 
explanation as to how a particular experience and behaviour can be deemed normal in 
one cultural setting, yet psychotic in another? However, if materialist assumptions 
about the nature of reality are set aside and the possible generic existence of spirits 
and psychospiritual realities is accepted, then such conceptual dilemmas are 
circumvented. Furthermore, acknowledging the prospect that spirits may exist and that 
spirit possession may, therefore, be universal, raises new investigative questions -  If 
spirits exist, what might they be, what roles might they play in psychosis, and how 
might a better understanding of this impact upon psychiatric thinking and practice? 
 
12.4.3   Jung on spirits and spirit possession 
As discussed above,138 Jung saw the collective unconscious as a fundamental psychic 
structure common to all of humanity. To him, this was the realm of “primordial images 
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 See Chapter Ten, Section 10.6.5. 
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which have always been the basis of man’s thinking” and also the source of the mythic 
imagery that abounds in psychotic experiences (Jung, 1969, pp.310-311). Accordingly, 
the study of spirit possession was very much an aspect of his investigations into the 
mechanisms of the unconscious self. Indeed, he makes frequent references to spirits 
and spirit possession throughout his writings. For example, in the following excerpt 
from his Memories, Dreams, Reflections, Jung (1965, pp.190-191) proffers an 
intriguing account of his experience of a poltergeist-like phenomenon:  
Around five o'clock in the afternoon on Sunday the front doorbell began 
ringing frantically. It was a bright summer day; the two maids were in the 
kitchen, from which the open square outside the front door could be seen. 
Everyone immediately looked to see who was there, but there was no one 
in sight. I was sitting near the doorbell, and not only heard it but saw it 
moving. We all simply stared at one another. The atmosphere was thick, 
believe me! Then I knew that something had to happen. The whole house 
was filled as if there were a crowd present, crammed full of spirits. They 
were packed deep right up to the door, and the air was so thick it was 
scarcely possible to breathe. As for myself, I was all a-quiver with the 
question: “For God's sake, what in the world is this?” Then they cried out in 
chorus, “We have come back from Jerusalem where we found not what we 
sought”. That is the beginning of the Septem Sermones [the title of a 
subsequent book written by Jung, also known as The Seven Sermons to the 
Dead]. Then it began to flow out of me, and in the course of three evenings 
the thing was written. As soon as I took up the pen, the whole ghostly 
assemblage evaporated. The room quieted and the atmosphere cleared. 
The haunting was over. 
Had he been a psychiatric patient reporting this experience to a resident clinician he 
probably would have been considered mad, yet it depicted an actual event in his life. 
Although the belief in spirits is traditionally dismissed within scientific circles as being 
fanciful and irrational, if not psychotically delusional, Jung was adamant that his study 
of this subject represented the scientific investigation of extant psychic phenomena. 
This is evident in his 1920 paper, titled ‘The psychological foundations of belief in 
spirits’, in which he affirms that spirits are “psychic facts of which our academic wisdom 
refuses to take cognizance” (Jung, 1969, p.316).139 Hence, it appears he paradoxically 
views the general refusal within scientific circles to investigate the ‘psychic fact’ of 
139
 Jung’s 1920 paper is reprinted in the 1969 edition of his Collected Works (Volume 8). 
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spirits, as an unscientific stance. Yet, conversely, while Jung’s unique views on spirits 
and spirit possession may appear ‘unscientific’ from a conventional scientific 
perspective, they potentially proffer new pathways for better understanding issues 
pertaining to psychiatry, metaphysics, cultural relativism, psychopathology in general, 
and psychosis in particular. 
 
In stating that spirits are ‘psychic facts’, Jung does not mean that they are actual 
discarnate entities. Rather, he sees them as autonomous manifestations of the deeper 
psyche that influence human experience. Although he understands the psyche to be a 
composite of various interconnected parts, he also views these parts, as being 
“relatively independent” phenomena which can manifest as “autonomous complexes”, 
or ‘spirits’ (Jung, 1969, p.307). He therefore defines spirits as “unconscious 
autonomous complexes which appear as projections”, and asserts that “dreams, 
visions, pathological hallucinations, and delusional ideas” were examples of such 
‘spirits’ (ibid, pp.308-309). He further explains that spirits are artefacts of the collective 
unconscious that manifest when “a complex of the collective unconscious becomes 
associated with the ego” (p.311). In other words, a spirit ‘comes into being’ when a 
collective unconscious complex enters the ego-conscious sphere. Jung maintains that 
people often experience these complexes, or spirits, (in both malevolent and 
benevolent forms), as foreign and alien to the self and suggests that such instances 
may represent a “characteristic symptom marking the onset of many mental illnesses” 
(p.312). Indeed, in terms of psychopathology, he makes the somewhat sweeping 
assertion that “the insane person has always enjoyed the prerogative of being the one 
possessed by a demon, which is, by the way, a correct rendering of his psychical 
condition, for he is invaded by autonomous figures and thought-forms” (Jung, 1939, 
p.1007). At this level of explication, his construal of spirits is essentially congruent with 
the aforementioned DSM-5 notion of the ‘splitting off of clusters of mental contents from 
conscious awareness’ in dissociative disorders. His understanding, however, goes 
deeper than this to postulate generic psychic structures that are native to, and 
encompass, the entire cross-cultural gamut of humanity. 
 
Like contemporary psychiatry, Jung also views cultural relativity as an important factor 
in discerning between healthy and psychopathological expressions of spirit possession. 
For instance, he explains that when such experiences are mediated within a supportive 
framework of cultural beliefs and practices, curative outcomes may occur whereby “the 
driving forces locked up in the unconscious are canalized into consciousness and form 
a new source of power” (Jung, 1969, p.315). In the absence of such supportive cultural 
frameworks, however, he holds that the forces remain unintegrated and the situation 
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can become psychopathological because “the collective unconscious may take the 
place of reality” (ibid). Jung’s reference here to cultural relativity is similar to views 
espoused by psychiatry regarding cross-cultural diagnostic considerations, however, 
his essential understanding is markedly different from the psychiatric view. For 
instance, while psychiatry does not apply culture-related considerations when 
diagnosing mainstream Western patients, Jung’s culture-related considerations apply 
in all instances, regardless of ethnicity. Accordingly, he understands spirit influence, or 
possession, to be a generic cross-cultural phenomenon – “I am convinced that if a 
European had to go through the same exercises and ceremonies which the medicine-
man performs in order to make the spirits visible, he would have the same 
experiences” (p.303). For Jung, then, the phenomenon of ‘spirits’ is universal, and 
whether a spirit’s influence has a beneficial or psychopathological outcome depends on 
the presence or absence of a supportive framework of cultural beliefs and practices. If 
an apposite support framework exists, then the spirit may be integrated into ego-
consciousness. If not, then a regression into psychopathology may occur.140 
 
Overall, it appears that Jung’s theory on spirits and spirit possession has much to say 
about the possible nature of psychosis and proffers an alternative way to contend with 
the vexing issue of how to differentiate culturally normative spirit possession from 
psychopathology. For example, building on Jung’s work, Huskinson (2010, pp.71, 85) 
endorses “a non-pathological diagnosis of spirit possession” approach whereby “spirit 
possession should not be evaluated according to the intensity of its presentations, but 
according to one’s capacity to endure it”. Such an approach could apply equally to 
understanding spirits as dissociated psychological complexes or as actual 
metaphysical entities. If spirits are psychic facts, as Jung proposes, then it ironically 
seems psychiatry is ‘out of touch with reality’ in failing to recognise them as such. If 
spirits are universal and can influence all people then it is erroneous and futile to adopt 
a binary diagnostic model of understanding which acknowledges the validity of non-
Western cross-cultural instances of spirit possession while deeming the same to be 
psychopathological in a Western context. Arguably, the latter situation does not reflect 
the presence of mental disorder, but the lack or absence of a framework of knowledge 
and skills to assist people to contend and cope with psychospiritual crises. In light of 
this possibility it can be hypothesised that, in failing to accept the ostensible reality of 
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 Intriguingly, while Jung endorses a psychodynamic understanding of spirits, it seems he was also 
ambivalent regarding their ultimate nature. For instance, in a footnote appended to his definition of spirits 
as ‘unconscious autonomous complexes’ he clarifies that “the question of whether spirits exist within 
themselves is far from having been settled. Psychology is not concerned with things as they are ‘in 
themselves’, but only what people think about them” (Jung, 1969, p.309, fn.5). This statement suggests 
that spirits might exist beyond his psychological rendition of them. 
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spirits, and to provide the requisite framework of beliefs and practices to cope with 
instances of spirit possession, the medical psychiatric approach may inadvertently 
precipitate the ‘mental illness’ outcomes it aims to prevent. 
 
12.4.4   Van Dusen on spirits and spirit possession 
Research conducted by American clinical psychologist Wilson van Dusen during the 
1960s proffers another view regarding the nature of psychosis in relation to spirits and 
spirit possession. Although his work reflects Jung’s in some ways, it is otherwise 
unique and radically different. For instance, he explains that “the first step is to see that 
spirits and affections are the same thing”, which mirrors Jung’s notion of spirits as 
affective archetypal complexes (van Dusen, 1974, p.112). He further adds that “it is 
more accurate to see them as inner ruling tendencies than to view them in their 
individual identities as Joe or Mary”, which, like Jung, portrays spirits as unconscious 
aspects of the metaphysical self (ibid). Indeed, van Dusen (p.115) explicitly states that 
the view “of mind as based on the presence of spirits is not observably different from 
the modern dynamic theories of the nature of mind”. Be this as it may, his theory of 
mind and spirits was formulated in researching the works of Emanuel Swedenborg,141 
whose theory of mind and views on the nature of spirits significantly differ from Jung’s. 
 
Van Dusen has adopted Swedenborg’s theory of mind to help him better comprehend 
the possible nature of psychotic experiences. He understands Swedenborg’s 
explication on the interrelationship between spirits and humans as suggesting that;  
 
there is no real way of distinguishing our own potentialities and the 
potentialities of spirits with us…there is a correspondence between the 
spiritual worlds and the mind of man. The specific line of correspondence in 
the individual is through the affective spirits with him, into his affects and 
thence into all other levels of the mind (p.14). 
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 Swedenborg (1688-1772) was an eminent scientist who dedicated his earlier life to becoming an 
authority in the major sciences of the day. He is described by Bucke (1901, p.285) as “one of the great 
men of all time—a great thinker, a great writer, a great scientist, a great engineer”. van Dusen (1970, p.60) 
similarly notes that Swedenborg was “fluent in nine languages, wrote 150 works in 17 sciences, was an 
expert in at least seven crafts, was a musician, member of parliament, and a mining engineer”. In his later 
life, he turned to the study of psychology and religion for answers to the nature of reality and it was here 
that he “broke through into the spiritual world” (ibid). This entailed daily communications with spirits of 
many types (Jones & Fernyhough, 2008, p.6). Appendix Seven presents an overview of Swedenborg’s 
theory of mind. This provides an elucidation of his views regarding the interconnection between humans 
and spirits, which informed van Dusen’s work with ‘psychotic’ voice hearing and spirit possession. 
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In other words, from this perspective, while spirits have an independent existence, they 
are also intrinsically connected to human beings through the commonly shared medium 
of affective states of being, which, in turn, can interact with and influence the cognitive 
function of everyday human consciousness.142 However, Swedenborg (1905 [1758], 
p.230) further maintains that “these spirits have no knowledge whatever that they are 
with man; but when they are with him they believe that all things of his memory and 
thought are their own”. Hence, extending this thinking in context of psychopathology, 
van Dusen (1974, p.117) proposes that “man’s life involves an interaction with a 
hierarchy of spirits. This interaction is normally not conscious, but perhaps in some 
cases of mental illness it has become conscious”. Here, he diverges from Jung’s 
thinking. Whereas Jung sees psychosis as the irruption of unconscious ‘spirit’ 
complexes into the conscious mind, van Dusen suggests that, in some instances, 
psychosis results in a ‘lifting of the veil’ that ordinarily conceals the connection between 
spirits and humans. Hence, some psychotic people can become aware of the spirits 
that are naturally with us, but which normally remain hidden from personal 
consciousness. 
 
If this idea is given credence, it opens new lines of investigative consideration. For one, 
it offers another way of understanding ‘spirit possession’ beyond the standard view of 
spirits possessing humans, for it appears that spirit possession can be construed as a 
universal and natural phenomenon whereby humans and their spirit counterparts 
coexist in a perpetual and unconscious state of mutual ‘possession’. Additionally, this 
view depicts the workings of the mind as intimately wedded with, and influenced by, 
psychospiritual forces and beings. Therefore, counter to the prevailing psychiatric 
practice of relegating psychospiritual matters to the fringes of clinical inquiry, it is 
possible that a better understanding of mental health and psychopathology requires an 
advanced knowledge about the larger psychospiritual realities of being human. 
 
12.4.4.1   Van Dusen’s research on spirits and psychosis 
In terms of psychosis research, van Dusen used Swedenborg’s theory of mind to guide 
a unique investigative experiment he conducted with patients regarding their 
‘hallucinatory’ experiences. His research represents an investigative shift from a 
reductive psychopathology-based approach to a heuristic approach, and his 
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 Although van Dusen generally discusses spirits as if they are actual beings, there are instances where 
he speculates on this issue. For instance, he muses, “I wonder whether hallucinations, often thought of as 
detached pieces of the unconscious, and hallucinations as spiritual possession might not simply be two 
ways of describing the same process. Are they really spirits or pieces of one’s own unconscious?” (van 
Dusen, 1970, p.69).  
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subsequent findings demonstrate the potential efficacy of the latter approach in 
gleaning better insights into the enigmatic nature of psychosis. 
 
In 1964, after sixteen years in practice as a clinical psychologist with psychotic 
patients, van Dusen (1974, pp.117-118) inadvertently discovered a marked correlation 
between patients’ reported symptomatology, especially voice hearing, and 
Swedenborg’s descriptions of spirit-human coexistence. One day, when working with “a 
young woman who was distressed about her love affair with an unseen lover”, he 
decided, “just for the heck of it”, to directly converse with the invisible lover via the 
patient, and was surprised when a response was forthcoming (van Dusen, 1981, 
p.136). Over the ensuing years, he chose patients “who could distinguish between their 
own thoughts and the things heard and seen” (van Dusen, 1974, p.118) as subjects for 
his further phenomenological research into the nature of the voices that people 
reported. He explains that during sessions with these people he would “hold long 
dialogues with a patient’s hallucinations and record both my questions and their 
answers” (van Dusen, 1970, p.61). This patently runs counter to standard psychiatric 
practice of dismissing the content of so-called hallucinations as unreal, meaningless, 
and incomprehensible. On this point, van Dusen (ibid) explains that “I treat the 
hallucinations as realities because that is what they are to the patient”. He further notes 
that “in no case did patients accept the term hallucinations for these experiences. The 
term was offensive. It implied they were not real” (van Dusen, 1981, p.140). As 
discussed below, the subsequent findings of his research demonstrate the feasibility of 
investigating so-called psychotic symptoms to ascertain whether or not they represent 
psychospiritual phenomena unknown to psychiatry.  
 
Far from being meaningless and illusory, the ‘hallucinatory’ voices interviewed by van 
Dusen demonstrated degrees of apparent cogency and agency independent from the 
person who was hearing them. From his documented communications with these 
voices he was able to produce a “roughly accurate phenomenological map” (ibid, 
p.152) of a realm of spiritual entities which ostensibly account for much of what 
psychiatry construes as psychotic auditory hallucinations. However, his analysis of 
these communications is not merely limited to what was said by the voices. If this were 
so, then his comparison of them with the symptoms of psychosis could rightly be 
dismissed as pure conjecture. In addition to the voices’ content he also noted patterns 
of behaviour and personality which suggested manifest types of being. Indeed, he 
reports that he was able to “give the Rorschach inkblot test to a patient’s voices 
separately from the patient’s own responses” (van Dusen, 1974, p.129). The types of 
beings he discerned broadly fell into two categories. As he explains, “in my dialogues 
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with patients I learned of the two orders of experience, borrowing from the voices 
themselves, called the higher and the lower order” (van Dusen, 1970, p.62). The key 
differentiating characteristics of each are listed in Table 11 below.143 
 
Table 11 – Typology of van Dusen’s higher order and lower order voices 
Higher Order Voices Lower Order Voices 
Less prevalent (about twenty percent of 
cases) 
Most prevalent (about eighty percent of 
cases) 
Benevolent, helpful and supportive Malevolent, wilfully destructive and 
hypercritical 
Respectful of a person’s autonomy Strive to control a person’s will 
Rarely speak Talk endlessly 
Intrinsically religious or spiritual Highly irreligious and adverse to spiritual 
matters 
Vocabulary and knowledge often 
transcendent to a person’s own 
Vocabulary and knowledge limited – “they 
cannot report more than the patient sees, 
hears, or remembers” 
“Thinks in something like universal ideas” Incapable of sequential reasoning 
Communications possess “an almost 
inexpressible ring of truth” 
Communications are deceitful  
(Source – van Dusen, 1970, pp.62-63) 
Of particular significance for van Dusen was the marked correlation between the nature 
and content of the voices he recorded and the near identical appearance of the same 
in Swedenborg’s writings. Hence, counter to psychiatry’s view that spirit possession 
represents a cultural belief or superstition, van Dusen maintains it may possibly be a 
generic, pervasive, and natural psychospiritual reality. 
 
A related and pertinent finding was that this potentially rich source of phenomenological 
material was not only ignored by psychiatry, but ironically, also rendered invisible by its 
disbelief in psychospiritual realities. Van Dusen (1981, p.138) discovered that many 
patients consequently hid the content of their voice hearing experiences from clinicians 
                                                          
143
 For van Dusen’s full description of the characteristics of higher and the lower order spirits, see 
Appendix Eight. I have placed this important material in an appendix, rather than in the main dissertation 
body, because it is several pages in length and is quoted verbatim. This constitutes a unique body of 
writing in terms of its phenomenological description of different types of spirits that may possibly explain 
the occurrence of various ‘psychotic symptoms’; especially voice hearing. The fact that this research was 
conducted by an experienced clinical psychologist within a mainstream mental health setting adds to its 
importance in that it sets potential precedence for further such investigation into possible psychospiritual 
determinants in voice hearing and other ‘psychotic’ symptoms. 
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for fear of being diagnosed and stigmatised with a psychiatric label. However, in 
gaining the trust of his patients by being open-minded and dropping the usual 
pathologising clinical mindset, van Dusen was afforded the opportunity to make some 
novel observations about the possible nature of voices in psychosis; an opportunity that 
is largely lost to mainstream psychiatry due to people hiding the phenomenological 
details of their experiences from disbelieving clinicians. In communicating with people’s 
‘hallucinatory’ voices he made discoveries that may be pivotal to better understanding 
not only the nature of ‘psychotic’ experiences, but also innate psychospiritual human 
experiences. 
 
12.4.4.2   Van Dusen on spirits and causes of psychosis  
If coexistence with spirits is intrinsic to being human, then under what circumstances 
does such natural ‘spirit possession’ become psychopathological, or psychotic? Van 
Dusen addressed this question in two ways. First, at a symptomatic level, he 
highlighted parallels between his own findings, Swedenborg’s descriptions, and/or the 
descriptive material in psychiatric texts about psychotic auditory hallucinations and 
other reported anomalous experiences. Second, at a conceptual level, he mused on 
the possible psychospiritual machinations of psychosis. 
 
In terms of the symptomatic focus, he found that lower order voices mirror typical 
descriptions in mainstream psychiatric literature regarding the pernicious nature of 
auditory hallucinations. From his dialogues with patients’ voices he noted a 
predominant presence of spirits that exercised a “persistent will to destroy” a person 
(Van Dusen, 1970, p.62).  Such voices; 
 
tease and torment just for the fun of it…find a weak point of conscience and 
work on it interminably…call the patient every conceivable name, suggest 
every lewd act…threaten death…suggest foolish acts…invade every nook 
and cranny of privacy, work on every weakness and credibility…[and] 
undermine the patient’s will (ibid). 
 
This reflects Swedenborg’s (1905 [1758], p.185) report, from his personal experience 
with spirits, that a fundamental objective of malevolent spirits is to seek to break a 
person, for they “are such that they hold man in deadly hatred, and desire nothing so 
much as to destroy him both soul and body”. Another commonly reported psychotic 
symptom is the belief that ‘something’ is attempting to take control of a part of a 
person’s body. On this issue, van Dusen (1970, p.62) observes that “the lower order 
can work for a long time to possess some part of the patient’s body”, while 
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Swedenborg (2015a [1747 - 1765]) likewise describes the wish of spirits “to 
possess…wherefore they also inflow with man, from the head as far as to the mouth, 
and to the breast - others from the feet as far as to the genitals”, and that people in 
such states of possession sometimes “behaved like insane persons” (2015b [1749 - 
1756]). Additionally, van Dusen (1981, p.148) holds that spirit-induced hallucinations 
“were very clearly the basis for delusional ideas”, an idea seemingly corroborated by 
Swedenborg’s (2015c [1749 - 1756]) observation that “if spirits were to flow into man 
from the exterior memory, he could not think from his own memory, but only from that 
of the spirit”. These are but a few of many examples in both van Dusen’s research 
findings and Swedenborg’s texts which closely correlate with symptoms of psychosis 
as identified by mainstream psychiatry. This is not to say that the works of van Dusen 
and Swedenborg irrevocably prove the role of spirit possession/influences in psychosis. 
However, they do present plausible and intriguing phenomenological possibilities that 
warrant further investigation.  
 
Van Dusen also considers the effect that the presence or absence of psychospiritual 
skills can have on psychotic outcomes. He proposes that, in contrast to the mystic’s 
conscious and voluntary entry into psychospiritual domains, the unwitting and 
unprepared person can become psychotic when exposed to the same. For instance, he 
suggests that Swedenborg’s entry into the realm of spirits was voluntary, as opposed to 
the involuntary experience of psychosis - “My guess is that Swedenborg systematically 
explored the same worlds that psychotic patients find themselves thrust into…the 
worlds beyond this one, inside this one” (van Dusen, 1974, pp.135, 137). He also notes 
that Swedenborg warned of the considerable dangers of dabbling into these realms 
and strongly counselled against doing so (Van Dusen, 1970, p.65; 1974, p.137; 1981, 
p.152). From this perspective it appears that psychosis results from involuntarily 
breaching the barrier separating worlds where unskilled or unprepared people find 
themselves at sea and subject to spirit attack. Elsewhere, he compares Swedenborg’s 
active use of yogic breathing techniques with the schizophrenic withdrawal into fantasy 
(van Dusen, 1970, p.65). This suggests that Swedenborg was able to avoid insanity 
through the acquisition and skilled application of technologies of consciousness, in 
contrast to van Dusen’s patients who somehow found themselves in other realms of 
being that they were ill-equipped to navigate. This arguably supports the idea that 
advanced conceptual and experiential knowledge about psychospiritual realities may 
help to better understand and navigate through distressing states of consciousness, be 
they spirit possession, spiritual emergencies, are other psychotic-like experiences. 
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Overall, van Dusen’s research represents a landmark in psychosis research for it 
seems his approach has not previously been attempted by other clinicians, nor has it 
been replicated since. His reported findings challenge present-day psychiatry’s 
portrayal of issues of spirit possession as a peculiar cultural-religious factor that is 
incidental to the bigger endeavour of identifying mainstream forms of psychopathology. 
Like Jung, Swedenborg saw ‘spirit possession’ as a natural and universal phenomenon 
and van Dusen’s dialogues with his patients’ voices appear to support this idea. His 
work also suggests that psychotic experiences of spirit influences cannot be 
psychopathologically differentiated from culturally normative experiences of the same. 
Indeed, this calls into question the veracity of psychiatry’s prevailing practice of 
equating ‘non-cultural’ psychospiritual experiences with psychopathology. If 
psychopathology cannot be accurately delineated, then it seems prudent and justifiable 
to refrain from insisting on its validity and, instead, adopt a heuristic approach to 
investigating and better understanding anomalous states of being and consciousness. 
 
12.5 Conclusion 
Psychiatry fails to explain how experiences deemed intrinsically psychotic in 
mainstream Western contexts are deemed normative and non-psychotic in ‘other’ 
cultural contexts. How can it be, for example, that reports of spirit possession by 
Western patients are considered unreal and psychotic, yet are viewed as normative 
and non-psychotic in patients from ‘other’ cultures? Indeed, my investigation 
throughout this chapter suggests that experiencing psychospiritual realities is a natural 
and pancultural human capacity. This arguably calls upon psychiatry to transcend its 
limited materialist and cognicentric worldview to incorporate metaphysical 
considerations within its epistemic scope. My ensuing exploration of Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry in Chapter Thirteen exemplifies the efficacy of using a heuristic approach to 
open-endedly investigate both physical and metaphysical phenomena in order to better 




Tibetan Buddhist Psychiatry: 
Spirit Possession and Psychosis in Practice 
 
13.0 Introduction 
This chapter deepens my exploration of psychosis and spirit possession within context 
of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatric epistemology and practice. As a culminating challenge 
to Western materialist psychiatry, this provides a concrete example of a holistic model 
of psychiatry that understands psychosis to be essentially psychospiritual in nature and 
aetiology. Examining the texts of three expert commentators on Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry pragmatically demonstrates the metaphysical depths to which psychosis can 
be understood and the therapeutic efficacy that such an understanding enables. Doing 
so anchors my dissertation’s driving argument that psychospiritual considerations are 
essential to better understanding psychotic and psychotic-like experiences. 
 
13.1 Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and psychopathology 
Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry appears to have a deeper understanding of the nature of 
psychopathology than Western psychiatry. Indeed, a core focus throughout my 
dissertation has been to systematically challenge the validity of Western psychiatry’s 
psychopathology-seeking approach to understanding psychosis. I have argued and 
aimed to demonstrate that the proposed constellation of diagnostic criteria that 
constitute ‘psychosis’ is a tenuous construct shaped by materialist supposition and 
limited phenomenological observation. This, however, does not infer that 
psychopathology is non-existent, but that the materialist approach adopted by Western 
psychiatry enables only a limited understanding of psychopathology due to its 
superficial scope of investigation. Likewise, for researchers who aim to discern 
psychotic from psychospiritual instances through rational and physical sense-based 
approaches alone, for it seems that identifying and understanding the deeper nature of 
psychopathology requires that clinicians and researchers have the capacity to explore 
metaphysical domains of reality via the use of technologies of consciousness. Indeed, 
it appears that while psychopathology-seeking and diagnostic differentiation are 
ineffectual in a materialist model of psychiatric practice and investigation, the effective 
diagnosing of psychopathology is often enabled in holistic approaches where 
practitioners are adept in using technologies of consciousness to explore 
psychospiritual domains. 
 
As demonstrated below throughout Section 13.3, the Tibetan Buddhist psychiatric 
approach arguably exemplifies how a profound understanding of psychopathology may 
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be gleaned through a deep heuristic and phenomenological investigation of physical, 
psychological and metaphysical realities. It appears that within this framework of 
understanding and practice, where psychospiritual knowledge is fundamental, 
practitioners can directly perceive and identify the causal roots of psychosis, and 
discern psychopathology from developmental psychospiritual experiences. Therefore, 
in light of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry’s detailed understanding of the nature of mind 
and mental disturbances, and its apparent high rate of therapeutic efficacy,144 it is 
feasible to suggest that Western psychiatry might gain a better understanding of 
psychosis, psychopathology and human developmental potential through investigating 
cross-cultural psychospiritual bodies of knowledge. 
13.2 Tibetan Buddhist theory of mind 
Before investigating the nature of spirit possession and psychosis within Tibetan 
Buddhist psychiatry, it is first apposite to provide a brief overview of the theory of mind 
upon which the discipline is based. This provides an epistemological backdrop for my 
later examination of three texts concerning how Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry 
understands mental health and illness, and the dynamics of spirit possession in 
psychosis. 
The Tibetan Buddhist theory of mind is vast, complex, and largely foreign to the 
Western materialist worldview regarding the nature of the psyche and reality. Hence, it 
is necessary to restrict the scope of description here to key understandings. Although 
modern psychiatry and psychology share common ground with Buddhist psychiatry in 
that they are all primarily concerned with issues pertaining to mental health and 
dysfunction, Buddhism differs markedly in its understanding about the nature of mind. 
In simple terms, the Tibetan Buddhist teacher Lama Yeshe (2003, p.75) explains that, 
from a Buddhist perspective, mind is understood to be composed of two interrelated 
aspects, “the relative and the absolute”. At face value, this appears similar to the 
psychoanalytic view of the conscious and unconscious mind; however, the Buddhist 
understanding of absolute mind goes far beyond Freud’s introjected unconscious 
material, and Jung’s autonomous archetypal domain, to encompass a meaning of 
cosmological proportions. Lama Yeshe (ibid) describes the relative mind as the 
“dualistic” mind that “perceives and functions in the sense world”. However, from a 
144
 According to Clifford (1984, p.199), “Tibetan psychiatric remedies…are held in wide esteem by the 
Tibetans for their effectiveness”, while Begley (1994, p.323) similarly notes that for centuries throughout 
Asia the discipline “has been highly respected for its effectiveness”. However, while commentators allude 
to the therapeutic efficacy of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry, further substantiating details about how and why 
are not provided. 
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Buddhist perspective, relative mind is but the microcosmic expression of macrocosmic 
mind or “the absolute true nature of the mind, which is totally beyond the duality” (ibid). 
Similarly, Evans-Wentz (1968, pp.6, 12) refers to macrocosmic mind as “One Mind” or 
“Cosmic Consciousness”, in comparison to ego mind which is seen as the existential 
province of the “unenlightened man” and “illusion-based belief”. One Mind is also the 
omnipresent source of all creation which “illuminates the innumerable myriads of finite 
minds” and “contain all things” (ibid, p.10). Clifford (1984, pp.5, 66) further maintains 
that the macrocosmic Mind is “the basis of all phenomena”, hence, in Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry the “entire universe is seen to be within the individual” and all illness, both 
physical and mental, is the product of failing to understand and mediate this mystic 
dimension of self. From this viewpoint, physical reality is epiphenomenal to One Mind, 
which is inverse to the Western psychiatric understanding that mind is epiphenomenal 
to physicality. 
 
Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry, then, is fundamentally informed by the understanding that 
all things are interconnected within the cosmological matrix of One Mind. Further to 
this, Clifford (ibid, p.151) explains that Buddhism understands the universe to be “like 
an immense field of electromagnetic energy” in which all things are interconnected, 
impermanent, in flux and, despite appearances, not solid. Rather, the entirety of 
existence, both physical and metaphysical, “consists of radiations of energy vibrations 
emitted as rays or as fields of force and at varying rates of speed and thus solidity” 
(ibid). What appears to be a solid and discrete object is in fact “a dynamic 
manifestation of vibrations” and, correspondingly, each person is seen as “a bundle of 
perceptions” that are in constant flux (ibid). This is similar to Western quantum physics 
theory. For instance, American physicist Harold Puthoff (2001, p.41) contends that; 
 
all of us are immersed, both as living and physical beings, in an overall 
interpenetrating and interdependent field in ecological balance with the 
cosmos as a whole, and even the boundary lines between physical and 
‘metaphysical’ would dissolve into a unitary viewpoint of the universe as a 
fluid, changing, energetic/informational cosmological unity.  
 
Hence, the universal matrix of vibrational interconnectedness encompasses and 
contains everything from stars, to geographical landforms, to trees, to human beings, to 
mental states, to metaphysical beings such as spirits.  
 
A related core concept is that of ‘prana’ which denotes the form and nature of the One 
Mind matrix of universal interconnectivity. Lama Govinda (1969, p.137) explains that 
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“all forces of the universe, like those of the human mind, from the highest 
consciousness to the depths of the subconscious, are modifications of ‘prana’”, while 
Sri Aurobindo (2005, p.283) describes prana as “the life-stuff, the substantial will and 
energy in the cosmos working out into determined form and action and conscious 
dynamis of being”. According to Epstein & Topgay (1982, p.67), while prana acts as a 
“vital force or energy that pervades the human organism”, demons are also 
manifestations of prana. Hence, the human mind and demons are different 
manifestations of the same pranic energy that permeates and constitutes all 
phenomena.145 As such, they are immutably interconnected. Overall, Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry sees all aspects of physical and psychospiritual reality as integrated, and 
integral to self, with One Mind as the omnipresent source of all creation that contains 
all things.  
 
Finally, while Tibetan Buddhism understands all things to be interconnected within One 
Mind, it paradoxically also understands that the perception of ‘self’ and ‘things’ within 
corporeal reality is ultimately illusory. As Clifford (1984, p.17) explains, the notion of “no 
self” is fundamental to Buddhist epistemology and reflects the ultimate understanding 
that “there is no independent self-entity, no self either in ourselves or in the 
phenomenal world around us. There is only contained experience”. Indeed, she 
maintains that a person “strays into delusion” when perceiving his or her ‘self’ as being 
concrete and individuated (ibid). Hence, according to this philosophical view, the idea 
of self as a unique ‘I’ is ultimately illusory. This applies not only to the idea of an 
individuated ‘self’ but also to the entirety of corporeal reality. For instance,  Goddard 
(1938, pp.102-103) notes that in Buddhist cosmology "all the mind's arbitrary 
conceptions of matter, phenomena, and of all conditioning factors and all conceptions 
and ideas relating thereto are like a dream, a phantasm...the phenomena of the 
physical appearance is wholly illusion". It therefore follows that normal ego function, 
which Western psychiatry understands to be ‘mental health’, is ultimately seen as a 
delusory form of ‘mental illness’ from a Tibetan Buddhist psychiatric perspective.  
 
On this point, Lama Yeshe (2003, p.38) holds that because “our mistaken perception 
processes the information supplied by our five senses and transmits incorrect 
information to our mind” the consequent outcome is that “most of the time we are 
hallucinating, not seeing the true nature of things”. He understands this to be a form of 
mental illness and further explains: 
 
                                                          
145
 The notion of prana is further discussed in Section 13.3.1 in context of spirit possession and psychosis. 
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By mental illness I mean the kind of mind that does not see reality...In the 
West, you wouldn’t consider this to be mental illness, but Western 
psychology’s interpretation is too narrow. If someone is obviously 
emotionally disturbed, you consider that to be a problem, but if someone 
has a fundamental inability to see reality, to understand his or her own true 
nature, you don’t. Not knowing your own basic mental attitude is a huge 
problem. 
According to Evans-Wentz (1968, p.11), the ultimate state of reality-based mental 
health is achieved when “the microcosmic becomes one with the macrocosmic” within 
a person. In other words, “realization of the One Mind, through introspectively attaining 
understanding of the nature of its macroscopic aspect innate in man, is equivalent to 
the attainment of the…Full Awakening of Buddhahood” (ibid, p.12). Therefore, optimal 
mental health is achieved with mystical Enlightenment, part of which includes 
becoming aware that the seeming separateness of things, and the experience of the 
individuated ‘I’, (which are both born of dualistic thinking), are illusory and out of touch 
with ultimate One Mind reality.  
This has major ramifications for Western psychiatry’s practice of diagnostically 
discerning ‘mental illness’ from ‘mental health’ because both are delusional from a 
Tibetan psychiatric framework of understanding. Such an idea essentially undermines 
the Western notion of ‘psychopathology’, for what differentiates the delusional nature of 
ego normality from psychotic delusional states? The depiction of corporeal reality as 
being ultimately ‘unreal’ is a repeated theme throughout mystic literature and 
fundamentally challenges conventional psychiatric thinking about psychopathology. 
The ensuing investigation of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and spirit possession 
demonstrates how a deep psychospiritual understanding of the nature of reality 
enables greater insight into the nature of the human condition as a whole. 
13.3 Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and spirit possession 
The Tibetan Buddhist understanding of spirit possession is complex and comprises a 
sophisticated body of knowledge regarding the nature of spirits, or demons, and their 
deleterious effects on the human condition. The scope of their influence in human life 
extends far beyond the Western psychiatric depiction of them as idiosyncratic cultural 
norms and beliefs. For instance, Clifford (1984, p.148) explains that, from a Tibetan 
psychiatric perspective, demons: 
 “represent a wide range of forces and emotions which are normally beyond
our conscious control”;
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 “prevent well-being and spiritual development”; 
 “are outer and inner factors”; 
 “can include such ‘demons’ as laziness, lust, bad companions, dualistic 
thinking, hypersensitivity, increased emotionality, attachment to wealth, 
sectarianism, spiritual pride, and clinging to tranquillity”.  
Hence, unlike Western psychiatry which refutes the existence of spirits, Tibetan 
Buddhist psychiatry sees spirits as having a pervasive impact on human life; 
personally, interpersonally, socially, and globally. This includes matters common and 
normal to Western secular society, such as attachment to wealth, indulging ego desires 
and appetites, and sectarianism. Intriguingly, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry also views 
‘dualistic thinking’ as a form of demon, presumably because it is a function of relative 
mind that is inherently prone to misconstruing the nature of reality due to its limited 
scope of cognition and perception. From this perspective, Western medical psychiatry, 
which is grounded in dualistic thinking, might be seen as the product of demon or spirit 
influence.   
 
What, then, is the nature of these demons? There are differing views amongst 
commentators about whether the ‘demons’ of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry are actual 
entities or symbolic psychological projections. According to Deane (2014, p.448), 
translators have generally represented the Tibetan psychiatric worldview in Western 
psychological terms to establish mutual grounds of understanding. For instance, 
Clifford (1984, p.149) maintains that the notion of ‘demon’ symbolically represents that 
which is “primarily a psychological phenomenon associated with the multitude of 
mental and emotional obscurations”, while, in psychoanalytical terms, she holds that 
“these demons are in the role of the id trying to obstruct the super-ego’s higher 
promptings”. In regards to psychopathology, she further explains that “in the pre-
Freudian terms of Tibet, ‘demons’ and ‘devils’ are appropriate names for the forces of 
life and emotion that can drive the mind insane” (ibid, p.150). However, Deane (2014, 
p.448) questions the veracity of this psychological interpretation for, in her view, it 
misrepresents the belief by many Tibetan Buddhist practitioners that demons are 
“entities in their own right…who had the ability to cause harm in the form of psychiatric 
or other illnesses”. She sees Clifford’s psychological translation of ‘demon’ as a 
compromise, as most Western professionals would be unable to accept them as actual 
beings. According to Clifford (1984, p.129), though, her extensive experience with 
Tibetan Buddhist psychiatrists reveals that, while the general Tibetan population 
believe spirits to be real, “learned Tibetans” understand the term ‘demons’ to 
symbolically represent the deeper psychospiritual dynamics of human existence. From 
another perspective, Plakun (2008, p.422) takes the middle ground in suggesting “there 
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may ultimately be little difference between the views”. This seems to infer that 
unconscious psychological projections and demons may be essentially the same.  
 
My investigation throughout the remainder of this chapter delves deeper into the nature 
of demons and of spirit possession in psychosis by examining the views of three 
leading commentators on Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry epistemology. This provides an 
explication of key concepts and terms in Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry that are integral to 
understanding psychotic experience and spirit possession. These authors are: 
i) Epstein & Topgay’s (1982) description of the interplay between prana and 
rlung;  
ii) Burang’s (1974) consideration of the impact of skandhas; and  
iii) Clifford’s (1984) description of gdon (demons) and their relation to 
madness.  
It is beyond the scope of this investigation, however, to elaborate on the complex array 
of related factors within the multidimensional matrix of Tibetan medicine. Still, my 
limited undertaking demonstrates how a sophisticated phenomenological knowledge of 
psychospiritual matters can lead to better understanding psychosis and to informing 
effective psychiatric therapeutic practices, beyond that which is possible within the 
Western materialist model of psychiatry. 
 
13.3.1 Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and spirit possession in psychosis (Epstein & 
Topgay, 1982) 
Epstein & Topgay (1982) provide an explication of the causal role of spirit possession 
in madness across a spectrum of dynamics ranging from specific to universal. Their 
views are drawn from analysing a key fourth century Tibetan medical text titled rGyud-
nShi, which includes a section on “nervous and mental disease” (ibid, p.69). Central to 
this explication is Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry’s concept of ‘rlung’. According to Epstein 
& Topgay (p.71), “in order to understand mental illness from the Tibetan point of view, 
an understanding of the nature, properties, and functions of rlung is essential”. 
Fundamentally, the term ‘rlung’ denotes the movement and flux of prana (p.69). In 
other words, rlung is to prana what currents are to the ocean. At a macrocosmic level, 
rlung-action operates throughout the entire universe. However, it also operates 
microcosmically within the body-psyche complex of each person. In terms of the latter, 
consciousness “is carried by the currents of rlung as it changes its object moment to 
moment” (p.71), hence, the faculties of human cognition are essentially dependent on 
the underlying presence of this psychospiritual force. Indeed, Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry sees the human mind as “inseparably linked to the body through the 
medium of rlung”, and mental disorder or illness is the result of distortion or disturbance 
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of rlung (p.72). Finally, rlung manifests in five interconnected currents of varying 
solidity, ranging from physical to ethereal (p.71). Of these five currents, the life-
sustaining or life-bearing current, known as sok-rlung, operates “as the basis of 
conceptual consciousness” and is chiefly related to mental disorders and spirit 
possession (pp.72, 76-77). Hence, it appears that through the application of 
technologies of consciousness that are little understood by Western psychiatry, Tibetan 
Buddhist practitioners have been able to identify subtle psychospiritual dynamics that 
can cause mental disorders. 
 
Furthermore, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry understands that mental disorders resulting 
from sok-rlung disturbances are ultimately precipitated by the detrimental influence of 
spirits (p.76). As Epstein & Topgay (p.77) explain, “Tibetan conceptions of 
psychopathology see spirit possession as an activating condition of psychosis”. 
However, harmful spirit incursion is itself enabled by “predisposing causes” such as 
negative mental states and poor lifestyles choices (p.76). More specifically, “psychosis 
is said to result when the space or channel containing the subtle life-bearing prana is 
forcefully entered by another energy, usually a spirit…disturbing the relationship 
between pranic flow and mind” (ibid). Upon entry into the pranic body the invading spirit 
is understood to form a blockage, therefore “occluding or reversing the current of prana 
upon which the mind rests. Thus, control over the functioning of mental process is lost, 
with loss of memory and hysterical behavior proceeding to full-fledged psychosis” 
(p.77). The authors further explain that “the spirit forcefully enters the site of the life-
bearing current, dis-localizing it and functioning itself in that space”, which 
consequently initiates an internal power struggle:  
 
This is akin to ‘two people forcefully living together in the one room’; when 
one becomes more powerful, the other loses control and struggle becomes 
commonplace. No longer does the affected person’s mind bear its original 
nature, but that individual has not totally lost his mind either (ibid). 
 
Interestingly, the struggle described here mirrors reports by psychotic individuals in 
Western society who claim they are under attack by invisible alien forces that seek to 
control their minds and bodies. It is also markedly similar to Bleuler’s (1950. p.9) 
portrayal of schizophrenia as a “clear-cut splitting of the psychic functions” and Jung’s 
(1939, p.1004) picture of psychosis as “a psyche at war with itself”. In the Tibetan 




Arguably, then, the understanding that psychosis results from the seat-of-
consciousness being disrupted, blocked or controlled by attacking spirits, suggests that 
the ‘delusional’ belief of many psychotic people about being possessed by spirits may, 
in fact, reflect reality. Indeed, Epstein & Topgay (1982, p.77) claim that “those spirits 
that cause psychosis come primarily from the realm of hungry ghosts”,146 which are 
driven by malevolent and negative inclinations and are “sometimes attracted to humans 
predisposed to their influence”. While the standard Western psychiatric response to 
such instances is to attempt to quell the ‘delusional’ beliefs with medication, the Tibetan 
psychiatric response is to use a holistic array of remedial methods to restore balance 
and to remove the possessing entity (ibid, p.76). In Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry, then, 
the clinical scope for identifying psychosis is not limited to simply noting physically 
observable signs and symptoms, but extends into metaphysical domains that are 
ostensibly the causal source of such disruptions. This raises the questions - If spirit 
possession, (however it is understood), is a primary causal agent in psychotic 
episodes, are biological treatments, such as antipsychotic medications, the optimal 
therapeutic approach? If psychospiritual dynamics are the basic causal determinants in 
psychosis, do such medications have any curative effect at all? 
 
13.3.2 Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and spirit possession in psychosis (Burang, 1974) 
Examining the work of Burang (1974) offers further insight into psychosis and spirit 
possession within a Tibetan Buddhist framework of understanding. After spending 
many years learning the Tibetan language and studying Tibetan medicine and 
psychiatry,147 Burang (1974, p.ix) concludes that “in contrast to the standpoint of 
Western research, it acquaints us with unusual spiritual foundations…and often 
displays a masterful observation of nature”. As such, he depicts Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry as a therapeutic discipline based on robust phenomenological observation 
and a subsequent deep psychospiritual understanding of the nature of human mental 
health and disturbances. Burang’s examination of the ancient Indian notion of 
skandhas, which Tibetan psychiatry has adopted, offers further elucidation on the role 
of spirit possession in psychosis.  
 
As explained above in Section 13.2, Tibetan Buddhist philosophy understands the 
seemingly real sense of self to actually be a composite “bundle of perceptions” 
                                                          
146
 According to Epstein & Topgay, (1982, p.77), hungry ghosts represent one of the six realms of Tibetan 
cosmology. Groves (2014, p.987) explains that “the hungry ghost realm is described as a state of intense 
and unsatisfied craving”.  
147
 Clifford, (1984, p.10) claims that, to her knowledge, Burang is the “only Westerner to have examined 
the whole range of Tibetan psychiatric treatment first-hand in Tibet”.  
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(Clifford, 1984, p.151). Further to this, Burang (1974, p.89) explains that, within Indian 
and Tibetan cosmology “man is considered to be an aggregate of ‘vehicles’ (skandhas 
in ancient Indian philosophy and pung-po in the Tibetan)”. In other words, he depicts 
skandhas as ‘vehicles’, or modalities of life-stuff, that coalesce to form the corporeal 
experience of being human. He notes that Tibetan physicians “devote detailed 
description and speculation to the various vehicles of the aggregate”, and that “after 
death, these vehicles or component parts of man are dismantled by varying degrees 
according to set laws” (ibid, pp.89-90). Descriptions by other authors help to elucidate 
the notion of skandhas. For example, Clifford (1984, p.17) explains that there are five 
skandhas, each of which represents a composite part of a person’s whole “conditioned 
experience”. She describes these as: 
 
the five aggregates or psycho-physical groupings” which are “form, feeling, 
perception, concept, and consciousness. The first three are instinctual 
processes; the last two are volitional. It is the dynamic interplay of these 
five rather than a permanent ontological self that describes the ego-sense 
(ibid). 
 
In a broad context, Lama Govinda (1969, p.70) describes skandhas as a composite of 
“the individuals’ active and reactive functions of consciousness in the sequence of their 
increasing density or ‘materiality’ and in proportion to their increasing subtlety, de-
materialization, mobility, and spiritualization”. Hence, that which a person experiences 
as an individuated ‘I-self’ is actually a no-self aggregate of skandhas. 
 
Burang also discusses the notion of skandhas in context of psychotic experience. For 
example, he explains that psychosis can occur when the influence of “interfering 
vehicles” results in “a discordant interaction of vehicles in the vehicle aggregate of 
man” which, in turn, can precipitate “a displacement of layers of personality of which 
the integrated self is normally composed” and consequently lead to “changes of 
consciousness” for the afflicted person (Burang, 1974, p.90). More specifically, he 
maintains that such disruption and dysfunction within the body of skandhas can lead to 
“the kind of split in consciousness which the Western psychiatrist encounters in 
schizophrenia” (ibid). Such instances, then, whereby interfering vehicles detrimentally 
affect the integrity of skandhas, constitute the precipitation of psychosis by spirit 
possession. 
 
Burang’s exposition on spirit possession is similar to Epstein & Topgay’s, though 
couched in different terminology. While Epstein & Topgay (1982, p.73) refer to spirits 
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as “external forces”, Burang depicts them as ‘vehicles’. For instance, he explains that 
spirit possession occurs as “the occupation of component parts of the personality by 
vehicles from the outside” (Burang, 1974, p.91). These occupying ‘vehicles’ are the 
demons of Tibetan cosmology which he intriguingly describes as “psychic fields of 
force, either natural or contrived” (ibid, p.92). It appears, here, that he understands 
possessing spirits may be both ontological (natural) or psychological (contrived) in 
nature. Indeed, his other descriptions support this idea. For example, he describes 
spirit-vehicles stemming from “the decaying vehicle aggregate of dead people”, which 
seems to suggest that, after death, the aggregate of skandhas that comprise an 
embodied person disintegrate into separate ‘vehicles’ or independent post-mortem 
spirits. However, he also depicts spirit-vehicles in a psychological context in that they 
“owe their origin either to an act of will exercised by a malicious person, or to 
consciously or unconsciously transmitted thought forms” (ibid). Therefore, in terms of 
the question regarding whether spirits are psychological or ontological, it appears from 
Burang’s understanding that they can manifest in both forms.  
 
Overall, Burang’s introduction to the Tibetan Buddhist domain of psychiatric knowledge 
and practice is illuminating. He provides insight into a highly complex field of psychiatry 
that is informed by deep psychospiritual knowledge and which, in turn, enables 
effective therapeutic interventions for people afflicted by psychosis and spirit 
possession. Indeed, according to Burang (p.89), “the success rate of Tibetan methods 
in the treatment of mental illness is remarkable”. Such therapeutic efficacy seems to 
give credence to the Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry understanding that psychosis largely 
reflects the presence of possessing spirits.  
 
13.3.3 Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and spirit possession in psychosis (Clifford, 1984) 
An examination of Clifford’s appraisal of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry demonstrates that 
it is possible for the discipline to operate via a model of understanding that incorporates 
physical, psychosocial and metaphysical considerations into its epistemology. 
However, in contrast to the materialist medical approach of Western psychiatry, which 
is fundamentally concerned with understanding, identifying and treating reified forms of 
psychopathology, the initial concern for Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry is to understand 
the ultimate psychospiritual nature of mental health, for in its purview all forms of 
mental illness stem from a failure to do so. Within this epistemological framework, 
psychospiritual factors are understood to have causal primacy in mental illness. For 
instance, Clifford (1984, p.170) notes that when “we no longer act and think in a 
manner which is harmonious with our deepest coherence of being…we become 
insane, self-destructive, not really ourselves” and consequently open to spirit attack. 
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Similarly, she argues that “we think we can hide from our spiritual deformity, since it is 
not immediately visible, but we can’t. It eats away at us and creates mental and 
physical disease” (ibid, p.156). In other words, mental illness is present to the degree a 
person is experientially estranged from his or her ultimate spiritual nature.  
 
Another intriguing and related idea inherent to the Tibetan Buddhist psychiatric 
worldview is that mental health and illness are states of being that stem from the same 
psychospiritual source, whereby the former epitomises the ability to realise the reality 
of one’s ultimate nature, and the latter represents varying degrees of the inability to do 
so. This is evident in Clifford’s (p.251) observation that, from the perspective of Tibetan 
psychiatry, “insanity and spiritual advancement are the two possibilities that follow from 
insight into reality”. Further to this she affirms: 
 
Herein lies the crucial point. The psychological basis of insanity is the same 
basis for enlightenment. It all depends on whether or not it is accepted and 
comprehended and ultimately worked with as the key to liberation. If it is 
not, it becomes…the cause of denial, repression, and, ultimately, mental 
illness (pp.138-139). 
 
This reflects the idea already discussed above,148 whereby an outcome of madness or 
enhanced psychospiritual development is dependent on whether or not a person has 
acquired the requisite knowledge and skills to navigate the stormy seas of 
metaphysical realities. Psychosis, from this perspective, is fundamentally a 
psychospiritual problem by nature.  
 
Clifford also provides an appraisal of the human psyche and psychosis in relation to the 
phenomenon of sok-rlung. To reiterate, Epstein & Topgay (1982, p.74) refer to sok-
rlung as the “life-bearing current”. Clifford (1984, p.132), however, refers to “sok-lung” 
as “life-wind”, which is “the main support of consciousness” and, therefore, is intrinsic 
to mental function in both its healthy and psychopathological manifestations. She 
further notes that this “very subtle life-force” is subliminally seated in the heart region 
and that “disturbed consciousness, neurosis and psychosis” may result if it is disrupted 
(ibid, pp.132, 138) (see Figure 5 for a Tibetan diagram showing the ‘madness’ centre in 




                                                          
148
 For example, see Chapter Nine, Section 9.3.6 and Chapter Twelve, Section 12.3.  
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Figure 5 - Tibetan illustration showing ‘madness’ centre in the heart 
(Source – Clifford, 1984, p.134) 
Indeed, other commentators have also identified the heart as the subliminal seat of 
madness. For instance, Epstein & Topgay (1982, p.76) note that the seat of the life-
bearing current is in the heart region and that mental disturbances and psychosis 
originate in this area. In context of kundalini research, Louchakova & Warner (2003, 
p.139) explain that “the left side of the chest, which houses the anatomical heart, also 
is said to contain the center of cosmic, supramental consciousness”. In her subsequent 
research of “spiritual systems such as Hesychasm, Vedanta, Shakta–Vedanta and 
Sufism”, Louchakova (2005, pp.87, 100, 105) reports that meditating participants were 
warned to not focus on the left side of the chest “to avoid the rapid opening of 
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subconscious material” and the possible precipitation of psychotic-like instances of 
spiritual emergency. 
 
In terms of causal factors in psychosis, Clifford (1984, p.135) explains that the original 
disruption “is bought on by” any one, or combination, of a variety of psychosocial 
stressors and she proffers several descriptions of consequent experiences which are 
very similar to Western psychiatric descriptions of psychotic symptoms. For example, 
when this subtle seat of consciousness is destabilised: 
 “The mind power of the individual begins to disintegrate and hallucinations 
and all sorts of distortions in perception of reality arise” (p.133); 
 “There is a constant cycle between elation and depression, continuous 
changes back and forth in mood. If left untreated, it can develop into 
psychosis” (p.135); 
 “When the very subtle life-force supporting consciousness is out of place, 
then the consciousness which the person experiences feels ‘wrong’ or 
‘alien’, which could give rise to the sense of being possessed by an outside 
force” (ibid).  
Further to this last point she explains that, such disruption can also create a point of 
entry for possessing spirits which “are said to enter through various channels and make 
their way to the heart where they take over consciousness” (ibid). This offers potential 
insight into the nature of psychotic hallucinations, delusions, manic states and beliefs 
regarding spirit possession, which Western psychiatry has generally construed as 
being essentially incomprehensible. 
 
Clifford also explains that In Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry there are five chief causes of 
insanity. These are, “karma; grief-worry; humoral (organic) imbalance; poison (organic); 
and ‘evil spirits’” (p.137). Demons, or spirits, that are specific to causing mental illness 
are known as “gdon” (p.148), which etymologically infers “to cause to come forth, to 
drive forth” (p.150). Thus, in context of causing mental illness, gdon generically refers 
to “those beings and forces that radiate negative effects” (p.151). In all, the Tibetan 
psychiatric system recognises 1,080 different types of gdon, which are divided into 
various subcategories (pp.154-155).149 Within this psychiatric framework of 
understanding there are also eighteen types of “elemental spirits” (known as ’byung-
po’i gdon) which represent “eighteen varieties of psychoses” (p.176). These ’byung-po’i 
                                                          
149
 The descriptive material pertaining to these subcategories of gdon is detailed and complex and goes 
beyond the general focus of the investigation here. It does, however, provide further insight into the 
sophisticated intricacy of the Tibetan Buddhist model of psychiatric understanding (see – Clifford, 1984, 
pp.154-195). 
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gdon are derivative counterparts of the “five great elements”; namely, “earth, fire, 
water, air, and space”, which are the “sub-atomic cosmic-physical principals” that 
operate to collectively form all of corporeal reality (pp.17, 251). Clifford (p.195) notes 
the marked similarity between symptoms resulting from possession by these ’byung-
po’i gdon and classic symptoms of DSM-II psychoses, and maintains that such spirit 
possession results in “the sudden onset of behavior of a consistently alien 
nature…[which] suggest schizophrenia and manic depressive psychosis”. Examples of 
such symptoms are: pronounced religious ideation; “unpredictable giggling, silly and 
regressive behavior and mannerisms”; manic speech and behaviour; garbled speech; 
beliefs in external forces of control; and difficulty in discerning one’s own thoughts from 
alien thoughts (pp.195-196). Hence, while Tibetan Buddhist and Western psychiatry 
share common ground in regards to psychotic symptomatology, they very much differ 
in their respective views as to the ultimate cause of such anomalies.      
 
Clifford also addresses the question as to whether spirits are psychological or 
ontological by nature. For instance, she states that spirits “span a large range from the 
purely psychological – our own demons so to speak – to the cosmic forces which 
attack us in accordance with larger laws of karma” (p.170). Thus, they are manifold, 
multivariate, and may manifest as both psycho-personal and cosmic-transpersonal 
forms and forces. She further explains that while spirits can be seen in the 
psychological sense as “ego-alien unconscious material and impulses that are 
projected as destructive forces that are perceived as an outer form which then possess 
us” (p.152), she clarifies that they cannot be “regarded simply as projections of an 
unhealthy mind” (p.159). By this she means that “although they arose from projections, 
they are said to be real in a relative sense. That is, they have to be dealt with” (ibid). 
Indeed, she emphasises that Tibetan lamas “refuse to relate to demons only as 
psychological phenomena in the Western sense”, for they see such simplistic 
interpretations as lacking a deeper understanding of the ultimate paradoxical nature of 
reality, and as “typical of the materialist habits of modern man” (p.162). Regardless of 
their actual nature, in the relative world spirits still represent “invisible negative forces 
and…their negative effects are very much to be reckoned with” (ibid). In this sense, 
they are seen as having autonomous ontology, even if psychological projections. It is 
possible, then that spirits are neither psychological nor ontological, but psycho-
ontological. 
 
On the other hand, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry paradoxically maintains that spirits 
ultimately do not exist at all. As Clifford (p.161) notes, ultimately, within a Buddhist 
cosmological perspective, spirits “do not exist. Like everything else they have no self-
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nature. They are in fact empty”. In order to help clarify this seeming contradiction, 
Clifford (ibid) likens the belief in spirits, (and all seemingly ‘real’ manifestations born of 
subject-object perception), to the experience of dreaming – “The dreams are not true, 
but they feel true when we are in them. All samsara…is like this; ghosts are the same” 
(p.159).150 From this viewpoint, Tibetan lamas and spiritual practitioners understand 
that in “approaching ghosts and spirits from the level of absolute truth, we realize the 
nature of emptiness, theirs and ours, so nothing can harm us…all sickness and 
negativity is subdued or dissolved. These distinctions simply do not exist” (p.161). In 
this sense, while spirits exist in a relative sense, they do not in an absolute sense. The 
same applies to all physical and metaphysical phenomena. 
 
This broad framework of understanding seemingly enables Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry 
to transcend the epistemological parameters of materialism and dualism that limit the 
thinking and practice of Western medical psychiatry. Whereas Western psychiatry 
largely endorses a biomedical understanding of psychosis that splits mind from body 
and proscribes the consideration of possible psychospiritual determinants, Tibetan 
Buddhist psychiatry has a holistic understanding of psychosis that enables the 
dialectical integration of metaphysical and materialist contingencies. For instance, 
Clifford (p.251) explains that when the ’byung-po’i gdon (i.e. elemental spirits) are 
excessively disrupted by mental-emotional stressors “then this can be interpreted as a 
disturbance of the basic biochemical ground that subsequently gives rise to eighteen 
basic divisions of perceptual distortions and disturbed consciousness”. In other words, 
                                                          
150
 Clifford (1984, p.19) does not directly define the term ‘samara’, but infers its meaning in stating that “the 
source of all painful, conditioned phenomenal existence, samsara, is our acting in a state of not-seeing”. 
Capriles (1990) also proffers an insightful elucidation on this Tibetan philosophical understanding: 
 
Tibetan spiritual systems regard as delusive, both the every day experience of human beings 
and the «supernatural» experience to which practitioners gain access by yogic and 
shamanistic means. This is not to say that both realms of experience are considered to be 
merely hallucinatory. Tibetan Teachings acknowledge that there is a given that, upon being 
processed by our mental processes, is experienced as the world in which we live, with its 
countless entities. Delusion arises when we are unable to see that entities do not have 
inherent, absolute existence, but depend both on the existence of other entities and on the 
functioning of our mental process in order to exist in the way they exist for us. Thus, delusion 
is a confusion about the mode of existence of entities, including the human subject: when we 
believe that ourselves and other entities exist inherently and substantially (in the sense of 
being self-existent and not needing anything other to itself in order to exist), that the relative 
is absolute, we are under delusion. 
 
Thus, it appears the term ‘samsara’ infers the ultimately ‘delusory’ nature of normal human cognition, 
perception and existence. 
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this portrays psychosis as the product of a disruptive interplay between mental-
emotional states, spirits and biochemistry. Hence, whereas a Western psychiatrist may 
see psychosis as caused by a biochemical brain imbalance, a Tibetan psychiatrist may 
see brain biochemistry imbalances in psychosis as the product of elemental spirits 
being overly disrupted by mental-emotional stressors. While, the former represents a 
materialist view stripped of psychological and psychospiritual determinants, the latter 
represents the holistic consideration of physical, psychological and psychospiritual 
determinants. As such, Tibetan psychiatry demonstrates the possibility of better 
understanding psychosis via a holistic epistemological framework in which medical 
science and metaphysics, biochemistry and spirit possession, are seen as 
complementary aspects of a dynamic psychiatric whole.  
 
Finally, while I have challenged the validity of Western psychiatry’s practice of 
psychopathology-seeking throughout this dissertation, the example set by Tibetan 
psychiatry suggests that it is not psychopathology-seeking per se that is problematic, 
but the way in which it is approached. For instance, the Tibetan psychiatric approach to 
psychopathology-seeking is holistic, heuristic, fundamentally inclusive of 
psychospiritual matters, and orchestrated by practitioners who are adept in using 
technologies of consciousness. Arguably, this investigative approach enables a 
profound understanding of the nature and multidimensional causes of psychopathology 
and, correspondingly, enables a practitioner to discern accurately between psychotic 
and psychotic-like psychospiritual developmental processes. Such open-ended 
investigation apparently leads to an advanced understanding of psychopathology. In 
contrast, Western psychiatric psychopathology-seeking is orchestrated through 
materialist, reductive and cognicentric approaches that proscribe the investigation of 
psychospiritual matters that are seemingly essential to understanding the holistic 
nature of psychopathology. In addition, a lack of skills and knowledge regarding 
technologies of consciousness seemingly makes it impossible for Western practitioners 
to discern the characteristic diagnostic features of psychosis from identical features 
occurring in healthy cross-cultural and psychospiritual developmental contexts. This 
psychopathology-seeking approach arguably produces a narrow and ambiguous 
understanding of psychopathology and creates the many conundrums examined 
throughout this dissertation. Indeed, it ultimately seems that the degree to which a 
therapeutic discipline can understand psychopathology and psychosis is proportionate 






As a holistic discipline, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry demonstrates the therapeutic 
efficacy of incorporating physical, psychosocial and psychospiritual considerations into 
clinical thinking and practice. The integral influence of spirits in human health and 
wellbeing underpins the Tibetan understanding of psychopathology, and psychosis is 
essentially understood to be a disorder of psychospiritual aetiology. Intriguingly, despite 
my systematic challenge to Western psychiatry’s psychopathology-seeking approach 
throughout this dissertation, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry exemplifies the ultimate 
clinical capacity to discern psychotic from psychospiritual experiences, but only when a 
deep and open-ended investigation of phenomena across the physical-metaphysical 








Bringing It All Together 
 
14.0 Reiteration of core process and objectives 
The act of formulating knowledge about and better understanding any given 
phenomenon is both enabled and limited by the worldview that scopes the 
investigation. My dissertation undertakes the joint task of drawing on psychospiritual 
considerations to glean a better understanding psychosis while challenging the 
materialist-based limitations of medical psychiatry. As such, its scope of investigation 
ranges across materialist and metaphysical domains of understanding via the use of a 
heuristic instrument of successive focal settings. Each of these focal settings 
represents a different conceptual framework of investigation for better understanding 
psychosis in light of psychopathological and psychospiritual concerns.  
 
My key argument throughout this process of investigation is that the phenomenon of 
psychosis can be better understood in light of psychospiritual considerations. 
Accordingly, I systematically aim to demonstrate that a psychospiritual investigation 
can work to:  
i) challenge some fundamental psychiatric assumptions that underpin and 
limit the conceptualisation of psychosis; 
ii) extend the parameters of perceived reality and knowledge formulation 
beyond the restrictive bounds of medical materialism to include 
psychospiritual reality; 
iii) show that this broadened conceptualisation of reality, if adopted by 
psychiatry, can result in better understanding the nature of psychosis; 
iv) set the stage for establishing new possible psychosis research pathways 
that fundamentally include psychospiritual considerations. 
This process supports my contention that the materialist-based and prescriptive model 
of psychiatric diagnostics limits the epistemological scope for understanding psychosis 
and proscribes the inclusion of psychospiritual matters within clinical research and 
practice. Indeed, it appears that the purported incomprehensibility of psychosis is more 
reflective of the limitations of materialist and psychiatric theory, than of the nature of 
psychosis per se. Concomitantly, my systematic use of focal settings, with each 
enabling a broader epistemological scope of inquiry, demonstrates that a heuristic 
investigative approach opens new possible ways for better understanding both 




14.1 What is psychosis? 
What is psychosis? My dissertation does not aim to provide a definitive answer to this 
question. Rather, I embark upon a heuristic and psychospiritual investigative process to 
systematically elicit a better understanding of psychosis than that proffered by 
mainstream psychiatry. In other words, I aim to make more comprehensible that which 
has been deemed fundamentally incomprehensible. The exploratory approach I use to 
achieve this is opposite to that used by traditional psychiatry, for it is an open-ended 
rather than a reductive endeavour. Whereas medical psychiatry has reductively 
attempted to establish a ‘solid’ understanding of psychosis (i.e. psychosis as a 
homogenous and biogenic psychopathological entity which is clinically identifiable by 
characteristic symptoms), my heuristic approach seeks to progressively open new 
potential investigative pathways for better understanding psychosis. This entails 
stepping beyond the epistemological borders of materialism to examine possible 
metaphysical determinants in psychotic experience, which are customarily eschewed 
by psychiatry. While there have been some developments in psychiatry that diverge 
from its usual reductive method (e.g. the inclusion of cross-cultural diagnostic 
considerations and the emerging shift to a heterogeneous and dimensional picture of 
psychosis), the latest escalation of biomedical psychosis research in psychiatry has 
generally corralled investigation to a very limited scope. In response to this prevailing 
materialist and biogenic approach, my dissertation poses and engages the research 
question – Can, and how can, psychosis be better understood by employing a heuristic 
approach which includes psychospiritual considerations within its investigative ambit?   
 
14.2 Better understanding psychosis via four focal settings 
My heuristic use of four focal settings throughout this dissertation has enabled a critical 
examination of psychosis in four different contexts along a materialist-to-metaphysical 
spectrum. In doing so I proffer a general challenge to key pillars of traditional 
psychiatric theory and practice, and a specific challenge to the basic psychiatric notion 
that psychosis is incomprehensible. I also progressively demonstrate that 
psychospiritual considerations can elicit a better understanding psychosis far beyond 
that enabled by the conceptual strictures medical psychiatry. 
 
14.2.1 Understanding psychosis within Focal Setting One 
As the starting point for my heuristic investigative process, Focal Setting One examines 
the construal of psychosis within medical psychiatry’s historical and epistemological 
purview. Within this clinical scope of perception, psychosis is understood to be a 
severe form of psychopathology of putative anatomical aetiology that can be diagnosed 
through the identification of certain characteristic symptoms. Here, psychosis is 
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understood to be intrinsically psychopathological and incomprehensible, and the 
consideration of possible psychospiritual determinants is near absent. This arguably 
represents a poor and limited understanding of psychosis. 
 
14.2.2 Understanding psychosis within Focal Setting Two 
Focal Setting Two represents a paradigm-changing step into new possible ways for 
understanding psychosis. This is achieved by directly challenging the view that 
metaphysical matters are largely irrelevant to psychiatry and psychosis research. Here, 
I demonstrate the feasibility and expediency for psychiatry to better understand 
psychosis by incorporating psychospiritual considerations into its epistemological remit. 
The fact that it is possible for psychiatry to consider metaphysical matters within its 
disciplinary compass is substantiated by highlighting significant instances in which it 
has already done so. This lends credence to the idea that the investigation of 
psychospiritual matters by psychiatry can lead to a better understanding of psychosis.  
 
14.2.3 Understanding psychosis within Focal Setting Three 
In Focal Setting Three I further widen the psychospiritual scope of investigation and 
centre on challenging the veracity of the prevailing psychopathological understanding 
of psychosis. This is orchestrated by critically appraising the conceptual and diagnostic 
integrity of the psychopathology of psychosis in three progressive steps. First, 
introducing the notion of non-psychopathological psychotic-like psychospiritual 
experiences aims to show that psychotic-like occurrences are not psychopathological 
per se. Second, my literature content analysis formulates, and then critically appraises, 
a putative framework of criteria for discerning psychotic from psychotic-like 
psychospiritual instances. Doing so initially affirms the existence of psychotic-like 
features in both psychopathological and psychospiritual contexts, then paradoxically 
refutes the existence of any valid criteria that can discern psychotic from 
psychospiritual instances. Extending on this, the third step suggests that a better 
understanding of psychosis may be gleaned through considering the prospect that 
psychotic and psychospiritual experiences are indiscernible and share a common 
transpersonal source. Indeed, the apparent propensity for psychosis to manifest as part 
of a larger self-healing process intrinsically challenges psychiatry’s binary model of 
understanding which allows no scope for considering that mental health may 
sometimes be advanced through processes of seeming psychopathology. 
 
14.2.4 Understanding psychosis within Focal Setting Four 
As a final paradigm shift, Focal Setting Four continues investigating the psychosis-
psychospiritual nexus, though in context of the idea that the two states of 
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consciousness are coterminous and, therefore, indistinguishable. Here I further 
challenge the validity of psychiatry’s construal of psychosis as purely 
psychopathological by demonstrating the non-psychopathological occurrence of key 
psychotic symptoms in both secular and transpersonal circumstances. In doing so, the 
traditional notion of psychopathology and practice of psychopathology-seeking are 
rendered highly dubious. Finally, my overall challenge to mainstream psychiatry is 
consolidated by extending the scope of investigation into cross-cultural considerations; 
especially in exploring the phenomenon of spirit possession. Here, it is shown that, far 
from being an intrinsically psychopathological and incomprehensible human condition, 
‘psychosis’ and its constituent ‘symptoms’ (i.e. psychotic-like features), may be 
understood as integral aspects of natural, meaningful and/or functional human 
transformative processes. From this perspective, the reductive and binary-based 
approach of psychopathology-seeking loses validity for all diagnostic features and 
criteria become highly ambiguous. While such an understanding of psychosis is 
impossible within the limited compass of a materialist worldview, it is clearly feasible 
when extending the scope of investigation into the metaphysical domain, as is 
evidenced in Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry. Arguably, then, superseding 
psychopathology-seeking with a heuristic approach may glean a better understanding 
of psychosis and other transpersonal human states of being and consciousness. 
 
14.3 Consolidating the challenge to medical psychiatry  
The heuristic investigative process throughout my dissertation proffers a 
psychospiritual challenge to medical psychiatry. This challenge consists of three 
interrelated aspects: 
i) a challenge for psychiatry to extend beyond the materialist assumptions 
that govern its thinking and practice so as to include psychospiritual 
considerations within its epistemological remit;  
ii) a challenge to the psychiatric construal of psychosis as a biogenic form of 
psychopathology that can be clinically identified via certain characteristic 
diagnostic criteria; and, 
iii) a challenge to the idea that psychotic experiences are fundamentally 
incomprehensible. 
I have fulfilled each of these challenges by using focal settings to systematically and 
critically investigate literature from many disciplinary perspectives. A brief consolidating 





14.3.1 The materialist-to-metaphysical challenge  
An integral aspect of my dissertation’s psychospiritual challenge to psychiatry is to 
demonstrate the possibility and necessity for the discipline to move beyond its 
materialist-based framework of operation in order to better understand psychosis. 
Medical psychiatry, which is largely based on the tenets of materialist philosophy, 
understands reality to be primarily a physical phenomenon, with human consciousness 
being epiphenomenal to the physical body. Hence, all normal and anomalous states of 
consciousness are understood to be secondary mental phenomena that originate and 
emanate from the brain. In terms of psychiatric logic, then, the best way to understand 
mental illness is not to seek causes in our epiphenomenal psychic selves, but in our 
primary corporeal selves. This explains psychiatry’s long-standing endeavour to find 
the cause of mental illness in the brain. In this picture, psychospiritual matters are 
considered immaterial to the quest of trying to understand the presumed physical 
nature of psychosis.  
 
Conversely, from a metaphysical perspective, reality is understood to have spiritual 
primacy from which the physical universe emerges or emanates as an 
epiphenomenon. Here, both mental and physical disorders are viewed as secondary 
manifestations of underlying psychospiritual imbalances or dynamics. In other words, 
consciousness is not seen as a secondary phenomenon that is somehow created in 
and by the brain, but the brain and all of physical reality is seen as the creation of 
Consciousness (i.e. God, Spirit). This worldview is antithetical to psychiatric 
understanding; however, for many Indigenous peoples, mystics, Buddhists, and other 
psychospiritual proponents, it represents the nature of primary reality. 
 
While neither of these philosophical stances about the ultimate nature of reality can be 
proven, there is arguably sufficient circumstantial evidence regarding metaphysical 
existences to legitimise the investigation of psychosis in light of them. Indeed, my 
proffering a challenge to medical psychiatry has necessitated undertaking the 
formidable task of creating a provisional structure of focal settings for straddling the 
epistemological divide between materialist and metaphysical worldviews. Doing so has 
enabled me to systematically extend the conceptual parameters through which the 
relationship between psychiatry, psychosis and psychospiritual considerations may be 
investigated. It also provides supportive evidence for the idea that an efficacious 
psychiatric model that integrates both physical and psychospiritual worldviews within its 
epistemological scope can be established. Hence, my dissertation’s process and 
findings proffer a challenge for Western medical psychiatry to move beyond its 
materialist-based parameters and incorporate psychospiritual considerations into its 
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quest to better understand psychosis. My culminating exposition on Tibetan Buddhist 
psychiatry and its understanding of psychosis provides an exemplary case-in-point of a 
model of psychiatry fundamentally informed by a metaphysical worldview that also 
incorporates physical and psychological considerations into its therapeutic practices.  
  
14.3.2 Challenging the psychiatric construal of psychosis 
Generally speaking, mainstream psychiatry has construed psychosis as a biogenic 
form of psychopathology which is identifiable through the presence of key characteristic 
diagnostic criteria. This reflects the medical science diagnostic format which is based 
on materialist theoretical principles. However, psychiatry has never substantiated this 
transposition of materialist and medical principles onto the domain of human psychic 
experiences. The justification for doing so rests solely on the supposition that psychotic 
experience is the epiphenomenal product of a yet-to-be discovered anatomical 
malfunction. My challenge in this context, then, has not been to negate the discipline of 
psychiatry per se, but to call into question:  
i) the veracity of its biogenic understanding of psychosis;  
ii) the lens of psychopathology through which it looks; and  
iii) the validity of the key diagnostic criteria which ostensibly constitute 
psychosis as an identifiable psychopathological entity.  
Each of these represents a vital pillar upholding mainstream psychiatry’s construal of 
psychosis. However, the legitimacy of these conceptual pillars is shown to be 
questionable when more closely examined through the lens of psychospiritual and 
cross-cultural considerations.  
 
14.3.2.1 Challenging psychiatry’s biogenic construal of psychosis 
Despite the aetiology of psychosis being predominantly viewed by psychiatry as 
anatomical, this standpoint is yet to be scientifically substantiated. Its veracity is further 
called to question when examining psychotic and psychotic-like experiences in light of 
psychospiritual and cross-cultural considerations. It appears possible that biological 
factors may be corollary rather than causal in psychosis and that psychotic-like 
occurrences may be the product of a holistic and interactive flux of factors, ranging 
from biological to psychospiritual. Indeed, the discipline of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry 
lends credibility to this idea because, for centuries, it has effectively employed a holistic 
and fundamentally psychospiritual approach which includes the consideration of 
physiological, psychological and environmental determinants in psychopathology. 
While the Western psychiatric biogenic stance is based on a materialist worldview that 
disallows the notion of metaphysical agents, it appears that such agents not only exist, 
but may play a causal role in psychotic-like instances. Although this does not refute the 
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role of biological determinants in psychosis it does challenge psychiatry’s biogenic 
construal of psychosis, for it calls upon the discipline to recognise and investigate the 
possibility of psychospiritual causal factors in both psychotic and psychotic-like 
experiences. 
 
14.3.2.2 Challenging psychiatry’s psychopathology-seeking approach 
Another key pillar of psychiatric thinking challenged throughout my dissertation is the 
axiomatic construal of psychosis as psychopathological. I argue that viewing psychosis 
purely through the lens of psychopathology works to significantly delimit the scope of 
investigation and understanding. The definitive task for psychiatry as a clinical 
discipline is to investigate, identify, and therapeutically respond to, instances of 
psychopathology. However, this task is orchestrated through the understanding that 
mental illness is distinct from mental health. Such a perception reflects the materialist 
philosophical stance of rational dualism which, when transposed into psychiatric 
practice, generates the view that a given experience is either psychopathological, or is 
not. This constitutes an understanding which innately limits psychiatric thinking and 
research to a particular epistemic scope. Such a view allows little room for entertaining 
the possibility that, whatever psychopathology is, it may be intrinsically coexistent with, 
rather than separate from, instances of non-psychopathology.  
 
Accordingly, my dissertation’s research process demonstrates the apparent ultimate 
impossibility of discerning psychotic from psychotic-like psychospiritual experiences, 
and suggests that the two experiences not only share the same source, but may 
represent a beneficial developmental process despite their ‘psychotic’ appearance. 
This fundamentally challenges the validity of psychiatry’s modus operandi of 
‘psychopathology-seeking’ as a means for identifying and understanding psychosis, for 
it has no capacity to discern potentially beneficial from psychopathological instances 
and avoid inaccurate diagnoses. Indeed, it appears that preconceived notions of 
psychopathology ultimately impede attempts to better understand the nature of 
psychotic-like anomalous experiences. I argue that a feasible solution to this issue is 
for psychiatry to adopt a heuristic approach whereby psychotic-like occurrences are 
investigated free of the presumption that they are innately psychopathological. Such an 
approach provides much scope for better understanding psychosis, for it transcends 
the limitations of psychiatry’s prescriptive diagnostic approach of psychopathology-
seeking to enable a multidimensional investigation of psychotic-like experiences, and 




14.3.2.3 Challenging the veracity of psychiatry’s psychotic symptoms 
Challenging psychiatry’s ‘psychopathology-seeking’ approach has involved not only 
critically appraising the epistemic lens through which psychiatry looks, but also the 
validity of that which it looks for (i.e. diagnostic criteria for identifying psychosis). In the 
absence of being able to define psychopathology through the discovery of biogenic 
markers, psychiatry has come to identify psychosis via the observable presence of 
typical symptomatic markers. Hence, psychiatric practice is innately bound to a process 
of psychopathology-seeking that fulfils its diagnostic remit by observing, or having 
patients report the experience of, certain symptoms. However, as demonstrated 
throughout my dissertation, key ‘psychotic’ indicators such as perceptual hallucinations, 
bizarre and incorrigible delusions, odd behaviour and speech, paranoia, negative 
affect, personal and social dysfunction, distress, and magical thinking can occur in both 
psychotic and non-psychotic instances. This fundamentally challenges the 
psychopathological veracity of key criteria formulated by psychiatry for diagnosing 
psychotic disorders, for how does a psychiatrist discern that which is 
psychopathological from that which is not? It appears mainstream psychiatry’s answer 
to this conundrum has been to remain largely ignorant of it, because metaphysical 
contingencies do not exist within its medical materialist purview.  
 
A further and important challenge to psychiatry’s categorical diagnostic approach is the 
conundrums created through its recognition of cross-cultural concerns. While doing so 
constitutes a progressive step by psychiatry, in its aim to avoid misdiagnosing culturally 
normative occurrences as psychotic, it is also problematic in that the observable 
concrete markers of psychosis, upon which diagnosis traditionally depends, are 
rendered highly ambiguous. For example, what phenomenologically discerns psychotic 
from culturally normative non-psychotic instances of voice hearing? Here, psychosis 
ultimately seems to be defined by the absence of a cultural context rather than the 
presence of a verifiable marker of psychopathology (i.e. if it is not culturally normative it 
must be psychotic). Furthermore, if claims of being possessed by spirits are deemed 
non-psychotic within a given cultural context, then how does psychiatry explain the 
nature of such possessing spirits, and why do they only possess human beings within 
religious and/or non-Western cultural settings? What, exactly, phenomenologically 
differentiates cultural instances of spirit possession from psychiatric psychosis proper? 
Such questions are neither asked nor answered by psychiatry, yet they logically arise 
from combining medical psychiatrics with cultural relativism and challenge axiomatic 
notions about the nature of psychopathology and psychosis.  
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In sum, the veracity of diagnosing psychosis via the identification of characteristic 
psychotic symptoms is fundamentally challenged by closely investigating voice hearing, 
spirit possession, and other psychotic-like psychospiritual occurrences. Indeed, the 
more one examines such phenomena the less substantial their presumed 
psychopathological and psychotic status becomes. This is not to say that psychosis 
and psychopathology do not exist, but it strongly suggests that a broader and deeper 
understanding of both these clinical notions may be gained by stepping beyond the 
epistemic parameters of materialism to heuristically investigate phenomena and 
questions of a metaphysical nature.  
 
14.3.3 Challenging the said incomprehensibility of psychotic experience 
As a consequence of its belief in the incomprehensibility of psychotic experience, 
psychiatry has focussed on some research areas, and rejected others. For instance, 
while much attention has been given to identifying and categorising key psychotic 
symptoms, and looking for evidence of their presumed biological cause, investigation 
into the deeper phenomenological nature of such symptoms has been overlooked. The 
rationale for this oversight is simple and seemingly self-evident – It is pointless to 
investigate that which is incomprehensible, hence, rather than undertaking the futile 
task of trying to understand the nature and content of psychotic experience, it is 
prudent to document, categorise and instrumentalise its observable forms. I argue that 
this a limited view that hinders psychosis research.  
 
My dissertation challenges this limited view by systematically demonstrating that a 
better understanding of psychosis may be gleaned by stepping beyond the logical 
limitations of psychiatric materialism, and the associated notion of ‘incomprehensibility’, 
to investigate possible psychospiritual dynamics and determinants in psychotic 
experience. For instance, Bucke’s view that psychosis manifests as part of a larger 
human evolutionary trajectory towards Cosmic Consciousness exemplifies the capacity 
for psychiatry to extend its understanding beyond materialist strictures. Here, psychosis 
is viewed as a natural evolutionary process within human consciousness development 
rather than as an incomprehensible and regressive departure from normalcy. Likewise, 
Dean’s work on Metapsychiatry, the Grofs’ notion of spiritual emergence and 
emergencies, Lukoff’s Mystical Experiences with Psychotic Features (MEPF), Meher 
Baba’s depiction of divine madness, and Nelson’s view of regression in the service of 
transcendence, all see psychotic-like experiences as being potentially meaningful and 
beneficial. Indeed, Perry maintains that, in many instances, psychosis is an intrinsic 
renewal process of self-healing, while, in a cross-cultural context, psychotic-like 
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experience has long been recognised as a meaningful and integral part of shamanic 
initiatory processes.  
 
My psychospiritual challenge to psychiatry not only contests the idea that psychosis per 
se is incomprehensible, but also illustrates how key psychotic symptoms can be seen 
as meaningful. For example, the common occurrence of non-psychotic voice hearing 
arguably suggests that there is much about this phenomenon that is yet to be seriously 
investigated and understood by psychiatry. What is the cause and source of these 
voices? One possibility is that the voices reflect spirit manifestations, be these in the 
form of autonomous unconscious psychic material or ontologically real metaphysical 
entities. As with the phenomenon of voice hearing, the phenomenon of psychotic 
delusional ideation is likewise construed as incomprehensible by psychiatry. However, 
Perry’s work exemplifies the possibility of understanding ‘delusions’ as being 
intrinsically meaningful and purposeful in his perception of them as patterned 
archetypal media through which the deeper human psyche facilitates a psychospiritual 
process of healing transformation. Far from being incomprehensible and 
phenomenologically void, it appears that so-called ‘psychotic symptoms’ may proffer 
profound insight into the deeper mechanisms and dynamics of both psychotic and 
other human states of consciousness. It is evident that many investigators have 
stepped beyond the limiting notion that psychosis is incomprehensible to unveil vistas 
of new meaning, and avenues for further possible psychosis research, that are invisible 
to mainstream psychiatry. This includes the possibility that psychotic and/or psychotic-
like experiences may reflect a psychospiritual process of self-healing and development.  
 
14.4 Key findings in better understanding psychosis 
The systematic process of critical investigation throughout my dissertation suggests 
that the psychiatric term ‘psychosis’ has been imbued with a purely psychopathological 
meaning that represents a narrow understanding of this enigmatic phenomenon. Yet, 
even this narrow depiction is questionable, because the psychopathological nature and 
concrete existence of psychosis have not been scientifically or conceptually 
substantiated. Indeed, I have shown that, upon close examination, none of the key 
psychiatric criteria for defining and diagnosing psychosis are definitive. It therefore 
appears that psychosis is not indubitably psychopathological, as asserted by 
psychiatry, but is a term that represents a provisional and ambiguous construct of 
assumed psychopathology.  
 
This critical view allows increased scope for better understanding psychosis, beyond 
the rigid conceptual strictures inherent to psychiatry’s construal of the term. My use of 
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the phrase ‘better understanding psychosis’ does not connote doing so in absolute 
terms, but in the relative sense of establishing a broader investigative scope through 
which many previously obscured dynamics and meanings of psychotic experience are 
revealed. As summarised below, my overall research process elicits and reveals 
several significant ways in which so-called ‘psychosis’ may be better understood 
beyond psychiatry’s limited and materialist epistemic horizons. 
 
14.4.1 Psychosis as comprehensible  
The purported incomprehensibility of psychosis largely appears to reflect limitations set 
by psychiatry as to what is and is not primary reality. If psychological and cultural 
considerations in psychosis research are deemed epiphenomenal to physical causes, 
and metaphysical matters are deemed non-existent, then the ultimate scope of 
understanding is restricted to that which can be scientifically observed, measured and 
explained. From this perspective, psychosis is largely incomprehensible. However, as 
is clearly demonstrated throughout my dissertation, extending the scope of 
investigation to include psychospiritual and cross-cultural considerations reveals many 
ways of understanding psychosis and psychotic symptoms previously eclipsed by a 
biogenic research focus. Ultimately, psychosis is far more comprehensible when 
examined holistically.  
 
14.4.2 Psychosis as having psychospiritual determinants  
My dissertation demonstrates that the consideration of psychospiritual matters appears 
to have significant relevance in better understanding the nature of psychosis. Indeed, 
the findings throughout my dissertation indicate that such research is highly warranted. 
For instance, further investigation into Laing’s theoretical phenomenon of ontological 
insecurity may lead to better comprehending unknown domains and dynamics of the 
deeper human psyche, from which psychotic and psychospiritual experiences 
ostensibly emerge. Likewise, a better understanding of psychospiritual determinants in 
psychosis may result from exploring Jung’s idea of the transcendent function, Laing’s 
metanoia, and the Grofs’ transpersonal notion of spiritual emergence and emergencies. 
Psychiatry may also benefit from a close investigation of the multifarious global mix of 
cultural knowledge systems. For example, commentators on both the Zen Buddhist 
notion of ‘nen’ and the Tibetan Buddhist notion of ‘sok-lung’ proffer sophisticated 
phenomenological explications as to how psychospiritual factors and forces operate to 
constitute psychotic behaviour and experience. Similarly, my detailed examination of 
the phenomenon of spirit possession reveals ways in which reality can be understood 
beyond materialism and how these may work to precipitate or influence psychotic 
experiences.  
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14.4.3 Psychosis as not necessarily psychopathological 
An implicit aim of my employing a heuristic research approach is to challenge the 
reductive psychiatric construal of psychosis as a psychopathological entity. Though 
contentious, in that it is antithetical to psychiatry’s understanding of psychosis, there is 
considerable evidence to support this undertaking. My research indicates that all of the 
key diagnostic markers which define psychosis as a psychopathological disorder may 
also occur in culturally normative and non-psychopathological psychospiritual 
instances. This seriously undermines psychiatry’s assumption that psychosis is 
fundamentally a form of mental illness. Efforts to differentiate psychotic from non-
psychotic psychospiritual experiences have seemingly also failed. Indeed, the two 
types of experience may be coexistent and ultimately indistinguishable. Therefore, it 
appears the psychiatric practice of psychopathology-seeking represents and 
perpetuates a poor understanding of psychosis and does not reliably enable clinicians 
to definitively identify psychotic-like experiences as psychopathological. Superseding 
this with a heuristic approach whereby psychotic-like phenomena are investigated 
openly and neutrally may foster a better understanding of psychosis and other 
mysterious depths of being human.  
14.4.4 Psychosis as the absence of psychospiritual instruction 
While psychosis is traditionally understood to signify the presence of medical 
psychopathology, my research shows that it can alternatively be seen as signifying the 
absence of the requisite skills, or technologies of consciousness, for competently 
navigating psychospiritual domains of reality.  Campbell analogously portrays this as 
the psychotic person drowning in the same metaphysical waters in which the shamanic 
adept swims, which depicts psychosis as the product of undeveloped psychospiritual 
functionality rather than of psychopathological dysfunctionality. While this view 
acknowledges the reality of distressing and debilitating occurrences, it sees psychotic-
like experience as a state of imbalance more than a case of medical morbidity. Indeed, 
the results of my literature content analysis show that the ‘absence of psychospiritual 
skills and/or teachers’ is identified by authors as the fifth highest criterion for discerning 
psychotic from psychospiritual experiences. This raises the question - Might the 
provision of psychospiritual skills and knowledge be more beneficial than medication 
and hospitalisation for certain people flailing in the stormy seas of transpersonal 
‘psychotic’ upheavals? 
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14.4.5 Psychosis as a developmental and beneficial process 
Considerable evidence exists to suggest that psychotic-like experiences may be 
integral to natural processes of human self-healing and psychospiritual development. 
This idea is exemplified in Washburn’s and Nelson’s phrase ‘regression in the service 
of transcendence’ (RIST). However, while Washburn and Nelson differentiate psychotic 
from psychotic-like RIST processes, others such as Laing and Perry understand all 
instances of so-called ‘psychosis’ to represent a healing gesture on behalf of the 
deeper psyche. From this perspective, it is understood that if the ‘psychotic’ process is 
appropriately supported, rather than medically thwarted, it may culminate in a state of 
self-renewal. In terms of psychotic symptoms, the perception of metaphysical realities 
(e.g. seeing visions, hearing voices, communicating with spirits) are also reportedly 
common for spiritual adherents as they advance along their path towards mystical 
illumination. Likewise, shamanic initiatory processes are typically marked by long 
periods of seemingly ‘psychotic’ experiences and behaviour. Indeed, a deep 
understanding of human psychospiritual realities is foundational to the practice of 
Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry. These are fields of knowledge and expertise from which 
Western psychiatry may learn much, for they recognise both the beneficial and 
detrimental potential of psychotic-like experiences. 
 
14.4.6 Psychosis as a holistic phenomenon 
Although this idea has been forwarded by others, and particularly by Meyer in his 
psychobiological theory, it is evident that psychiatry’s prevailing attempts to 
substantiate the biogenic theory of psychosis overlook many aspects of the holistic 
complex that apparently constitute psychotic experience. As is evidenced in Chapter 
Thirteen, Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry exemplifies the feasibility and efficacy of a 
holistic psychiatric model whereby therapeutic assessments include psychospiritual, 
psychosocial and physical considerations. 
 
14.5 Research limitations 
Adopting a heuristic research approach has given me considerable freedom in terms of 
my epistemological scope of investigation. While the open-ended mutability of this 
method enables limitless unfolding scope of investigation it is arguably problematic in 
that the understanding of psychosis is rendered perpetually ephemeral. In other words, 
it is never possible to say definitively what psychosis is because each progressive 
viewpoint has a new horizon beyond which there is the potential for further discovery 
and understanding. At present, in a world where knowledge is predominantly 
constituted via materialist and empirical processes of evidence-based research, there 
is little ground for the pragmatic application of such provincial and psychospiritual 
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understandings of psychosis. Be this as it may, my heuristic approach has 
systematically allowed me to critically examine many ways of understanding psychosis 
across the materialist-metaphysical spectrum, without being bound to any. This has 
subsequently enabled me to elicit prospective insights into the nature of psychosis that 
conventional methods of knowledge formation would not.     
 
Another limitation is that my research is wholly literature-based. While the 
multidimensional and multidisciplinary breadth of this undertaking is valuable in that it 
has elicited a comprehensive body of views about psychosis for appraisal, it lacks input 
drawn from my own direct research with people regarding their views and experiences 
of psychosis, psychiatry and psychospiritual realities. Although I considered the 
potential merit of conducting such research, I decided it was apposite to first undertake 
the formidable task of spanning the materialist-metaphysical divide in my critical 
investigation of psychosis and psychiatric practices. Having done so, the conceptual 
and theoretical background has been established from which research questions may 
be formed for later possible post-doctoral investigation with participants in this field of 
concern. 
 
14.6 Ramifications for psychiatric practice  
My dissertation’s psychospiritual challenge to medical psychiatry has significant 
ramifications in terms of prospective change to its epistemology, research scope, 
understanding of psychopathology, and clinical training. Such ‘change’ does not simply 
entail swapping one psychiatric model for another. Rather, it involves a process of 
investigation and transition, whereby a deeper understanding of psychospiritual matters 
may gradually be integrated into the psychiatric corpus of knowledge, while avoiding 
the present materialist inclination toward reductive conceptualisation and 
categorisation. 
 
14.6.1 Epistemology  
As established in Chapter Two, Section 2.3, psychiatric epistemology has generally 
reflected a medical materialist purview that limits the investigative scope for 
understanding the nature of reality and psychosis to biogenic parameters. However, 
the incorporation of psychospiritual considerations into psychiatric thinking and practice 
necessitates establishing a new epistemological base and framework of understanding, 
whereby medical materialism is superseded by medical holism. Instigating such a 
change requires that psychiatry relinquish its present and predominant biological focus 
in exchange for a holistic focus that embraces the full metaphysical-materialist gamut 
of reality within its investigative remit. Doing so would enable the formation a radically 
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new model of psychiatry with radically new ways, and scope, for understanding the 
multidimensional nature and causes of psychopathology. 
 
Such an enterprise also necessitates considering ways to bridge the ostensible 
epistemological chasm between materialist and metaphysical worldviews. Although 
quantum psychics and new disciplines such as neurotheology have already made 
advances in this direction, psychiatry remains predominantly entrenched in a modality 
whereby the axioms of medical materialism have been transposed into the domain of 
human psychopathology. As Powell (2001, p.319) observes, the discipline of psychiatry 
“has largely focused on the biology of mental disorder” and that “the view taken by 
many is to regard mind as epiphenomenal, on the basis that the brain itself is somehow 
generating consciousness”. However, from a Tibetan Buddhist psychiatric perspective, 
physical reality is epiphenomenal to universal consciousness, hence, the human brain 
is epiphenomenal to individual consciousness, hence, the aetiology of psychosis is 
psychospiritual. This is inverse to Western psychiatry’s biogenic view of psychosis. 
Furthermore, while the Western materialist model eschews psychospiritual 
considerations in preference for biomedical research, the Tibetan holistic model 
investigates physical and psychosocial factors within its broader understanding that 
psychosis is essentially psychospiritual in nature. Arguably, this latter approach 
provides greater scope for better understanding the nature of reality, psychosis and the 
human condition in their many interconnected forms. It also entails pursuing lines of 




Throughout the course of this dissertation I investigate many psychospiritual views in 
order to demonstrate their research value in terms of better understanding psychosis. 
Doing so intrinsically constitutes a challenge to medical psychiatry to undertake similar 
such research. Although my investigative process unveils prospective new psychosis 
research pathways, each of these warrant further investigation for they open to fields of 
knowledge beyond the present materialist scope of medical psychiatry and proffer 
potential ways of better understanding psychosis and other human states of 
consciousness and being.  
 
In terms of psychosis research, then, a significant ramification for psychiatry is to 
inquire more deeply into psychospiritual matters. For example, throughout my 
dissertation the phenomenon of kundalini and its potential to precipitate psychotic or 
psychotic-like experiences is touched upon several times. Kundalini experiences 
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feature in the Grofs’ spiritual emergency typology and have also been researched by 
the Royal College of Psychiatrists Spirituality and Psychiatry Special Interest Group 
(SPSIG). Indeed, Regner (1998, p.i) avers that “some nonordinary states of 
consciousness, viewed as aberrant by conventional psychiatry, may reflect the 
workings of a healing mechanism known as kundalini awakening”. Rather than 
eschewing the investigation of such metaphysical realities, psychiatry may advance its 
knowledge about psychosis and other anomalous states of consciousness by following 
the lead already set by SPSIG in kundalini research. There exists an extensive body of 
literature pertaining to kundalini and/or the dangers it can pose to mental health. This is 
an untapped source of potential rich knowledge in psychosis research. 
 
My literature research process also reveals frequent references to the seemingly 
dreamlike nature of psychotic experience. For instance, Dean views both dreams and 
psychosis as metapsychiatry interest areas, while Robbins contends that they are both 
forms of primordial mental activity. Jung also notes parallels between dream and 
psychotic experiences and pointedly asserts that;  
 
to say that insanity is a dream which has become real is no metaphor. The 
phenomenology of the dream and of schizophrenia is almost identical, with 
a certain difference of course; for the one state occurs normally under the 
condition of sleep, while the other upsets the waking or conscious state 
(Jung, 1939, p.1005). 
 
Arguably, psychiatric research in this area may foster further insights into the nature of 
psychosis, dreaming and the deeper unconscious self. 
 
Furthermore, references to psychosis in context of meditation are manifold within 
literature across many disciplines. For instance, commentators variously note that 
meditative practices can include psychotic-like experiences, induce psychosis, or, 
conversely, help to remediate psychosis. Dean identifies meditation as a prospective 
metapsychiatry research area while Jung warns how meditative practices, like active 
imagination, can lead the unskilled explorer into madness. Also, the diverse gamut of 
technologies of consciousness used by shamans and mystics are essentially 
meditative practices that may help ‘psychotic’ people integrate overwhelming 
subconscious content and experiences. Indeed, the profound depth of understanding of 
psychosis in Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry is the direct product of exploring 
psychospiritual domains of reality via meditative practices. Clearly, further research into 
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meditation may likely advance psychiatric knowledge about the nature and causes of 
psychosis. 
A final and fascinating area of prospective psychosis research is into the mystic view 
that normal human faculties of perception and cognition allow only a limited and 
distorted apprehension of reality. From this perspective, the physical world that most 
people accept as solid and real is only so in a relative sense. However, from the mystic 
perspective of spiritual enlightenment, the world experienced through corporeal 
consciousness is ultimately illusory. This has profound ramifications in terms of better 
understanding psychosis for it poses the question – What differentiates the delusional 
nature of normal sense perception from psychotic delusional experience when both 
appear to be out of touch with ultimate reality? Indeed, despite its often distressing and 
disruptive nature, is psychosis a state of consciousness more in touch with deeper 
reality than is secular normality? Such questions call psychiatry to investigate 
psychospiritual knowledge systems in order to better understand the nature of reality, 
psychosis, and other mysterious vicissitudes of being human. 
14.6.3 Understanding psychopathology 
As suggested in my Chapter Thirteen investigation of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry, it is 
seemingly not possible to truly identify instances of psychopathology until the nature of 
psychopathology is deeply and holistically understood. Hence, the transition from a 
biogenic model of psychiatry to a holistic model would entail major changes to the 
traditional practice of reductive psychopathology-seeking, which arguably represents 
an approach that prematurely diagnoses instances of psychopathology that are 
scarcely understood. Indeed, it appears that psychiatry inadvertently veils and 
perpetuates this lack of understanding via the assumption that psychotic-like 
happenings are intrinsically incomprehensible. However, as is shown throughout my 
dissertation, such phenomena can be understood as deeply meaningful and non-
psychopathological, especially when considered in light of cross-cultural and 
psychospiritual contexts.  
A significant task and challenge for psychiatry-in-transition, then, is to abandon its 
standard and reductive practice of psychopathology-seeking in preference for a 
heuristic investigative approach whereby the discovery of new knowledge perpetually 
opens the way for further such discovery. This approach would incorporate physical, 
psychological and metaphysical considerations in its open-ended investigative scope. 
Arguably, only when a deep holistic understanding of the complex interplay of 
phenomenological factors within the metaphysical-physical nexus has been attained, is 
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it then possible to identify psychopathology, and discern it from non-psychopathology, 
with a degree of comprehensive expertise. 
 
14.6.4 Clinical training  
Finally, my psychospiritual challenge to medical psychiatry also has profound 
ramifications for psychiatric training as it requires psychiatrists to become conceptually 
and experientially conversant with the nature of psychospiritual realities. In other 
words, rather than ignoring or giving secondary consideration to psychospiritual 
matters, psychiatrists would be required to develop a deep understanding of 
metaphysical realities within many cultural contexts. This may include considering the 
idea that physical reality is epiphenomenal to psychospiritual reality and, subsequently, 
that understanding the roots of psychopathology requires a deep understanding of the 
multifaceted nature of reality in its interrelated physical and non-physical forms. 
However, such conceptual knowledge would not be sufficient alone. As is evidenced by 
Tibetan Buddhist psychiatrists and shamanic healers, the most effective practitioners 
are adept in employing technologies of consciousness to perceive and directly work 
within metaphysical domains of reality. Ostensibly, psychiatrists may become ‘soul 
doctors’, who, through their advanced holistic understanding and psychospiritual 
expertise, can exhibit greater therapeutic efficacy when working with psychotic-like 



















A historical overview of uses of the term ‘psychospiritual’ 
My challenge to medical psychiatry throughout this dissertation is a psychospiritual 
one; hence, elucidating the meaning of this core concept is important. While the 
definition provided in Chapter Two, Section 2.1 sufficiently meets this task in terms of 
articulating its essential scope and meaning, the historical overview here further fleshes 
out its significance and substance within the domain of metaphysical epistemology. Of 
particular pertinence are historical uses of the word ‘psychospiritual’ in reference to 
non-ordinary experiences and states of consciousness which may appear to be 
psychotic-like from a psychiatric perspective.  
The word ‘psychospiritual’ was ostensibly first used as a scriptural idiom in 1879 by the 
American pastor Israel Warren, in his book titled The Parousia (1879).151 Here, he 
referred to human nature as being “strictly psycho-spiritual”, by which he meant that the 
essential spiritual self is wedded with the psychic self when embodied in human form 
(Warren, 1879, p.280). Since Warren, the word psychospiritual has been used by 
commentators from various fields. However, two prominent metaphysical 
commentators who have used the term frequently in their respective works are the 
theosophist Helena Blavatsky (more commonly known as Madam Blavatsky), and the 
Indian scholar-mystic Sri Aurobindo. 
Blavatsky first used the term ‘psycho-spiritual’ in her 1888 book titled The Secret 
Doctrine. Here, she referred to “psycho-spiritual man” as an existential conjunct to the 
‘physical man’ of scientific materialism (Blavatsky, 1888a, p.528). She further argued 
that “the methods used by our scholars and students of the psycho-spiritual sciences 
do not differ from those of students of the natural and physical sciences. Only our fields 
of research are on two different planes” (Blavatsky, 1889, pp.1, 49). Hence, she saw 
the study of psychospiritual matters as a scientific endeavour. She also understood the 
term ‘psychospiritual’ as designating an extrasensory aptitude and challenged 
psychiatry’s construal of such aptitude as mental illness. For instance, she mused:  
We ask: Do you know the nature of hallucination, and can you define its 
psychic process? How can you tell that all such visions are due merely to 
physical hallucinations? What makes you feel so sure that mental and 
nervous diseases, while drawing a veil over our normal senses (so-called) 
151
 After conducting an exhaustive search, this is the earliest use of the term ‘psychospiritual’ that I was 
able to find. 
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do not reveal at the same time vistas unknown to the healthy man, by 
throwing open doors usually closed against your scientific perceptions (?): 
or that a psycho-spiritual faculty does not forthwith replace the loss, or the 
temporary atrophy, of a purely physical sense? (Blavatsky, 1888b, p.332). 
 
Here, she questions the veracity of accepted materialist theory and strongly suggests 
that a psychospiritual perspective proffers further ways to consider, understand and 
explain phenomena that might otherwise be deemed psychotic. This extension of the 
scope of science to include psychospiritual knowledge challenges the terra firma of 
biological-based medical psychiatry and has significant ramifications for understanding 
and diagnosing psychosis. 
 
Throughout the first half of the twentieth century the Indian scholar and sage Sri 
Aurobindo also frequently used the term ‘psychospiritual’ in his writings, whereby he 
emphasised and validated aspects and vistas of life which scarcely feature within the 
materialist worldview, if at all. For instance, in an evolutionary context, he referred to 
“the psycho-spiritual plane” as an intermediary domain of human existence between 
secular life and “the spiritual consciousness proper”, whereby a process of “psycho-
spiritual change” is both pursued and experienced by the spiritual adherent (Sri 
Aurobindo, 2011, pp.154, 147, 141). He saw this process of spiritual development as 
constituting “a complete psycho-spiritual and psycho-physical science of Yoga” that 
entailed the use of “Yoga-systems of psycho-spiritual discipline and self-finding” and 
“inner mental and psycho-spiritual methods” (Sri Aurobindo, 1997, pp.376, 190, 211). 
Additionally, he maintained that “psychospiritual means” can be actively harnessed for 
healing and therapeutic uses (2006, p.375), and that “a psycho-spiritual transformation 
of this kind would be already a vast change of our mental human nature” (2005, p.943). 
Hence, from an Aurobindoian perspective, the term ‘psychospiritual’ denotes many 
things, including a plane of existence, a scientific process in disciplinary practice of 
personal development and transformation, and the methods, experiences and 
capacities therein.  
 
Sri Aurobindo also described normal psychospiritual experiences and powers that, from 
a psychiatric perspective, would be perceived as abnormal and probably diagnosed as 
symptomatic of psychosis. For instance, he explained that a notable and common 
feature of spiritual development is the occurrence of extrasensory “psychospiritual 
experiences” whereby the adherent’s consciousness “opens to all kinds of things and 
to suggestions, and messages from all sorts of planes and worlds and forces and 
beings” (Sri Aurobindo, 2006, p.371). In psychiatric practice such experiences are 
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generally understood (or misunderstood) to be diagnostic indicators of a psychotic 
episode.  
 
Although psychologists and psychiatrists have not used the term ‘psychospiritual’ as 
prolifically as metaphysical commentators such as Blavatsky and Sri Aurobindo, there 
is evidence of the term’s use within their respective bodies of literature. For instance, 
an online keyword search for ‘psychospiritual’ or ‘psycho-spiritual’ in the American 
Psychological Association’s PsychINFO database results in a total of 489 items, 
ranging from 1930-2013, with most appearing after 1990.152 A similar search of 
psychiatric literature reveals that the terms ‘psychospiritual’ and ‘psycho-spiritual’ have 
been used in 108 articles between 1930-2013.153 These findings demonstrate its 
significant use within psychological literature, and a lesser, though growing use in 
psychiatric literature. Therefore, it is clear that the term is not completely foreign to 
psychiatry and apposite to suggest that incorporating psychospiritual considerations 
into psychiatric epistemology does not require the integration of an alien concept. 
Rather, it requires the willingness by psychiatry to extend its parameters of thinking to 
encompass psychospiritual considerations that already exist, in latent and rudimentary 
form, within its epistemological body. 
 
  
                                                          
152
 Source - PsychINFO at http://www.apa.org/pubs/databases/psycinfo/index.aspx. This search was 
conducted on 27 October 2013 and restricted to books (n = 122), dissertations (n = 165) and journal 
articles (n = 202).  
153
 There is no comprehensive psychiatric equivalent of PschINFO. Therefore, I conducted an online 
keyword search for ‘psychospiritual’ or ‘psycho-spiritual’ in Psychiatry Online, PubMed and Google 
Scholar. The total results were then collated after omitting repeat articles. This search was conducted on 
27 October 2013 and included journal articles only, as there were no instances of the terms being used in 




Key factors shaping the DSM-III revision process 
 
A2.0 Introduction 
The review process in transiting from DSM-II to DSM-III marked a radical shift from a 
psychodynamic model back to a medical model of psychiatry and of understanding 
psychosis. It appears, however, that the DSM-III medical model is a provisional 
construct, the formation of which was influenced by a flux of non-scientific factors such 
as professional embarrassment, shifting psychosocial circumstances, ideological 
preferences, economic expediency, political wrangling, in-house voting processes, and 
the survival imperative for psychiatry to demarcate its operational territory as a 
profession. Despite the influential predominance of these factors in shaping the manual 
and the absence of any scientifically validated proof as to the biological roots of 
psychopathology, the reconfiguration of DSM-III set the stage for a subsequent 
biogenic revival. As noted by Stein (1991, p.412) the DSM-III authors “narrowed 
diagnostic syndromes so that biological homogeneity is assured, and so fore-grounded 
biological explanations”. In this multifaceted manner, the DSM-III task force, and other 
biologically oriented psychiatrists, successfully reconstituted a biogenic and medical 
model in American psychiatry. 
 
My ensuing appraisal of these factors provides a backdrop for better grasping the 
dynamics at play in shaping modern psychiatric thinking and practice which have 
subsequently set the epistemological parameters for understanding psychosis since 
then. It is important to bear in mind the inextricable relationship between these 
dimensions of DSM-III formation. Although examined separately, these seemingly 
different factors actually operated in a dialectical interchange of mutual influence. 
 
A2.1 The DSM-III task force remit  
The DSM-III review process formally began in 1974 when Robert Spitzer was 
nominated by the APA as Chair of the task force on Nomenclature and Statistics (APA, 
1980, p.2). Although the task force was initially formed to develop a manual that was 
useful to clinicians and researchers of various “theoretical orientations” (ibid), it 
subsequently adopted a predominantly medical focus in keeping with Spitzer’s intention 
and declaration that DSM-III would be a “defense of the medical model as applied to 
psychiatric problems” (Spitzer in Wilson, 1993, p.405). This venture to establish, or re-
establish, American psychiatry as a medical speciality was viewed as “a Kraepelinian 
revival” and earned the task force the appellation of “the neo-Kraepelinians” (Klerman, 
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1978, p.106). As discussed below, various factors precipitated this endeavour to re-
constitute American psychiatry as a medical discipline. 
 
A2.2 The crisis in diagnostic reliability and validity   
The credibility of psychiatry as a discipline depends on demonstrating diagnostic 
reliability and validity. Simply put, reliability is defined as “diagnostic 
agreement…among practitioners” (Allardyce et al, 2010, p.1), and validity as “the 
extent to which something represents or measures what it purports to represent or 
measure” (Schaler, 1995). During the 1960s and early 1970s, four concurrent incidents 
challenged the reliability and validity of American psychiatric diagnostics, and played a 
pivotal role in shaping DSM-III. First, the reliability of the DSM-II schizophrenia 
category was challenged by the results of a cross-national study of US and UK trial 
patient groups from 1965 to 1972, which showed that there “was a dramatic 
preponderance of schizophrenia in the New York samples as opposed to the London 
samples” (Professional Staff of the United States-United Kingdom Cross-National 
Project, 1974, p.85). In other words, when presented with the same clinical data, 
American psychiatrists diagnosed schizophrenia far more frequently than British 
psychiatrists. Indeed, Spitzer (1989, p.21) later acknowledged “the sorry state of 
psychiatric diagnosis” in America during the 1960s and early 1970s, whereby 
“clinicians and researchers consistently were unable to agree on the psychiatric 
diagnoses that they assigned to patients”. The crisis this created for psychiatry as a 
discipline cannot be understated, for as DSM-IV Chair Allen Frances explains, “without 
reliability the system is completely random, and the diagnoses mean almost nothing - 
maybe worse than nothing, because they’re falsely labelling. You’re better off not 
having a diagnostic system” (Spiegel interviews Frances, 2005). The findings of the 
United States-United Kingdom Cross-National Project raised considerable concerns 
about diagnostic reliability in American psychiatric practice. 
 
Concurrently, there was a threefold attack on psychiatric diagnostic validity. First, 
during the 1960s and 1970s, anti-psychiatrists disputed the veracity of psychiatric 
diagnoses because they were, in their view:  
i) arbitrary, and hence, mythical constructs;  
ii) used as a hegemonic tool for fabricating professional legitimacy; and  
iii) used to exercise power and social control via labelling patients (Decker, 
2007, pp.343-344).  
Second, in 1973, gay activists successfully lobbied the APA to revoke homosexuality 
from DSM-II as a form of mental disorder. This cast a pall of doubt over the validity of 
psychiatric diagnoses, for it inferred they “were strongly influenced not solely by 
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scientific criteria, but by public opinion, social constructions of deviance, and political 
pressure” (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.258). Indeed, the final decision to revoke the 
psychopathological status of homosexuality was not the product of medical re-
evaluation, but of a voting process whereby 5,854 APA members voted for, and 3,810 
against, removing homosexuality from DSM-II (Butler, 1999, p.22). This incident 
suggested the dubious validity of psychiatric mental disorder categories for it seemed 
they were formulated more via subjective opinion than objective medical fact. 
 
The third incident, which also occurred in 1973, was in the form of an experiment 
conducted by psychologist David Rosenhan (1973, p.251) whereby several sane 
pseudo-patients approached different psychiatric hospitals and informed resident 
psychiatrists that they heard a voice saying “empty”, “hollow” or “thud”. Most were 
diagnosed as ‘schizophrenic’ and treated as such by staff, despite acting normally 
immediately upon admission, and were eventually released with the updated diagnosis 
of schizophrenia “in remission” (ibid, p.252). As a result, Rosenhan (p.257) scathingly 
concluded that “it is clear that we cannot distinguish the sane from the insane in 
psychiatric hospitals”. These combined events highlighted “the absence of evidence 
about validity and causation” (Klerman, 1984, p.541), and constituted a major public 
embarrassment for psychiatry. In response to this array of disconcerting occurrences,  
the DSM-III task force decided to implement innovative strategies to first improve 
diagnostic reliability and then to attempt to substantiate the validity of DSM-III mental 
disorders.  
 
A2.3 Diagnostic innovations in DSM-III   
The principal and galvanising objective of the DSM-III task force was to create a 
superior medical diagnostic instrument that redressed issues pertaining to reliability 
and validity. Samuel Guze (1982, p.7), a task force consultant and key player in the 
review process, described diagnosis as “the keystone of medical practice and clinical 
research”, while Feighner et al (1972, p.57), whose proposed diagnostic criteria model 
formed the basis of the DSM-III framework, also underscored the fundamental role of 
diagnosis in medical psychiatry. Consequently, between 1974 and 1980, the DSM-III 
task force sought to rectify the reliability and validity problem through several innovative 
developments, namely, the formation of: 
i) a so-called ‘atheoretical’ model; 
ii) a generic definition for ‘mental disorder’; 
iii) a set of operational diagnostic categories and criteria; and 
iv) a multiaxial evaluation system. 
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A2.3.1     Positing an atheoretical model 
The DSM-III task force maintained that the psychodynamic approach to psychiatric 
practice in America, heralded by DSM-I and DSM-II, was driven by unsubstantiated 
theories pertaining to aetiology. According to Tsuang et al (2000, p.1045), “a key 
innovation of DSM-III was its explicit separation of diagnostic criteria from speculation 
about etiology. At the time DSM-III was developed, this separation was essential 
because theories of etiology had not yet been subjected to empirical tests”. Klerman 
(1984, p.540) hailed the DSM-III’s ostensible scientific approach as remedying the 
unverified psychodynamic aetiological theories. Spitzer (1985, p.522) referred to this 
DSM-III development as an “atheoretical” approach, by which he inferred a; 
 
descriptive approach [that] emphasizes classification on the basis of shared 
descriptive clinical features rather than on presumed etiology, and 
emphasizes the importance of specified diagnostic criteria for improving 
diagnostic reliability rather than the use of highly inferential clinical 
concepts for making a diagnosis.  
 
According to the DSM-III authors, this “atheoretical approach” represented a 
nonpartisan framework that practitioners from “varying theoretical orientations” could 
adapt to suit their respective clinical approaches (APA, 1980, p.7). At face value, this 
depicted the DSM-III upgrade as an egalitarian development which supported the 
views and approaches of both psychodynamic and medical disciplines, however, closer 
investigation reveals flaws in the task force’s atheoretical claim.  
 
Numerous commentators have disputed the veracity of DSM-III’s supposed 
‘atheoretical’ nature. These broadly constitute two different, though related, points of 
contention. The first is that, despite its purported atheoretical stance, DSM-III was itself 
a fundamentally theoretical document (Butler, 1999, p.27; Wilson, 1993, p.408; Carson 
1991, p.305; Blashfield, 1984, p.133). As McLaren (2007, p.xi) succinctly puts it: 
 
Psychiatrists can’t have it both ways. They can’t claim on the one hand to 
be functioning within a scientific framework yet, on the other, also claim that 
their diagnostic system is atheoretical. There is no such thing as a non-
theoretical science as a science is necessarily committed to a theory; 
science just is the process of explicating and testing a theory. 
 
Indeed, Faust & Miner (1986, pp.962, 963) argued that DSM-III was modelled on 
Baconian empiricism, and hence, “replete with presuppositions and theoretical 
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assumptions”. This view was not only expressed by detractors, but also acknowledged 
by medical model proponents. For instance, Millon (1983, p.808), a task force member, 
asserted that “it should be said that the categorical syndromes of the DSM-III are…in 
the main, only theoretical constructs”, while Klerman (1978, p.107), an ardent supporter 
of the DSM-III project, alluded to the manual’s theoretical nature in acknowledging that 
“mental illness and the medical model are social constructs; they are inventions of 
modern society”. In fact, Spitzer (1984a, p.546), as task force Chair, also declared that 
“all diagnostic categories are actually hypotheses; that is how we regard the diagnostic 
categories of DSM-III”. This admission by Spitzer is surprising, for, on the one hand, he 
emphasises that the DSM-III atheoretical approach essentially differentiates it from the 
psychodynamic conjecture of DSM-II, yet, on the other hand, he acknowledges the 
ultimate theoretical nature of DSM-III.  
 
A further point of contention by commentators was that, despite the egalitarian 
assurances regarding the DSM-III atheoretical approach, the project, in fact, aimed to 
supplant psychoanalytic and psychotherapeutic approaches (Butler, 1999, p.21; 
Rogler, 1997, p.11; Wilson, 1993, p.404; Gaines, 1992, p.9; Blashfield, 1984, p.21). For 
instance, Skodal (2000, p.442) maintains that “Spitzer and other members of the DSM-
III task force were blatantly antianalytic, not simply atheoretical”. Spitzer (2001, p.354), 
contested such criticisms, asserting that a number of DSM-III categories “were 
proposed by clinicians with a psychoanalytic perspective”. However, one of the few 
psychoanalytically oriented DSM-III task force members resigned his position because 
“he felt that his suggestions for shaping the manual in a more psychodynamic direction 
had been dismissed out of hand” (Frosch in Wilson, 1993, p.405). Additionally, Houts 
(2000, p.947) concludes that, whether or not a biomedical agenda drove the DSM-III 
project, “the fundamental concepts of psychoanalytic theory were expunged from the 
official psychiatric nomenclature”. Overall, then, it appears that the existing 
psychodynamic model was supplanted by a putative ‘atheoretical’ and medical model 
of psychiatry. 
 
A2.3.2     Defining ‘mental disorder’ 
Another major DSM-III innovation was the inclusion of an explicit definition for ‘mental 
disorder’. According to Spitzer & Endicott (1978, p.15), an attempt to define mental 
illness had not occurred in prior DSM and ICD editions, nor in “standard textbooks of 
medicine and psychiatry”, hence, fashioning this definition represented an original 
undertaking in psychiatry. It also constituted a process that went to the problematic 
heart of reframing psychiatry as a medical profession and sought to answer several 
conjoint questions - What is a medical disorder, what is a mental disorder, in what ways 
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might DSM-III mental disorders be construed as medical disorders, and what are the 
professional boundaries of medical psychiatry? Therefore, in 1975, the DSM-III task 
force decided to formulate a definition for mental disorder (Millon, 1983, p.805). Beyond 
the apparent need to explicate the conceptual and ontological parameters of ‘mental 
illness’, a further and fundamental motivation for undertaking this task was to convince 
detractors that “psychiatry was a legitimate branch of medicine” (Spitzer, 1981, pp.3, 
33). The orchestrators of this initiative subsequently composed definitions for both 
‘medical disorder’ and ‘mental disorder’, provided a rationale to support these 
definitions, and fashioned a model of proposed operational criteria for diagnostically 
distinguishing mental from non-mental medical disorders (ibid, pp.18-30). Despite its 
seeming rigour, this proposal created a maelstrom of protest from psychologists who 
perceived it as an attempt by medical psychiatry to appropriate the domain of mental 
disorders as its professional purview, and was consequently rejected as “provocative” 
by formal vote at a 1978 APA meeting (Millon, 1983, pp.805-806). Additionally, Moore 
(1978, p.85) described the Spitzer-Endicott definition proposal as “stipulative” in that it 
prescriptively “focuses on how it ought to be used” rather than on implicit meaning. In 
1980, the final definition was published in DSM-III, however, according to Millon (1983, 
p.806), this was a modified version of the 1979 consensus definition, which had been 
altered “at the editorial level without task force approval”. The final edited version 
included the term “biologic dysfunction” whereas the original did not.154 When 
considering that DSM-III was published as a manual to guide the practice of a 
reinstituted medical model of psychiatry and that a definition of mental illness 
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 The DSM-III glossary defines mental disorder as follows: 
 
A mental disorder is conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral or psychologic 
syndrome or pattern that occurs in an individual and that typically is associated with either a 
painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or more important areas of functioning 
(disability). In addition, there is an inference that there is a behavioral, psychologic, or 
biologic dysfunction, and that the disturbance is not only in the relationship between the 
individual and society. When the disturbance is limited to a conflict between and individual 
and society, this may represent social deviance, which may or may not be commendable, 
but is not by itself a mental disorder [italics added] (APA, 1980, p.363). 
 
The original and intended definition was as follows; 
 
No precise definition is available that unambiguously defines the boundaries of this concept. 
(This is also true of such concepts as physical disorder or mental or physical health.) 
However, in the DSM-III each of the mental disorders is conceptualized as a clinically 
significant behavioural or psychological syndrome or pattern of an individual that is 
associated, by and large, with either a painful symptom (distress) or impairment in one or 
more important areas of functioning (disability) (Millon, 1983, p.806). 
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delineates the essential nature of the psychiatric domain, then the obvious question 
raised is – For what possible purpose was this unauthorised change made? 
 
In response to this question it is apposite to suggest that the doctored DSM-III 
definition reflects the intentional insertion of a biomedical bias into the manual. Indeed, 
many commentators have expressed the view that the publication of DSM-III 
represented a switch to a biomedical model of psychiatry. For example, Arthur (1973, 
p.846) observed that the advent of the DSM-III review project saw the emergence of a 
biomedical trend in American psychiatry which he variously described as: “a sudden 
pullulation of basic biological research into mental illness”; “a neo-Kraepelinian revival 
of interest in typology”; and “a reaffirmation of the psychiatrist as medical specialist with 
problems clearly in the province of medicine rather than psychology, sociology, or 
anthropology”. Similarly, Butler (1999, p.21) maintained that the DSM-III project was 
governed by a covert biomedical agenda from the outset in that “the diagnostic project 
intended from its inception to lead to a progressive exclusion of non-biologically 
focused systems of explanation”.155 However, Spitzer vigorously and repeatedly refuted 
these claims. For instance, he asserted that the view of DSM-III detractors that “the 
focus of psychiatric physicians should be particularly on the biological aspects of 
mental illness”, was “nonsense” (Spitzer, 1982, p.592). Indeed, twenty-one years after 
the publication of DSM-III he continued to argue that “it is not true that DSM-III…is 
covertly committed to a biological approach to explaining psychiatric disturbance” 
(Spitzer, 2001, p.351).156 Klerman, a key medical model proponent, contradicted 
Spitzer’s rebuttals. For instance, he referred to the “biological concepts” of the 
“neokraepelinian view” (Klerman, 1971, p.310), and observed that, “applied to 
schizophrenia, there is a greater attention to…biological causes and treatments of the 
disorder” in the proposed DSM-III (Klerman, 1978, p.105). Despite this seeming 
impasse of opinion, it is evident that the DSM-III review process precipitated (either 
deliberately or inadvertently) a revival of biologically oriented psychiatry which has 
subsequently become integral to contemporary psychiatry and its fundamental 
understanding and definition of psychosis.  
 
A2.3.3     Formulating operational diagnostic categories and criteria 
The DSM-III task force believed the reliability crisis in American psychiatry was 
primarily due to DSM-II classifications being ambiguous and lacking formal definitions 
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  For further comments of a similar nature, see – Double, 2008, p.332; Butler, 1999, p.21; Wilson, 1993, 
p.402; Gaines, 1992, p.9; Klerman, 1978, p.105; Romano, 1977, p.798. 
156
 For further comments by Spitzer of a similar nature, see - Spitzer & Williams, 1982, p.23; Spitzer, 1981, 
p.33; Spitzer & Endicott, 1978, p.17, 30; Spitzer et al, 1977, p.6. 
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and operational criteria, resulting in psychiatrists making incongruent interpretations 
and diagnoses (Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, 1978, p.773). As Spitzer (2001, p.355) 
explains, “the brevity and general nature of these descriptions was of little help in 
indicating to the diagnostician which features of the disorder needed to be present in 
order to make the diagnoses”. The embarrassing disparity between US and UK 
diagnoses of schizophrenia was primarily due to the vagueness of DSM-II classification 
descriptions, whereby American psychiatrists diagnosed the same people as 
schizophrenic that their British counterparts generally diagnosed as neurotic or 
depressed (Healy, 2002a, p.298). While the DSM-I and DSM-II manuals provided a 
brief symptomatological description of mental disorders they did not include an 
operational system that prioritised and designated the number of symptoms required to 
make a diagnosis (Blashfield, 1984, p.113). According to Spitzer, Endicott & Robins 
(1978, p.773), this was a major source of unreliability due to the diagnostic discordance 
resulting “when there are differences in the formal inclusion and exclusion criteria that 
clinicians use to summarize patient data into psychiatric diagnoses”. Hence, the DSM-
III authors focussed on “replacing vague descriptions of psychiatric disorders with 
precise definitions using specified criteria” (Spitzer, 1989) and established a tool which 
enabled clinicians “to determine the presence or absence of specific clinical 
phenomena, and then to apply the comprehensive rules provided for making the 
diagnosis” (Spitzer et al, 1977, p.15). This innovation, coupled with the provision of 
descriptive diagnostic categories with information about clinical signs and symptoms for 
each disorder (Spitzer, 2001, p.356), ostensibly worked to invest DSM-III diagnostic 
categories with empirical rigour and much improved reliability. Indeed, the DSM-III 
introduction attested that it had achieved “far greater reliability than had previously 
been obtained with DSM-II” (APA, 1980, p.5), while Klerman (1984, p.341) claimed 
that, in DSM-III, the reliability problem had been “solved”. However, Klerman’s claim 
was evidently overstated, for Spitzer explained in a 2005 interview that: 
  
To say that we’ve solved the reliability problem is just not true. It’s been 
improved. But if you’re in a situation with a general clinician it’s certainly not 
very good. There’s still a real problem, and it’s not clear how to solve the 
problem (Spitzer in Spiegel, 2005). 
 
It therefore appears only a partial improvement of reliability was achieved in psychiatric 
diagnostics via this DSM-III development. 
 
Indeed, while many DSM-III advocates have lauded the manual’s enhanced diagnostic 
reliability, other commentators have contested this. Some assert that these claims to 
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superior reliability are simply inaccurate. For example, after analysing studies 
upholding claims of high reliability in DSM-III diagnostic criteria, Caplan (1995, pp.197-
203) concluded that reliability was, in fact, “poor”, while Kutchins & Kirk (1997, pp.252-
253), after a similar process, determined that “the evidence offered for this claim was 
lacking”.157 Others challenged the veracity of the process by which the diagnostic 
criteria were formulated. For instance, Millon (1983, p.812) proffers the “insider’s 
perspective” that DSM-III reliability was not “anchored to empirical research”. This is a 
damning statement for, as a DSM-III task force member, his disclosure of this fact 
casts considerable doubt on the scientific soundness of DSM-III reliability measures. 
Millon’s view is corroborated by American psychiatrist Mandel Cohen158 who also 
spoke on the issue of DSM-III diagnostic criteria formulation:  
 
But you know the problem is that these people in DSM-III don’t get their 
criteria now by research – they get a group of good people to sit around the 
table and discuss it all before they finally decide to accept whatever (Healy, 
2002b, p.222). 
 
It therefore appears that, rather than being the product of sound empirical research, the 
DSM-III diagnostic criteria were arrived at through a process of discussion and 
consensus.  
 
In fact, descriptions of these diagnostic criteria formulation sessions indicate that they 
were more a process of unruly skirmish than of sage deliberation and debate. For 
instance, Millon (1983, p.804) alludes to this in his reference to a process negotiated by 
“a highly diverse collection of outspoken and independently thinking professionals with 
clearly disparate views”, while Spitzer (1985, p.523) admits the “complicated and 
frequently heated interactions” when composing the DSM-III diagnostic content. 
Indeed, British psychiatrist and DSM-III consultant, David Shaffer, recalls that “whoever 
shouted the loudest tended to be heard…it was more like a tobacco auction than a sort 
of conference” (Spiegel, 2003). Similarly, DSM-IV task force Chair, Allen Frances, 
retrospectively observed that “the loudest voices usually won out”, and that Spitzer 
would synthesise these differing opinions into “some combination of the accepted 
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 In their book titled The Selling of DSM: The Rhetoric of Science in Psychiatry, Kirk & Kutchins (1992, 
pp.133-160) dedicate an entire chapter to a rigorous critical appraisal of studies claiming to corroborate 
high reliability. 
158
 Mandel Cohen was an eminent American psychiatrist who championed a ‘medical model’ approach 
during the era when psychoanalytic psychiatry predominated. He was subsequently perceived by some as 
“deserving the credit for DSM-III” for his influential and founding role in mentoring a core group of like-
minded psychiatrists who later became prime movers in formulating DSM-III (Healy, 2002b). 
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wisdom of the group…with a little added weight to the people he respected most” 
(Spiegel interviews Frances, 2005). It therefore seems that the validity of DSM-III 
diagnostic criteria and categories is tenuous, for they arguably reflect a process of 
heated wrangling rather than of objective empiricism. Furthermore, it seems that any 
improvement in reliability was not reflective of scientific rigour, but of a group of 
psychiatrists collectively memorising a set of agreed upon diagnostic criteria. As 
Nathan (1979, p.477) notes, establishing reliability is simply a matter of consensus 
classification, “given that clinicians can learn to agree on how to elicit and chronicle 
those criteria”. The DSM-III operational criteria for diagnosing psychosis were also 
forged through this dubious process. It is consequently feasible to suggest that such 
criteria were more reflective of subjective opinions by psychiatrists about psychosis 
than of the actual nature of psychosis per se. 
 
A2.3.4     Creating a multiaxial system 
A final DSM-III innovation was the development of a multiaxial evaluation system. This 
consisted of five axes of evaluation, which formed a complete clinical picture when 
combined. Axis I pertained to “Clinical Syndromes”, Axis II to “Personality Disorders”, 
Axis III to “Physical Disorders and Conditions”, Axis IV to “Severity of Psychosocial 
Stressors”, and Axis V to “Highest Level of Adaptive Functioning Past Year”. The first 
three axes constituted the “official diagnostic assessment” components, while the latter 
two axes provided additional information regarding possible related influences (APA, 
1980, p.23). Intriguingly, the influential role of psychosocial stressors in mental 
disorders which featured centrally in DSM-I, and were all but expunged from DSM-II, 
were resurrected in DSM-III as a seven point rating system ranging in increasing 
severity from: 1 (None = “No apparent psychosocial stressor”) through to 7 
(Catastrophic = “Concentration camp experience; devastating natural disaster”) (ibid, 
p.27). This inclusion of psychosocial considerations within the diagnostic framework 
arguably counters accusations that DSM-III was biased towards a biomedical 
understanding of mental disorders. Indeed, Spitzer (2001, p.357) claimed that the 
development of a multiaxial system “enabled DSM-III to be presented as within a broad 
biopsychosocial model—rather than the narrow diagnostic model that its critics 
feared”.159 However, with DSM-III the primary diagnosis was made in light of the first 
three axes only, which did not include psychosocial considerations. Such factors were 
secondary and not integral to making diagnosis. Therefore, it seems Spitzer’s likening 
of DSM-III to a biopsychosocial model, due to its multiaxial system, was a political 
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 The biopsychosocial model Spitzer alludes to here is that proposed by American psychiatrist, George 
Engel (1978; 1977), during the DSM-III review process, as a holistic alternative to medical psychiatry and 
its narrow diagnostic focus. 
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rhetorical device employed to give the appearance of acknowledging psychosocial 
causes of mental disorders when, clearly, the chief aim was to enshrine psychiatry as a 
fundamentally medical discipline. 
 
A2.4 Non-medical forces shaping DSM-III 
In addition to the aforementioned embarrassments and factors that played an influential 
role in the DSM-III review project, sundry other socio-economic and political forces 
converged to shape the subsequent process, and the final published product. These 
are examined separately below as social, economic and political forces, though, in fact, 
they worked together as a complex and synergistic whole.  
  
A2.4.1     Social forces shaping DSM-III 
The main social force that influenced the formulation of DSM-III was the alleged ‘neo-
Kraepelinian movement’ which was driven by a group of medical oriented psychiatrists. 
According to Klerman (1978, pp.104-105), this group championed key tenets of 
Kraepelinian thinking, particularly the categorisation of mental disorders, and also 
endorsed “a general movement of psychiatry towards greater integration with 
medicine”. Decker (2007, p.345) proffers the following description of the so-called neo-
Kraepelinians:  
 
In the 1960s and early 1970s a small band of psychiatrists at Washington 
University in St Louis were dissatisfied with and critical of the state of 
American psychiatry. In their view, here was a psychiatry that dealt in non-
psychiatric pursuits, had largely eschewed the medical model, did not value 
diagnosis and classification, rejected sharp distinctions between mental 
illness and mental health, and seemed unbothered by the abysmally low 
scores of inter-rater reliability – two or more psychiatrists coming to the 
same conclusion about the diagnosis of a patient. The Washington 
University psychiatrists and their few sympathizers believed that only 
empirical psychiatric research with a strong focus on biology held any hope 
for the treatment and improvement of the mentally ill. 
 
Blashfield (1984, pp.43-45) maintained that the neo-Kraepelinian movement 
exemplified the sociology of science notion of an “invisible college”, which has two 
fundamental identifying features. Firstly, it is similar to a college in that “the group 
represented a collection of intellectuals who had a sense of allegiance to each other 
and frequently interacted both professionally and socially”, and secondly, it is ‘invisible’ 
in that the group’s existence is generally not evident to those outside of it (Blashfield, 
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1982, p.3). In sociological terms, although such groups can exercise considerable 
persuasive power, they are not actively clandestine, but emerge as a natural aspect of 
scientific progress (ibid). This is arguably a fitting description of the DSM-III task force 
and others in psychiatric circles who worked closely with them. 
 
The perceived existence of an invisible college of neo-Kraepelinian psychiatrists is 
more than conjecture, as their existence was substantiated by commentators of the 
time. For instance, Blashfield (1984, p.36) created a sociogram to demonstrate that 
most neo-Kraepelinian members were employed at one of four networked institutions; 
namely, Kings Hospital Institute (New York), New York State psychiatric Institute (New 
York), Washington University (St Louis), and University of Iowa (Iowa City). He also 
noted that, of the nineteen DSM-III task force members, ten were prominent figures 
within this neo-Kraepelinian network (ibid, p.116). According to Klerman (1978, p.105), 
the “founding” neo-Kraepelinian members were: Eli Robins, Sam Guze and George 
Winokur from St Louis, who were task force consultants and/or advisory committee 
members, and co-authors of the Feigner paper which was pivotal to DSM-III’s 
classification system and diagnostic criteria. He additionally named Donald Klein and 
Robert Spitzer from New York (both key task force members) as prominent neo-
Kraepelinians (ibid). It is pertinent to reiterate here that, at the time, Klerman ranked as 
one of America’s leading psychiatrists and was renowned for his endorsement of 
reconstituting a medical model of psychiatry. Hence, his views pertaining to the identity 
of neo-Kraepelinian members hold considerable professional weight. Despite this body 
of evidence, Spitzer (1984b, p.552) challenged the existence of such a consortium, 
which he derisively referred to as “the so-called neo-Kraepelinian group”. Indeed, in an 
issue of Schizophrenia Bulletin, he lampooned the idea by stating that, “I take this 
opportunity, in the hallowed pages of this distinguished journal, to offer my resignation 
publically from the neo-Kraepelinian college” (Spitzer, 1982, p.592).  Regardless of 
Spitzer’s aversion to the appellation ‘neo-Kraepelinian’, innumerable commentators 
have asserted the existence of such an elite group, and its prominent role in shaping 
DSM-III. 
 
If the neo-Kraepelinians were the collective protagonist in the DSM-III move to 
medicalise psychiatry, and the task force spearheaded this venture, then Robert 
Spitzer was arguably the central driving force behind the entire mounting edifice. In 
fact, Spiegel (2005; 2003) refers to Spitzer as being the man who “revolutionized the 
practice of psychiatry” and “revolutionized the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual”, for he 
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was a member of twelve of the fourteen Advisory Committees (APA, 1980)160 and 
functioned as the executive dynamo in most aspects of developing DSM-III. For 
instance, DSM-III Advisory Committee member, David Shaffer (Spiegel interviews 
Shaffer, 2005), recalled that Spitzer made the final decisions concerning DSM-III 
classifications by consulting “some internal criteria” of his own. DSM-IV editor, Michael 
First, corroborates this view in stating that “a lot of what’s in the DSM represents what 
Bob thinks is right…He really saw this as his book, and if he thought it was right he 
would push very hard to get it in that way” (Spiegel interviews First, 2005). Indeed, 
Spitzer recalls with pride, “my fingers were on the typewriter that typed…every word” of 
the diagnostic entities published in the manual (Spiegel interviews Spitzer, 2005). From 
this perspective, it is seemingly evident that the turning of the psychiatric tide back to a 
medical model in DSM-III was fundamentally influenced, not so much by hard science, 
but by a social force in the form a neo-Kraepelinian clique which advocated a biogenic 
understanding of mental illness. This was further consolidated by the subjective sway 
of one man, Robert (Bob) Spitzer,161 who intimately shaped the final biomedical DSM-
III product.  
Spitzer was also instrumental in advancing technological methodology in psychiatric 
diagnostics. For instance, due to his penchant for data-based diagnostics he 
consequently hand-picked “data-oriented people” as task force and Advisory 
Committee members (Spiegel interviews Spitzer, 2005) and also introduced computer 
programs to crunch data for diagnostic purposes (Endicott & Spitzer, 1978, p.844). This 
operated as a powerful enabling force in furthering the DSM-III project, for, as 
retrospectively observed in a DSM-IV text; 
no technological advance has more significantly influenced the 
development of DSM-III and the way psychiatrists think about mental illness 
than the personal computer…In subtle and often unacknowledged ways, 
modern psychiatry’s devotion to the computer has determined its 
conception of the psyche (LaBruzza & Mendez-Villarubia, 1994, p.25). 
160
 The role of the Advisory Committees was to “come up with detailed descriptions of mental disorders” for 
each of the main categorical areas (Spiegel, 2005). Spitzer frankly admits his carte blanche role in 
selecting committee and task force members – “I was able to appoint anybody that I wanted, not only on 
the task force, but also on these you know, individual committees” (Spiegel, 2003). 
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 In fact, Spitzer was perceived by his contemporaries as being obsessed by the project, working up to 
eighty hours per week. He was consequently described by colleague Allen Frances as a “kind of an idiot 
savant of diagnosis—in a good sense, in the sense that he never tires of it” (Spiegel interviews Frances, 
2005). 
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Indeed, it appears that Spitzer’s efforts to delineate mental illnesses into diagnostic 
units that could then be measured via technological methods was influenced by his 
personal uneasiness with the enigmatic and seemingly chaotic nature of the psyche. 
For instance, he admitted to having a poor understanding of people’s emotions 
(Spiegel, 2003) and in harking back to his prior attempts to use a psychoanalytic 
approach he confessed that – “I was uncomfortable with not knowing what to do with 
their messiness…I don’t think I was uncomfortable listening and empathizing; I just 
didn’t know what the hell to do” (Spiegel interviews Spitzer, 2005). It seems he was 
more comfortable with a conception of the psyche that was conducive to the 
predictable diagnostic approach of structured observation, measurement and 
categorisation exemplified in DSM-III. Consequently, the understandings of the psyche 
(and psychosis) in DSM-III were ostensibly more reflective of the authors’ biomedical 
ideology, and Spitzer’s personal technological preferences, than of robust scientific 
research, or deep phenomenological investigation into their nature. 
Two further social forces that combined to foster the advance of DSM-III were the poor 
state of community mental health services in America in the late 1970s and the 
corresponding rise of pharmaceutical treatment approaches to mental disorders. 
During the 1960s, a policy of deinstitutionalisation was enacted in America whereby 
many people with psychiatric disorders were treated at Community Mental Health 
Centres (CMHC) rather state-run institutions (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, p.255). However, 
over the ensuing decade there was a concomitant trend in psychiatry towards private 
psychoanalytic practice which resulted in the emergence of a “new cohort” of people 
with severe mental disorders in the understaffed community mental health system (ibid, 
p.256). Many CMHC psychiatrists felt ill-equipped to treat these people and
progressively resorted to prescribing medications because of their apparent 
effectiveness in controlling or blunting psychiatric symptoms (ibid). Consequently, a 
mutually beneficial relationship developed between the new DSM-III medical model 
and biological psychiatric approaches. On the one hand, “the symptom-based 
diseases” of the new manual helped spur growth in the psychiatric drug treatments 
market (Mayes & Horwitz, 2005, pp.256, 266; Zung, 1975, p.25), while 
correspondingly, the rising impetus of this biomedical enterprise bolstered the 
necessity for an empirical psychiatric manual (Wilson, 1993, p.404). According to Healy 
(2002a, pp.305-306), this heralded the birth of “a new psychiatry”, which progressively 
consolidated into a biomedical model of psychiatric thinking and practice. In 
consideration of the abovementioned factors, it is evident that the formulation of DSM-
III was powerfully influenced by various social forces. 
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A2.4.2     Economic forces shaping DSM-III 
Economic imperatives also played a significant role in abetting the reestablishment of 
psychiatry as a medical discipline and in the development of DSM-III as the official 
diagnostic guidebook. The foremost influence was pressure from health insurance 
companies for psychiatry to provide medically legitimate diagnoses. As Decker (2007, 
p.345) explains, “third-party payers of psychotherapeutic treatment mounted a 
campaign to pay only for ‘real diseases’…psychotherapy was to them a bottomless pit”. 
This concern was emphasised by the medical director of a major insurance company, 
who asserted in 1979 that “problems of living” treated by psychodynamic psychiatrists, 
such as “floundering marriages, trouble raising children, and the difficulties in finding 
meaning in life”, were outside the principal remit of insurance coverage. He maintained 
that: 
 
Medical insurance should only be asked to cover medical mental disorders. 
Insurance is meant to pay for the sick, not the discontented who are 
seeking an improved lifestyle. We need your help in differentiating between 
those who have mental disorders and those who simply have problems 
(Sharfstein, 1987, p.533). 
 
It appears there was a measure of desperation to this appeal, for according to  Mayes 
& Horwitz (2005, p.262), insurance companies “virtually begged Spitzer and his task 
force to standardize the manual’s diagnostic criteria so that insurers could separate 
legitimate mental illness from nonpsychiatric problems”. This development beggars the 
question – Was DSM-III’s ascendency chiefly due to the robust scientific validity of 
disorders included in the manual, or did serving national pecuniary interests help lend it 
legitimacy that it would not have achieved independently? When considering DSM-III 
architects frankly admit that all disorders therein are non-validated constructs, the latter 
scenario appears to be the more influential force. Indeed, as Kutchins & Kirk (1997, 
p.256) observe, the interrelationship between economics and psychiatry was limited 
prior to 1980, but since DSM-III “a strange defacto institutional marriage” developed 
between health insurance companies and medical psychiatry. Others also attest to the 
emergent influence of economic forces upon psychiatry since the publication of DSM-
III. For instance, McHugh (2006, p.51) claims that “the new DSM approach of using 
experts and descriptive criteria in identifying psychiatric diseases has encouraged a 
productive industry”, while Schacht (1985, p.514) contends that DSM-III has become 
“an official document that participates in the organization and distribution of social and 
economic power”. Hence, it seems economic forces not only shaped the DSM-III 
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process and content, but also rendered the manual itself an economic force that 
precipitated the establishment of American psychiatry as a profitable industry. 
 
Although the relationship between fiscal forces and psychiatry is a valid socio-
economic reality from a certain perspective, there also exists the critical view that this 
alliance compromised the medical integrity of DSM-III.  For example, while psychiatrist 
Ben Bursten (1981, p.371) acknowledged the practical fact that “economics demand 
that we be medical”, he also cautioned about “the danger…that we will be forced to 
limit our activities to those that fit the popular concept of what is medical because that 
is what insurance companies will pay for”. In a similar vein, just prior to DSM-III’s 
publication, the ex-president of the American Psychological Association, George Albee 
(in Spitzer & Endicott, 1978, p.36), expressed his concern that the manual was “turning 
every human problem into a disease, in anticipation of the shower of health plan gold 
that is over the horizon”. Spitzer (1981, p.3) vigorously rejected such suggestions as 
“nonsense” and “absurd”, clarifying that: 
  
The only instance that I can recall in which ‘economic’ considerations 
influenced DSM-III was our reluctant decision to drop the term ‘chronic 
minor affective disorders’ because a group of clinicians insisted that 
insurance companies would not want to reimburse for the treatment of a 
condition that appeared to be both incurable and trivial. 
 
This is a perplexing defence, for it openly admits what it aims to refute; for in at least 
one instance, a diagnostic entity was excluded from DSM-III due to economic 
considerations. Was this occurrence unique? It seems not, for, task force member 
Henry Pinkser (in Wilson, 1993, p.405) stated in a 1975 memorandum: 
 
I believe that many of what we now call disorders are really but 
symptoms…Physicians diagnose these things, prescribe, and insurance 
companies reimburse. I don’t believe the gastroenterologists have task 
forces to decide whether constipation and pylorospasm should be listed as 
diseases or not. 
 
This statement implies the artificial construction of all DSM-III mental disorders as ‘real’ 
diseases in order to qualify, in part, for insurance reimbursement. Spitzer (in Wilson, 
1993, p.405) challenged this idea, warning that “reimbursement would be very difficult if 
the symptom clusters in the manual were not called ‘syndromes’ or ‘disorders’”. This 
arguably amounts to an admission that DSM-III entities are indeed symptom clusters, 
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but presented as ‘true’ medical disorders for reasons of economic expediency. In sum, 
it appears economic forces played a pivotal role in enhancing the medical status of 
DSM-III, and economic considerations regulated the selection criteria for mental 
disorder inclusion in DSM-III more so than scientific veracity. 
 
A2.4.3     Political forces shaping DSM-III 
Political forces and factors also played a core role in shaping the DSM-III process and 
content. For instance, Schacht (1985, p.516) argued that “political forces are an 
integral part of the rational-scientific knowledge-producing process”, and explained that 
due to the prevailing and mistaken belief that scientific sanctity is preserved by 
separating it from politics, Spitzer was trapped into denying the political dimension of 
DSM-III, while simultaneously engaging in an ongoing process of politicking (ibid, 
pp.518-520). Spitzer (1985, p.524) rebutted this claim, stating, “I did not deny all 
political dimensions of DSM-III. I only denied certain specific allegations, such as that 
the politics of DSM-III compromised its scientific values for professional or economic 
gain”. Regardless of these differing views as to the exact nature of political play in the 
DSM-III project, there appears to be general concurrence that, as Schacht (1985, 
p.515) puts it, “DSM-III is a political document”. Indeed, many commentators have used 
military terms to describe the success of the DSM-III project. For instance, the 
manual’s inauguration is depicted by Houts (2000, p.497) as “a successful palace coup 
within the APA”, by Healy (2002a, p.304) as being executed by an “army from 
nowhere, with the contest being over almost before anyone knew it had begun”, and by 
others as a “revolution” (Decker, 2007, p.350; Mayes & Horwitz, 2005; Rogler, 1997, 
p.10). This raises the question - If a revolution did occur, then by whom was it 
instigated, and why?  
 
An appraisal and distillation of the vast body of literature on the DSM-III phenomenon 
seems to provide a plausible answer to this question, namely, that the DSM-III project 
was fundamentally a political struggle by a minority group of medically oriented neo-
Kraepelinian psychiatrists against the prevailing force of psychodynamic psychiatry. 
The primary aims of this operation appeared to be threefold:  
i) to fight a battle of survival for the discipline of psychiatry generally;  
ii) to secure professional legitimacy for a medical model of psychiatry; and  
iii) to establish a clear-cut jurisdictional arena for the practice of medical 
psychiatry.  
These aims were mutually effecting in that: the perceived survival crisis was redressed 
by establishing professional legitimacy and jurisdiction; creating legitimacy advanced 
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jurisdiction claims; and the status afforded by delineating a field of jurisdiction added 
further weight to medical psychiatry’s legitimacy.  
First, in terms of the perceived survival crisis, the 1976 APA president Alan Stone 
apprehensively noted that the socially oriented psychodynamic approach to psychiatry 
“had bought the profession to the edge of extinction” (Stone in Wilson, 1993, p.402). 
Indeed, during the 1970s, the question loomed large among practitioners in the mental 
health field - What differentiates psychiatry from other mental health practices? For 
example, Hackett (1977, p.434) observed at the time that “apart from their training in 
medicine, psychiatrists have nothing unique to offer that cannot be provided by 
psychologists, the clergy, or lay psychotherapists”. Similarly, Mayes & Horwitz, (2005, 
p.257) noted that “there was nothing explicitly psychiatric about dynamic psychiatry; 
nonmedical and medical professionals alike were equally able to learn and practice it”. 
Hence, after two-and-a-half decades of psychodynamic rule, psychiatry as a distinct 
discipline faced imminent redundancy by being absorbed into the nebulous matrix of 
psychological and mental health disciplines.  
 
In response to this perceived survival crisis, members of the neo-Kraepelinian group of 
psychiatrists saw a need to concurrently establish empirical legitimacy and demarcate 
medical psychiatry’s field of authority. In this political light, the DSM-III innovations of 
improving reliability, defining the concept of mental disorder, and developing a 
categorised, descriptive, operationalised and multiaxial diagnostic system, served a 
twin purpose. One, it provided psychiatry with a stamp of empirical legitimacy, and two, 
it subsequently redefined psychiatry as belonging to the scientific field of medical 
disciplines. As Blashfield (1984, p.77) observed, defining mental disorder in a medical 
context aimed to help “resolve the demarcation problem…[and] draw a boundary 
between persons who should be seen by mental health professionals and persons who 
should not”. This observation was corroborated by Spitzer (1985, p.525), who 
conceded that one of the “political advantages” of defining mental disorder was 
“justifying the professional activities of psychiatry as a branch of medicine”. Arguably, 
such developments represent a case whereby the task force appropriated and used 
key tenets of medical science to develop an operational model of psychiatry that 
served the fundamental imperative of maintaining the discipline’s survival. If so, then in 
this instance, it appears that survival, rather than science, was the primary factor 
driving the push for developing a medical model of psychiatry in DSM-III. 
 
This move precipitated a strident backlash from psychoanalytic psychiatry which 
threatened to derail the review process. According to Sptizer (ibid, p.523), as a 
consequence of proposed changes by the task force, there ensued; 
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an extremely bitter political struggle between the DSM-III task force and a 
large number of psychiatrists within the American Psychiatric Association 
who believed that the task force was not representative of American 
psychiatry and was using DSM-III to expunge Freud's valuable 
contributions to the understanding of psychopathology. 
 
This was particularly so when the task force attempted to remove the ‘neurosis’ 
category from DSM-III because it was deemed an ambiguous and theoretical 
aetiological notion (Bayer & Spitzer, 1985, p.189). Healy (1997, p.235) described the 
subsequent struggle as “a political skirmish…[where] pitches made by both sides were 
based on what would secure votes rather than by appeals to the evidence”. What had 
been, until then, a mostly undetected and well-orchestrated reform, suddenly became 
an open turf war. This conflict threatened to overthrow the DSM-III project, forcing 
Spitzer to negotiate a mutually acceptable compromise in 1979 (Bayer & Spitzer, 1985, 
p.192), thus enabling the culmination of a turbulent transition from a psychodynamic to 
a medical model of psychiatry. A year later the neo-Kraepelinian coup was finally 
realised with the approval of DSM-III by majority vote at the 1980 APA annual meeting 
(Decker, 2007, p.353). The formal publication of the new manual saw the reinstatement 
of a medical model of practice in American psychiatry, and arguably, the beginning of a 
concomitant trend towards biological determinism in understanding psychopathology 
and psychosis. 
 
A2.4 DSM-III and psychosis 
It stands to reason that the various dynamics and factors which shaped the production 
of DSM-III correspondingly shaped the construal of psychosis therein. Hence, in terms 
of aetiology, the DSM-II psychogenic understanding of psychosis as a reactive disorder 
precipitated by psychosocial stressors was superseded in DSM-III by an understanding 
of psychosis as a medical and ostensive biogenic disorder precipitated by yet-to-be-
discovered anatomical aberrations. Additionally, it appears that the DSM-III construal of 
psychosis was not only shaped by empirical attempts to redress issues of diagnostic 
reliability and validity, but also by a raft of social, economic and political factors. For 
instance, a precipitating social factor in the formulation of operationalised diagnostic 
criteria for psychotic disorders in DSM-III was the professional embarrassment caused 
to psychiatry by the Rosenhan experiment. Similarly, a failing community mental health 
system, coupled with fiscal pressure from insurance companies for psychiatric 
disorders to be differentiated from general psychological disorders, led to psychosis, 
and other forms of psychopathology, being diagnosed via a prescriptive medical 
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diagnostic formula. All of this, in turn, was implemented through the medium of political 
manoeuvring and the pressing imperative, in the task force’s view, for psychiatry to 
establish itself as a scientific and medical discipline in order to circumvent its own 
imminent demise. Finally, the quantitative development of diagnostic criteria for 
psychotic disorders was ultimately not born of objective science but by the subjective 
and political process of heated debate and voting. In composite, such factors have 
seemingly been instrumental in establishing a categorical and biogenic picture of 
psychosis in DSM-III. In light of all of this, it is apposite to suggest that the medical 
model for understanding psychosis says more about socioeconomic and political 
expediency than it does about the nature of psychosis per se. 
 
A2.5     Conclusion 
This examination of the DSM-III review process has provided an informative window 
into the various factors and dynamics that have worked to shape not only a psychiatric 
diagnostic manual, but also to facilitate a sea-change transition from one model of 
psychiatry to another. In this instance, the transition was from a psychogenic-cum-
psychodynamic to a biogenic-cum-biomedical model of understanding. The publication 
of DSM-III has been hailed for its purported science-based rigour and for supposedly 
investing psychiatry with the status of being a legitimate medical discipline. However, 
while it can be argued that DSM-III has the appearance of being a medical model due 
to its operationalised diagnostic criteria, descriptive diagnostic categories, multiaxial 
diagnostic system, definition of mental illness and ostensibly improved diagnostic 
reliability, this does not make it a medical model per se. Indeed, in consideration of the 
material examined throughout this appendix, it can reasonably be argued that DSM-III 
was fundamentally shaped by a composite of social, economic and political factors, 
with medical science factors playing a secondary role. The subsequent understanding 






The many meanings of mysticism  
and related ramifications to better understanding psychosis  
 
The term ‘mysticism’ has manifold meanings ranging from the universal to the specific. 
Consequently, the body of research relating to this subject is vast. Indeed, Feenstra & 
Tydeman, (2011, p.132) note that “a recently released encyclopaedia of mysticism 
written in Dutch took ten years, thirty-four collaborators and 1149 pages to bring 
together”.162 Hence, a thorough explication of the mystic domain is beyond the scope of 
this appendix and descriptions are limited to some key conceptualisations of mystical 
experience. Additionally, and importantly, the understanding of reality from a mystic 
perspective is seemingly at odds with conventional views of reality, and normal mystic 
experiences can mirror those which, from a psychiatric perspective, may appear to be 
psychotic. If the validity of mystic experience is accepted as possible then this calls for 
a reconsideration of what constitutes ‘normal reality’ versus ‘psychotic unreality’.   
 
In general lay terms the word ‘mystical’ is a catchphrase referring to anything of an 
esoteric, magical, paranormal, or spiritual nature. This is evident in the manifold 
‘mystical’ interests of the New Age spiritual movement, which is, itself, described as a 
“mystical” phenomenon (Hess, 1993, p.159). However, in a theistic or spiritual sense, 
the term is generally used to denote the path, the practices, and the experiences of 
psychospiritual development. Underhill (1912, pp.113, 203) refers to this as “the Mystic 
Way”, which consists of five general “states or stages of development”, namely: “1) 
Awakening or Conversion; 2) Self-knowledge or Purgation; 3) Illumination; 4) 
Surrender, or the Dark Night; 5) Union”. Hence, for the spiritual adherent, this 
development involves a progressive vacillation between states of luminosity and dark 
suffering. Further to this, the philosopher-psychologist William James (1905, pp.380-
382) identifies four defining characteristics of mystical experience (see Table A1).  
 
Table A1 – James’ four defining characteristics of mystical experience 
Characteristics of Mystical Experience 
1. Ineffability - The handiest of the marks by which I classify a state of mind as 
mystical is negative. The subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, 
that no adequate report of its contents can be given in words. It follows from this 
that its quality must be directly experienced; it cannot be imparted or transferred to 
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 See – Baers, J., Brinkman, G., Jelsma, A. & Steggink, O. (2003) Encyclopedie van de Mystiek, 
Fundamenten, Tradities, Perspectieven. Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok. 
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others. In this peculiarity mystical states are more like states of feeling than like 
states of intellect. 
2. Noetic quality - Although so similar to states of feeling, mystical states seem to 
those who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of 
insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are 
illuminations, revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though 
they remain; and as a rule they carry with them a curious sense of authority for 
after-time. 
3. Transiency - Mystical states cannot be sustained for long. Except in rare instances, 
half an hour, or at most an hour or two, seems to be the limit beyond which they 
fade into the light of common day. Often, when faded, their quality can but 
imperfectly be reproduced in memory; but when they recur it is recognized; and 
from one recurrence to another it is susceptible of continuous development in what 
is felt as inner richness and importance. 
4. Passivity - Although the oncoming of mystical states may be facilitated by 
preliminary voluntary operations, as by fixing the attention, or going through certain 
bodily performances, or in other ways which manuals of mysticism prescribe; yet 
when the characteristic sort of consciousness once has set in, the mystic feels as if 
his own will were in abeyance, and indeed sometimes as if he were grasped and 
held by a superior power. 
(Source – James, 1905, pp.380-382) 
The first two characteristics he deemed to be the prominent and principal markers of a 
mystical state, while the latter two, though less common, were still indicative (ibid, 
p.381). Indeed, Leonard (1999, p.107) maintains that “mysticism is difficult to 
comprehend due in part to the pervasive difficulty of trying to say something meaningful 
about an awareness that mystics universally allege is ineffable”. In fact, he suggests 
that ineffability is the “sine qua non for mystical experience” (ibid, p.88). Hence, broadly 
speaking, the mystic experience is a non-ordinary state of consciousness that is 
ultimately impossible to elucidate in words.   
 
The American philosopher-mystic Franklin Merrell-Wolff has also written profusely on 
the subject of mysticism. It is therefore apposite to examine some of his views, for as a 
contemporary Western mystic they are drawn from the process of his own experiences 
along the path to spiritual Enlightenment. According to Merrell-Wolff (1995, pp.222-
223), conceptualisations of mysticism fall into three camps: 
i) the religious view, which sees mystical “union” as the epitome of mysticism; 
ii) the epistemological view, which is concerned with definitions pertaining to 
“the instrumentality whereby the mystical consciousness is attained”; and 
312 
iii) the psychological view, which “considers the state primarily as an 
‘experience’ and hence something that may occur in the lives of empiric 
beings as they live in time”. 
He further notes that, from a psychological perspective, the subject of mysticism is 
“viewed from the outside, that is, as it can be observed by a consciousness that has no 
immediate acquaintance with the state” (ibid). However, Merrell-Wolff (1994, p.425) 
explains that true mystical experience is beyond the conventional understanding of 
‘experience’: 
 
In the broadest sense, the Transcendent stands in radical contrast to the 
empirical. It is that which lies beyond experience. Hence, Transcendent 
Consciousness is non-experiential consciousness; and, since experience 
may be regarded as consciousness in the stream of becoming or under 
time, the form is of necessity a timeless Consciousness. The actuality of 
such Consciousness can never be proved directly from experience when 
the latter term is taken in this restricted sense. Thus, It is either a 
philosophic abstraction or a direct mystical Recognition.   
 
The transcendent mystical event is experienced directly and not meditated via the 
sensory and conceptual modes of normal human cognition; or that which Merrell-Wolff 
calls “subject-object consciousness” (ibid, p.13). In other words, while the subject-
object act of cognition is comprised of an ‘observer’ and the ‘observed’, where the two 
seemingly exist as discrete phenomena, in the mystical ‘experience’ the observer and 
the observed become united. The conventional sense of distance or separation 
dissolves as subject-object consciousness is transcended (p.199). However, because 
the core of mystical experience is inexpressible in language it can only be alluded to 
symbolically. Ultimately, mystic experience is transcendent and ineffable. 
 
Aspects of Merrell-Wolff’s mystic philosophy also have ostensible bearing on better 
understanding the psychotic experience. For example, his views on the relative nature 
of reality have significant implications for the psychiatric depiction of psychosis as a 
‘gross impairment in reality testing’. In regards to so-called ‘hallucinations’, Merrell-
Wolff (pp.331-332) argues that; 
 
modern psychology [and psychiatry] distinguishes between objects that it 
calls real and objects that it calls hallucinations…Some mystical states, 
probably the greater number, involve the experiencing of subtle objects of 
the type that the psychologist calls hallucination. Practically, this has the 
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effect of classifying the mystic with the psychotic, apparently with the intent 
of common depreciation. Such a course involves both intellectual laziness 
and a failure in discrimination. 
 
He further holds that “there is no important difference” between ‘consensual reality’ and 
a ‘hallucination’ from the viewpoint of mystical Enlightenment because the latter 
“merely means private experience as opposed to social experience” and subsequently 
“constitutes no true judgement of value” (pp.331, 332). From this mystical perspective 
the notion of ‘reality’ becomes highly elastic, for ‘hallucinations’ are deemed to be as 
real as normal states of cognition. This view fundamentally challenges the binary model 
of psychiatric dualism. In fact, he argues that “in a given case, the so-called 
hallucination may far outreach any social object in the relative reality” (p.332) and 
provocatively suggests “it is quite possible that some present inmate of a psychiatric 
institution may outdistance all the philistines in the world who pride themselves on their 
sanity” (p.387). While these views do not assert the nonexistence of ‘psychotic’ states 
of consciousness, or suggest that all such experiences are actually mystical, they 
arguably indicate that investigating the phenomenon of psychosis, or apparent 
psychosis, from a mystical perspective may foster a greater understanding of this 
enigmatic experience, and concomitantly, foster a greater understanding of the nature 





Franklin Merrell-Wolff: A mystic’s critique of Dean’s metapsychiatry 
 
This appendix examines the appraisal of Dean’s work on metapsychiatry by the 
American mystic Franklin Merrell-Wolff.163 In 1974, Merrell-Wolff delivered a lecture in 
which he discussed the “difficulties that are connected with a scientific approach to an 
essentially religious subject matter” (Merrell-Wolff, 1974, p.1), and as a case in point, 
critiqued Dean’s (1974b) article titled ‘Metapsychiatry: The confluence of psychiatry 
and mysticism’.164 Merrell-Wolff exemplifies the capacity to incorporate both materialist 
and metaphysical knowledge within his epistemological reach; therefore, it is apposite 
to examine his critique of Dean’s work for it offers a first-person mystic viewpoint 
regarding the merits and shortcomings of Dean’s metapsychiatry project. This provides 
a rare and critical window of insight, from a mystic’s perspective, into the idea of 
incorporating metaphysical realities into psychiatric practice.  
 
 
Throughout his delivery Merrell-Wolf both endorses and challenges Dean’s ideas. In 
terms of endorsement, his general response is to “commend wholeheartedly” Dean’s 
proposal for its contribution towards furthering a dialogue between science and 
mysticism (Merrell-Wolff, 1974, p.8). He also holds that Dean’s word 
‘ultraconsciousness’ is “a very excellent term for the higher consciousness” (ibid, p.4), 
and offers positive appraisal on many other points. For instance, it is his opinion that 
considering Dean’s lack of personal experience of psi or mystical states, he “attains an 
impressive and even astonishing degree of insight” (p.3) in his compilation of psychic 
aphorisms. Two aphorisms in particular are highlighted for their insightful significance. 
First, Merrell-Wolff affirms that Dean’s aphorism “psychogeny recapitulates 
cosmogony” is a “particularly impressive statement”, in its succinct representation of 
the metaphysical principal that “development is synchronous in the different directions 
or forms of the development in nature, and in man, in apparent things, and in the states 
of consciousness” (p.4). Hence, he concurs with Dean’s notion of a metaphysical 
evolutionary aspect to human development whereby the gradual emergence of 
advanced states of consciousness supersede normal modalities of human cognition. 
Second, he observes that Dean’s aphorism “thought is a form of energy” is a “very 
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 Merrell-Wolff achieved mystical Enlightenment on 7 August 1936 and eschewed a promising academic 
career to pursue a path of mystical exploration and explication (Merrell-Wolff, 1976, p.15). This included 
the production of a prodigious body of experiential and philosophical writings about mystic reality. 
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 It appears that Dean and other commentators were unaware of Merrell-Wolff’s appraisal for it is 
mentioned nowhere in the literature pertaining to metapsychiatry. 
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important statement” because it characterises the mystic understanding that “thought is 
a power...that can penetrate directly into the heart of things and that we are not 
restricted to the methods of scientific research which is oriented primarily to sensuous 
experience” (p.4). Dean’s ten points pertaining to the nature of ultraconsciousness are 
also lauded by Merrell-Wolff as being “of particular interest” in that they are generally 
reflective of the mystical state of Enlightenment (p.5), however, he further stipulates 
that “many Awakenings include part of these but not all” (p.6). Finally, in Merrell-Wolff’s 
view, Dean “achieves his own particular orientation” (p.7) in posing six questions to 
appraise the ramifications of ultraconsciousness theory for psychiatric thinking and 
practice.165 Overall, his appraisal of Dean’s project is mostly optimistic and he supports 
the idea of developing a confluence between psychiatry and mysticism. 
 
In terms of challenge, Merrell-Wolff questions some of Dean’s assumptions concerning 
the nature of a merger between psychiatry and mysticism. His main point of contention 
with metapsychiatry is that it posits mysticism as “subordinate to a discipline which is 
oriented to the pathological” (p.3). This is a warranted criticism, for although Dean 
envisions metapsychiatry as a field that recognises and harnesses attributes of mystic 
knowledge, his depiction of mysticism as but one side of a pyramid, of which 
metapsychiatry forms the base, misrepresents the transcendental nature of 
ultraconsciousness. As Merrell-Wolff explains, mysticism is “that which belongs to the 
opening of another door of cognition which transcends the conceptual powers as it very 
definitely transcends the perceptual capacity of man” (p.3). In other words, mystic 
reality cannot be sublimated to the status of a conceptual object within the rubric of a 
branch of psychiatry, for ultimately it transcends all conceptual constructs. Additionally, 
in framing the question – ‘Is the ultraconscious experience a natural biological 
phenomenon latent in us all?’ – Dean apparently suggests the primacy of biology over 
spiritual experience. In response to this question/suggestion, Merrell-Wolff asserts: 
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 These questions are: 
1. Is the ultraconsciousness a gift of God, beyond human understanding? If so, it should be 
accepted as a matter of pure faith, and without further question.  
2. Is it a pathological mental disorder? If so, how could it elicit genius in religion, literature, 
and the arts?  
3. Is it hypnosis or suggestion?  
4. Does self-mortification and sensory deprivation, as practiced by [the] ascetics, produce 
metabolic by-products with hallucinogenic properties similar to those of psychedelic 
drugs?  
5. Is it all a matter of charlatanism?  
6. Is the ultraconscious experience a natural biological phenomenon latent in all of us? 
(Merrell-Wolff, 1974, pp.7-8) (also see Dean, 1974b). 
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Indeed, I should say it is latent in all of us, but...not of such a nature as to 
be called ‘natural’. It is something that transcends nature and belongs to 
what we might call super-nature perhaps, or that which descends from on 
high into the consciousness (p.8). 
 
From his own experience Merrell-Wolff understands spiritual Enlightenment, or mystical 
apotheosis, to be beyond confinement to a framework of psychiatric thinking. However, 
as indicated above, he believes metapsychiatry’s attempt to better understand mystic 
states of consciousness (as opposed to sublimating them) is a significant step towards 
bridging the gap between scientific and psychospiritual worldviews.  
 
Another of Merrell-Wolff’s key concerns is the tacit association of mystic experiences 
with pathology and disease via metapsychiatry. He notes that clinical psychiatry, by 
definition, is “a discipline concerned with the diseases of the mind”, and consequently 
there exists “an overtone that is unavoidably denigrating when one associates a type of 
consciousness which transcends the normal consciousness as being related to 
disease” (p.2). In fairness, when conceptualising metapsychiatry, Dean made no 
pathological inferences about ultraconscious phenomena; however, the potential for 
mysticism to be appropriated under the umbrella of psychiatry’s psychopathology-
centred remit is arguably a valid concern. In fact, Merrell-Wolff stresses that the 
transcendent states of consciousness characteristic of mysticism “should not be viewed 
from the angle of disease; rather, it is becoming essentially well” (p.2); and in his 
summation reiterates that “I wish to underscore this as powerfully as I can. It is not 
disease. It is becoming at last truly well” (p.9). It appears this assertion inversely 
suggests that normal human consciousness is somehow ‘not fully well’. Indeed, 
Merrell-Wolff (p.3) contends that from the viewpoint of mystic Enlightenment, “our so-
called normal state...is the norm of an asylum”. This speaks to the important issue of 
the relativity of defining insanity, particularly in the attempt to better understand 
psychosis.  
 
In sum, while Merrell-Wolff’s appraisal of Dean’s work does not address psychiatric 
illnesses per se, he offers some potentially valuable insights into the efficacy of 
incorporating psychospiritual knowledge into better understanding psychotic 
experiences. For instance, he affirms the existence of modes of cognition that ‘are not 
restricted to the methods of scientific research’ which, nevertheless, provide valid 
insights into the nature of life and its multifarious phenomena. Also, his allusion to the 
danger of materialist reductionism, and the related conflating of spiritual and 
psychopathological experiences, has also been expressed by commentators in the field 
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of psychopathology. Indeed, Newberg & Lee (2005, pp.481-482) exhort that “care must 
be taken to avoid referring to spiritual experience only in pathological terms or as 
associated with pathological conditions and also to avoid reducing spiritual experiences 
only to neurophysiological mechanisms”. Finally, Merrell-Wolff’s discussion on two of 
Dean’s aphorisms (i.e. ‘psychogeny recapitulates cosmogony’ and ‘thought is a form of 
energy’) depicts consciousness as holistically integral with, rather than epiphenomenal 
to, the physical body. This has considerable ramifications for the prevailing psychiatric 
view that psychotic states of consciousness are the product of a yet to be discovered 
anatomical aberration. What if this view is incorrect? What if states of consciousness 
are interrelated with, but not epiphenomenal to, anatomical processes? How might this 
influence the quest to understand the causes and nature of psychosis? Such questions 
reflect the challenge that psychospiritual considerations can pose to conventional 
psychiatric assumptions and beliefs. 
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Appendix Five 
List of texts examined in my content analysis 
 
Table A2 below lists, in alphabetical order, the seventy texts examined in my Chapter 
Nine content analysis. They all contributed to my quantitative findings. Hence, this list 
depicts the nature and scope of the material from which my topmost nine criteria 
discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences have been drawn. Many of these 
texts are cited throughout Chapters Nine and Ten, and also elsewhere throughout my 
dissertation, and are included in my general reference list. However, not all are cited in 
my dissertation and consequently do not appear in the end-of-text references, 
therefore, it is apposite to list all seventy citations here. 
 
Table A2 – List of texts examined in my context analysis 
Citation 
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Typologies proposed by various authors for differentiating 
psychotic from psychospiritual experiences 
 
Discerning psychotic from psychospiritual experiences is a complex undertaking. 
Indeed, I argue in Focal Setting Four that, ultimately, it is a seemingly impossible task, 
and the diversity of views throughout the tabled models below seem to support this 
argument, especially in conflicting instances. However, they also provide a 
comprehensive and unique compilation of resources from this field of study. To my 
knowledge, such a list has not been previously composed. Despite the complex and 
diverse nature of these collective views, they also constitute a valuable body of 
phenomenological research into both psychotic and psychospiritual states of 
consciousness.  
 
Table A3 - Austin’s comparisons between the mystical path and schizophrenic 
reactions 
 Mystical Path Schizophrenic Psychosis 
General nature and 
duration 
An ongoing, more orderly 
development 
May be compressed, 
disorderly and disorganized 
Hallucinatory phenomena In general, more visual; not 
threatening 
In general, more auditory; 
can be threatening 
Ideas of self-reference Enlightenment cuts off the 
personal connotations of 
stimuli 
Stimuli generate ideas of 
self-reference, especially in 
paranoid schizophrenia 
A gap is experienced which 
splits outer social reality 
from inner personal reality 
1* 3 
Inhabiting only the inner 
world and being fearful of it 
0-1 3 
Degree of tolerance for 
inner experiences 
Trained for and well-
tolerated 
May be overwhelmed by 
them 
Simplification of lifestyle 
and renunciation of 
worldliness 
More under conscious 
control 
More under unconscious 
control 
Dissolution of social 
achievements 
1 3 
Reentry into society, 
improved by experience 




contacts with society 
2 1 or 0 
Sense of unity with the 
environment 
2 (partially cultivated) Less commonly perceived 
Driving by craving and 
aversions 
Reduced May be enhanced 
Continued conscious 
control 
Usual Less effective 
* 0 = none; 5 = maximal          (Source – Austin, 1998, p.31)   
 
Table A4 - Chadwick’s parallels between mystical and psychotic states 
Mystical intuitions Psychotic intuitions 
I am in touch with everyone Everyone can hear my thoughts 
The world is not as it is commonly seen The world has changed, there’s a war on 
There is great harmony and oneness 
between all things 
People and the world are all together in 
communication against me 
Nothing is trivial Everything means something, even street 
signs and car number plates 
No one is a stranger Everyone knows me and is plotting 
against me 
I am both supreme and insignificant I am the Christ and the Devil 
I am passive, floating, at one with the 
universe, open to all 
I am dissolving, decaying, penetrated by 
rays, penises 
Meaning is everywhere/all is meaning Everything that I do or that happens has 
double, triple or quadruple meanings 
I do not think, I am thought I do not think, thoughts are planted in my 
head by computers/hypnotherapy at a 
distance 
(Source – Chadwick, 2001, p.86) 
 
Table A5 - DeHoff’s psychotic experience versus mystical experience 
Psychotic Experiences Mystical Experiences 
Fearing others conspiring against oneself Experiencing a visceral sense of 
God's presence 
Person out of touch with reality Seeing a bright, white light 
Using language not connected with [sic] Hearing God's voice internally 
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Using incohesive language Seeing Jesus 
Claiming to be Jesus or the Virgin Mary Experiencing God's physical, 
psychological healing 
Hearing voices telling one to harm self or 
others 
Feeling God's hands 
Lacking insight Hearing God's voice externally 
Exhibiting flat affect Experiencing God's inner presence 
Focusing on self, not others God leading so that "everything works out" 
Avoiding of eye contact God communicating through coincidences 
in nature 
Exhibiting poor self-care, inability to 
function 
One person instrumental in healing 
another 
Lacking positive relationships Experiencing God in secular life 
(Source – DeHoff, 2012, p.195) 
 
Table A6 – Eeles et al’s main indicators of mental illness versus well being 
 Nature of the 
experience 
Outcome of the 
experience 
Context of the 
experience 
Indicators of illness Similarity to 
common symptoms 
of mental illness  
 
Negative content 








people close to the 
individual 
Indicators of well 
being 
This did not feature 
predominantly 
Good functioning at 
work and in 
relationships 
This did not feature 
predominantly 
 (Source - Eeles et al, 2003, p.204) 
 




Onset is usually during adolescence or 
early adulthood. Pre-morbid history usually 
indicates poor adaptability in work and 
Usually very positive premorbid history, 
sometimes exceptional. Success in 
school, work, personal relationships. 
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relationships. Usually personality was 
suspicious, introverted, withdrawn or 
eccentric before the break. In some cases 
they had a schizotypal or borderline 
personality disorder prior to the break. 
During acute stages the person may lack 
the ability and/or interest in eating and 
grooming. DSM 3 states that full recovery is 
considered so rare that many clinicians 
question the diagnosis of anyone who 
recovers. For a true diagnosis of 
schizophrenia the person should have 
continuous signs of illness for six months, 
including psychotic symptoms.  
Healthy sense of self. Possibly someone 
who has searched for the meaning of life 
or the nature of god, or followed some 
kind of proactive spiritual practices, body 
therapies, martial arts or psychotherapy. 
Prior to onset may recently have had a 
traumatic physical or emotional event in 
their life or a strong personal encounter 
with a guru or spiritual teacher. 
Loss of boundaries or consensus reality 
Person is flooded most of the time with the 
inability to differentiate information from the 
unconscious mind from consensus reality. 
It is hard to distinguish what is imaginal 
(and often paranoid) from what is actually 
happening. Delusions are usually multiple, 
fragmented and bizarre (I.e. thoughts are 
being broadcast from the head into others 
or from the TV set). One is unable to 
organize thoughts or to use insight to 
determine the meaning of events. May 
engage in bizarre repetitive rituals. Little 
awareness of needs or opinions of others. 
Likely to be compulsive, irrational, 
unreliable.  
May occasionally have had an 
experience of expanded awareness, as if 
they are out of their body, their 
consciousness is spreading into space, 
or they are merged with another place or 
person (even inside a painting). Such 
events may be reported as frightening or 
awesome but the person recognizes 
them as distinctly altered from ordinary 
states. May feel once or twice a need to 
perform a ritual, which is usually seen as 
having significant meaning spiritually (i.e. 
taking a bath in salt, or balancing 
masculine and feminine energies in the 
house). These are not repetitive or 
compulsive, and a person can break the 
activity (e.g. to answer the front door) if 
need be. Usually there is conscious 
concern about what others will think and 
an effort to keep behavior 
compartmentalized in a way that it will 
not cause any problems in their life. 
There is often an enhanced sensitivity to 
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the feelings of others.  
Hallucinatory visions and voices 
Hearing voices from outside the head is the 
most common hallucination, and usually 
they are insulting or threatening. May be 
flooded and driven by visions or inner 
voices, interpreting them with inflation (I am 
God) or ominous meaning (I am going to be 
destroyed or I must destroy someone else). 
Feels helpless in the face of these 
recurrent messages. DSM 3 lists auditory 
and tactile hallucinations i.e. electrical, 
tingling or burning sensations, and the 
sensation of snakes crawling inside the 
abdomen.  
May receive an inner voice or perceive a 
vision occasionally. Most often these are 
positive and affirming experiences, with 
helpful advice, such as ‘peace’ or ‘call to 
commitment’. Sometimes they come in a 
foreign language (Sanscrit) [sic] or they 
are Biblical quotes. Visions may be in the 
form of symbolic or geometric shapes, 
images of spiritual beings, images of 
deceased loved ones or strangers, depict 
images of another lifetime or point in 
history, or seem to be predictors of future 
events. They are random, infrequent, 
and a person will describe them in a way 
that you get a felt sense of their genuine 
experience and their rational thoughts 
and concerns about the event.  
Communication with others 
Affect is often blunted, flattened or 
inappropriate, with little facial expression. In 
some cases people believe you can read 
their mind, or are having the same 
experiences and are holding out on them. 
In others there is extreme distrust and an 
unwillingness to tell you what they are 
experiencing. But if you talk to a person in 
psychosis long enough some of the 
distortions in their thinking will be revealed. 
You often cannot understand what they 
actually said. Writing is often convoluted 
and ideas are mixed up in incongruent 
pictures. Sometimes speech is garbled, the 
person is unable to accomplish clear 
connection interpersonally, and has 
delusions about the intentions of others. 
There is a ‘loosening of association’ to the 
Good affect and sociability is most 
common. People express a relief and 
happiness in finding someone they can 
tell their story to who is not labelling 
them. Speech is normal although the 
person may become slightly dissociated 
or weepy when talking of the events. 
They usually relate some positive 
associations and feelings and are 
seeking a way to make these events 
more meaningful in their life, while 
managing or reducing the uncomfortable 
symptoms. Counter-transference – you 
are interested and often touched deeply 
by their presence and what they are 
telling you. 
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point that speech may become 
incomprehensible. Your counter-
transference – often you feel confused and 
uncomfortable, unable to feel a genuine 
connection. 
Regression and connection to self 
Ability to function at mature adult level is 
seriously impaired most of the time and 
person acts compulsively out of defensive 
patterns. Logic is convoluted, bringing in 
data that seems to have no basis in 
objective reality. 
Occasionally the person feels regressed 
or overwhelmed by memories, past-life 
images, strong emotions or 
hypersensitivity to others, but is usually 
able to pull together and function 
appropriately if they need to. Often they 
need to relieve stresses in their life and 
avoid toxic relationships for a while. 
Some go through stages of avoiding 
television and newspapers, and want to 
be more in a nature environment. But 
there is a sense of progression, rather 
than regression in these decisions, a 
sense they are connecting more deeply 
to who they are. 
Religious ideation 
May have spiritual visions while deeply 
regressed and become confused, believing 
this means he/she is a god, the mother 
Mary, or Jesus. May see the devil in others. 
These experiences become alienating and 
may lead to inappropriate expectations and 
actions. If there is a unitive experience it is 
felt as regressive – wanting to coil up and 
retreat, be embraced into the connection, 
or feel special and that only they have such 
experiences, so they must be a saint. 
May have spiritual visons while deeply 
regressed, and become confused. May 
have spiritual visons of any 
denomination, or light experiences, and 
are profoundly moved by these, possibly 
humbled, filled with joy or ecstasy. They 
may sense what is happening is a life-
changing event, and find shifting 
interests and priorities in their life. They 
may be fearful that others will label this 
‘crazy’ and will likely be cautious about 
who they tell about these experiences. 
May describe unitive experiences or 
transcendent awareness, a perception of 
merging or being scattered into 
something all-encompassing and greater 
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than oneself. Following this event they 
usually describe peace, understanding, 
bliss.  
Changed affect 
Some of the consequences can be 
confusion, depression, dark foreboding, 
fear, convoluted information, paranoia, 
sense of inner chaos, sexual and 
aggressive fantasies.  
Touched with awe, seeking 
understanding, reports ecstasy or joy, 
insight, sense of a deep wisdom guiding 
their life, feelings of unconditional love. 
They may seem naïve in their level of 
trust, or they fear death or insanity.  
Attempt at transformation 
The psychological structure is collapsing 
and needs to be rebuilt with a new ego 
structure if there is to be hope of cure. 
Usually there is simply management with 
medication and the quality of life is 
dependent on the circumstances the 
person is in related to family and economic 
support.  
The sense of self is realising limitations 
and growing into a greater sense of 
connection with the cosmic whole. Once 
there is understanding and acceptance 
of this as a spiritual process these is a 
calming and working-through phase of 
personal growth.  
(Source – Greenwell, 2002) 
 
Table A8 - Jackson’s distinctions between spiritual and psychotic experience according 
to content, form and process 
Content  Spiritual Experience Psychotic Experience 
Content 
Religious or paranormal 
content 
 
Belief in personal mission, 
divine calling 
 
Experience of discarnate 
entities, ‘sense of 
presence’  
 






Humility, recognition of 
personal fallibility 
 














































Creative problem solving 
process (impasse – insight 
- resolution) 
 
Transient in time 
 
Spiritual fruits (humility, 
altruism, creativity) 
 
Extended in time 
 
Mental illness (self-
centredness, inability to 
function) 
(Source – Jackson, 2001, p.170) 
 
Table A9 - Jackson & Fulford’s criteria for distinguishing between spiritual and 
pathological forms of psychotic experience 
Spiritual Experience  Psychosis  
Doctrinal orthodoxy--  
content acceptable to  
sub-cultural group  
Bizarre content--  
particularly claims of  
divine status or  
special powers  
Sensory elements are  
"intellectual"  
(experienced as  
mental contents)  
Sensory elements are  
"corporeal"  
(experienced as  
veridical perceptions)  
Predominantly visual  
hallucinations  
Predominantly auditory  
hallucinations  
Beliefs formed with  
possibility of doubt.  
Insight present  
Incorrigible beliefs.  
Insight absent  
Brief duration  Extended duration  
Watson 1982  
Volitional control over  
experiences  
Experiences are  
involitional  
Other oriented  Self-oriented  
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Greeley 1974  
"self actualizing"; life  
enhancing; spiritual  
fruits  
Disintegrative;  
deterioration in life  
functioning  
[Source – Jackson & Fulford, 1997, p.62) 
 
Table A10 - Kemp’s comparison between the healthy, mystic and psychotic person 
Healthy Mystic Psychotic 
Independent Dependent on God Dependent on a ‘controlling 
force’; thought insertion 
Conform to social roles and 
position 
Only conform if it is ‘right’ Conform to their own 
interpretation of the world. 




Communication with God 
through prayer 
Communication with others 
through telepathy; 
broadcasting of thoughts 
‘Self-assertive’: i.e. neither 
introverted nor extraverted 
Oscillates between being 
meek and humble, and 
claiming to be a child of 
God 
Delusions of grandeur, e.g. 
claims to be Christ, 
coupled with intense 
feeling of shame or guilt 
Imaginative and creative Believes in supernatural 
phenomena 
Receives visions or signs 
Not compulsive; 
spontaneous 
Follows divine rules Obsessive about 
apparently mundane 
matters 
Mood equilibrium Sinner/saved polarity Intense polarity of moods: 
overjoyed/damned 
Able to adapt to new 
situations 
Adapts new situations to 
unchanging laws 
Mission to change the 
world 
Reason as source of 
knowledge 
Revelation Voices 
Stability between life- 
(eros) and death- 
(thanatos) libido 
Claims to be born again, be 
dead to the old life and 
have eternal life 
Wants to die/believes to be 
already dead 
In control of thoughts at all 
times 
Seeks to gradually lose 
control of thoughts through 
Sudden ,passive 
experience of loss of 
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following God’s will control of thoughts 
Sociable Love strangers and 
enemies 
Everyone knows me and is 
plotting against me 
(Source - Kemp, 2000, p.162). 
 
Table A11 - Nelson’s signs for distinguishing regression in the service of 
transcendence (RIST) from schizophrenia 
RIST Schizophrenia 
Begins abruptly Insidious onset 
Precipitated by stressful life event Usually unrelated to specific life events 
Affect and feeling-tone is preserved and 
often wildly exaggerated 
Bleak greyness 
Shock of self-recrimination and guilt No shock of self-recrimination and guilt 
Can occur any time of life Usually occurs during the second and 
third decades of life 
Hallucinated voices never command Hallucinated voices do command 
May be dramatically extroverted in its 
presentation or take an introspective turn 
Almost always leads to withdrawal 
Can maintain some insight into one’s 
disordered state 
No insight 
Can try to restrain behaviour Impulsive 
Paranoid ideas absent or in context of a 
global terror of the unknown 
Paranoid ideas present and in context of a 
specifically defined conspiracy 
Tells a meaningful story composed of 
archetypal or mythic themes 
Tells an incomprehensible story 
(Source - Nelson, 1994, pp.248-249) 
 
 
Table A12 - Siegler et al’s differences between psychedelic and psychotic experiences 
Psychedelic experience Psychotic experience 
Time dimension 
Liberation from time. 
 
Expansion of time dimensions. 
 
 
Internal or external time may speed up, 
Frozen in time: nothing will ever change. 
 
Shrinkage and collapse of time 
dimensions. 
 
Internal and external time may slow down, 
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increasing possibility of quick and decisive 
action. 
 
Ability to modify past, present, future. 
 
 
The future is the realm of ambition and 
motivation. 
inhibiting action and creating despair. 
 
Inability to influence any of the temporal 
categories. 
 







Distance perception stable. 
 





Distance perception highly variable. 
 
Distances so vast that one feels isolated 
and alienated. 
Affect 
Feeling that everything is meaningful and 
exhilarating. 
 





Feeling of delight with oneself. 
Feeling that everything contains hidden, 
threatening meanings. 
 





Feeling of disgust with oneself. 
Thought processes 
Thought changes are sought for, 
expected, valued. 
 
Seeing more possibilities that can be 
acted upon, which makes life exciting. 
 
Seeing beyond the usual categories. 
 
 
Seeing new connections which have 
Thought changes come unawares, are not 
welcome, are seen as accidental. 
 
Seeing so many possibilities that action is 
impossible. 
 
Seeing only fragments or parts of the 
usual categories. 
 
Seeing connections which are not 
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always been possible. 
 
Ability to see things objectively. 
 
 
Ability to see things subjectively. 
 




No objectivity, inability to disengage from 
total involvement. 
 
No subjectivity, estrangement from self. 
 
Desperate attempts (delusions) to explain 
thought changes. 
Perceptions 
Clear and distinct vision. 
 
Augmentation of perception. 
 
Unusual perceptions seem to emanate 
from greater-than-human spirit or force. 
 
Perceptual changes may be experienced 
as exhilarating, exciting, novel. 
Blurred and distorted vision. 
 
Diminution of perception. 
 
Unusual perceptions seem to emanate 
from mechanical or sub-human forces. 
 
Perceptual changes may be experienced 
as frightening, threatening, dangerous. 
Identity 
Feeling of unity with people and material 
objects. 
 
Experience of the self. 
 
 
Feeling of being at one with the world. 
 
 
Feelings of humility and awe as one sees 
oneself as part of the universe. 
 
Feelings of integrity and identity. 
 
Pleasant, creative fantasies that one can 
control. 
 
Feeling that one can join the company of 
Feeling of invasion by people and material 
objects. 
 
Experience of the no-self ego 
fragmentation. 
 
Feeling of being opposed to and in conflict 
with oneself and the world. 
 
Feelings of smallness and insignificance 
as one feels at the mercy of the universe. 
 
Loss of integrity and identity. 
 
Nightmarish fantasies that one cannot 
control. 
 
Feeling that one is less and less human, 
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other enlightened people. more and more isolated. 
(Source – Siegler et al, 1969, p.956) 
 
Table A13 - Siglag’s similarities and differences between schizophrenic individuals who 
claim to have had a mystical experience and other schizophrenic individuals 
Similarities Differences 
Do not feel any greater control over their 
experiences 
Are more likely to have experienced a 
sense of unity, oneness, connectedness 
in the world 
Do not feel a greater sense of coping 
ability 
Report more of a range of affective 
experiences, and are  more likely to have 
experienced joyful, peaceful states of 
consciousness 
Do not experience any more improvement 
in their relationships 
Are more likely to report time-space 
distortions 
Experience terror, fear, depression, and a 
sense of insecurity 
Experience more of a sense of 
sacredness or holiness 
 Are more likely to see their experiences 
as valid and meaningful 
(Source – Siglag, 1986, p.138) 
 
Table A14 - Watkins’ criteria for discerning authentic from erroneous spiritual 




experiences and beliefs 
Erroneous spiritual 
experiences and beliefs 
Peace versus 
agitation 
Contribute to enhancement of 
mental peace, serenity, and an 
abiding state of emotional 
equanimity. 
Tend to foster impulsiveness, 
impatience, seriousness, 
inflexibility and lack of 
reflection…Likely to exacerbate 




Are life-enhancing. Nourish the 
spirit, inspire and guide in a 
positive way, help people love 
and accept themselves and 
others, foster inner strength 
and personal responsibility, 
facilitate acceptance of reality 
Preoccupation with erroneous 
ideas fosters misguided or 
inflexible behaviour which 
impairs adaptation and inhibits 
personal growth. In extreme 
cases may condemn a person 
to limited, unproductive, 
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and an ability to deal with 
complexity and uncertainty, 
enhance enjoyment and 
appreciation of life.  




Promote humility and an 
attitude of reverence for life in 
all its myriad forms. Foster 
selflessness and willing 
acceptance of limitations and 
shortcomings. Accommodate a 
sense of humour that helps 
counteract pride or tendencies 
to take oneself too seriously. 
May foster an attitude 
characterised by pride, 
arrogance, and an inflated or 
grossly exaggerated sense of 
self-importance that culminates 




Are kept in perspective and 
understood to be but one facet 
of life. Are consistent with 
beliefs held before the 
psychotic crisis occurred and 
capable of being integrated into 
a harmonious, life-affirming 
personal belief system. 
Lack of appropriate balance 
and perspective may result in a 
tendency to overemphasize 
irrational notions or become 
preoccupied with trivial issues. 
Phenomena with the power to 
dominate and entrance the 
mind often possess an 
addictive quality and may 
readily become the 
predominant focus of a 
person’s life. 
Free will versus 
compulsion 
Do not impair free will. Person 
may surrender to certain 
legitimate beliefs of 
experiences but is able to 
exercise choice and 
demonstrate mature self-
control. Good ‘reality testing’ is 
maintained, enabling person to 
question and critically evaluate 
his or her beliefs and 
experiences. 
May be so compelling and 
mesmerising that choice, free 
will, and self-control are 
compromised. Certain 
phenomena (e.g. voices) may 
involve specific orders or 
demand unquestioning 
obedience. In extreme cases 
person may become enslaved 
by phenomena that obsess and 
possess them to such an extent 
they are unwilling or unable to 




While varying in specific form 
and content from one person to 
another nonetheless meet 
legitimacy criteria established 
by recognised authorities, e.g. 
religious tradition, respected 
teachers, sacred texts. Novel 
ideas, insights or beliefs are 
consistent with those of others 
with a comparable religious 
and/or spiritual philosophy and 
world view.  
Are often highly idiosyncratic, 
eccentric, or bizarre and 
diverge substantially from 
generally accepted standards. 
Some ideas may be patently 
irrational, self-contradictory or 
incomprehensibly ‘autistic’, i.e. 
person concerned understands 
them but nobody else can. 
Inclusiveness 
versus isolation 
Build bridges between people 
by fostering awareness of the 
fundamental unity of life and 
sense of trust in the universe. 
Enhance the capacity for love 
and intimacy in relationships 
which may grow into genuine 
compassion for the whole of 
humanity and all living beings. 
Fanatical ideas create barriers 
that shut a person off from 
others in increasing isolation, 
exclusiveness, and self-
absorption. May devolve into 
narcissistically constricted ‘all 
about me’ attitude that results 
in ever-diminishing sensitivity to 
the feelings and needs of 
others.  




An overview of Emanuel Swedenborg’s theory of mind 
 
The content of this appendix enables a deeper appreciation of Swedenborg’s 
metaphysical theory, which informed van Dusen’s unique research into the ostensible 
relationship between psychotic voice hearing and spirit possession. It explicates 
Swedenborg’s understanding, (born of his own mystic observations), of the intrinsic 
interconnectedness between human thoughts, affects and spirit beings, and provides a 
historical and epistemological backdrop to van Dusen’s research, as examined in 
Chapter Twelve. Additionally, Swedenborg’s views on the correlation between common 
human desires and ‘mental illness’ parallels Tibetan Buddhist thinking, and sets the 
stage for Chapter Thirteen’s examination of Tibetan Buddhist psychiatry and psychosis.  
 
During the earlier half of his life, Swedenborg’s empirical investigation into the nature of 
reality involved an exhaustive immersion into the physical sciences of the time. 
However, in failing to find the answers he was seeking in exploring the physical world 
and sciences, he turned his focus inwards to conduct an equally thorough empirical 
investigation of the metaphysical world. Like Jung two hundred years later, he saw both 
science and metaphysics as empirical pursuits for each involved the investigation of 
observable phenomena; the material via physical sense faculties and the metaphysical 
via latent inner-senses. From the perspective of materialist science, Swedenborg’s 
explication of the nature of mind and self would appear outrageous, if not psychotic. 
Therefore, it is apposite to note that, as far-fetched, or ‘psychotic’, his theory of mind 
may appear, he maintained a highly functional life until he died at the age of eighty 
four, was well respected by his gentry peers, and soon after his death the 
Swedenborgian New Church was founded as a religion, and has since expanded to 
many countries around the world (Williams-Hogan, 2005a; 2005b). These factors 
suggest that his views are of a mystic rather than delusional nature. 
 
As a mystic, Swedenborg’s theory of mind did not emerge from a process of abstract 
conceptualisation, but from direct personal experience of transpersonal states, or 
realms, of consciousness. According to van Dusen (1974, p.115) his writings 
constituted a “theological psychology”. From his forays into realms of reality existing 
beyond the conscious apprehension of most people, he came to understand that 
thought derives from feeling, or, as he put it “the thought is nothing other than the form 
of the affection” (Swedenborg, 1892 [1764], p.124). Van Dusen (1974, p.101) 
understands this to mean that thoughts are the product and expression of underlying 
affective states – “The affective side of thought can be felt as a tone or as the 
339 
background of feeling from which thought arises. Thought gives feeling form and is part 
of its actualising”. By and large, this idea is congruent with many models of modern 
psychological thinking, however, his further views on this issue go beyond the bounds 
of Western epistemology; both secular and religious. 
 
While it is beyond the scope of this overview to describe the manifold dynamics and 
intricacies of Swedenborg’s theory of mind, in general terms, he saw humans and 
spirits as intrinsically, though unconsciously, interconnected in affect and thought. For 
instance, he asserts that “spirits are affections, and therefore in a human form similar to 
their affections” (Swedenborg, 1905 [1758], p.474) and elsewhere that “a man’s spirit is 
nothing else than affection…after death he becomes an affection, an angel of heaven if 
he is an affection for a good use, a spirit of hell if an affection for an evil use” 
(Swedenborg, 1942 [1763], p.18). Here he appears to be saying that spirits are affects 
and their existence is analogous to the affective states of human experience. Yet he 
goes further to seemingly suggest an intrinsic interrelationship between humans and 
spirits and affect-thoughts:  
 
With every man there are good spirits and evil spirits…When these spirits 
come to man, they enter into all his memory, and thus into his entire 
thought, evil spirits into the evil things of his memory and thought, and good 
spirits into the good things of his memory and thought (Swedenborg, 1905 
[1758], pp.229-230). 
 
Indeed, he holds that humans and spirits can unconsciously share a common affect-
thought experience, with each being unaware of the other, and believing the 
experience to be uniquely their own. As he explains, “these spirits have no knowledge 
whatever that they are with man; but when they are with him they believe that all things 
of his memory and thought are their own” (ibid, p.230). In other words, humans and 
spirits are intrinsically and unknowingly connected through the experience of affect-
thought. 
 
How, then, does psychotic experience fit into Swedenborg’s theory of mind? Although 
his writings predate the advent of psychiatry and the formulation of diagnostic 
categories such as ‘psychosis’ and ‘schizophrenia’, he did allude to issues of madness 
in places. For instance, he speaks of people who “labor under an infirmity of mind” 
when they grandiosely believe in and become fixated by “illusions” which are fabricated 
by spirits (Swedenborg, 2015a [1747 - 1765]), and also of psychotic-like spirit 
possession whereby a spirit will “enter into his body, and occupy all his senses, and 
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speak through his mouth, and act through his members” (Swedenborg, 1905 [1758], 
p.192). Interestingly, however, he predominantly construes insanity as the existential 
state in which a person, despite outward appearances, is principally driven by secular 
desires and selfish appetites, so that “each one is insane in accord with his own lusts” 
(ibid, p.460). He maintains that such a person is subject to “insanities and phantasies 
of various kinds” and although he (or she) may be “sane in outward appearance” and 
presents as “a rational man”, the ultimate truth is that when “stripped of his externals 
his insanities are revealed” (pp.534, 457). This mystic view of insanity subverts the 
usual meaning of the term. Rather than juxtaposing secular normality against 
psychopathology, it sets a measure by which many so-called normal people would 
qualify as insane. Indeed, this idea is common to many mystic traditions. Arguably, 
then, it proffers a challenge to the conventional psychiatric understanding of 
psychopathology, for here, sanity is not relative to apparent normality, but to the degree 
that psychospiritual maturity has been achieved. Thus, from this perspective, psychosis 




van Dusen’s phenomenological description of  
lower and higher order voices (spirits) 
 
The phenomenological descriptions below, of lower and higher order spirit voices, is 
excerpted verbatim from van Dusen’s journal article titled ‘Hallucinations as the world 
of spirits’ (1970, pp.62-63). It complements the typology of van Dusen’s higher order 
and lower order voices  in Chapter Twelve, Section 12.4.4.1 (see Table 11). In regards 
to his work with voice hearers, van Dusen  explains that “in my dialogues with patients I 
learned of two orders of experience, borrowing from the voices themselves, called the 
higher and the lower order” (ibid, p.62). This material exemplifies how psychospiritual 
research can open new investigative paths to identifying possible determinants in the 
experience of voice hearing and to better understanding the mysteries of both 
psychosis and being human. 
   
Lower Order Voices 
(Quoted verbatim from van Dusen (1970, pp.62-63) 
Lower order voices are as though one is dealing with drunken bums at a bar who like to 
tease and torment just for the fun of it. They will suggest lewd acts and then scold the 
patient for considering them. They find a weak point of conscience and work on it 
interminably. For instance one man heard voices teasing him for three years over a 
ten-cent debt he had already paid. They call the patient every conceivable name, 
suggest every lewd act, steal memories or ideas right out of consciousness, threaten 
death, and work on the patient's credibility in every way. For instance they will brag that 
they will produce some disaster on the morrow and then claim honor for one in the 
daily paper. They suggest foolish acts (such as: Raise your right hand in the air and 
stay that way) and tease if he does it and threaten him if he doesn't. The lower order 
can work for a long time to possess some part of the patient's body. Several worked on 
the ear and the patient seemed to grow deafer. One voice worked two years to capture 
a patient's eye which visibly went out of alignment. Many patients have heard loud and 
clear voices plotting their death for weeks on end, an apparently nerve-wracking 
experience. One patient saw a noose around his neck which tied to "I don't know what" 
while voices plotted his death by hanging. They threaten pain and can cause felt pain 
as a way of enforcing their power. The most devastating experience of all is to be 
shouted at constantly by dozens of voices. When this occurred—the patient had to be 
sedated. The vocabulary and range of ideas of the lower order is limited, but they have 
a persistent will to destroy. They invade every nook and cranny of privacy, work on 
every weakness and credibility, claim awesome powers, lie, make promises and then 
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undermine the patient's will. They never have a personal identity though they accept 
most names or identities given them. They either conceal or have no awareness of 
personal memories. Though they claim to be separate identities they will reveal no 
detail that might help to trace them as separate individuals. Their voice quality can 
change or shift, leaving the patient quite confused as to who might be speaking. When 
identified as some friend known to the patient they can assume this voice quality 
perfectly. For convenience many patients call them by nick-names, such as "Fred," The 
Doctor," or "The Old Timer." I've heard it said by the higher order that the purpose of 
the lower order is to illuminate all of the person's weaknesses. They do that admirably 
and with infinite patience. To make matters worse they hold out promises to patients 
and even give helpful sounding advice only to catch the patient in some weakness. 
Even with the patient's help I found the lower order difficult to relate to because of their 
disdain for me as well as the patient. 
 
The limited vocabulary and range of ideas of the lower order is striking. A few ideas 
can be repeated endlessly. One voice just said "hey" for months while the patient tried 
to figure out what "hey" or "hay" was meant. Even when I was supposedly speaking to 
an engineer that a woman heard, the engineer was unable to do any more arithmetic 
than simple sums and multiplication the woman had memorized. The lower order 
seems incapable of sequential reasoning. Though they often claim to be in some 
distant city they cannot report more than the patient sees, hears, or remembers. They 
seem imprisoned in the lowest level of the patient's mind, giving no real evidence of a 
personal world or any higher order thinking or experiencing. 
 
All of the lower order are irreligious or anti-religious. Some actively interfered with the 
patients' religious practices. Most considered them to be ordinary living people, though 
once they appeared as conventional devils and referred to themselves as demons. In a 
few instances they referred to themselves as from hell. Occasionally they would speak 
through the patient so that the patient's voice and speech would be directly those of the 
voices. Sometimes they acted through the patient. One of my female patients was 
found going out the hospital gate arguing loudly with her male voice that she didn't 
want to leave, but he was insisting. Like many, this particular hallucination claimed to 
be Jesus Christ, but his bragging and argumentativeness rather gave him away as of 
the lower order. Sometimes the lower order is embedded in physical concerns, such as 
a lady who was tormented by "experimenters" painfully treating her joints to prevent 
arthritis. She held out hope they were helping her, though it was apparent to any 
onlooker they had all but destroyed her life as a free and intelligent person. 
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Higher Order Voices 
(Quoted verbatim from van Dusen (1970, p.63) 
In direct contrast stands the rarer higher order hallucinations. In quantity they make up 
perhaps a fifth or less of the patients' experiences. The contrast may be illustrated by 
the experience of one man. He had heard the lower order arguing a long while how 
they would murder him. He also had a light come to him at night like the sun. He knew 
it was a different order because the light respected his freedom and would withdraw if it 
frightened him. In contrast, the lower order worked against his will and would attack if it 
could see fear in him. This rarer higher order seldom speaks, whereas the lower order 
can talk endlessly. The higher order is much more likely to be symbolic, religious, 
supportive, genuinely instructive, and communicate directly with the inner feelings of 
the patient. I've learned to help the patient approach the higher order because of its 
great power to broaden the individual's values. When the man was encouraged to 
approach his friendly sun he entered a world of powerful numinous experiences, in 
some ways more frightening than the murderers who plotted his death. In one scene he 
found himself at the bottom of a long corridor with doors at the end behind which raged 
the powers of hell. He was about to let out these powers when a very powerful and 
impressive Christlike figure appeared and by direct mind-to-mind communication 
counseled him to leave the doors closed and follow him into other experiences which 
were therapeutic to him. In another instance the higher order appeared to a man as a 
lovely woman who entertained him while showing him thousands of symbols. Though 
the patient was a high-school educated gas-pipe fitter, his female vision showed a 
knowledge of religion and myth far beyond the patient's comprehension. At the end of a 
very rich dialogue with her (the patient reporting her symbols and responses) the 
patient asked for just a clue as to what she and I were talking about. Another example 
is that of a Negro who gave up being useful and lived as a drunken thief. In his weeks 
of hallucinations the higher order carefully instructed him on the trials of all minority 
groups and left him with the feeling he would like to do something for minorities. 
 
In general the higher order is richer than the patient's normal experience, respectful of 
his freedom, helpful, instructive, supportive, highly symbolic and religious. It looks most 
like Carl Jung's archetypes, whereas the lower order looks like Freud's id. In contrast to 
the lower order, it thinks in something like universal ideas in ways that are richer and 
more complex than the patient's own mode of thought. It can be very powerful 
emotionally and carry with it an almost inexpressible ring of truth. The higher order 
tends to enlarge a patient's values, something like a very wise and considerate 
instructor. Some patients experience both the higher and lower orders at various times 
and feel caught between a private heaven and hell. Many only know the attacks of the 
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lower order. The higher order claims power over the lower order and indeed shows it at 
times, but not enough to give peace of mind to most patients. The higher order itself 
has indicated that the usefulness of the lower order is to illustrate and make conscious 
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